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ABSTRACT
Accounting represents a process of communication, with this communication 
primarily achieved via the financial reporting function. Users of financial reports, 
though, may harbour doubts and uncertainties with respect to the accounting 
processes by which financial reports are constructed and with respect to the resulting 
quality of the communicated information. Auditors therefore fulfil an assurance role. 
A key reason they can fulfil this role is their independence from the managements of 
the entities they audit.
This experimental study investigates the meaning of the concept of auditor 
independence utilising the measurement o f meaning (semantic differential) 
framework originally proposed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). The 
research provides insight into whether there is shared meaning of the concept of 
auditor independence between key parties to the financial reporting communication 
process and the extent to which those meanings are affected by various potential 
threats to, and safeguards of, auditor independence. The threats and safeguards 
examined represent contemporary auditor independence issues.
The experimental cases developed for the study allow examination of the impact on 
interpretations of auditor independence of alternative potential independence threats 
and safeguards. The potential auditor independence threats manipulated in the study 
were (a) non-audit services, (b) interlocking directorships among audit clients, 
(c) longer periods of audit firm tenure, and (d) a former audit firm partner being a 
director of the auditee company. The auditor independence safeguards manipulated 
were (a) additional external public oversight, (b) differing audit partner rotation
periods, and (c) the presence of a local (internal) independence board within the audit 
firm.
At a general level across all experimental cases, the three groups of research 
participants (auditors, financial report preparers and financial report users) were 
found to have a shared meaning of auditor independence. The major individual area 
in which there was a significant between-group difference in connotations 
(interpretations) of independence was that of the auditor provision of non-audit 
services.
Analysis of the experimental cases indicated that (a) significant differences in 
connotations of an auditor’s independence existed between the auditor participants 
and the other two participant groups in the presence of audit firm provided non-audit 
services, even though the services were specified to comprise only traditional taxation 
services, (b) preparers and users exhibited equal independence concerns for low and 
high levels of taxation services, (c) in the presence of a high level of taxation 
services, none of the three participant groups perceived benefits to auditor 
independence from additional audit firm oversight by a public oversight board, (d) all 
groups perceived an adverse impact on auditor independence when interlocking 
directorships were present, (e) a longer period of audit firm tenure was not interpreted 
to adversely affect auditor independence when audit partner rotation policies exist, 
and this was unaffected by whether audit partner rotation occurred every four years or 
every seven years, (f) all participant groups agreed on the adverse impact on 
independence of a former audit firm partner being a director of the auditee company, 
even though it was specified that the former partner had not previously been involved 
in the audit of the auditee, and (g) the auditor and user participants agreed on the 
beneficial impact of the existence of a local independence board within the audit firm.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii
ABSTRACT iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS vi
LIST OF APPENDICES xi
LIST OF FIGURES xii
LIST OF TABLES xiii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 The issue addressed in the thesis 2
1.2 Objectives of and motivations for the research 5
1.3 Contributions to knowledge 7
1.3.1 Theoretical implications 8
1.3.2 Policy implications 8
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 9
CHAPTER 2 THE AUDIT FUNCTION, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND THE MEANING OF THE INDEPENDENCE 
CONCEPT 12
2.1 The audit and assurance functions 12
2.1.1 Nature of the audit function 12
2.1.2 Assurance services 16
2.2 The regulatory and institutional framework for statutory company audits
in Australia 18
2.3 The concept of auditor independence 25
2.4 Auditor independence threats and safeguards 31
2.5 Recent auditor independence developments 33
2.5.1 Australian developments 34
2.5.2 Developments in the United States 42
2.6 Interpretations of the meaning of the independence concept 45
2.7 Summary 49
vii
CHAPTER 3 THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING:
A FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH 51
3.1 General research question 51
3.2 The measurement of meaning framework and semantic differential
analysis 52
3.2.1 Overview of the measurement of meaning framework 52
3.2.2 Factor analysis and the measurement of meaning 57
3.3 Prior accounting and auditing measurement of meaning studies 64
3.3.1 Foundation accounting and auditing studies 64
3.3.2 Further accounting and auditing studies 69
3.4 Investigative questions 73
3.5 Summary 74
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION 75
4.1 Pilot Study 76
4.1.1 Pilot study research instrument 85
4.1.2 Pilot study research participants 85
4.1.3 Pilot study results 86
4.1.4 Conclusions from the pilot study 96
4.2 Final research instrument 98
4.2.1 Semantic differential scales 98
4.2.2 Experimental case scenarios 98
4.2.3 Research instrument: Alternative versions and variations 103
4.2.4 Format of research instrument 108
4.3 Summary 109
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 111
5.1 Sample size considerations 112
5.2 Auditors 113
5.3 Financial report preparers 117
5.4 Financial report users 120
5.4.1 Bank analyst research participants 120
5.4.2 Private shareholder research participants 123
5.5 Research participant comparative descriptive statistics 127
5.6 Summary 132
Vlll
CHAPTER 6 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 133
6.1 Experimental cases 133
6.1.1 Independence threats 134
6.1.1.1 Auditor provision of non-audit services 134
6.1.1.2 Interlocking directorships among audit clients 152
6.1.1.3 Period of audit firm tenure 157
6.1.1.4 Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee 164
6.1.2 Independence safeguards 168
6.1.2.1 Audit subject to additional external oversight 168
6.1.2.2 Auditor rotation 176
6.1.2.3 Local independence board within the audit firm 183
6.1.3 Summary: Potential independence threats and safeguards 189
6.2 Hypotheses: Cognitive Structure 190
6.3 Hypotheses: Experimental cases and measured meaning 191
6.3.1 Between-group differences 192
6.3.2 Within-group differences 192
6.3.2.1 Non-audit services and additional external oversight 193
6.3.2.2 Interlocking directorships among audit clients 197
6.3.2.3 Longer period of audit firm tenure and audit partner
rotation 198
6.3.2.4 Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee and
local independence board 200
6.4 Summary 203
CHAPTER 7 INITIAL DATA ANALYSIS 206
7.1 Sample size across participant groups and experimental cases 206
7.2 Manipulation checks 208
7.3 Semantic differential scale descriptive statistics 214
7.4 Correlation matrices 216
7.4.1 Evaluative scales 216
7.4.2 Potency scales 219
7.4.3 Activity scales 222
7.5 MANOVA of semantic differential scale data 224
7.6 Perceptions of auditor independence 229
7.7 Summary 235
IX
CHAPTER 8 RESEARCH FINDINGS: COGNITIVE STRUCTURE 236
8.1 Factor analysis: Component analysis versus common factor analysis 237
8.2 Initial factor analysis results 240
8.3 Four factor model 243
8.4 Three factor model 248
8.5 Two factor model 252
8.6 Single factor model 255
8.7 Discussion of cognitive structure 257
8.8 Summary 261
CHAPTER 9 RESEARCH FINDINGS: BETWEEN-GROUP
COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL CASES 263
9.1 Between group comparisons of semantic scale data by case 264
9.2 Factor placements at the aggregated case level 268
9.3 Between-group comparisons at the aggregated case level 271
9.4 Factor placements at the individual case level 275
9.5 Between-group comparisons at the individual case level 278
9.6 Summary 283
CHAPTER 10 RESEARCH FINDINGS: WITHIN-GROUP
COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL CASES 284
10.1 Non-audit services and public oversight board 284
10.2 Interlocking directorships among audit clients 292
10.3 Longer period of audit firm tenure and audit partner rotation 296
10.4 Former partner as director of auditee and local independence board 299
10.5 Summary 304
CHAPTER 11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 306
11.1 Summary of the research 306
11.2 Summary of the research conclusions 308
11.2.1 Cognitive structure and shared meaning 310
11.2.2 Between-group comparisons of experimental cases and shared
meaning 310
11.2.3 Within-group comparisons of experimental cases 311
11.3 Limitations of the research 313
11.3.1 Statistical conclusion validity 313
11.3.2 Internal validity 316
11.3.3 Construct validity 317
11.3.4 External validity 320
X11.4 Implications of the research 324
11.4.1 Theoretical implications 325
11.4.2 Methodological implications 326
11.4.3 Policy implications 327
11.4.4 Future research implications 335
11.5 Chapter summary 339
APPENDICES 340
BIBLIOGRAPHY 387
XI
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Pilot study research instrument 340
Appendix 2 Final research instrument: 349
2.1 Cover sheet and instructions 350
2.2 Experimental cases 354
2.3 Response sheets 364
2.4 Manipulation checks 368
2.5 Biographical details 372
Appendix 3 Factor comparability analysis: Alternative four factor
models: 375
3.1 Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation 376
3.2 Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation 377
3.3 Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation 378
Appendix 4 Factor comparability analysis: Alternative three factor
models: 379
4.1 Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation 380
4.2 Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation 381
4.3 Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation 382
Appendix 5 Factor comparability analysis: Alternative two factor
models: 383
5.1 Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation 384
5.2 Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation 385
5.3 Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation 386
Xll
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1 Overview diagram of experimental cases 100
X ll l
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 Semantic scales developed and used in prior accounting and
auditing studies 79
Table 4.2 Experimental case scenario information — Pilot study research
instrument 81
Table 4.3 Pilot study descriptive statistics 87
Table 4.4 Pilot study eigenvalues, scree plot and factor comparability
analysis 89
Table 4.5 Pilot study two factor cognitive structure 91
Table 4.6 Pilot study case placements within two factor cognitive structure 94
Table 4.7 Experimental case scenario information — Final research
instrument 101
Table 4.8 Alternate versions of the research instrument 106
Table 5.1 Auditor research participants 116
Table 5.2 Preparer research participants 119
Table 5.3 Bank analyst research participants 122
Table 5.4 Shareholder research participants 126
Table 5.5 Research participant comparative descriptive statistics 129
Table 5.6 Research instrument versions administered 131
Table 6.1 Research hypotheses 204
Table 7.1 Summary of research sample size by experimental case
and participant group 207
Table 7.2 Summary of manipulation checks 209
Table 7.3 Analysis of manipulation checks 213
Table 7.4 Semantic differential scale descriptive statistics 215
Table 7.5 Correlation matrix — Evaluative scales 218
Table 7.6 Correlation matrix — Potency scales 221
Table 7.7 Correlation matrix — Activity scales 223
Table 7.8 MANOVA results for semantic differential scale data 226
Table 7.9 MANOVA results by research participant group 228
Table 7.10 Univariate ANOVA of seven point scale perception responses 231
Table 7.11 Univariate ANOVA of seven point scale perception responses
by group 232
Table 7.12 Logistic regression of dichotomous scale perception responses 234
Table 8.1 Eigenvalues and scree plot 242
Table 8.2 Rotated factor matrix — Four factor model 244
Table 8.3 Factor comparability analysis — Four factor model 246
Table 8.4 Rotated factor matrix — Three factor model 249
XIV
Table 8.5 Factor comparability analysis — Three factor model 251
Table 8.6 Two factor model 254
Table 8.7 Single factor model 256
Table 9.1 MANOVA of semantic scales — Between-group differences in
individual cases 265
Table 9.2 Factor placements — Aggregated cases 269
Table 9.3 One-way ANOVA of factor placements — Aggregated cases 272
Table 9.4 Factor placements — Individual cases 276
Table 9.5 One-way ANOVA of factor placements — Individual cases 279
Table 10.1 Case placements — High non-audit (taxation) services 287
Table 10.2 Case placements — Low and high non-audit (taxation) services 290
Table 10.3 Case placements — Interlocking directorships 295
Table 10.4 Case placements — Longer period of audit tenure and audit
partner rotation 298
Tablel 0.5 Case placements — Former partner as director of audit client
and internal independence board 302
Table 11.1 Research hypotheses — Summary of research findings 309
1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Accounting represents a process of communication. In the context of communication 
by reporting entities in capital markets, this communication is primarily achieved via 
the financial reporting function (see, for example, Bedford and Baladouni, 1962; 
Goldberg, 1965; McClure, 1983; Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 1990; 
Houghton, 1997). However, users of financial reports may harbour doubts and 
uncertainties with respect to the accounting processes by which financial reports are 
constructed and with respect to the resulting quality of the communicated information 
(Lee, 1993). The demand for auditing is therefore derived from a demand to monitor 
and arbitrate on the application of accounting methods, to control the behaviour of 
managers in this respect and to verify the financial report (see, for example, Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Antle, 1982; Ball, 1989; Anderson, Francis and Stokes, 1993).
The aim of the audit function is to establish that communicated financial reports have 
a high degree of credibility and to create rational belief and confidence in those 
reports (Lee, 1993). An audit aims to provide assurance to the various stakeholders 
that the financial report information meets specified quality standards (Wolnizer, 
1987; Lee, 1993). A major reason auditors can fulfil this assurance role is their 
independence from the managements who are responsible for the contents of financial 
reports (see, for example, De Angelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1981, 1983;
Lee, 1993; Arrunada, 1999a).
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This experimental study investigates the meaning of the concept of auditor 
independence using the measurement o f meaning (semantic differential) framework 
originally proposed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). The aim of the 
research is to provide insight into whether there is shared meaning of the concept of 
auditor independence between key parties to the financial reporting (accounting) 
communication process and the extent to which those meanings are affected by 
various potential threats to, and safeguards of, auditor independence. The key parties 
to the financial reporting communication process are central capital market 
participants with respect to the financial reporting function.
The research provides further theoretical and empirical insight into the concept of 
independence. It will also provide guidance for regulators, professional accounting 
bodies, educators and, especially, auditing standard setters. Although a large volume 
of auditor independence research exists, the issues examined in the study have not 
previously been investigated from the perspective of the measured meaning of the 
auditor independence concept. The Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning 
framework allows investigation of the connotative meaning of the independence 
concept, this comprising the emotional associations, evaluations and judgments of the 
concept (Osgood et al., 1957; Flamholtz and Cook, 1978; Bruno, 1980; Bagranoff, 
1990).
1.1 THE ISSUE ADDRESSED IN THE THESIS
The audit function aims to provide assurance that communicated financial reports 
meet specified quality standards in order to satisfy the information needs of capital 
market participants. Audit quality is dependent on a whole range of factors related to 
the auditor acting with professional competence and due care. Definitions of audit
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quality emphasise an auditor’s competence and independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). Auditor independence is fundamental to the audit 
function and a major factor impacting on audit quality. Independence has historically 
been seen to be one of the foremost standards with which auditors should comply,1 
and this continues to be the case. In fact, it is fair to say that auditor independence has 
become of increased importance over the past five or six years following the spate of 
corporate collapses earlier this decade involving, for example, Enron and WorldCom 
in the United States and HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia.
The primary objective of an audit is for the auditor to ‘provide independent assurance 
to the shareholders that the directors have prepared the financial statements properly’ 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2004a, para. 3, emphasis added). Independence is a major 
factor influencing an auditor’s reputation (see, for example, Benston, 1975; Firth, 
1990; Wilson and Grimlund, 1990), and Johnstone, Sutton and Warfield (2001, p. 2) 
state that independence ‘is the most fundamental and vital asset possessed by the 
auditing profession.’
Professional accounting bodies and regulators have generally operationalised the 
independence concept by requiring auditors to be independent in fact and in 
appearance (see, for example, International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
2002b; International Federation of Accountants, 2005; Accounting Professional and 
Ethical Standards Board, 2006a; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
2006). The independence pronouncements and standards issued by the various 
professional accounting organisations and regulatory bodies represent their attempts
See, for example, Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Higgins (1962), Carey and Doherty (1966),
Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts (1973), Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and
Management (1977), Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992), Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (1999) and the European Commission (2000).
Chapter 1 4
to provide a definition of auditor independence and to provide guidance for auditors 
when considering their independence in practice. The various statements therefore 
elaborate on the meaning of the concept of auditor independence, particularly by 
providing definitions and explanations of independence and by providing rules 
regarding various threats to auditor independence and safeguards that can be 
implemented to mitigate threats to reduce them to an acceptable level.
For the concept of auditor independence to be effectively implemented in practice, it 
is necessary for a shared understanding of the meaning of the concept to exist. 
However, it may be difficult for auditors to effectively consider and evaluate their 
independence, particularly in marginal situations, if the meaning of independence in 
the context of an audit is subject to ambiguity and uncertainty and if their 
interpretation of the meaning of the concept differs from that of other key parties and 
stakeholders. Many current professional pronouncements and other documents 
specify a general test for auditor independence based on what a reasonable and 
informed investor or other third party, having knowledge of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would conclude to be acceptable (see, for example, Auditing Practices 
Board, 2004a; International Federation of Accountants, 2005; Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards Board, 2006b; American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 2006). These statements require the auditor to identify and 
evaluate circumstances and relationships that create threats to independence and to 
take action by applying appropriate safeguards. However, what auditors and other 
reasonable and informed parties would conclude to be acceptable is largely dependent 
on their interpretation of the meaning of the concept of auditor independence, 
particularly in response to the various circumstances and conditions (threats and 
safeguards) that could impact on an auditor’s actual and/or perceived independence.
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The issue addressed in the study therefore focuses on whether there is shared meaning 
of the concept of auditor independence between different key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF AND MOTIVATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH
The research is designed to provide further investigation into the concept of auditor 
independence using an innovative research method not previously applied in the 
extant literature. The objective of the study is to determine the presence and extent of 
shared meaning of this important concept between different parties to the financial 
reporting communication process. The parties to the financial reporting 
communication process used as research participants are auditors, financial report 
preparers and financial report users.
Vigorous debate on auditor independence arose following the series of corporate 
collapses earlier this decade involving companies such as Enron and WorldCom in 
the United States and HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia. A number of formal 
inquiries and reviews were commissioned and reports prepared in Australia and 
internationally. These resulted in considerable substantive amendment to the 
legislative and professional rules and guidelines with the aim of strengthening the 
independence of auditors. As noted in the previous section, the pronouncements and 
standards issued by the relevant professional and regulatory bodies, in defining 
auditor independence and providing guidance for auditors, elaborate on the meaning 
of the concept of auditor independence. The research is therefore motivated by the 
various recent developments relating to the concept of auditor independence that may 
have impacted on the way in which the meaning of the concept of auditor
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independence is interpreted by different parties to the financial reporting 
communication process.
It was noted in Section 1.1 that it is necessary for a common understanding of the 
meaning of the concept of auditor independence to exist if it is to be effectively 
implemented in practice. The study’s general research question is therefore stated as:
Is there shared meaning o f the auditor independence concept between key
parties to the financial reporting communication process?
The research framework for the measurement of meaning originally developed by 
Osgood et al. (1957), and used in a number of prior studies examining accounting and 
auditing concepts, is used to investigate the study’s general research question. In 
investigating the general research question, the measurement of meaning framework 
is used to investigate a number of contemporary auditor independence issues that 
have been questioned in relation to the companies involved in the recent corporate 
collapses and in the prior literature. These issues relate to (a) auditor independence 
threats highlighted in the literature, (b) independence safeguards introduced to 
mitigate independence threats, and (c) proposals for additional independence 
safeguards.
The specific potential independence threats examined in the study encompass (a) the 
auditor provision of non-audit services, (b) interlocking directorships among audit 
clients, (c) longer periods of audit firm tenure, and (d) a former partner of the audit 
firm being a director of the audit client. The independence safeguards involve 
(a) additional auditor oversight by (i) an external body and (ii) a local (internal)
2 Interlocking directorships arise when company boards of directors include directors who also 
serve on the boards of other companies, creating networks of inter-company ties (Mizruchi, 
1996; Jubb, 2000; Houghton and Jubb, 2003a).
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independence board, and (b) audit partner rotation. The study is therefore motivated 
by the ability of the Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning framework to 
provide valuable research into these contemporary issues, particularly from the 
perspective of the way in which the threat and safeguard circumstances and 
conditions affect interpretations of auditor independence.
Research into interpretations of the meaning of the auditor independence concept can 
also be motivated by reference to the audit expectation(s) gap literature. The audit 
expectations gap has been defined as a ‘divergence in expectations between auditors 
and the users of the audit function in respect of the objectives of the independent 
audit’ (Godsell, 1993, p. 1) and as ‘a representation of the feeling that auditors are 
performing in a manner at variance with the beliefs and desires of those for whose 
benefit the audit is being carried out’ (Humphrey 1997, p. 9). Auditor independence 
has been argued to represent a central issue contributing to the expectations gap (see, 
for example, Hooks, 1991; Godsell, 1993; Humphrey, Moizer and Turley, 1993; 
Humphrey, 1997; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2002b). With 
respect to auditor independence, the expectations gap suggests differences between 
auditors and financial report users in interpretations of the meaning of the 
independence concept in individual contexts.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE
The findings of the research have theoretical and policy implications that will 
contribute to knowledge. These applications are outlined in the following sub­
sections.
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1.3.1 Theoretical implications
The findings from the research will have theoretical implications. The study makes a 
methodological contribution by utilising the measurement of meaning research 
framework to examine a concept to which it has not previously been applied. The 
framework has been used extensively in many disciplines and its reliability, validity 
and effectiveness have been extensively tested (Heise, 1969; Kerlinger, 1973; 
Fishbein and Azjen, 1975). However, only a relatively small number of prior studies 
have applied the method to accounting and auditing concepts. The present study will 
therefore add to theory by showing how the method can be applied to examine further 
concepts within the auditing discipline.
In being the first study to apply the Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning 
research framework to examine the concept of auditor independence, a conclusion 
can be drawn on whether the method represents a valid and useful tool for the 
purpose of examining interpretations of independence in specific contexts and across 
alternate parties to the financial reporting communication process. The study builds 
on earlier research that has examined perceptions of auditor independence in different 
contexts, in this case by focusing on contexts encompassing alternative potential 
independence threats and safeguards. In particular, the study makes a theoretical 
contribution by focusing on the three major groups of parties to the financial 
reporting communication process (auditors, financial report preparers and financial 
report users) in a single study.
1.3.2 Policy implications
The findings from the research also have policy implications for policy-makers. As 
noted above, the research will show whether the measurement of meaning research
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framework represents a valid and useful tool for the purpose of examining 
interpretations of independence in specific contexts and across alternate parties to the 
financial reporting communication process. This will be useful for policy-makers in 
determining whether the method can provide a means to enable an improved 
understanding of the effects of potential independence threat and safeguard 
circumstances on interpretations of independence.
As noted in Section 1.2, the study investigates a number of contemporary auditor 
independence issues that have been questioned in relation to the companies involved 
in recent corporate collapses and in the prior literature. The research will therefore 
have practical application for policy-makers by providing further information on 
those specific independence issues.
In showing that the measurement of meaning framework can effectively be applied to 
examine the concept of auditor independence, the study signifies that the method can 
be utilised by policy-makers to prospectively evaluate the impact on interpretations of 
independence of any proposed changes to auditor independence rules. This indicates 
that, in developing new or revised rules, the method can be used by professional 
bodies, regulatory bodies and researchers to assess the reaction of various interested 
parties to any revisions prior to their finalisation. The method can also be used to 
assess reactions to variations of any proposed measures.
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
Following the introduction to the research in this chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review 
of relevant auditing and other literature concerning the nature of the audit assurance 
function and the concept of auditor independence.
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Chapter 3 introduces the research framework for the measurement o f meaning 
originally developed by Osgood et al. (1957). The chapter also provides an overview 
of the prior accounting and auditing studies that have utilised the measurement of 
meaning framework.
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the study’s research method. Procedures for the 
construction of the study’s research instrument are explained in Chapter 4. 
Development and administration of a pilot study used to guide development of the 
study’s final research instrument is described, together with the pilot study results and 
conclusions drawn. The final research instrument is also explained.
The study’s research participants, comprising auditors, financial report preparers and 
financial report users, are described in Chapter 5. These participants represent the 
major alternate groups of identifiable parties to the financial reporting communication 
process. Procedures for administration of the research instrument with the participants 
are also presented in the chapter.
The study’s research hypotheses are developed in Chapter 6. The prior literature, on 
which the experimental case manipulations specified in the study’s research 
instrument are based, is first presented. This literature provides the basis and 
justification for the auditor independence threat and safeguard manipulations in the 
experimental cases. This discussion is followed by development and statement of the 
research hypotheses.
The results from a number of initial data analysis procedures are presented in Chapter 
7. These procedures provide an initial understanding of the research data and ensure 
the data is appropriate for subsequent statistical analysis.
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The study’s data analysis results are presented and interpreted in accordance with the 
study’s research hypotheses in Chapters 8 to 10. Chapter 8 presents findings related 
to the cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor independence is 
considered by research participants. Findings from an examination of the measured 
meaning of auditor independence across the alternative experimental cases and 
research participant groups are presented in Chapters 9 and 10. Findings from 
between-group comparisons of the experimental cases are examined in Chapter 9, 
while Chapter 10 examines differences within each of the participant groups between 
related sets of experimental cases.
In concluding the thesis, Chapter 11 summarises the research findings and discusses 
research limitations. It also discusses the theoretical, methodological and policy 
implications of the research and concludes with some suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE AUDIT FUNCTION, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND THE MEANING OF THE INDEPENDENCE
CONCEPT
This chapter provides an overview of the nature of the audit function and the concept 
of auditor independence. The chapter commences with a description of the audit 
function and the demand for auditing in Section 2.1, followed by an overview of the 
Australian institutional framework for statutory corporate audits in Section 2.2. The 
concept of auditor independence is introduced in Section 2.3. The conceptual 
framework approach to independence, requiring auditors to identify and evaluate 
independence threats and safeguards, is explained in Section 2.4. A summary of 
major recent developments impacting on auditor independence, concentrating on 
Australian developments, is presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 discusses issues 
relating to interpretations of the meaning of the concept of auditor independence, and 
a summary in Section 2.7 completes the chapter.
2.1 THE AUDIT AND ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS
2.1.1 Nature of the audit function
Accounting represents a process of communication (Bedford and Baladouni, 1962; 
Goldberg, 1965; McClure, 1983; Houghton, 1997; amongst many others), with 
communication primarily achieved through the financial reporting function 
(Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 1990). However, doubt and uncertainty
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is associated with the accounting communication (financial reporting) process. Doubt 
and uncertainty can arise with respect to the accounting content of financial reports 
and the various accounting processes by which such reports are constructed (Lee, 
1993). Of particular concern is the question of whether these processes provide the 
designated recipients with financial information meeting specified quality standards 
(Wolnizer, 1987; Lee, 1993). The audit function aims to provide this assurance.
An audit aims to establish the credibility of communicated financial reports and 
create rational belief and confidence in those reports (Lee, 1993). The primary 
objective of a financial statement audit is to ‘provide independent assurance to the 
shareholders that the directors have prepared the financial statements properly’ 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2004a, para. 3, emphasis added). Management typically 
has incentives to present the entity’s financial performance and financial position in 
the best possible light, and may be motivated to present financial information that is 
overly optimistic, misleading or false (Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein, 1997). 
The auditor obtains and evaluates audit evidence to obtain reasonable assurance as to 
whether the financial report gives a true and fair view or is presented fairly, in all 
material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework 
(Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2006b; International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board, 2006a).1 Sufficient and appropriate audit evidence must 
be obtained to enable the auditor to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base the 
audit opinion (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2004; Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board, 2006c).
In an audit pursuant to the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), sections 307 and 308 require 
the auditor to form and report an opinion on whether the company’s financial report is in 
accordance with the Act and accounting standards, and on whether the financial report conveys a 
true and fair  view.
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The audit of a financial report can be viewed as an agency function and cost in 
situations where an agent, such as the board of directors of a company, is entrusted by 
a principal, such as the company’s shareholders, to manage its resources and 
operations and to report thereon (Wallace, 1980, 1987). Monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms have the potential to control the behaviour of managers, and auditing is 
one of these mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).2 Auditing services are 
demanded as monitoring devices due to the potential conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers and between different classes of security holders (Watts, 1977; 
DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1981, 1986).
The auditor acts as an arbiter to determine the consistency of the agent’s financial 
statements with specified accounting procedures (Ball, 1989). By being independent 
of those seeking capital, auditors add value in public capital markets by addressing 
inherent conflicts of interest and by protecting the interests of capital providers 
(Johnstone, Sutton and Warfield, 2001). By enhancing the credibility of financial 
reports, the audit function enhances the effectiveness of capital markets in allocating 
scarce resources by improving the decisions of financial report users, and also assists 
in lowering the cost of capital to auditee entities by reducing information risk (see, for 
example, Schuetze, 1994; Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; Independence 
Standards Board, 2001; Ramsay, 2001).
The demand for auditing can also be viewed from an information perspective, with 
the audit function aiming to increase the quality of reported financial information 
(Wallace, 1980, 1987). Public confidence in the operation of capital markets depends,
2 Other monitoring and bonding mechanisms include formal control systems, budget restrictions 
and incentive compensation systems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986).
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in part, on the credibility of the opinions and reports issued by auditors (Auditing 
Practices Board, 2004a). Investors demand audited financial reports as such reports 
provide information that is useful to their investment decisions. An audit is also 
valued as a means of improving the financial data utilised by managers for internal 
decisions.3 The information perspective predicts a demand for audited financial 
information ‘as a means of reducing the risk of investments, improving internal and 
external decision making, enhancing gains from trade, and improving the portfolio 
investment position of individuals’ (Wallace, 1980, p. 20).
A further demand for auditing is suggested by the insurance hypothesis. The audit 
market literature suggests that a valued attribute of an audit is that of implicit 
insurance.4 The insurance stems from the investor’s potential right to recover from 
auditors any losses sustained by relying on audited financial statements that contain 
misrepresentations (Dye, 1993; Menon and Williams, 1994; Stokes, 2002). If an 
investor purchases shares or other securities on the basis of audited financial 
statements and subsequently sustains losses, and if some form of audit failure can be 
demonstrated, the legal system may provide recourse against the auditor. The auditor 
thus ‘effectively functions as a potential (partial) indemnifier against investment 
losses’ (Menon and Williams, 1994, p. 328). Unfortunately for auditors, it has been
For example, an audit can improve data for internal decision making by finding errors or by 
making employees more careful in preparing records subject to audit. Also, more accurate data 
for capital budgeting, inventory planning and production and pricing decisions can improve 
internal decision making (Wallace, 1980).
See, for example, Wallace, 1980; Kellogg, 1984; Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Chow, Kramer 
and Wallace, 1988; Turpen, 1992; Rittenberg and Schwieger, 2001.
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argued that they have become ‘the first tranche of insurance cover for investors and 
creditors against losses incurred in a corporate failure’ (Bartholomeusz, 2002).5
In summary, the audit function aims to provide assurance to dispel or considerably 
reduce doubts and uncertainties that may arise with respect to the accounting 
processes by which accounting reports are constructed. The quality of the work of an 
external auditor is said to significantly influence the public’s perception of the 
credibility of financial reports (International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
2002b). Indeed, it has been argued that a quality difference in audits converts to a 
price differential in shares traded on stock markets (Houghton, 2002a; Houghton and 
Jubb, 2003b, 2003c).
2.1.2 Assurance services
Recent developments have seen continuing change in the environment in which the 
auditing profession operates. Largely due to the changing needs of users, the auditor’s 
role is expanding beyond the traditional financial reporting function to a broader 
range of assurance services and subject matters (Pound, 1997). It has been highlighted 
that there is now ‘a much broader range of functions or activities for which 
independent and expert opinions are being required’ (Gay and Simnett, 2000, p. 2). 
Accordingly, in addition to the traditional financial report attestation audit, auditors 
are increasingly providing broader assurance services. An assurance services 
engagement has been defined as ‘an engagement where an independent professional
issues a written report that expresses a conclusion about the reliability of a subject
%
matter for which an accountable party is responsible’ (Schelluch and Gay, 1997, p. 1).
The phrase deep pocket syndrome has been coined to refer to the fact that auditors may find 
themselves subject to lawsuit due to their professional indemnity insurance coverage (see, for 
example, Kothari, Lys, Smith and Watts, 1988; Palmrose, 1988, 1997; Schipper, 1991; Godsell, 
1993; Menon and Williams, 1994; McLean, 2002).
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The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) released a report of 
its Special Committee on Assurance Services, the Elliott Report, in 1997 (Special 
Committee on Assurance Services, 1997). The report suggested that assurance 
services represent the greatest opportunity for growth for the auditing profession and 
that such services are expected to form a platform for the future evolution of the 
profession. Assurance services are defined in the Elliott Report as ‘independent 
professional services that improve the quality of information, or its context, for 
decision makers’ (Special Committee on Assurance Services, 1997). The report states 
that this definition encompasses audit and attestation engagements and also 
accommodates many new service concepts.6
Information improvement is a core benefit of the audit-attest tradition, and this 
provides a foundation for further value-added assurance services (Elliott and Pallais, 
1997). The strengths and competencies of the audit profession, in terms of audit 
methodology, standards, and techniques for evidence gathering and evaluation, have 
value and applicability as a process beyond financial information and extend to 
broader categories of information and assurance services (Pound, 1997). It has been 
argued that members of the auditing profession have a competitive advantage over 
other potential assurance providers because of their ‘professional standing, reputation 
for independence and quality of services provided’ (Schelluch and Gay, 1997, p. 2, 
emphasis added). The Elliott Report stressed that assurance services evolved naturally 
from attestation and audit services, and that the ‘roots of all three are in independent
The Elliott Report identifies a number of new assurance services having significant market 
potential, including those in the areas of risk assessment, entity performance (including entity 
performance measures and the reliability of information systems), systems reliability, electronic 
commerce, health care and aged care (Special Committee on Assurance Services, 1997). Other 
areas in which assurance reports are increasingly being demanded include those of 
environmental, social and sustainability issues, information systems, internal control, corporate 
governance processes, and compliance with grant conditions (International Federation of 
Accountants, 2004).
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verification’ (Special Committee on Assurance Services, 1997, emphasis added). 
Similarly, it has been argued that ‘it is the independence and expertise of the 
practitioner that are sought after’ (Gay and Simnett, 2005, p. 9, emphasis added).
2.2 THE REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
STATUTORY COMPANY AUDITS IN AUSTRALIA
To provide a further background to the audit function, a brief overview of the 
regulatory and institutional framework governing statutory company audits in 
Australia is provided in this section. The major elements of the Australian regulatory 
and institutional framework are (a) the Australian Corporations Act 2001, (b) the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), (c) the Companies 
Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB), (d) the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), (e) the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), and 
(f) quality control processes stemming from professional self regulation and 
individual firm regulation.
The provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 represent the starting point for any 
discussion of the regulatory framework for Australian company audits. Specified 
entities must prepare annual financial reports (s. 292),7 and these financial reports 
must be audited (s. 301). ASIC has responsibility for the registration of auditors under 
the Act (ss. 1279-1280).
The auditor is required to form an opinion (s. 307) and report that opinion to 
members (s. 308). The major requirement is for the auditor to form and report an
7 These entities are disclosing entities, public companies, large proprietary companies and 
registered schemes (s. 292(1)). The discussion in this section will concentrate on audits of 
annual financial reports.
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opinion about whether the entity’s financial report is in accordance with the 
Corporations Act, including in accordance with accounting standards and the 
provision of a true and fair view (ss. 307(a) and 308(1)).8 The audit must be 
conducted in accordance with auditing standards (s. 307A(1)), with the AUASB 
empowered to make these standards (s. 336(1)).
The auditor is required to give the audited entity’s directors an independence 
declaration (s. 307(C)). This declaration of independence requires the auditor to state 
that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, there has been no contravention of the 
Act’s auditor independence requirements or of any applicable code of professional 
conduct (s. 307(C)(1)(c)).
ASIC is the statutory body constituted to administer the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth),9 and is the body responsible for 
administration of the Corporations Act 2001 and related regulations. A number of 
bodies have been created pursuant to these two Acts which impact on the regulation 
of auditors. The most important of these bodies are the CALDB, the FRC and the 
AUASB.
The auditor must also form an opinion on whether they have been given all information, 
explanation and assistance necessary for the conduct of the audit (s. 307(b)), whether the entity 
has kept financial records sufficient to enable a financial report to be prepared and audited 
(s. 307(c)), and whether the entity has kept other records and registers required by the Act 
(s. 307(d)). The Corporations Act also requires the auditor to report certain circumstances to 
ASIC (s. 311). These relate to circumstances (a) that the auditor has reasonable grounds to 
suspect represent a contravention of the Act, (b) that represent an attempt by any person to 
unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead a person involved in the conduct of an audit, or 
(c) that represent an attempt by any person to otherwise interfere with the proper conduct of the 
audit (ss. 311(1 )(a), 311 (2)(a) and 311 (3)(b)).
ASIC evolved from the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), which was originally 
established pursuant to the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) and which replaced 
the earlier National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) (Tomasic, Jackson and 
Woellner, 2002; Boros and Duns, 2007; Deegan, 2007). The Commission itself is a body 
corporate comprising three to eight members appointed by the Governor-General on the 
nomination of the relevant minister (ss. 8-9).
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The CALDB is an independent statutory body administered under Part 11 of the ASIC 
Act. It was originally established in 1990, and members are appointed by the 
Treasurer (CALDB, 2007b). The CALDB has the functions and powers conferred on 
it by the Corporations Act (ss. 1292-1298) and the ASIC Act (ss. 203-223). As the 
board’s name implies, it can take disciplinary action against registered auditors. In 
particular, the board is required to determine whether a registered auditor has 
contravened provisions of the Corporations Act in any of the following ways: (a) has 
failed to carry out their duties and functions adequately and properly, (b) is not a fit 
and proper person to remain registered, (c) is subject to disqualification, or (d) is 
otherwise ineligible to remain registered (CALDB, 2006, 2007a). Applications to the 
CALDB for disciplinary action can be made only by ASIC or the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).10 Penalties for any contravention include 
the cancellation or suspension of registration, an admonition or reprimand, or a 
requirement for an undertaking by the auditor (CALDB, 2007a).
The FRC, a statutory body, was originally established on 1 January 2000 under s. 225 
of the ASIC Act for the purpose of overseeing Australia’s accounting standard setting 
process (FRC, 2007a). In addition to its original accounting standard setting oversight 
function, the FRC also provides broad oversight of the processes for the setting of 
Australian auditing standards (s. 225(1 )(b)). This particularly involves overseeing the 
auditing standard setting body, the AUASB, appointing its members (other than the 
chair), determining its broad strategic direction, and giving it direction, advice or 
feedback on matters of general policy and procedures (s. 225(2A)). As will be 
discussed later in Section 2.5.1, the FRC’s responsibilities were expanded from 1 July
10 APRA is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry, and oversees 
banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life 
insurance, friendly societies and certain members of the superannuation industry (APRA, 2007).
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2004 to also include oversight of auditor independence requirements in Australia 
(s. 225(2B)).n The FRC has formed an Audit Independence Committee comprising 
three FRC members, none of whom can be a serving partner or an employee of an 
accounting firm, to assist it in the performance of the auditor independence functions 
conferred by the ASIC Act (FRC, 2007b). Also, ASIC conducts inspections of 
Australian audit firms on behalf of the FRC (Department of the Treasury, 2005; Jubb 
and Floughton, 2007). Two public reports to the FRC on the audit inspection program 
have been prepared to date (ASIC, 2005, 2006).
As noted above, audits under the Corporations Act must be conducted in accordance 
with auditing standards prepared by the AUASB (ss. 307A(1), 336(1)). The AUASB 
was reconstituted as an independent statutory body (body corporate), under the 
guidance of the FRC, on 1 July 2004 pursuant to the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). The AUASB’s standards, designated ASAs, are 
legislative instruments under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and, as such, have 
the force of law (effective from 1 July 2006) for audits performed under the 
Corporations Act (AUASB, 2006a; Arens, Best, Shailer, Fiedler, Elder and Beasley, 
2007).
The AUASB’s specified powers under the ASIC Act (s. 227B(1)) are to (a) make 
auditing standards under s. 336 of the Corporations Act for the purposes of the 
corporations legislation, (b) formulate auditing and assurance standards for other 
purposes, (c) formulate guidance on auditing and assurance matters, (d) participate in 
and contribute to the development of a single set of auditing standards for world-wide
Further details on ASIC and FRC auditor oversight and inspection functions will also be 
discussed in Chapter 6 when developing the study’s research hypotheses.
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use, and (e) advance and promote the main objects of the Australian financial 
reporting system.
The ASIC Act permits the AUASB to formulate auditing standards by adopting 
international standards (s. 227(B)(3)). It also allows the international standards to be 
modified to the extent necessary to take account of the Australian legal or 
institutional environment (s. 227(B)(4)). Accordingly, wherever possible the AUASB 
uses International Standards on Auditing (ISAs)12 as the basis from which to develop 
Australian standards (AUASB, 2006a). The Australian standards do generally 
conform to the international standards, and any differences between an Australian 
standard and its international equivalent are described in each standard (Arens et al., 
2007).
Earlier discussion highlighted that auditors must comply with any applicable code of 
professional conduct (Corporations Act, s. 307(C)(1)(c)). The applicable Australian 
code is APES 110: Code o f Ethics for Professional Accountants (APESB, 2006a), 
issued by the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB).13 The 
APESB was established as an independent board to set the code of professional 
conduct and professional standards with which members of The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia (ICAA) and CPA Australia, and later members of the 
National Institute of Accountants (NIA), must comply (Accounting and Professional 
Ethical Standards Board, 2007; Portelli, 2007). The primary objectives of the APESB 
are to (a) develop and issue, in the public interest, professional and ethical standards 
that will apply to the membership of the professional bodies, and (b) provide a formal
ISAs are issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the
International Federation of Accountants (IF AC).
As will be discussed in Section 2.5.1, this code replaced the earlier Professional Statement F .l
(The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia, 2004).
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and rigorous forum for the consideration, promulgation and approval of professional 
and ethical standards, with this performed in an open, timely, independent and 
proactive manner (APESB, 2007). Further detail on APES 110 is provided in Section 
2.3.
Quality control processes stemming from professional self regulation and individual 
firm regulation represent the final major component of the regulatory and institutional 
framework for statutory company audits. The APESB, in a pronouncement aimed at 
reinforcing the requirements specified in APES 110, issued APES 320 Quality 
Control for Firms in May 2006 (APESB, 2006b). APES 320 requires individual audit 
firms to establish a system of quality control designed to provide it with reasonable 
assurance that the firm and its personnel comply with professional standards and 
regulatory and legal requirements and that reports issued by the firm or its 
engagement partners are appropriate in the circumstances (APESB, 2006b, s. 3). 
Pursuant to APES 320, quality control systems must include policies and procedures 
addressing six major elements: (a) leadership responsibilities for quality within the 
firm, (b) ethical requirements, (c) acceptance and continuance of client relationships 
and specific engagements, (d) human resources, (e) engagement performance, and 
(f) monitoring (APESB, 2006b, s. 7). APES 320 contains specific provisions to 
ensure independence requirements are complied with (APESB, 2006b, ss. 18-27).
Another APESB statement, APES 410 Conformity with Auditing and Assurance 
Standards, reinforces the Corporations Act provisions requiring auditors to comply 
with the Australian auditing standards (APESB, 2006c).
A further recent development designed to enhance quality control within audit firms 
has been the formation of the Australian Quality Review Board (AQRB). The AQRB
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was established in December 2005 and publicly launched on 17 February 2006 
(AQRB, 2006e). The AQRB is an independent, not-for-profit company established 
within the audit profession whose purpose is to monitor the processes by which 
participating audit firms seek to ensure their compliance with applicable professional 
standards and legal obligations regarding independence and audit quality (AQRB, 
2006a, 2006c, 2006d). The AQRB board consists of individuals with broad 
knowledge and experience in legal, regulatory, business and auditing affairs (AQRB, 
2006e). The ten current board members comprise accountants, a company secretary, 
lawyers, law professors, a former ASIC chairman, a former auditor-general and 
former Big Four accounting firm partners (AQRB, 2006b). Participation in AQRB 
reviews is voluntary and available to all Australian auditors of listed companies, with 
the Big Four accounting firms agreeing to be involved from the time of the board’s 
commencement (AQRB, 2006e).14 The review process is transparent in that a 
summary report of each audit firm review is published and made publicly available 
(AQRB, 2006a).15
Professional self regulation is based on (a) high entry standards for professional 
membership, (b) high standards of performance and conduct required of members, 
and (c) the power to discipline, and in extreme cases to dismiss from membership, 
those whose performance falls short of required standards (Leung, Coram and 
Cooper, 2007). Two major components of professional self regulation relevant to the 
auditing function are mandatory continuing professional education (CPE) and
The four Big Four firms remain the only participating firms and the only ones for which quality 
control reviews, for 2006 and 2007, have been prepared (AQRB, 2006f, 2007).
The AQRB states that the work of the AQRB will be transparent in three ways: (a) each 
participating firm files a quality control report, which is made public, (b) AQRB publishes a 
summary report, with a more detailed report that may contain commercially sensitive material or 
detailed comments being only available to the monitored firm, and (c) an annual report is 
published by the AQRB commenting on the overall review process (AQRB, 2006a).
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programs for quality control and practice (peer) reviews. The major professional 
accounting bodies, CPA Australia and the ICAA, require members to undertake 120 
hours of compulsory CPE over a three year period (Gay and Simnett, 2005). They 
also independently undertake quality assurance reviews of accounting practices, with 
serious deficiencies in quality control standards subject to disciplinary action (Arens 
et al., 2007; Leung et al., 2007). The quality (peer) reviews, undertaken by trained 
public practitioners, consider the quality control policies and procedures established 
by the firm to ensure they comply with professional standards and are followed (Gay 
and Simnett, 2005; Arens et al., 2007). The resulting assessments are discussed with 
the reviewed member, with these subject to strict confidentiality rules (Gay and 
Simnett, 2005; Arens et al., 2007). Any unsatisfactory findings must be remedied and 
are subject to a follow-up review (Gay and Simnett, 2005; Arens et al., 2007).
2.3 THE CONCEPT OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The Australian Code o f Ethics for Professional Accountants, APES 110, issued by the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB, 2006a), specifies 
ethical rules for accountants. The code includes rules for independence, and is based 
on the parallel publication issued by the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC, 2005). These two publications emphasise that a ‘distinguishing mark of the 
accountancy profession is its acceptance of the responsibility to act in the public 
interest’ (IFAC, 2005, s. 100.1; APESB, 2006a, s. 100.1). To meet this responsibility, 
the code specifies five fundamental principles that members must comply with, these 
being (a) integrity, (b) objectivity, (c) professional competence and due care, 
(d) confidentiality, and (e) professional behaviour (IFAC, 2005, s. 100.4; APESB, 
2006a, s. 100.4). The second of these fundamental principles, objectivity, is of 
particular relevance to auditors, with the United States Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC) stating that independence ‘is understood to refer to a mental state 
of objectivity and lack of bias’ (SEC, 2000, p. 3). The Auditing Practices Board in the 
United Kingdom states that ‘independence is related to and underpins objectivity’ 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2004a, para. 12).
Pursuant to the Australian and international codes, the principle of objectivity 
requires members not to compromise their professional or business judgment because 
of bias, conflict of interest or the undue influence of others, and to avoid relationships 
that bias or unduly influence professional judgment (IFAC, 2005, ss. 120.1 and 120.2; 
APESB, 2006a, ss. 120.1 and 120.2). In providing guidance on the requirement for 
objectivity for members performing assurance engagements, the codes explicitly 
point to the specific guidance on independence specified therein (IFAC, 2005, 
s. 280.2; APESB, 2006a, s. 280.2). APES 110 explains that, in assurance 
engagements, the concept of independence is fundamental to compliance with the 
principles of integrity and objectivity and that these underlying principles are 
consistent with objective and impartial judgment (APESB, 2006a, s. 290).16
The quality of an individual audit depends on a whole range of factors related to the 
auditor acting with professional skill and due care, with definitions of audit quality 
emphasising an auditor’s competence and independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1981). These two characteristics have been described as the ‘pillars’ 
of auditing (Houghton 2002a, Houghton and Jubb 2003b).
The AICPA (2006, s. 55.01) states that independence ‘precludes relationships that may appear to 
impair a member’s objectivity in rendering attestation services.’ The Auditing Practices Board 
(2004a) distinguishes objectivity and independence by stating that objectivity is a personal 
behaviour characteristic concerning the auditor’s state of mind, while independence relates to 
the circumstances surrounding the audit, including the financial, employment, business and 
personal relationships between the auditor and the client.
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To create a demand for audit services, auditors must convince the market of their 
independence (as well as, of course, their competence). It has long been recognised 
that a reputation for independence is an auditor’s greatest professional asset and that 
any negligence on an auditor’s part will leave them open to severe penalties in the 
form of, inter alia, a loss of reputation (see, for example, Owens, 1941; Ashley, 
1942). An auditor’s reputation, once established, increases the demand for his or her 
services and fees. Reputation serves as a collateral bond for independence, in that the 
reputation of an auditor found to be less independent than expected will be damaged 
and the present value of his or her audit services will be reduced (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).
In the early auditing conceptual literature, independence has been emphasised as 
being fundamental to auditing (see, for example, Sharaf and Mautz, 1960; Mautz and 
Sharaf, 1961; Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, 1973). For example, Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961, p. 204) state that ‘[t]he significance of independence in the work of 
the independent auditor is so well established that little justification is needed to 
establish this concept as one of the cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory.’
More recently, Johnstone, Sutton and Warfield (2001, p. 2) stated that independence 
‘is the most fundamental and vital asset possessed by the auditing profession.’ 
Observations on the importance of auditor independence are supported by surveys of 
various groups of financial report preparers and users (see, for example, Schulte, 
1965; Hartley and Ross, 1972; Beck, 1973; Lavin and Libby, 1977; Firth, 1980, 
1981). With the rise of the information age, Levitt (2000) referred to the auditing
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profession as the ‘public’s profession’ and emphasised the continued, timeless value
17of credibility, objectivity and independence.
The pronouncements and standards of various professional and regulatory bodies 
require auditors to be independent both in fact (independence of mind) and in 
appearance (see, for example, International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
2002b, para. 4; IFAC, 2005, s. 290.8; AICPA, 2006, s. 55.04; APESB, 2006a, 
s. 290.8). Independence in fact exists when auditors are actually able to act with 
objectivity, integrity, impartiality and freedom from any conflict of interest. The 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 specifies a test for independence in fact where a 
conflict of interest situation will be considered to exist when ‘the auditor, or a 
professional member of the audit team, is not capable of exercising objective and 
impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body’ 
(s. 324CD(l)(a)).
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) refer to independence in fact as practitioner independence, 
where the individual auditor is able to maintain the proper attitude and freedom in the 
planning of the audit program (programming independence), in the performance of 
verification work (investigative independence) and in the preparation of the audit 
report (reporting independence). Necessary conditions for independence in fact are 
‘honesty’ and an ‘independent attitude of mind’ (Moizer, 1997, p. 57). This 
independence o f mind should enable an individual auditor to be free from the effects 
of threats to independence that would be sufficient to compromise their objectivity 
(Independence Standards Board, 2001) and to be able to act with integrity and
17 At the time of making this statement, Arthur Levitt was the Chairman of the SEC.
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exercise objectivity and professional scepticism (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.8; APESB, 
2006a, s. 290.8).
Because the auditor’s independence must be accepted by shareholders and other third 
parties, and as these parties usually have no way of ascertaining the presence or 
absence of independence in fact, independence must be apparent as well as real 
(Axelson, 1963; Shockley, 1982). In addition to being independent in fact, it is 
necessary that auditors are ‘seen to be independent by means of explicit and public 
signals that this is so’ (Lee, 1993, p. 99). Because objectivity can rarely be observed 
directly, the confidence of investors and others in the independence of the auditor 
rests largely on their perceptions (SEC, 2000). This is the concept of independence in 
appearance, where the auditor should be perceived by others to be independent. The 
test for independence in appearance specified in the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 specifies that a conflict of interest situation will exist when ‘a reasonable 
person, with full knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude 
that the auditor, or a professional member of the audit team, is not capable of 
exercising objective and impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of 
the audited body’ (s. 324CD(l)(b)).
The auditor will be independent in appearance when no potential conflict of interest 
exists that could tend to jeopardise public confidence in the auditor’s independence in 
fact (Higgins, 1962; Gill, 1979). It is important for the auditor to be seen to be in a 
position in which it is possible to exercise independence as the ‘confidence of 
shareholders and others is more likely to be hinged on the visible than on the invisible 
aspects of the concept’ (Lee and Kenley, 1985, p. 75). Independence in appearance 
requires the avoidance of situations of such significance that a reasonable and 
informed third party would reasonably conclude that the auditor’s integrity,
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objectivity or professional scepticism had been compromised (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.8; 
AICPA, 2006; APESBa, 2006, s. 290.8).
Wolnizer (1987) argues that accountants have extended the notion of independence in 
fact to independence in appearance to demonstrate that there are justifiable grounds 
for public confidence in the impartiality and trustworthiness of auditors’ judgments. 
While auditing is sometimes referred to as fulfilling a quasi-judicial function, Gilling 
(1980) argues that such a description is not complete or accurate, but that the 
profession’s acceptance and reliance on this notion lies in emphasising the 
importance of the attribute of independence. Further, in the process of defining, 
defending and extending its jurisdiction, the accounting profession has attached 
considerable importance to its image and aura of independence (Sikka and Willmott, 
1995).
With respect to assurance services, independence is a key attribute that has enabled, 
and will continue to enable, auditors to expand into a wider range of assurance areas. 
The audit tradition is a professional asset of incalculable value, deriving from the 
marketplace need for decision-making information of high quality (Elliott, 1997). A 
major aspect of this tradition is the concept of independence and, when extended to 
wider audiences and subject matters, ‘decision makers are likely to be most 
comfortable with assurance from an independent party qualified to judge the quality 
of information’ (Elliott, 1997, p. 62, emphasis added). It is this attribute of 
independence that has enabled auditors to expand into the provision of a broader 
range of assurance services (Schelluch and Gay, 1997; Gay and Simnett, 2005).
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2.4 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS
The IFAC and APESB ethical codes adopt a conceptual framework approach, 
reqairing professional accountants to identify, evaluate and address threats to 
conpliance with the fundamental ethical principles (IFAC, 2005, s. 100.5; APESB,
i o
2006a, s. 100.5). Threats to auditor independence represent circumstances that could 
inmir independence (AICPA, 2006). Where identified threats are not clearly 
ins.gnificant, the codes require professional accountants to apply safeguards to 
eliminate the threats or reduce them to an acceptable level so that compliance with the 
fur.damental principles is not compromised (IFAC, 2005, s. 100.5; APESB, 2006a, 
s. 100.5). Safeguards are controls that mitigate or eliminate threats to independence, 
and range from partial to complete prohibitions of fne threatening circumstance to 
procedures that counteract the potential influence of the threat (AICPA, 2006). Audit 
firms in individual audit engagements should evaluate any threats to independence, 
and the nature of safeguards required, in deciding whether to accept or continue an 
engagement (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.13; APESB, 2006a, s. 290.13).
The international and Australian ethical codes provide examples of circumstances that 
may create threats to independence. These include, for example, threats arising from 
financial interests in the client, loans and guarantees, close business relationships, 
family and personal relationships, employment and recent service with the client, 
serving as an officer or director on the client’s board, long association of senior audit 
personnel with the client, the provision of non-audit services to the client, fees and 
pricing, gifts and hospitality, and actual or threatened litigation (IFAC, 2005, 
ss. 290.100-290.214; APESB, 2006a, ss. 290.100-290.214). The examples provided
18 This conceptual framework approach is also the basis for the rules in, for example, the United 
Kingdom (Auditing Practices Board, 2004a) and the United States (AICPA, 2006).
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in the codes are not meant to represent an exhaustive list (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.12; 
APESB, 2006a, s. 290.12), but do illustrate the wide range of circumstances that can 
potentially threaten auditor independence in individual audit engagements.
The codes also provide examples of safeguards necessary to eliminate potential 
independence threats or reduce them to an acceptable level. For example, there are 
various prohibitions relating to threats arising from significant financial interests, 
material loans, significant business relationships, serving as an officer or director on 
the client’s board, and gifts and hospitality.19 Similarly, legislative provisions specify 
various prohibitions to protect against independence threats. For example, the 
provisions of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (ss. 324CE-324CH) specify that 
an individual auditor, an audit firm or an audit company contravenes the Act’s 
independence requirements if, for example, they (a) are an officer or audit-critical 
employee of an audited body, (b) are a partner or employee of an officer or an audit- 
critical employee of an audited body, (c) have an investment or a beneficial interest in 
an investment in an audited body, (d) owe an amount of more than $5000 to, or are 
owed an amount by, an audited body, a related body corporate or an entity that the 
audited body controls, (e) are liable under a guarantee of a loan made to the audited 
body, a related body corporate or an entity that the audited body controls, or (f) are 
entitled to the benefit of a guarantee given by the audited body, a related body 
corporate or an entity that the audited body controls.
In addition to outright prohibitions, other individual safeguards are also specified to 
mitigate certain specific independence threats. As an example, a possible safeguard
19 See, for example, IFAC (2005, ss. 290.113-290.119, 290.129, 290.132, 290.149, 290.151,
290.213) and APESB (2006a, ss. 290.113-290.119, 290.129, 290.132, 290.149, 290.151 and
290.213) .
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specified to mitigate the threat arising from a long association of senior personnel 
with the client is that of rotating senior personnel, audit partners or the engagement 
quality control reviewer (IFAC, 2005, ss. 290.153 and 290.154; APESB, 2006a, 
ss. 290.153 and 290.154). Similarly, examples of possible safeguards specified to 
mitigate the threat arising from the audit firm provision of non-audit services include 
(a) policies and procedures to prohibit professional staff from making management 
decisions for the audit client, (b) discussing independence issues related to the 
provision of the non-audit services with those charged with governance, such as the 
audit committee, (c) policies within the auditee regarding the oversight responsibility 
for the provision of the non-audit services, (d) involving an additional professional 
accountant to advise on the potential impact of the non-audit services on auditor 
independence, (e) disclosing the nature and extent of fees charged to those charged 
with the auditee’s governance, and (f) ensuring the personnel providing the non-audit 
services do not participate in the audit engagement (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.163; APESB, 
2006a, s. 290.163).
In discussing and providing examples of potential threats to auditor independence and 
safeguards to mitigate those threats, this section highlights that there are a range of 
potential threats and safeguards which the auditor must evaluate in individual audit 
engagements. A number of these specific threats and safeguards are examined in this 
study. In developing the study’s research hypotheses, detailed discussion of these 
threats and safeguards, and the relevant prior literature, is presented in Chapter 6.
2.5 RECENT AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS
While auditor independence has been subject to considerable research since the 
1960s, it continues to represent an issue of substantial contemporary importance.
Chapter 2 34
Auditor independence has been subject to vigorous debate in recent years, particularly 
resulting from the major corporate collapses and financial difficulties earlier this 
decade of companies such as Enron, Cendant, WorldCom, Global Crossing, 
Microstrategy, Sunbeam, Tyco International, Waste Management, and Xerox in the 
United States,20 and of Harris Scarfe, HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia.21 A 
detailed summary of the various recent Australian developments, and a brief 
summary of the major parallel developments in the United States, are provided in this 
section to illustrate their significant nature.
2.5.1 Australian developments
Fundamental questions of auditor independence and the audit function have, as noted 
above, been raised in the Australian financial press following the recent Australian 
corporate collapses and financial difficulties of Harris Scarfe, HIH Insurance and 
One.Tel. Headlines such as ‘[ajuditors face conflict crackdown’ (Hepworth, 2001) 
and ‘HIH shows auditors need more to fear’ (Wade, 2001) are examples of a 
questioning of auditor independence.22 The then Federal Government Minister for 
Financial Services and Regulation stated ‘Harris Scarfe, HIH and One.Tel have raised 
community concerns about the effectiveness of the audit process and I perceive there 
has been some loss of confidence in our corporate accounts’ (Hockey, 2001b).
See, for example, Bums (2001a, 2001b), Collins (2001, 2002a, 2002b), Dow Jones Newswires 
(2001), Voreacos (2001) and Williams (2002).
See, for example, Chenoweth (2001, 2002), Evans (2001), Fenton-Jones (2001), Frith (2001), 
Harris (2001a), Harrison (2001), Horton (2001), Laurence (2001), Murray (2001), Ramsay 
(2001), Rudy (2001), Towers (2001), Valentine (2001), Way and Voorhaar (2001), White 
(2001), Buffini (2002a), Buffini and Fenton Jones (2002) and Woodley (2002).
Questions regarding auditor independence were also raised in the settlement of litigation taken 
by the liquidator of Southern Equities Corporation (formerly Bond Corporation) against the 
company’s former auditor for the audit of the company’s financial statements for the period 
1988 to 1990 (Altmann, 2001a, 2001b; Milne, 2001).
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In response to these developments, the Australian federal government commissioned 
an inquiry into the state of auditor independence in Australia in 2001 (Hockey, 2001a, 
2001b; Patrick, 2001; Ravlic, 2001a). The inquiry was undertaken by Professor Ian 
Ramsay from the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Corporate Law and Securities 
Legislation, and examined existing Australian legislation, professional requirements, 
and recent international developments. The report by Professor Ramsay was released 
in early October 2001 (Ramsay, 2001).
The Ramsay report recommended significant revisions to the auditor independence 
rules, including rules governing employment, financial and business relationships 
between audit firms and their audit clients (Ramsay, 2001, pp. 7-10). The report 
recommended the creation of a statutory Auditor Independence Supervisory Board, 
with such a Board playing ‘a vital role in ensuring public confidence in the 
independence of auditors by monitoring implementation of the new regime, 
compliance with it, and important international developments in the area of auditor 
independence’ (Ramsay, 2001, p. 12). The report also recommended that the 
Australian Stock Exchange listing rules be amended to require all listed companies to 
have an audit committee (Ramsay, 2001, p. 14). With respect to the auditor provision 
of non-audit services, the report recommended a revision of the profession’s ethical 
rules and the disclosure in company financial reports of the amount of all non-audit 
services, divided by category of service, with appropriate discussion of those services 
(Ramsay, 2001, pp. 10-11). A statement in company financial reports by the audit 
committee or board of directors as to whether they had considered whether the
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orovision of those non-audit services was compatible with maintaining the auditor’s
9 9ndependence was also recommended (Ramsay, 2001, p. 11).“
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) also announced an 
investigation into auditor independence in June 2001 (ASIC, 2001; Dixon and Martin, 
2001). ASIC surveyed the Top 100 listed companies to improve the level of 
information about auditor independence available to industry, government and 
regulators. The survey questioned companies about ‘relationships with their external 
audit firm, including any business or professional relationships that exist outside their 
role as external auditors’ (ASIC, 2001, p. 1). Survey results were published in 
January 2002 (ASIC, 2002a), with ASIC expressing some concerns relating to auditor 
independence (ASIC, 2002b; Buffini and Fenton-Jones, 2002).24
The two major Australian professional accounting bodies, CPA Australia and The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) announced, in May 2002, that 
they had agreed to a new ‘internationally harmonised standard for professional 
independence’ based on the standard developed by IFAC (ICAA and CPA Australia, 
2002b). The new standard replaced the former Professional Statement F.l in the Joint 
Code o f Professional Conduct of the two bodies (ICAA and CPA Australia, 2002a). 
In reissuing Professional Statement F.l, the accounting bodies were keen to 
emphasise that this development would improve the profession’s independence rules.
While the release of the Ramsay report was generally welcomed by the Australian professional 
accounting bodies (CPA Australia, 2001a, 2001b; ICAA, 2001a, 2001b), it was not universally 
accepted. Various commentaries and letters in the financial press immediately expressed 
concerns that the report’s recommendations did not go far enough (see, for example, Eveleigh, 
2001; Harris, 2001b; Longo, 2001; Sykes, 2001; Turnbull, 2001; Walker, 2001).
The major concerns expressed by ASIC related to the high level of non-audit services fees 
earned by audit firms, a lack of rigour in processes to manage potential conflicts between 
companies and their auditors, and a reluctance to adopt auditor rotation procedures (ASIC, 
2002b).
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They stated at the time that the revised standard was ‘tailored to reflect Australian 
community expectations’ and that the measures ‘not only strengthen existing 
guidelines and reflect international best practice, but take the lead on the 
implementation of a number of key recommendations outlined in the Ramsay Report’ 
(ICAA and CPA Australia, 2002b). While adoption of the new standard was not to be 
mandatory until 31 December 2003, members were ‘strongly encouraged to 
immediately align ongoing and future engagements with the new standard’ (ICAA 
and CPA Australia, 2002b).
The Australian Federal Treasurer foreshadowed, in early February 2002, that a review 
of auditing laws would be a high priority for the government (McFarlane and Marris, 
2002; Murphy and Walker, 2002; Walters, 2002a). This would occur once a Royal 
Commission into the collapse of HIH, originally scheduled to deliver its findings by 
30 June 2002, was completed. However, reflecting an increased priority for such a 
review, the Treasurer announced a process for the examination of audit regulation and 
corporate disclosure as the next phase in the Government’s Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP) in June 2002 (Treasurer of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002). The subsequent CLERP 9 discussion paper, Corporate Disclosure: 
Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002) was released in September 2002 and addressed, inter alia, auditor 
independence issues.
Major proposals with respect to auditor independence canvassed in the CLERP 9
discussion paper were (a) expansion of the responsibilities of the FRC to oversee
The Royal Commission into the failure of the HIH Insurance group was announced by the 
Federal Government on 18 June 2001. Findings were originally to be released on 30 June 2002, 
but this deadline was subsequently extended to 28 February 2003 and then 4 April 2003. The 
final report of the Commission was publicly released on 16 April 2003 (Attorney General for 
Australia, 2003; Lewis, 2001; Main, 2002; Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2003).
Chapter 2 38
auditor independence requirements, (b) amendment of the Corporations Act 2001 to
26(i) include a general statement of principle requiring the independence of auditors,
(ii) require auditors to make an annual declaration, addressed to the board of 
directors, that they have maintained their independence, and (iii) further restrict 
employment and financial relationships between auditors and their clients, and 
(c) support for the Australian accounting profession’s revised Professional Statement 
F.l (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, pp. 1-3). The report also supported more 
extensive disclosures in company annual reports of non-audit services fees 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, pp. 3-4).28 With respect to the appointment and 
removal of auditors, the report proposed audit partner rotation after a five year period 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 4).
A further Australian inquiry into auditor independence was that of the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, a statutory committee of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. The inquiry was announced in April 2002 (Fabro, 2002; 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2002a). The committee’s final report
The wording for this general statement of principle was that ‘an auditor is not independent with 
respect to an audit client if the auditor is not, or a reasonable person with full knowledge of all 
relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the auditor is not, capable of exercising 
objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the auditor’s engagement’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 46).
Specific restrictions included a two year cooling-off period before a former audit partner who 
was directly involved in the audit of a client could become a director of the client or take a 
position with the client involving responsibility for fundamental management decisions 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 2).
Disclosure was recommended of fees paid for the various categories of non-audit services 
provided, together with a statement of whether the audit committee was satisfied that the 
provision of non-audit services was compatible with auditor independence (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002, p. 3). This would include an explanation as to why the provision of certain non­
audit services, if contracted, did not compromise auditor independence. These categories were 
a) preparing accounting records and financial statements of the audit client, b) valuation 
services, c) internal audit services, d) information technology (IT) systems services, 
e) temporary staff assignments, f) litigation support services, g) legal services, h) recruitment of 
senior management for the audit clients, and i) corporate finance and similar activities 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, pp. 3-4).
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was tabled in parliament in September 2002 (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit, 2002b), but was somewhat overshadowed by the release of the CLERP 9 
discussion paper on the same day.
The Joint Committee’s report was less prescriptive in its recommendations than the 
CLERP 9 discussion papers Major recommendations impacting on auditor 
independence were that the Corporations Act 2001 be amended to (a) require all 
listed public companies to have an independent audit committee, (b) require audit 
firms to submit an annual report to ASIC detailing how independence issues have 
been managed and outlining any pertinent future independence management issues,
(c) provide ASIC with authority to investigate and address independence issues,
(d) require ASIC to publish benchmark criteria used for determining the adequacy of 
the internal systems and processes of large audit firms, and (e) include a statement in 
the legislation requiring auditors to be independent.30
The report of the HIH Royal Commission into the failure of HIH Insurance was 
released in April 2003. Included in the Commission’s terms of references was an 
investigation of the extent to which decisions or actions of the company’s auditors 
contributed to the failure of the company or to undesirable corporate governance 
practices (HIH Royal Commission, 2002).
For example, with respect to non-audit services and auditor rotation, the committee noted that 
‘while legislative changes prohibiting the simultaneous provision of all non-audit services and 
the rotation of audit firms are more popular reactions in the eyes of the general public, these 
responses may not achieve the outcomes desired’ (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit, 2002b, p. 107). The committee stated that such proposals ‘may impede audit quality and 
drive up the costs of audit and related services’ (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 
2002b, pp. 107-8).
The wording for this recommended statement was ‘[t]he auditor must be independent of the 
company in performing or exercising his or her functions or powers under this Act’ (Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2002b, p. xxv).
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Major proposals regarding auditor independence recommended by the Commission 
were (a) a general standard of auditor independence to be stated in all relevant 
legislation and standards,31 (b) disclosure in company annual reports of all non-audit 
services provided by the audit firm, the fees applicable to each type of work, and an 
explanation of why those non-audit services do not compromise audit independence, 
and (c) an extension of the CLERP 9 discussion paper’s proposals regarding 
(i) former audit personnel becoming directors or employees of audit clients32 and,
• • • • T 'l(n) rotation of audit personnel (HIH Royal Commission, 2003, pp. lxvii-lxviii).
A bill of the CLERP 9 draft provisions, the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003, was released in October 2003 (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2003). The final legislation, embodied in the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004, was passed on 25 June and received royal assent on 30 June 
2004 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). The provisions affecting auditor 
independence were generally consistent with those in the original CLERP 9 
discussion paper. The major impact of the legislation was to make contraventions of 
the statutory independence requirements an offence for which individual auditors
The wording for this recommended statement was ‘[a]n auditor is not independent with respect 
to an audit client if the auditor might be impaired -  or a reasonable person with full knowledge 
of all relevant facts and circumstances might apprehend that the auditor might be impaired -  in 
the auditor’s exercise of objective and impartial judgment on all matters arising out of the 
auditor’s engagement’ (HIH Royal Commission, 2003, p. lxvii).
The Commission’s proposals were for (a) a cooling-off period of four years before a former 
partner directly involved in the audit of the client could become a director or take a senior 
management position with a client, (b) this restriction to be extended to include key senior audit 
personnel, (c) a two year cooling-off period for former partners who were not directly involved 
in the audit of a client, and (d) a prohibition on any more than one former partner of an audit 
firm at any one time being a director of, or taking a senior management position with, the client 
(HIH Royal Commission, 2003).
The proposals was for the requirement for the rotation of the lead engagement partner and 
review partner to be extended to include key senior audit personnel (HIH Royal Commission, 
2003, p. lxviii).
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and/or audit firms would be liable to penalties under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, Divisions 3-5).
The ICAA and CPA Australia reissued Professional Statement F.l in December 2004 
(ICAA and CPA Australia, 2004). While the statement was reissued to be more 
aligned with the CLERP 9 legislation, the professional bodies stressed that the 
conceptual framework approach adopted in the statement contrasted with the 
prescriptive approach of the Corporations Act, and therefore that members also 
needed to refer to the legislation to determine any additional obligations (ICAA and 
CPA Australia, 2004, s. 2).34
The final major Australian auditor independence development discussed in this sub­
section is that of the incorporation of the Accounting Professional and Ethical 
Standards Board (APESB). Earlier discussion in Section 2.2 discussed the 
establishment of the APESB. To reiterate, the board was established on 7 February 
2006 to set the code of professional conduct and professional standards with which 
members of the specified professional bodies must comply (Accounting and 
Professional Ethical Standards Board, 2007; Portelli, 2007).
As a result of the establishment of the APESB, Professional Statement F.l was 
replaced with the new APES 110: Code o f Ethics for Professional Accountants, which 
became operative from 1 July 2006 (APESB, 2006a). As noted in Section 2.3, 
APES 110 was based on the parallel IFAC code which had been revised in June 2005
The relevant section stated that ‘members and other readers of this Statement should recognize 
that adherence to this Statement is not a substitute for legislation and members and other readers 
must refer to the Corporations Act to determine their additional obligations as auditors, as this 
Statement does not ensure compliance with the law’ (ICAA and CPA Australia, 2004, s. 2).
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(IFAC, 2005). However, in developing APES 110, various additional sections were 
added by the APESB to suit Australian circumstances.
These various developments impacted on the specific independence threats and 
safeguards examined in the present study. Accordingly, the relevant developments are 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 6 when developing the study’s research 
hypotheses.
2.5.2 Developments in the United States
A discussion of recent auditor independence developments would not be complete 
without mentioning the United States Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002. The provisions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act impact not only on auditors in the United States but also, due 
to the extra-territorial operation of the Act’s registration provisions, on foreign (and 
hence Australian) accounting firms conducting audits of foreign subsidiaries and 
affiliates of United States issuers and of foreign private issuers (SEC, 2003, 
McClelland and Stanton, 2004).
The series of accounting scandals beginning with Enron and culminating with 
WorldCom captured headlines and stimulated the United States Congress to act 
(Carmichael, 2004). The result was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002, formally titled 
the ‘Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act’, 
enacted on 30 July 2002b (Committee on Financial Services, 2002). The two main 
developments affecting auditors were the creation of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the enactment of various auditor independence 
provisions.
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The provisions establishing the PCAOB and specifying its functions are stated under 
Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (ss. 101-109). The PCAOB’s specified role is to 
‘oversee the audit of public companies ... in order to protect the interests of investors 
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and 
independent audit reports’ (s. 101(a)). Oversight and enforcement authority over the 
board is the role of the SEC (s. 107).
Specific duties of the PCAOB are to (a) register public accounting firms that prepare 
audit reports for issuers, (b) establish or adopt auditing, quality control, independence 
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports, (c) conduct 
inspections of registered accounting firms and associates, (d) conduct investigations 
and disciplinary proceedings, (e) perform other duties or functions as the board or 
SEC determines to be necessary or appropriate, (f) enforce compliance with the rules 
and standards relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports, and (g) manage 
the board’s operations (s. 101(c)).
Major oversight functions of the board include a continuing program of inspections to 
assess the degree of compliance of registered firms and associated persons with 
applicable rules and standards (s. 104) and the conduct of investigations and 
disciplinary proceedings (s. 105). For the purpose of inspecting Australian firms 
registered with the PCAOB, a Statement o f Protocol between ASIC and the PCAOB 
was entered into in July 2007 ‘to enhance cooperation in the supervisory oversight of 
auditors and public accounting firms that practice in the two regulators’ respective 
jurisdictions’ (PCAOB, 2007). By virtue of amendments enacted in the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Amendment (Audit Inspection) Act 2007, 
ASIC has been empowered to undertake inspections on behalf of the PCAOB.
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The auditor independence provisions are specified under Title II of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act (ss. 201-209). These provisions have also been adopted by the SEC in its 
auditor independence rules (SEC, 2003). Major provisions relate to the auditor 
provision of non-audit services (ss. 201-2), audit partner rotation (s. 203), and 
conflict of interest situations (s. 206).
The non-audit services provisions prohibit a range of non-audit services to audit 
clients (s. 201),35 and require the pre-approval by the company’s audit committee, in 
most cases, of any other non-audit services (s. 202).
The audit partner rotation rules require partner rotation after a maximum of five 
years. The Act makes it unlawful for a firm to provide audit services to an issuing 
entity if the lead or coordinating partner, or the partner responsible for reviewing the 
audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each of the previous five years 
(s. 203). While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is silent with regard to the period of time 
before a partner can return to the audit client engagement, the SEC specifies a five 
year time out period in its rules (SEC, 2003).
The conflict of interest rules specified in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act stipulate a cooling 
off period of one year before individuals participating in an audit can take certain 
positions with the audit client. In this respect, the Act makes it unlawful for an 
accounting firm to perform an audit if the audit client’s chief executive officer, 
controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer or any person serving in an
The prohibited categories of non-audit services are (a) bookkeeping or other services related to 
the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client, (b) financial information 
systems design and implementation, (c) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions or 
contribution-in-kind reports, (d) actuarial services, (e) internal audit outsourcing services, 
(f) management functions or human resources, (g) broker or dealer, investment adviser or 
investment banking services, (h) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit, and 
(i) any other service that the PCAOB determines, by regulation, to be impermissible.
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equivalent position has previously been employed by the accounting firm and 
participated in the audit in any capacity during the one year period preceding the date 
of initiation of the audit (s. 206).
The above represents a brief summary of the relevant provisions in the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act. As with the applicable Australian independence developments, the Act’s 
provisions that are relevant to the independence threats and safeguards examined in 
the present study are discussed in further detail in Chapter 6 when developing the 
study’s research hypotheses.
2.6 INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING OF THE INDEPENDENCE 
CONCEPT
The independence pronouncements and standards issued by the major professional 
accounting organisations and regulatory bodies represent their attempts to provide a 
definition of auditor independence and to provide guidance for auditors when 
considering their independence in practice. In so doing, these statements elaborate on 
the meaning of the concept of auditor independence, particularly by presenting 
explanations of independence and by providing rules and guidelines regarding various 
threats to auditor independence and safeguards to protect against independence 
impairment.
Independence has been described as a ‘common English word which has assumed a 
special significance in the linguistic structure of the accounting profession’ (Bartlett, 
1991, p. 12), but linguistic difficulties exist with the specialised usage of the word 
(Burton, 1980; Bartlett, 1991). As a result, the nature of independence has been 
debated by practitioners and academics, and has been subject to intense empirical 
research, over the past five or so decades (Bartlett, 1993).
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In prescribing rules and concepts related to auditor independence, the relevant 
pronouncements provide explanations and guidelines related to the meaning of the 
independence concept. However, as with many common words that assume 
specialised connotations, Bartlett (1991) argues that the meanings attributed to the 
concept of independence have been poorly specified. This raises questions as to the 
meaning that various parties ascribe to the concept of auditor independence and 
whether there are commonalities in those perceived meanings.
It has often been stated that auditor independence is an elusive notion that has been 
difficult to reduce to an easily understood or precise definition (see, for example, 
Sharaf and Mautz, 1960; Antle, 1984; Lee and Kenley, 1985). Elliott and Jacobson 
(1992, p. 34) argue that the profession’s authoritative literature ‘does not contain an 
unmistakably clear concept for establishing independence rules.’ Schuetze (1994) 
observes that the concept is abstract and difficult to define either generally or in its 
peculiar application to the professional accountant.
The discussion above highlights the difficulty of reducing the concept of 
independence to an easily understood or precise definition, particularly as it is subject 
to a multitude of contexts in individual audit engagements. In considering actual 
independence as a state of mind, Lee and Kenley (1985, p. 75) argue that this is ‘not 
an ideal basis on which to place the confidence of the shareholders and other 
interested persons, mainly because of its intangible qualities.’ It is for this reason that 
the appearance of independence is such a fundamental component of the concept of 
independence. However, prior research indicates that different parties tend to have 
alternative perceptions of the contexts and situations under which independence
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might be impaired.’6 Hence, interpretations of the meaning of the independence 
concept can be subject to ambiguity and uncertainty.
Antle (1984, p. 1) observed that professional rules on auditor independence ‘are 
lengthy and subject to constant reinterpretation.’ The current efforts of the various 
professional and regulatory bodies in this regard indicate that this continues to be the 
case. The independence pronouncements and standards issued by the various 
professional accounting organisations and regulatory bodies represent their attempts 
to provide a definition of auditor independence and to provide general concepts and 
practical guidance for auditors. Hence, these statements elaborate on the meaning of 
the concept of auditor independence, while the need for constant revision to the 
pronouncements reflects the difficulty of reducing the meaning of the concept to a set 
of universally accepted rules.37
The ethical codes of IFAC and the APESB note that:
The use o f the word “independence” on its own may create misunderstandings. 
Standing alone, the word may lead observers to suppose that a person 
exercising professional judgment ought to be free from all economic, financial 
and other relationships. This is impossible, as every member o f society has 
relationships with others. Therefore, the significance o f economic, financial and 
other relationships should also be evaluated in the light o f what a reasonable 
and informed third party having knowledge o f all relevant information would
See, for example, Schulte (1965), Briloff (1966), Titard (1971), Hartley and Ross (1972), Lavin 
(1976), Firth (1980), Shockley (1981), Pany and Reckers (1983, 1984), Lindsay et al. (1987).
Scott (1992) suggests that, in modem societies, an important category of the rules and belief 
systems that arise are sets of rational myths. The concept of auditor independence and associated 
professional rules can be considered in this light. In explaining rational myths, Scott (1992) 
notes that the beliefs and mles are rational in the sense that they identify specific social purposes 
and then specify, in a rule-like manner, the activities to be carried out to achieve them. However, 
the beliefs and mles are myths in the sense that they depend, for their effectiveness, on the fact 
that they are widely shared, or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted 
the right to determine such matters.
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reasonably conclude to be unacceptable. (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.9; APESB, 
2006a, s. 290.9)
The test of what a ‘reasonable and informed third party would reasonably conclude’ 
s common to many of the professional and regulatory organisations’ statements (see, 
or example, Auditing Practice Board, 2004a; AICPA, 2006). The test is implicit in 
he Australian Corporations Act 2001 where, as noted earlier in Section 2.3, a 
conflict of interest will be considered to exist if ‘a reasonable person with full 
knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor, or 
i professional member of the audit team, is not capable of exercising objective and 
impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body’ 
<s. 324CD(l)(b)). However, what any reasonable and informed party would 
reasonably conclude to be acceptable or unacceptable is largely dependent on their 
interpretation of the meaning of the concept of auditor independence. This, in turn, 
affects their connotations and perceptions of independence in individual contexts.
For the above ‘reasonable and informed party’ test to be effective, it is necessary for a 
common understanding and interpretation of the meaning of the concept of auditor 
independence to exist. It may be difficult for auditors to effectively consider and 
evaluate their independence, particularly in marginal situations, if the exact meaning 
of independence is subject to uncertainty and if their own interpretation of the 
concept differs from that of financial report users and other parties to the financial 
reporting communication process. The reliance on the test of ‘what reasonable and 
informed third parties would conclude’ in the various pronouncements indicates the 
relevance of research examining connotations of independence within individual
contexts.
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Research into the meaning of the auditor independence concept can also be motivated
o o
by reference to the audit expectation(s) gap literature. Independence issues have 
been argued to be at ‘the heart of the audit expectations debate’ (Humphrey, 1997, 
p. 19), and the independence concept has been identified as a central issue 
contributing to the expectations gap (see, for example, Hooks, 1991; Godsell, 1993; 
Humphrey et al., 1993; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2002b). 
Particular concerns relate to the commercialisation of the profession and the joint 
supply of audit and non-audit services to audit clients, with critics emphasising the 
loosely constructed, ritualistic nature of audit practice and the ability of economic 
pressures to influence such practice behind the protective veil of claims to 
professional independence and judgment (see, for example, Humphrey and Moizer, 
1990; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Pentland, 1993; Power, 1995). The expectations gap 
indicates differences in views on the nature and role of auditing. With respect to 
auditor independence, the expectations gap suggests differences between auditors and 
financial report users in interpretations (connotations) of the independence concept in 
individual contexts.
2.7 SUMMARY
The chapter provided an overview of the audit function and the concept of auditor 
independence. This included discussion of the conceptual framework approach to 
independence, requiring identification and evaluation of independence threats and 
safeguards, and of major recent developments impacting on auditor independence.
The audit expectations gap has been defined as a ‘divergence in expectations between auditors 
and the users of the audit function in respect of the objectives of the independent audit’ (Godsell, 
1993, p. 1) and as ‘a representation of the feeling that auditors are performing in a manner at 
variance with the beliefs and desires of those for whose benefit the audit is being carried out’ 
(Humphrey 1997, p. 9). The expectations gap has also been described as a difference in 
orientation between the buyer and seller of audit services (Sikka, Puxty, Willmott and Cooper, 
1992).
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The discussion of issues relating to interpretations of the meaning of the concept of 
auditor independence highlights that the concept of independence has specialised 
connotations in the audit context, but that the concept is abstract and difficult to 
precisely define. It may therefore be difficult for auditors to effectively consider and 
evaluate their independence if the exact meaning of the concept is subject to 
uncertainty and if their own interpretation of the concept differs from that of other 
parties to the financial reporting communication process.
The overview of the audit function and auditor independence contained in the chapter 
provides the basis for the introduction of the research method for the measurement of 
meaning in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH
Following the previous chapter’s discussion of the concept of auditor independence, 
the aim of this chapter is to present the study’s research question and introduce the 
measurement of meaning research framework.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The study’s general research question is presented 
in Section 3.1. The measurement of meaning research framework which forms the 
basis of the study’s research method is described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 provides 
an overview of the prior accounting and auditing studies that have utilised the 
measurement of meaning framework. The study’s investigative questions are 
presented in Section 3.4, followed by a summary in Section 3.5. The chapter provides 
the basis for a discussion of the study’s research method, presented in Chapters 4 and 
5.
3.1 GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTION
The study’s general research question is stated as:
Is there shared meaning o f the auditor independence concept between key 
parties to the financial reporting process?
It was emphasised at the conclusion of the previous chapter that the independence 
pronouncements and standards issued by the professional accounting organisations
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and regulatory bodies provide guidance for auditors when considering their 
independence in practice, and that these pronouncements and standards elaborate on 
the meaning of the concept of auditor independence. This study advances the prior 
auditor independence research by utilising an experimental research method 
specifically designed to examine interpretations (connotations) of the meaning of 
particular concepts. This method is based on the measurement o f meaning framework 
originally developed by Osgood et al. (1957).1 The measurement of meaning 
framework is employed in this study to provide insight into whether there is shared 
meaning of the concept of auditor independence between alternative groups of 
identifiable parties to the financial reporting communication process, and the extent to 
which those meanings are affected by various situations or circumstances that 
represent potential threats to, and safeguards of, auditor independence.
3.2 THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING FRAMEWORK AND 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
3.2.1 Overview of the measurement of meaning framework
The purpose of this study is to examine the connotative (measured) meaning of the 
auditor independence concept by means of semantic differential analysis. Semantics 
is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as ‘the branch of linguistics that deals 
with the study of meaning, changes in meaning, and the principles that govern 
relationship between signs and symbols and what they represent’, and concerns ‘the 
relationship of a word, sign or symbol to a real-world object or event’ (Godfrey, 
Hodgson and Holmes, 2003, p. 29). This study examines the concept of auditor 
independence from a semantic perspective. This is particularly appropriate as ‘it is the
Earlier work leading to the framework was published in Osgood (1952) and Osgood and Suci 
(1955).
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semantic relations that make a theory realistic and meaningful’ (Godfrey et al., 2003, 
p. 29).
Developed by Osgood et al. (1957), semantic differential analysis presents a means 
for measuring the connotative meaning of concepts.2 Connotative meaning refers to 
an accumulation of emotional association that a particular referent has acquired 
arising from personal experience (Johnson, 1992). Connotative meanings include the 
emotional associations to particular concepts (Bruno, 1980) and evaluations of 
concepts (Bagranoff, 1990). They imply some judgment of a concept (Flamholtz and 
Cook, 1978) and give rise to an individual’s reactions to a concept (Osgood et al., 
1957; Bagranoff, 1990).
Based on psychology and learning theory, Osgood (1952) defined meaning as a 
representational mediation process. According to this view, the meanings which 
different individuals have for the same signs will vary to the extent that their 
behaviours toward whatever is signified have varied. This is because the composition 
of the representational process, the meaning of the sign, is dependent on the nature of 
the total behaviour occurring while the sign is being established. While the meaning 
of many primary, perceptual signs will be quite consistent across individuals, the 
meaning of many other signs will reflect the idiosyncrasies of individual experience 
(Osgood et al., 1957).
Connotative meaning can be contrasted with denotative meaning, which is the 
ordinary or literal meaning of a concept and what it denotes. Denotation is the 
element of meaning that gives an object or concept a name (Flamholtz and Cook,
2 Connotative meaning is also referred to as affective meaning, being closely related to the 
behavioural dimensions of emotion or feeling (Osgood, 1962, 1969; Osgood, May and Miron, 
1975).
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1978). The denotative meaning of a symbol (word, concept, phrase or some other 
linguistic form) involves the communication of an objective description or definition, 
rather than a subjective attitude or emotion (Adelberg and Farrelly, 1989). For 
example, the word dog denotes a ‘domesticated canine mammal’ (Collins English 
Dictionary). In a study examining both denotative and connotative meanings of 
financial statement terminology, Adelberg and Farrelly (1989) found that it was 
connotative meaning that revealed the more important differences in meaning.3 Even 
with agreement between communicating parties as to denotative meaning, the parties 
can display different behaviours in their response to a symbol or concept (Osgood et 
al., 1957; Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). For example, returning to the earlier dog 
example, an animal devotee may have a completely different behavioural reaction to 
the object dog than a small child who has a fear of such animals.4
With reference to the concept of auditor independence, the various professional and 
regulatory pronouncements might be considered to provide statements of the ordinary 
or literal (denotative) meaning of the independence concept. However, alternative 
parties may nevertheless differ in their interpretations of the connotative meaning of 
the concept in different situations, such as in the presence of particular threats to an 
individual auditor’s independence. For example, a number of prior studies have found 
differences between auditors and users in perceptions of auditor independence 
impairment when an audit firm also provides non-audit services (see, for example, 
Briloff, 1966; Hartley and Ross, 1972; Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980; Shockley, 1981; 
Lindsay, Rennie, Murphy and Silvester, 1987). This suggests possible differences in
Adelberg and Farrelly (1989) used two psycholinguistic techniques, classification analysis and 
association analysis, in their study.
Bagranoff, Houghton and Hronsky (1994) use the accounting example of profit to illustrate the 
distinction. While the denotative meaning of profit is the excess of revenues over expenses, the 
connotative meaning might be that it is good, necessary and valuable.
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the connotative meaning of independence held by auditors and users in the presence 
of auditor provided non-audit services.
Osgood (1952) argued that, as the basic function of language was the communication 
of meaning, ordinary language could be used to differentiate between concepts and 
measure their meaning. Accordingly, pursuant to the semantic differential technique 
for the measurement of meaning, bipolar adjectives for the concept under 
investigation are constructed. Examples of bipolar adjectives (adjectival pairs) that 
have been utilised in prior accounting studies include exact-estimated, bad-good, 
measurable-unmeasurable, necessary-unnecessary, objective-subjective, tangible- 
intangible, static-dynamic and flexible-inflexible.5 The prior accounting studies have 
tended to use at least 20 of these bipolar adjectives for each concept examined. The 
adjectival pairs are generally presented on a seven point scale, with research 
participants indicating the position on each scale that reflects their perception of the 
relationship between the adjective and the concept.6 Marking the position on the 
semantic scale indicates the ‘direction and intensity’ of the judgment of the concept 
(Osgood et al., 1957, p. 35; Osgood, 1976, p. 16). An individual’s judgment of a 
concept across a series of scales serves to allocate that concept ‘to a point in semantic 
space’ (Haried, 1972, p. 377).
To measure connotative meaning, the bipolar adjectives that represent factors or 
dimensions that define meaning for the particular concept are selected. This is 
achieved by factor analysing the semantic scales to identify the scales which group
See, for example, Haried (1972, 1973), Flamholtz and Cook (1978), McNamara and Moores 
(1982, 1995), Houghton (1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1997), Bagranoff (1990), Houghton and Messier 
(1990), Houghton and Hronsky (1993), Bagranoff et al. (1994) and Hronsky and Houghton 
(2001). These studies are discussed in Section 3.3.
Osgood et al. (1957) found a seven point scale to be suitable in defining semantic space in many 
different experiments, and a seven point scale has been used in most research since.
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together to define each single dimension of meaning (Flamholtz and Cook, 1978). 
Factor analysis, discussed in further detail in the following sub-section, enables 
identification of the structure, referred to as the cognitive structure, within which the 
research participants hold the selected concept (McNamara and Moores, 1982; 
Houghton, 1987a, 1987b). This structure signifies the dimensions of the participants’ 
responses and is representative of the dimensionality within which the participants 
hold their meanings with respect to the concept or concepts under investigation 
(Houghton and Messier, 1990). The factors reflect the score profile or the semantic 
space associated with the concept, which can then be used to determine similarities or 
differences in meaning (Bagranoff, 1990). For example, by reference to factor scores, 
different concepts can be examined to determine whether they have the same or 
different meanings. Similarities or differences in concept meanings between 
individuals, groups and particular contexts can also be investigated.
Osgood et al. (1957) proposed three dimensions for the general domain of 
connotative meaning (that is, for common concepts within ordinary fields of usage). 
Concepts were considered within an E-P-A (Evaluative, Potency, Activity) structure. 
The evaluative dimension comprises semantic scales such as good-bad, the potency 
dimension comprises scales such as strong-weak, and the activity dimension 
comprises scales such as active-passive.7 Osgood et al. (1957, p. 325) concluded that 
these three factors ‘have reappeared in a wide variety of judgmental situations, 
particularly where the sampling of concepts has been broad.’ These three dimensions
Factor analysis results from Osgood et al. (1957, p. 45) indicate that the semantic scales 
associated highly with the evaluative factor were good-bad, nice-awful, beautiful-ugly, honest- 
dishonest, sweet-sour and fair-unfair. Scales associated highly with the potency factor were 
strong-weak, large-small, heavy-light, rugged-delicate and hard-soft. Scales associated highly 
with the activity factor were fast-slow, active-passive and sharp-dull.
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of meaning have been supported in many prior studies, including across different 
cultures (see, for example, Osgood, 1962, 1969; Miron, 1969; Osgood et al., 1975).8
Of the three dimensions, the evaluative factor plays the dominant role in meaningful 
judgments (Osgood et al., 1957, p. 38). The relative weights of the three dimensions 
have been reasonably consistent in many prior studies, with the evaluation dimension 
accounting for approximately double the amount of variance of either the potency or 
activity dimensions (Osgood et al., 1957, p. 325). In the original Osgood et al. (1957) 
study, the evaluative factor explained over four times the variance of either of the 
potency or activity dimensions.
The semantic differential has been extensively used in many disciplines, and its 
reliability, validity and effectiveness have been extensively tested (Heise, 1969; 
Kerlinger, 1973; Fishbein and Azjen, 1975). While, in comparison to other 
disciplines, semantic differential analysis has not been extensively used in accounting 
and auditing research, the prior studies have indicated that it is well developed and 
reliable. These prior studies are summarised in Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Factor analysis and the measurement of meaning
Factor analysis warrants specific discussion as it is the principal statistical method 
used within the measurement of meaning framework. It is the method used to 
determine the dimensions of connotative meaning for the concept or concepts being 
examined.
8 Miron (1969, p. 189) stated that the E-P-A factor structure ‘has been replicated far more often 
under far more diverse circumstances than most other inferential “facts” of our science.’
Chapter 3 58
Factor analysis refers to a class of multivariate statistical methods which aim to 
identify the underlying structure in a relatively large number of variables. It is a 
technique that summarises patterns of correlations among observed variables to 
reduce them to a smaller number of factors, thereby resulting in considerable 
parsimony (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
While factor analysis is a generic name given to a class of multivariate statistical 
methods (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998), there are many variants. The two 
major subsets are component (or principal component) analysis and common factor 
analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Gorsuch, 1983). The latter subset is often referred 
to simply as factor analysis, and hence confusion arises as to whether the term is 
being used in its generic sense as a class of methods or in its narrower, statistical 
variant sense. Factor analysis is explained in this sub-section in its generic sense. The 
distinction between component analysis and common factor analysis, and its effect on 
the current study’s research analysis, is discussed in Chapter 8 9
Factor analysis is applied to a single set of variables to discover which of them form 
coherent subsets that are relatively independent of one another (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). The two primary uses for factor analysis are summarisation and data 
reduction (Hair et al., 1998). In summarising the data, factor analysis derives 
underlying dimensions that describe the data in a smaller number of factors than the 
original individual variables. A factor is essentially a ‘dimension or construct which 
is a condensed statement of the relationships between a set of variables’ (Kline, 1994, 
p. 5) Data reduction can be achieved by calculating scores (factor scores) for each
It is sufficient to observe here that the component and common factor methods differ with 
respect to preparation of the observed correlation matrix for extraction of the factors and in the 
underlying theory for their use (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001).
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urderlying dimension and substituting them for the original variables. Factor scores 
an a composite measure calculated as a weighted linear combination of the observed, 
urderlying variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978a; Hair et al., 1998).
T( develop the measurement of meaning framework, Osgood et al. (1957) selected 20 
concepts considered to be diversified in meaning. These included concepts such as 
‘fidy’, ‘boulder’, ‘sin’, ‘lake’, ‘symphony’, ‘Russian’, ‘fire’ and ‘fraud’. Research 
participants indicated their interpretation of each of the 20 concepts by reference to 
5C semantic differential (seven point) scales.10 Factor analysis was used to reduce this 
large number o f semantic scales to a smaller number of factors considered to 
characterise the alternative dimensions of connotative meaning. As noted earlier, 
factor analysis identified three underlying dimensions of meaning, these being 
interpreted by Osgood et al. (1957) as evaluative, potency and activity dimensions.
Factors represent combinations of variables that are correlated with one another but 
which are largely independent of other subsets o f variables. They are considered to 
reflect the underlying processes that created the correlations among the variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Factor analysis is based on the fundamental 
assumption that it is these underlying factors that are responsible for the covariation 
among the observed variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978a).
After selecting and measuring a set o f variables, the first major step in deriving 
factors is to prepare a correlation matrix between the individual variables. This allows 
investigation of the interrelationship among the variables to determine which have 
high correlation with each other but low correlation with other subsets. The factor 
analytic approach is used to assess whether the observed correlations can be
10 Participants were 100 undergraduate introductory psychology students.
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explained by the existence of a small number of hypothetical variables or constructs 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978a).
The second major step is to extract a set of factors from the correlation matrix and 
determine the number of factors that can adequately explain the observed correlations 
among the individual variables. The percentage of variance in the data ‘explained’ by 
the factor solution increases as more factors are extracted, but parsimony is decreased 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). While as many factors could be extracted as there are 
variables, a trade-off is required to retain enough factors for an adequate fit but not so 
many as to lose parsimony.11
Factors are formed to maximise their explanation of the entire variable set (Hair et al., 
1998), with the restriction that factors are orthogonal to (uncorrelated with) each 
other (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). The first factor is derived to account for as much 
variance as possible. The second factor is then derived to account for as much of the 
residual variation left unexplained by the first factor, and this process can be 
continued until the number of factors extracted equals the number of variables.
To obtain an initial solution, the researcher must either specify the number of factors 
to be extracted or establish the criterion by which the number of factors to be 
extracted can be determined (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). While the issue of the 
number of factors to be extracted is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 8 in 
the context of this study’s research data, the major criterion relates to evaluating the 
percentage of total variance explained by the extracted factors. The first factor 
accounts for the most variance and the factors are ordered in size as they are extracted
i i Hair et al., (1998, p. 103) use the analogy of focusing a microscope to illustrate this trade-off: 
‘[t]oo high or too low an adjustment will obscure a structure that is obvious when the adjustment 
is just right.’
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(Kline, 1994). The selection decision is then based on determining where to draw the 
line with respect to the percentage of the total variance represented by the extracted 
factors, typically by reference to factor eigenvalues'2 and/or a scree test.'3 The 
selection decision must also take into account the composition, interpretability and 
substantive importance of the extracted factors, and statistical procedures are also 
available to evaluate whether factors are robust and stable (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; 
Stevens, 1986).
After determining the number of factors that can adequately account for the observed 
correlations between the variables, the third major step involves rotating the factors 
to increase interpretability. It is generally assumed that rotation will be undertaken so 
that the factors have a greater likelihood of being relevant and meaningful (Gorsuch, 
1983). The goal of rotation is to simplify the pattern of factor loadings and obtain a 
more readily interpretable solution. Regardless of the underlying true model, the 
initial solution often results in variables having substantial loadings on more than one 
factor (Kim and Mueller, 1978b). Rotation, achieved by manipulating or adjusting the 
factor axes, minimises the number of variables that load on each factor (Hair et al.,
The eigenvalue of a factor indicates how much variance it accounts for. As each variable 
contributes a value of one to the eigenvalues, the total of the eigenvalues equals the number of 
variables. For example, in a factor analysis with 20 variables where the first factor extracted 
accounts for 43 per cent of the total variance, its eigenvalue would be 8.6. If the second and third 
factors account for 21 and three per cent of the total variance respectively, their eigenvalues 
would be 4.2 and 0.6. In this example, the usual eigenvalue selection criteria would result in a 
two factor solution. The third factor would not be considered important as its eigenvalue is less 
than one and therefore contributes less variance (explanation) than a single variable.
The scree test involves plotting eigenvalues against factors, with the shape of the resulting curve 
being used to determine the cutoff point. The maximum number of factors to extract is indicated 
by the point at which the curve begins to straighten out and form a straight line with a near 
horizontal slope (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Hair et al., 1998). The cut-off point therefore occurs 
where the rate of change in the eigenvalues decreases sharply (Houghton, 1988).
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1998).14 Rotation does not, though, change the degree of fit between the data and the 
factor structure (Kim and Mueller, 1978a).
Factor loadings indicate the correlation between the original variables and the factors, 
and are ‘the key to understanding the nature of a particular factor’ (Hair et al., 1998, 
p. 89). Loadings can be positive or negative depending on whether the individual 
variable is positively or negatively associated with the factor. Loadings of higher 
absolute value indicate that the individual variable is representative of the factor. 
Loadings with an absolute value of at least .50 are generally accepted to meet a 
‘practical significance’ criterion (Hair et al., 1998, p. 111).15
Factors are interpreted by analysing the factor loadings which are largest in absolute 
magnitude. An individual factor is interpreted by attempting to determine what the 
highly loading variables have in common. Stevens (1986) observes that the 
researcher’s task is to give a name to the construct that underlies variability, thereby 
identifying the factor substantively.
If required, the fourth major step in factor analysis is data reduction, achieved by 
calculating factor scores. Factor scores, or scales, are ‘estimates of the scores subjects 
would have received on each of the factors had they been measured directly’ 
(Tabchnik and Fidell, 2001, p. 626). Coefficients, or weights, are calculated with 
which to combine the values of the observed variables to represent the underlying 
factor. The variables with the highest loadings will have the highest weightings
The two major types of rotation are orthogonal and oblique. Pursuant to orthogonal rotation, the 
reference axes are maintained at 90 degrees and the factors are therefore uncorrelated. Oblique 
rotation does not retain the 90 degree angle between the reference axes, and the extracted factors 
therefore become correlated to some extent (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Hair et al., 1998).
Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that loadings in excess of .71 are excellent, .63 very good, .55 
good, .45 fair and .32 poor.
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(factor score coefficients) in calculating the factor scores. Hence, the value of an 
individual variable will have a large effect on the score of the factor on which it loads 
highly, but only a small and possibly negligible effect on the scores of factors on 
which it loads to only a minor extent. In the context of the semantic differential 
technique, factor scores are used to indicate the measured meaning of the particular 
concept (Houghton and Messier, 1990; Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Hronsky and 
Houghton, 2001).
In summary, factor analysis refers to a class of multivariate statistical methods that 
summarises patterns of correlations among observed variables to reduce them to a 
smaller number of factors. This allows identification of the dimensions or constructs 
underlying the data, and enables data reduction through the calculation of factor 
scores.
In the context of the measurement of meaning framework and the semantic 
differential technique, factor analysis enables identification of the dimensions, or 
cognitive structure, underlying the comiotative meaning of particular concepts. A 
particular issue, though, is evaluating whether the factors comprising the dimensions 
of meaning are robust and stable. This requires analysis of whether the extracted 
factors are comparable within individual groups of research participants and between 
any alternative groups (Nunnally, 1978; Everett and Entrekin, 1980; Everett, 1983). 
This aspect is discussed within the following section, and the specific application of 
factor analysis, including factor comparability analysis, in this study is discussed in
Chapters 4 and 8.
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5.3 PRIOR ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MEASUREMENT OF 
MEANING STUDIES
5.3.1 Foundation accounting and auditing studies
Haried (1972, 1973) established that the measurement of meaning framework could 
3e applied to the examination of accounting concepts. Haried (1972) administered a 
research instrument, comprising 33 semantic scales across 18 accounting related 
:oncepts, to a variety of sophisticated and unsophisticated research participants. 
Of the 33 scales, 30 were specifically developed by Haried as being relevant to 
financial report terms. Three additional scales (good-bad, active-passive and strong- 
weak), representing the general E-P-A dimensions from Osgood et al. (1957), were 
also used. Seven factors, comprising 26 of the 33 scales, were extracted by the study, 
with these being considered to represent alternative dimensions of meaning. The 
seven alternative dimensions were labelled ‘objectivity’, ‘evaluation’, ‘control’, 
‘activity’, ‘time’, ‘stability’ and ‘necessary’.
Haried (1973) used a subset of 15 of the semantic scales from the 1972 study in a 
further study of accounting concepts, with research participants comprising 
accountants, financial analysts, lawyers, investment club members and students. 
These scales were drawn from across the seven dimensions (factors) found in the 
earlier study. Findings confirmed the adaptability of the semantic differential as a 
‘sensitive, reliable, and valid instrument for measuring connotative meanings 
conveyed by terms used in financial reports’ (Haried, 1973, p. 143). However, Haried
The concepts employed in the study were accounting definitions and terminology, such as 
‘asset’, ‘goodwill’, ‘liability’, ‘retained earnings’, ‘depreciation expense’, ‘extraordinary item’, 
‘net income’, ‘working capital’, ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ and ‘stock dividend’ 
(Haried, 1972, p. 384).
Research participants comprised practising accountants, investment club members and a variety 
of graduate and undergraduate accounting and non-accounting students.
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did not consider the technique to be successful in testing hypotheses regarding 
semantic problems in accounting communication, such as in determining differences 
in meaning between the financial report preparers and the user groups.18 This 
conclusion was to be tested in later research by Houghton (1988), discussed later in 
this sub-section.
While Haried (1972, 1973) concentrated on the meaning of accounting terms utilised 
in financial reports, Oliver (1974) examined eight basic concepts utilised in 
formulating the financial report message, these being ‘accounting’, ‘income 
determination’, ‘consistency’, ‘disclosure’, ‘matching’, ‘valuation’, ‘cost’, and 
‘revenues and expenses’. The study used ten semantic scales, comprising the four 
evaluative, three potency and three activity scales possessing the highest factor 
loadings in Osgood et al. (1957). Findings confirmed these to be successful in 
detecting differences in the meanings of the selected accounting concepts between 
accounting educators and practising professionals.19 While Oliver’s (1974) study was 
considered to have been correct in accepting the E-P-A structure, Houghton (1997) 
argued that use of the Osgood et al. (1957) scales without adaptation to the 
accounting domain of meaning was less valid than Haried’s (1972, 1973) use of 
scales specifically developed for examining accounting concepts.
Flamholtz and Cook (1978) applied semantic differential analysis to examine the 
connotative meaning of 11 accounting concepts, six of which related to human 
resource accounting. Twelve sematic scales were used, comprising seven from 
Osgood et al. (1957) deemed to be particularly relevant to the chosen concepts and an
Haried (1973) concluded that an alternative technique which measures the denotative aspect of
meaning, the antecedent-consequent method, was more appropriate for this purpose.
The practising professionals comprised accountants, financial analysts, securities dealers,
financial executives and bankers.
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acditional five considered by the researchers to be relevant to human resource 
accounting. A four factor cognitive structure was identified which was only partially 
consistent with the Osgood et al. (1957) E-P-A structure. This comprised two 
abemative evaluative-type factors, labelled ‘evaluati ve/utility ’ and
‘e/aluative/operationalization’, and two potency-type factors, labelled 
‘prtency/benign’ and ‘potency/strong’. An activity-type factor was not identified by 
the study. Differences in the connotative meaning of a number of the alternative 
concepts, by reference to the extracted factors, were found by the study, although no 
significant differences in the connotative meanings of the concepts between the 
accountant and manager participant groups were detected.
Karvel (1979) utilised 48 semantic scales, including 21 from Osgood et al. (1957) and 
17 from Haried (1972), in a study examining the connotative meaning of alternative 
audit opinion paragraphs. Research participants were accountants, lawyers, financial 
analysts and managers/executives. While non-response problems existed with this 
study (Houghton, 1986), Karvel (1979) confirmed the scales to be robust with respect 
to measuring audit report meaning and to be capable of detecting between-group 
differences in meaning.
McNamara and Moores (1982)20 replicated Haried’s (1972) study with undergraduate 
student participants, using the 33 semantic scales and 13 of the 18 accounting 
concepts from Haried (1972). Findings indicated a cognitive structure with four main 
factors; ‘relevance’, ‘reliability’, ‘potency/significance’ and ‘timeliness’.
A crucial issue that arises in the use of semantic differential analysis is determining 
the number of factors (dimensions of meaning) that should be identified. The above
20 This working paper was subsequently published as McNamara and Moores (1995).
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stidies of accounting and auditing concepts were not particularly rigorous in 
es ablishing the number of factors that should comprise the dimensions of connotative 
meaning. In particular, Houghton (1988) was critical of the seven factor model 
identified by Haried (1972, 1973) and the resulting conclusion that the semantic 
differential technique had limited applicability to the study of accounting. Houghton 
therefore sought to show that Haried’s results were inaccurate.
Houghton (1988) re-analysed Haried’s (1973) data utilising a more rigorous method 
to test the reliability and stability of the factor solution. Using factor comparability 
analysis, Houghton found a three factor solution to be generally robust and stable 
for all participant groups except the students, and found these factors to have 
characteristics consistent with an E-P-A structure. The structure was found to be 
stable, both between and within groups, for the ‘sophisticated’ groups (accountants, 
financial analysts and lawyers). Further, based on this shared three-factor structure, 
Haried’s (1973) hypotheses were re-tested for the three sophisticated groups. 
Significant between-group and between-concept differences were found. 
Accordingly, the major contributions of Houghton (1988) were to confirm that the 
measurement of meaning framework could be validly and reliably applied to the 
examination of accounting concepts, but that it was important to test whether any 
cognitive (factor) structure representing dimensions of meaning was robust and 
stable.
Factor comparability analysis was originally designed to test between-group comparability 
(Nunnally, 1978), but can also be used to test comparability within groups (Everett and Entrekin, 
1980). In comparing two groups or sub groups, separate factor analyses are run for each group 
and two sets of factor scores are derived by applying the factor score coefficients from each 
analysis to all responses. Correlations between the two sets of factor scores are then calculated to 
determine comparability, with only high correlations indicating a robust and stable factor 
structure.
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The final study that can be considered to have provided a foundation for application 
of the measurement of meaning framework to accounting and auditing concepts is 
Houghton (1987a). Utilising 22 of the semantic scales from Haried (1972), being 
those that had factor loadings greater than 0.5, Houghton (1987a) examined the 
connotative meaning of the concept ‘true and fair view’. Utilising factor 
comparability analysis, findings indicated differences in cognitive structures for ‘lay’ 
users (private, non-institutional shareholders) and ‘sophisticated’ accountants 
(preparers). The former group exhibited only a simple, single factor structure, while 
the accountants exhibited a more complex, three factor structure similar to an E-P-A 
structure. This is consistent with the view that experts in a particular field exhibit a 
more complex structure within their field than non-experts (Foa and Foa, 1974). 
Accordingly, Houghton (1987a) confirmed the usefulness of the sub-set of 22 of 
Haried’s (1972) scales in evaluating accounting concepts, and also identified possible 
differences in cognitive structures between ‘naive’ and ‘sophisticated’ parties to the 
financial reporting communication process.
In summary, the earlier studies published between 1972 and 1982 showed that the 
measurement of meaning framework could be used to examine accounting and 
auditing concepts. A major limitation, though, was that these studies had not 
rigorously determined the number of alternative dimensions of meaning that should 
be identified. Using more rigorous factor comparability analysis, Houghton (1988) 
showed that robust and stable dimensions of meaning could be extracted. The further 
contributions of Houghton (1987a) were to identify a set of semantic scales that 
exhibited reliability and to highlight differences in cognitive structures between naive 
and sophisticated parties to the financial reporting communication process.
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3.3.2 Further accounting and auditing studies
Building on the foundation studies summarised in the previous sub-section, a further 
seven major studies have employed the measurement of meaning framework within 
the accounting and auditing domain.
Three of these studies (Houghton, 1987b; Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Houghton, 
1997) examined the meaning of a number of general accounting concepts and 
conventions for various groups of students, accountants and financial report users. 
Houghton (1987b) examined the connotative meaning of 13 basic accounting 
concepts and conventions using MBA students. The research instrument, comprising 
17 of Haried’s (1972) semantic scales,22 was administered at both the commencement 
and completion of the students’ MBA accounting course. Findings indicated 
significant changes over the period in the meaning to the students of the accounting 
concepts and conventions. Results also showed changes in the cognitive structure 
underlying those concepts, indicating that these structures can change with relevant 
education. Four major dimensions of meaning were identified (‘potency’, 
‘evaluative’, ‘activity’ and ‘manageable’), although this structure showed a tendency 
to move toward a three dimensional E-P-A structure over the study period.
Houghton and Hronsky (1993) investigated the extent to which there was shared 
meaning between accounting practitioners and final year accounting students of 15 
fundamental accounting concepts. The semantic scales used were the 22 highly 
loading scales from Haried (1972) as used in Houghton (1987a). Findings indicated a 
shared structure between the students and practitioners that was generally consistent 
with an E-P-A structure. However, the positioning of the concepts within this
22 These 17 scales comprised 14 that loaded highly on the first three factors from Haried (1972), 
together with one heavily loading scale from each of the next three factors.
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structure was not shared, with a number of highly significant differences in measured 
meaning between the two groups.
Houghton (1997) examined the connotative meaning of seven basic accounting 
concepts using accountants, bankers, managers and private non-institutional 
shareholders as research participants. The first three of these groups, representing 
‘sophisticated’ groups possessing ‘business experience’, exhibited three factor 
cognitive structures with similarities to an E-P-A structure. However, the private 
shareholders held the meaning of the accounting concepts within a simplistic, one­
dimensional framework. This indicated a lack of shared meaning between the 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated groups. For the three sophisticated groups, a 
small number of differences in measured meaning of the accounting concepts existed 
between accountants and bankers and between accountants and managers. A larger 
number of significant differences existed between bankers and managers.
While the above studies examined general accounting concepts and conventions, 
Houghton and Messier (1990) extended the measurement of meaning research by 
examining concepts of relevance to auditing and audit reports. Houghton and Messier 
(1990) examined the meaning held by auditors and bank lending officers of six 
alternative types of unqualified and qualified audit reports with alternative wordings. 
The alternative wordings were based on changes in the relevant auditing standards in 
the United States. As a mail questionnaire mode of data collection was used, only 12 
semantic differential scales were employed in an attempt to maximise responses. 
These 12 were randomly selected from the 22 highly loading scales from Haried 
(1972). Findings revealed a cognitive structure partially consistent with an E-P-A 
structure, with ‘evaluative’, ‘obligatory’ and ‘potency’ dimensions of meaning 
identified. Within this factor structure, findings revealed significant differences
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between the auditors and bankers, between the alternate audit report wordings from 
the two audit standards, and between the alternative types of unqualified and qualified 
reports.
The measurement of meaning method was extended by Johnson (1992) to examine 
management accounting concepts. Nine concepts were examined, examples of which 
were ‘budget’, ‘product cost’, ‘variance’ and ‘return on investment’. Twelve semantic 
scales were used, eight of which were from Haried (1972) and four developed by the 
researcher for the specific purpose of examining management accounting concepts.23 
Findings indicated a three factor cognitive structure, comprising ‘evaluative’, 
‘activity’ and ‘control’ dimensions of meaning.
Two further studies, Bagranoff et al. (1994) and Hronsky and Houghton (2001), 
extended the research by examining associations between measured meaning and 
accounting decision making. Both studies examined the ‘extraordinary items’ 
accounting concept under various regulatory definitions and sought to determine 
whether auditors’ extraordinary items classification decisions were systematically 
associated with variations in measured meaning.
Bagranoff et al. (1994) examined whether there was shared meaning of the 
‘extraordinary items’ concept among United States and Australian auditors. The 22 
semantic scales from Haried (1972) and Houghton (1987a) were used, and significant 
differences in cognitive structure were found between the two groups of auditors. A 
three factor structure, exhibiting similarities to an E-P-A structure, was discerned for 
the Australian auditors, while a five factor structure was identified for the United
23 These four scales were ‘important-unimportant’, ‘irrelevant-relevant’, ‘cost-oriented-revenue- 
oriented’ and ‘operational-strategic’.
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States’ auditors. The first two factors for the US auditors were labelled ‘activity’ and 
‘potency’, but the remaining three were not capable of easy labelling. Study results 
showed some subtle differences between the two auditor groups in decisions on 
whether particular items should be classified as extraordinary, illustrating the link 
between connotative meaning and accounting decision making.
Hronsky and Houghton (2001) examined the measured meaning of the extraordinary 
items concept in the context of a regulated change in their definition in the relevant 
Australian accounting standard. The research participants, experienced auditors, were 
presented with ten case scenarios where the exercise of judgment was required to 
determine whether each scenario satisfied the extraordinary items definition. Using a 
between-subjects design, one group of auditors determined classification decisions 
based on the superseded extraordinary items definition while the second group used 
the new definition. Utilising the 22 semantic scales validated in the prior studies, a 
cognitive structure consistent with an E-P-A structure was found. The auditors’ 
extraordinary items classification decisions were found to be systematically 
associated with differences in measured meaning of the extraordinary items 
definition. As with the findings of Bagranoff et al. (1994), this provides support for 
the link between connotative meaning and accounting decision making.
In summary, with a small number of notable exceptions, the later studies have 
generally supported the E-P-A structure, or some variation of that structure, for 
sophisticated groups of accountants, auditors and accounting information users. They 
have generally also found shared meanings of concepts within individual groups, but 
some differences in measured meaning between alternate groups. Taken together, the 
studies support the use of the measurement of meaning framework and semantic 
differential analysis in examining accounting and auditing concepts. In particular, the
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studies show that robust and stable cognitive structures within which accounting and 
auditing concepts are interpreted can be discerned by the method.
3.4 INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS
The study’s general research question was stated in Section 3.1 as follows:
Is there shared meaning o f the auditor independence concept between key 
parties to the financial reporting communication process?
Investigative questions are the more specific questions that a researcher must address
to satisfactorily answer the general research question (Emory, 1991). This chapter’s
discussion of the measurement of meaning framework and the semantic differential
technique provides the justification for the following specific investigative questions
required to address the general research question:
What are the dimensions underlying the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept?
Are the dimensions underlying the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept consistent with the E-P-A structure o f Osgood et al. 
(1957)?
Are the dimensions underlying the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept consistent (shared) between key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process?
To what extent are measured meanings o f the auditor independence concept 
affected by various situations that represent potential threats to, and safeguards 
o f independence?
Are there observable differences in the measured meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept between alternative groups o f key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process in response to various situations that 
represent potential threats to, and safeguards of, independence?
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3.5 SUMMARY
An explanation of the Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning research 
framework, which aims to assess the connotative meaning of individual concepts, was 
presented in this chapter. This framework forms the basis for the present study’s 
research method. An overview of the development of the measurement of meaning 
method in prior accounting and auditing studies was provided in the chapter, and the 
study’s general research question and investigative questions were presented.
The chapter’s discussion of the measurement of meaning framework provides the 
basis for the explanation of the present study’s research method, contained in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The research question and investigative questions also presented in 
this chapter provide the basis for the study’s research hypotheses. These are 
developed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION
Following the previous chapter’s discussion of the research framework for the 
measurement of meaning, the aim of this and the following chapter is to describe the 
study’s research method utilising that framework.
The study examines the connotative meaning of the concept of auditor independence 
within an experimental research framework. In utilising the measurement of meaning 
framework to examine the concept of auditor independence across various settings, 
selection is required of (a) alternative experimental audit case scenarios to enable 
investigation of the meaning of the concept across alternative settings, (b) the 
semantic differential scales to be utilised to measure connotative meaning, and 
(c) research participants. This chapter describes construction of the research 
instrument encompassing the experimental cases and the semantic scales. Information 
on the research participants and administration of the research instrument is presented 
in Chapter 5.
A pilot study was undertaken to guide construction of the final research instrument. 
Development of the pilot study is described in Section 4.1, together with results from 
the study and conclusions drawn. The final research instrument is described in 
Section 4.2, followed by a summary in Section 4.3.
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4.1 PILOT STUDY
A pilot study was undertaken for the purpose of providing input into the development 
of the final research instrument, and particularly to guide the development of the 
alternative experimental audit case scenarios and the selection of the semantic scales 
to be used in the study.
A pilot study is a ‘small-scale test-run for a planned piece of empirical research’ 
(Buckingham and Saunders, 2004, p. 293). The aims of a pilot study are to test the 
research instrument or other aspects of the research method on a trial sample for fine- 
tuning purposes (De Vaus, 2002) and to ensure that the planning of the proposed 
study, and its research tools, are correct, suitable, reliable and valid (Sarantakos, 
2005). In the present study, the major aim of pilot testing was to determine the 
suitability of the 22 semantic differential scales from prior accounting and auditing 
research for the purpose of measuring the connotative meaning of the concept of 
auditor independence.
While the pilot study and its findings now form part of the published literature 
(Wines, 2006), they are presented here in their original form.
4.1.1 Pilot study research instrument
The pilot study research instrument is reproduced in Appendix 1. The instrument 
comprised an introduction and general instructions for research participants, followed 
by three experimental audit engagement case scenarios. After each of the three 
scenarios, participants were presented with a response sheet requesting them to 
complete, for each case, (a) an initial question eliciting their perception of the audit
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firm’s independence in the presented scenario on a seven point scale,1 and (b) their 
interpretation of the audit firm’s independence in relation to the 22 semantic scales 
(seven point scale) from the prior accounting and auditing research.
Applying the semantic differential technique to measure connotative meaning 
requires the selection of appropriate semantic scales. While Osgood et al. (1957, 
p. 80) believed that standard factors of judgment exist, they emphasised that ‘the 
particular scales which may, in any given research problem, best represent these 
factors are variable and must be carefully selected by the experimenter to suit his 
(her) purpose.’ Researchers should select scales on some rational basis, such as by 
reference to pre-test results or careful judgment against pre-established criteria 
(Bagranoff, 1990). If the concept or concepts to be measured ‘belong to a domain that 
previous studies have examined, the researcher may use the same set (or a subset) of 
adjectives from that study’ (Bagranoff, 1990, p. 73).
While the concept of auditor independence is within the general domain of 
accounting and auditing, it is obviously not an identical concept to those examined in 
the prior studies summarised in Chapter 3. However, the scales used in those prior 
studies do represent those most rigorously tested across various accounting and audit 
report settings and have proven to be valid, reliable and robust. In pre-testing the 
scales, Houghton (1997) found they covered multi-dimensional semantic space, 
exhibited stability, had relevance and did not induce subject fatigue. As the
i The wording for this question was based on the guidelines expressed in the version of 
Professional Statement F .l applicable at the time (ICAA and CPA Australia, 2002, paras 10 and 
14).
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development of original scales is an extremely complex task,2 the present study’s 
approach has been to pre-test the existing 22 scales to determine their suitability for 
measuring the meaning of the auditor independence concept. These semantic scales 
are shown in Table 4.1 under their E-P-A category headings. The table highlights that 
the 22 scales are distributed evenly across each of the E-P-A categories.
For a discussion of the method used to develop semantic differential scales, see Triandis (1959), 
Haried (1972) and Houghton (1988). Scales are generally developed by a triad procedure, which 
is an adaptation of the Kelly Repertory Test (Kelly, 1955). Participants are presented with sets of 
three concepts which act as stimulus terms. For example, Haried (1972) utilised 14 sets of 
financial report stimulus terms, two examples of which were a) asset, equity, liability, and 
b) book value, market value, cost. Participants are requested to a) identify which of the three 
stimulus terms in each set differs the most from the other two, b) describe the characteristic that 
makes it different, c) describe that characteristic in a single adjective, and d) state the logical 
opposite (antonym) of that adjective.
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Evaluative (E) Scales Potency (P) Scales Activity (A) Scales
B a d - G o o d
B e n e f ic ia l-A d v e rs e
C o n tro lla b le -U n c o n tro lla b le
D is c re t io n a ry -R e q u ire d
N e c e s s a ry -U n n e c e s s a ry
O bj e c ti v e -S u b j  ec ti v e
S a f e - R is k y
U n e x p e c te d -E x p e c te d
C o m p le te - In c o m p le te
In d ire c t-D ire c t
E x a c t-E s tim a te d
M  ea su ra b l e - U  n m e a su ra b  1 e
R e a l- Im a g in a ry
T  a n g ib le - In ta n g ib le
S tro n g -W e a k
In f le x ib le -F le x ib le  
L o n g - te rm -S h o r t- te rm  
P 1 a n n e d -U  n p l a n n e d  
P a s s iv e -A c tiv e  
S ta t ic -D y n a m ic  
T  e m p o ra ry -P e rm a n e n t  
V  a r ia b le -C o n s ta n t
Studies in which the above scales were developed and used:
H o u g h to n  (1 9 8 7 a )
H o u g h to n  (1 9 8 7 b )  (su b se t o f  17 sca le s )
H o u g h to n  (1 9 8 8 )
H o u g h to n  a n d  H ro n sk y  (1 9 9 3 )
H o u g h to n  (1 9 9 7 )
H o u g h to n  a n d  M e ss ie r  (1 9 9 0 )  ( su b se t o f  12 sc a le s )  
B a g ra n o f f  e t  a l. (1 9 9 4 )
H ro n s k y  a n d  H o u g h to n  (2 0 0 1 )
Table 4.1: Semantic scales developed and used in prior 
accounting and auditing studies
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A secondary aim of pilot testing was to guide the development of alternative 
experimental cases. The criterion was to develop cases where variability in the 
semantic differential scales, in measuring connotations of auditor independence under 
those scenarios, would be expected. This allows the cognitive structure (dimensions) 
within which participants interpret the auditor independence concept to be identified.
The pilot research instrument presented participants with three hypothetical audit 
engagement (experimental) case scenarios, as follows:
• Case 1: No major potential threats to auditor independence;
• Case 2: Audit firm provision of a relatively high level of non-audit services;
• Case 3: Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee.
Table 4.2 provides further information on the experimental cases with respect to the 
auditee company, the audit firm and audit engagement partner, and the experimental 
manipulations.
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Auditee Company: -Public com pany operating in retailing.
-L isted on the A ustralian Stock E xchange (A SX ) for the past 20 
years.
-Size: M arket capitalisation ranking o f  around num ber 200 on the 
A SX.
-Sound financial position.
-Eight m em ber board, w ith a clear separation  o f  chairm an and 
m anaging director functions.
-N one o f  the directors act as a d irector o f  any other com pany audited 
by the incum bent audit firm.
-E ffective audit com m ittee, com prising  three non-executive 
directors, established eight years ago.
-No directors w ere previously  em ployees, associates or partners o f  
the audit firm  (m anipulated  in C ase 3).
Audit firm/Audit 
engagement partner:
-U nnam ed ‘B ig F iv e’ audit firm.
-Four years audit firm  tenure, w ith  the sam e audit engagem ent 
partner over that period.
-U nqualified  audit opinions issued in all years by current and p rior 
auditors.
-C urrent year audit fee o f  $162 500, representing  approxim ately  5%  
o f  the total audit fee revenue o f  the audit firm  office, located in 
‘an A ustralian State capital c ity ’.
-No additional audit firm  rem uneration  from  non-audit services over 
the period o f  the audit engagem ent (m anipulated  in C ase 2).
Potential audit threat 
manipulations:
-Provision o f  additional non-audit services (tax com pliance, tax 
p lanning, in form ation  technology system s advice, feasib ility  
studies, m ergers and acquisitions advice) o f  three to four tim es 
the audit fee over the audit firm ’s four year tenure period (C ase 
2).
-Form er partner as director o f  auditee: D irector resigned 18 m onths 
earlier after over 17 years w ith the audit firm, becom ing  d irector 
o f  the auditee 12 m onths earlier (C ase 3).
Table 4.2: Experimental case scenario information — Pilot 
study research instrument
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As noted in Table 4.2, the information on the auditee company specified in all three 
pilot study cases portrayed a financially stable retailing company publicly listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)3 with a market capitalisation ranking of 
‘around number 200’. Strong corporate governance was indicated by reference to a 
clear separation of the chairman and managing director functions and an effective 
audit committee comprising three non-executive directors.
All three cases specified the auditor being an unnamed ‘Big Five’ audit firm to 
portray an audit by a ‘high quality’ auditor. DeAngelo (1981b) argued that audit firm 
size has a major influence on audit quality, as audit firms with a greater number of 
clients have more to lose if they are perceived not to be competent and independent. 
Empirical studies have, in general, found higher audit fees for the first tier (previously 
Big Eight, Big Six, Big Five and now Big Four) auditors.4 This suggests that audit 
clients are prepared to pay higher fees to first tier auditors because those auditors are 
perceived to be providers of higher quality audits.
Each of the three pilot study cases specified that the audit firm had been incumbent 
for the previous four years. This was to suggest an audit that was not a new 
engagement but also not one representing a lengthy period of tenure. The cases also 
specified that the same partner had managed the audit engagement over the four year 
tenure period.
The current year audit fee was stated to be $162 500 in all three cases. This figure 
was derived from actual audit fees for the 2002 financial year for a sample of nine
The Australian Stock Exchange merged with the Sydney Futures Exchange in July 2006 and 
now operates under the brand ‘Australian Securities Exchange’ (ASX Ltd, 2006).
See, for example, Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes (1986), Palmrose (1986a), Francis and 
Simon (1987), Simon and Francis (1988) and Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995).
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companies (excluding banks, financial services companies and trusts) around a 
market capitalisation ranking of 200 on the ASX.5 The average audit fee for the 
sample of nine companies was $174 378.6 The current year audit fee specified in the 
pilot study ($162 500) was slightly below the average fee for the sample companies.
The first experimental case represented an audit scenario in which no major threats to 
auditor independence were indicated. The audit scenarios selected for Cases 2 and 3 
incorporated examples of significant potential threats to auditor independence 
highlighted in the literature. While various independence threats could have been 
selected, these two satisfied the purpose of providing clear contrasts to a situation 
where no major potential threats existed.
The effect on auditor independence of the joint supply of audit and non-audit services 
has been the subject of debate and research since at least the 1960s.7 As far back as 
the late 1970s, it was stated that ‘few aspects of the practice of accountancy have 
been questioned more frequently or scrutinized more closely than the potential effects 
of MAS (management advisory services) on audit independence’ (Klion, 1978, p. 77). 
Also, the spate of corporate collapses earlier this decade brought a renewed focus to
o
the issue. Case 2 in the pilot research instrument indicated that the accounting firm 
had provided additional non-audit services, mainly comprising tax compliance work,
The 2002 year was the latest financial year preceding administration of the pilot study. As 
explained later in Section 4.1.2, the pilot study instrument was administered to research 
participants in June 2003.
Reflecting considerable variation in audit fees for the sample companies, the minimum and 
maximum fees were $37 290 and $438 484 respectively, the median fee was $96 682 and the 
standard deviation was $137 736.
See, for example, Cony (1961), Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Trueblood (1961), Hylton (1964), 
Brooker and Staunton (1966), Schulte (1966, 1967), Hoenemeyer (1967) and Kell (1968).
See, for example, Ramsay (2001), Commonwealth of Australia (2002), Joint Committee of 
Public Accounts and Audit (2002), HIH Royal Commission (2003), Imhoff, (2003) and Wyatt 
(2004).
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tax planning, information technology systems advice, feasibility studies and mergers 
and acquisitions advice.9
The remuneration for the non-audit services specified in Case 2 amounted to between 
three and four times the audit fee for each of the current and prior three years of the 
audit engagement. For the sample of nine companies used as a basis for determining 
the audit fee specified in the pilot study experimental cases, the non-audit services 
fees amounted to an average of 220 per cent of the audit fee.10 The non-audit services 
fees stated in Case 2 (399 per cent of the audit fee in the current year) was specified 
to portray a high level of auditor provided non-audit services.11
Case 3 in the research instrument indicated that one of the auditee company’s 
directors, who had become a director 12 months earlier, had previously been 
employed in the incumbent audit firm for a total period of over 17 years, with 11 of 
these as a partner. The scenario indicated that the current audit engagement partner 
had been with the audit firm for the entire period in which the director (former 
partner) had previously been with the audit firm, although the director had not 
previously been involved in the audit of the auditee. The case indicated that the 
current audit engagement partner had worked as an audit supervisor and manager on 
several audits for which the director had previously been the manager or audit 
engagement partner, hence indicating a previous close working relationship between
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, some of these non-audit services became subject to later 
legislative limitations. However, while ‘information technology services’ and ‘corporate finance 
and similar activities’ were mentioned as an area of concern in the CLERP 9 discussion paper 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, pp. 3-4), all the non-audit services listed were permissible 
at the time the pilot study was undertaken.
The minimum and maximum non-audit fees amounted to 33 per cent and 861 per cent of the 
company audit fee respectively, with a median of 130 per cent of the audit fee and a standard 
deviation of 252 per cent.
This was almost twice the average non-audit services percentage of 220 per cent for the sample 
companies, but was less than one-half the highest non-audit services percentage of 861 per cent.
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the two. Prior research has indicated that financial report users’ perceptions of auditor 
independence tend to be diminished when an auditor accepts employment with a 
client (Imhoff, 1978; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993; Parlin and Bartlett, 1994; Kaplan 
and Whitecotton, 2001). This threat scenario was particularly relevant given the HIH 
Insurance collapse, where three of HIH’s directors, including the chairman, were 
formerly partners of the incumbent audit firm (Ramsay, 2001; HIH Royal 
Commission, 2003).
4.1.2 Pilot study research participants
The pilot study research instrument was administered in June 2003 to 103 
undergraduate students at the end of their single semester third year auditing course at 
two Australian universities. The research instrument was administered in the same 
week at each university under controlled conditions. The independence topic had 
been taught at each university over a one week period early in the semester in 
accordance with the normal course curriculum.12 The content of the auditing course at 
each university and their coverage of auditor independence were similar in nature.
Eighty-nine usable responses were received from the 103 pilot research instruments 
distributed to students, representing a usable response rate of 86.4 per cent. Non- 
usable responses involved students either not completing the research instrument at 
all or completing it in an obviously careless manner or without any thought. 
Examples of the latter were students marking the midpoint or the same endpoint of all 
scales for all three cases, or ticking the scales in the form of a pattern for all cases.
12 That is, there was no change in emphasis in the courses on the issues comprising the 
experimental cases.
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Given the pilot study results summarised in the following sub-section, which 
established the general suitability of the pilot research instrument, the non-usable 
response rate of 13.6 per cent was not considered to be excessive. The usable 
response rate for students would be expected to be lower than for more committed, 
expert and mature groups of participants.
4.1.3 Pilot study results
Descriptive statistics of the semantic scale data from the pilot study, presented in 
descending order of variance, are shown in Table 4.3. Lusk (1973) suggests a 
procedure for choosing scales based on the computation of variances following pre­
testing, with scales showing the greatest variance being selected for the final study. 
Table 4.3 indicates that the 22 scales had variances of between 1.72 and 3.84 (seven 
point scale), and all had a range from the lowest to highest possible values. Also, a 
mix of evaluative, potency and activity scales is evident in the scales that exhibited 
highest variances. The ten scales with variances exceeding 2.5 comprised five 
evaluative, two potency and three activity scales. Of the 13 scales with variances 
exceeding 2.3, there were six evaluative, three potency and four activity scales.
13 All statistical analyses undertaken in this thesis were conducted using the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 12.0 (SPSS Inc, 2002) and Version 14.0 (SPSS Inc, 2005).
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Semantic scale 
(E-P-A)
Variance Standard
Deviation
Mean Minimum Maximum
Safe-R isky (E) 3 .84 1.96 4 .28 1 7
Strong-W eak (P) 3 .77 1.94 4 .08 1 7
B ad-G ood (E) 3 .40 1.85 3 .94 1 7
D iscretionary-Required (E) 3 .07 1.75 4 .67 1 7
B eneficial-A dverse (E) 3 .06 1.75 3 .76 1 7
V ariable-C onstant (A) 3 .02 1.74 4.15 1 7
O bjective-Subjective (E) 2 .93 1.71 3.96 1 7
C om plete-Incom plete (P) 2.71 1.65 3.99 1 7
Long-term -Short-term  (A) 2 .66 1.63 3 .50 1 7
Tem porary-Perm anent (A) 2 .54 1.60 4 .29 1 7
Controllable-U ncontrollable (E) 2 .43 1.56 3.48 1 7
Passive-A ctive (A) 2 .40 1.55 4 .16 1 7
R eal-Im aginary (P) 2 .34 1.53 3.53 1 7
N ecessary-U nnecessary (E) 2 .29 1.51 2 .30 1 7
U nexpected-Expected (E) 2 .28 1.51 4 .57 1 7
M easurable-U nm easurable (P) 2 .22 1.49 3.31 1 7
Exact-Estim ated (P) 2.21 1.49 3.96 1 7
Planned-U nplanned (A) 2 .16 1.47 3 .22 1 7
Indirect-D irect (P) 2 .09 1.44 4 .22 I 7
Tangible-Intangible (P) 2 .03 1.42 3 .87 1 7
Inflexible-Flexible (A) 2 .00 1.42 4 .1 6 1 7
Static-D ynam ic (A) 1.72 1.31 3 .90 1 7
N = 267 (89 participants times three experimental cases)
Table 4.3: Pilot study descriptive statistics
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Consistent with the prior measurement of meaning literature, the data reduction 
process used for the semantic differential data was factor analysis with varimax 
(orthogonal) rotation (see, for example, Osgood et al. 1957, Houghton 1987a, 1987b, 
1988; Houghton and Messier 1990; McNamara and Moores 1995; Hronsky and 
Houghton 2001). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.921, 
a level considered to be ‘marvellous’ (Kaiser 1970, 1974). Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
was significant at p < .001.14
Factor analysis of all responses revealed five factors with an eigenvalue of greater 
than one, as shown in Panel A of Table 4.4. The scree plot presented in Panel B 
suggested anywhere between a one and five factor solution.
The participants’ responses were randomly split into two halves to enable factor 
comparability testing (Nunnally, 1978; Everett and Entrekin, 1980; Houghton, 1987a, 
1988). Separate factor analyses were run for each half, and two sets of factor scores 
were derived by applying the factor score coefficients from each half to the responses 
of all participants. Correlations between the two sets of factor scores were then 
calculated to determine comparability.15 Results of the factor comparability analysis 
for three, two and single factor models are presented in Panel C of Table 4.4.
Bartlett’s test statistic equalled 3094.0 (231 degrees of freedom). Bartlett’s test is used to 
evaluate the overall significance of all correlations within the correlation matrix (Hair et al., 
1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
Parametric Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated as the factor scores represented 
interval data.
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Panel A: Eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative %
1 8.63 39.24 39.24
2 1.65 7.49 46.73
3 1.39 6.32 53.05
4 1.33 6.06 59.11
5 1.16 5.25 64.36
6 0.93 4.22 68.58
7 0.77 3.48 72.06
8 0.73 3.32 75.38
9 0.68 3.08 78.46
10 0.60 2.74 81.20
Panel B: Scree plot
Factor Number
Panel C: Factor comparability analysis
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
3 factor m odel 
2 factor m odel 
1 factor m odel
0.930 0.844 0.380
0.941 0.823
0.988
Table 4.4: Pilot study eigenvalues, scree plot and factor comparability analysis
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The eigenvalues and scree plot indicate the dominance of the first factor extracted. 
With an eigenvalue of 8.63, it explained over five times the variance of the second 
factor (eigenvalue of 1.65). This dominance of the first factor can be compared with 
the prior accounting and auditing studies utilising these 22 scales and in which 
eigenvalues were published.16 In prior studies deriving three or four factor solutions, 
the highest eigenvalue was 6.76 (Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). The only study 
finding a higher eigenvalue than in the pilot study was Houghton (1987a), where a 
single factor solution had an eigenvalue of 9.1 for shareholder participants 
(Houghton, 1987a).
The results of factor comparability testing presented in Panel C of Table 4.4 indicated 
that a three factor model was not robust and stable for the pilot study data, given the 
correlation of only 0.380 for the third factor. In contrast, the single factor model was 
highly robust and stable. Fifteen of the 22 scales had factor loadings on the single 
factor exceeding 0.5, while another three scales had loadings of at least 0.478. Hence,
1 718 of the 22 scales had high loadings (at least 0.478) under the single factor model.
The two factor model had a structure approaching stability. The first factor’s 
correlation coefficient was 0.941. The second factor’s correlation of 0.823 was above 
the arbitrary threshold of 0.8 initially suggested by Everett and Entreken (1980, 
p 169), but below the more rigorous cutoff of 0.9 suggested by Everett (1983) and 
Houghton (1987a, 1987b, 1988). Table 4.5 shows the nature of the factors obtained 
under the two factor model. As with the single factor model, 15 of the 22 scales had 
factor loadings above 0.5.
These studies were Houghton (1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1997), Houghton and Messier (1990), 
Houghton and Hronsky (1993) and Hronsky and Houghton (2001).
The four scales with low factor loadings were discretionary-required, inflexible-flexible, 
necessary-unnecessary, and static-dynamic.
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Panel A: Rotated factor matrix -  2 factor model
Scales
Factors
1 2
S trong-W eak .808 P .398
S afe-R isky .771 E .401
O bjective-Subjective .758 E .214
B ad-G ood -.756 E -.389
B enefic ia l-A dverse .701 E .405
C om plete-Incom plete .662 P .441
E xact-E stim ated .568 P .377
T em porary-Perm anent -.066 -.645 A
U nexpected-E xpected -.211 -.629 E
L ong-term -Short-term .120 .607 A
R eal-Im ag inary .497 .590 P
V ariab le-C onstan t -.302 -.556 A
Ind irec t-D irect -.201 -.554 P
T angib le-In tang ib le .237 .532 P
M easurable-U nm easurable .199 .520 P
P lanned-U nplanned .406 .470
P assive-A ctive -.425 -.459
C ontro llab le-U ncontro llab le .390 .370
D iscretionary-R equired -.213 -.255
Inflex ib le-F lex ib le -.200 -.100
N ecessary -U  nnecessary .251 .101
S ta tic-D ynam ic -.214 .082
(Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
(Rotation Method: Varimax)
Panel B: Factor structure
F a c t o r  1: E m p h a s i s F a c t o r  2 :  V a r i a b i l i t y
S trong-W eak
S afe-R isky
Obj ecti ve-S ub j ecti ve
G ood-B ad
B enefic ia l-A dverse
C om plete-Incom plete
E xac t-E stim ated
Perm anent-T  em porary 
Expected-U nexpected 
Long-term -Short-term  
R eal-Im aginary  
C onstan t-V  ariable 
D irect-Indirect 
T angib le-In tangib le 
M easurable-U nm easurable
(Individual scales are reversed in Panel B above where necessary to denote positive 
correlation between individual scales and the relevant factor)
Table 4.5: Pilot study two factor cognitive structure
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The two factors identified were partially consistent with the standard E-P-A 
(evaluative, potency, activity) structure. Factor 1 consisted of scales with both 
evaluative and potency dimensions, but this combination is explainable. For the 
independence concept, the safe, objective, good and beneficial evaluative scales are 
similar in effect to the strong, complete and exact potency scales. For example, high 
objectivity is traditionally associated with auditor independence, and such 
independence would also be considered to be strong. Accordingly, given the nature of 
the individual evaluative and potency scales comprising this first factor, the factor 
could be labelled EMPHASIS.
Factor 2 consisted of scales with both activity and potency dimensions. The 
permanent-temporary, expected-unexpected, long-term-short-term and constant- 
variable scales represent activity scales having temporal connotations. The real- 
imaginary, direct-indirect, tangible-intangible and measurable-unmeasurable scales 
have been associated in prior research with a substantiveness factor, a sub-set of 
potency (Houghton, 1987a, 1988, 1997; Houghton and Messier, 1990; Houghton and 
Hronsky, 1993; Bagranoff et al., 1994). With respect to the concept of auditor 
independence, the activity and potency (substantiveness) scales comprising this 
second factor do have a high degree of similarity. For example, an assessment of 
independence as permanent and long-term also indicates that it is real, direct and 
tangible. Accordingly, given the nature of the individual activity scales comprising 
this second factor, a factor label of VARIABILITY could be used.
Further comparison can be made of the factor scores between the three case scenarios 
to determine whether there was a significant difference in connotations of 
independence between the scenario where no major potential independence threats
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were present and those where potential threats were introduced. Table 4.6 shows the 
placement of the independence concept within the two factor cognitive structure.18
Factor placements, presented in Panel A of Table 4.6, were positive for both the 
EMPHASIS and VARIABILITY factors for Case 1 but negative for both factors for 
Cases 2 and 3. The results of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) show 
significant differences in factor scores for both factors between the experimental 
cases.
18 To aid interpretability, and consistent with prior studies, factor placements are obtained by 
multiplying factor scores by 100.
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Panel A: One-way ANQVA of factor placement means
Factor p acements
Case scenarios E m p h a sis V a r ia b il it y
1. No major threats +88 +50
2. Non-audit services -33 -15
3. Ex-audit partner director -55 -35
ANOVA: F 117.6 27.15
P <.001 <.001
(The signs of factor placements have been reversed to simplify interpretation)
Panel B: Post hoc comparison tests of factor placements
F actor 1: EMPHASIS
Case scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Case 1 versus Case 2 121 p <  .001 /?< .001
Case 1 versus Case 3 143 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 2 versus Case 3 22 p = .094 p = .089
F actor 2: VARIABILITY
Case scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Case 1 versus Case 2 65 p < . 0 0 \ p < .0 0 1
Case 1 versus Case 3 85 p <  .001 p < .0 0 1
Case 2 versus Case 3 20 N.S. N.S.
N.S. = Not significant
Table 4.6: Pilot study case placements within two factor cognitive structure
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The results of the post hoc comparison tests presented in Panel B of Table 4.6 show 
no significant difference in factor placements on either of the two factors, at p<  .05, 
between Cases 2 and 3.19 There was a difference of moderate significance between 
these two cases for the EMPHASIS factor. There were, though, highly significant 
differences in factor scores for the two factors between Cases 1 and 2 and between 
Cases 1 and 3. In summary, for both the factors EMPHASIS and VARIABILITY, 
factor placements were significantly higher in the no major threat scenario (Case 1) in 
comparison to Cases 2 and 3. For the two factors, factor placements were positive in 
Case 1 where no major potential independence threats were present, but were 
negative in Cases 2 and 3 where potential independence threats were indicated. In the 
two case scenarios where potential independence threats were present, the audit 
firm’s independence was considered, in the terminology of the factor labels adopted, 
to have less emphasis (for example, to be weaker, more risky, less objective and less 
beneficial) and to have greater variability (for example, to be more temporary, more 
short-term, less real and more intangible).
The initial question following each case scenario in the pilot research instrument 
elicited participants’ perceptions of the audit firm’s independence. Mean perception 
scores for Cases 1 to 3 on the seven point scale were 6.02, 3.13 and 2.70 respectively. 
One-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference in these responses (F = 189.37,
Post hoc tests, also known as posttests and multiple comparison techniques, are conducted after 
an ANOVA to determine which mean differences are significant (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2004). 
The three most popular of these are Bonferroni, Scheffe and Tukey (Lindman, 1992; Agresti and 
Finlay, 1997). Bonferroni is considered to have the greatest power when the number of 
comparison tests is small (Lindman (1992). Tukey is limited to tests of contrasts with equal 
sample sizes (Lindman, 1992). The Scheffe test is accepted as the most conservative and flexible 
of the popular methods and is more suitable for testing complex comparisons (Hair et at, 1998; 
Tabchnick and Fidell, 2001; Gravetter and Wallnau, 2004). Based on these considerations, the 
approach in the present study is to show both Bonferroni and Scheffe results.
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20p < .001).“ Of relevance to an evaluation of the two factor cognitive structure, the 
perception scores were significantly correlated (at /?<.001) with both the 
EMPHASIS and VARIABILITY factors.21
4.1.4 Conclusions from the pilot study
The pilot study results can be summarised as follows:
• All 22 scales exhibited variability across the three case scenarios, and all had a 
range from the lowest to highest of the possible values. A mix of scales across 
those generally considered to represent evaluative, potency and activity 
dimensions was evident in the scales exhibiting the highest variances.
• While the analysis did not reveal a three factor E-P-A structure for the student 
participants, significant aspects of such a structure were found within the two 
factor model."“ While the second factor did not have a split-half correlation of 
0.9, the correlation of 0.823 indicated 67.7 per cent shared variance. Also, the 
two factors under this model were interpretable and could be considered to 
have substantive importance.
• Factor scores for both factors under the two factor model were significantly 
different between the case where no major independence threats were 
indicated and the two cases where threat scenarios were introduced. These 
factor scores were significantly correlated with participants’ perception scores.
• Under the more robust and stable single factor model, 18 of the 22 scales had 
high loadings. These scales represented a mix of evaluative, potency and 
activity scales.
Based on the above findings, it was concluded that the 22 semantic scales were 
suitable for examining the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept,
Post hoc comparison testing indicated significant differences between the first and second and 
the first and third cases (at/? < .001).
Spearman correlation coefficients between the perception scores and the EMPHASIS and 
VARIABILITY factors were 0.782 and 0.453 respectively. Non-parametric Spearman 
correlations were calculated as the perception scores represented ordinal data.
Osgood et al. (1957, p. 79) recognised that the E-P-A structure might not be applicable to all 
cases.
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and therefore were appropriate for use in the final research instrument for the study.23 
This conclusion was particularly based on the exhibited variability of the scales 
across the different experimental cases, the fact that a robust and stable two factor 
cognitive structure appeared to be emerging, and the fact that a robust and stable 
single factor model was found.
The pilot study also provided input into issues of relevance in developing the study’s 
final research instrument. These issues related to the format of the research 
instrument and experimental cases, the participants’ understanding and completion of 
the research instrument, and statistical analysis issues.
The pilot study indicated that the format of the research instrument and experimental 
cases was appropriate in terms of being understandable and capable of completion in 
a reasonable period of time.24 Further, the cases elicited variability in participants’ 
responses to the semantic scales. The instructions for completing the research 
instrument tasks were understandable to the student participants and enabled them to 
effectively complete the required tasks.
Finally, the statistical analysis methods undertaken were found to be appropriate. In 
particular, the measurement of meaning research framework, utilising semantic 
differential analysis and factor analysis, was successfully applied to the pilot study’s 
data, and various statistically significant differences between the different 
experimental cases were found.
While four of the scales did not have high loadings under either the single or two factor models, 
it was decided to utilise all 22 scales in the final research instrument for consistency with the 
prior research.
The students completed the research instrument containing the three experimental cases in a 
maximum of 50 minutes.
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4.2 FINAL RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
The final research instrument is described in this section, focusing on the semantic 
differential scales, the experimental case scenarios and the alternate versions of the 
research instrument.25
4.2.1 Semantic differential scales
Based on the pilot study results, and as noted in sub-section 4.1.4 above, the 22 
semantic differential scales from the prior accounting and auditing studies were 
assessed as being suitable for examining the connotative meaning of the auditor 
independence concept. Accordingly, those 22 scales were utilised in the final research 
instrument.
4.2.2 Experimental case scenarios
The experimental cases developed for the final research instrument were designed to 
enable investigation of any variability in measured meaning across different scenarios 
and between different research participant groups. Nine cases were developed 
representing alternative hypothetical, but realistic, audit engagement scenarios.
The experimental cases manipulated the audit engagement scenarios with respect to 
potential independence threats and safeguards. The justification for these various case 
manipulations and the prior research on which they are based are provided in Chapter 
6 when developing the study’s research hypotheses. However, to introduce the 
manipulations here, the potential threats to auditor independence were:
25 The final research instrument was developed with the input and feedback at various stages of a 
number of other academics. These particularly included the PhD supervisor and four 
experienced accounting and economics academics at Deakin University.
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• Interlocking directorships among audit clients;
• Longer period of audit firm tenure;
• Provision of non-audit (taxation) services;
• Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee.
Th; independence safeguards manipulated in the cases were:
• Period of audit partner rotation;
• Audit subject to additional oversight by the United States Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB);
• Local (internal) independence board within the audit firm.
Th; above experimental manipulations represent contemporary auditor independence 
issies. They comprise potential independence threats highlighted in the literature that 
car presently arise, independence safeguards introduced to mitigate potential 
independence threats, or proposals for additional independence safeguards. As noted 
abcve, the prior literature justifying selection of the threat and safeguard conditions 
anc forming the basis for development of the experimental case scenarios is presented 
in Chapter 6.
Figure 4.1 presents an overview diagram of the experimental cases. This is followed 
by Table 4.7, which provides further details on the cases with respect to the auditee 
company, the audit firm and audit engagement partner, and the experimental
manipulations.
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A uditee C om pany: -Public com pany operating  in retailing.
-L isted  on the A SX  for the past 20 years.
-Size: M arket cap ita lisation  ranking  o f  around num ber 200 on the 
A SX .
-Sound financial position.
-E ight m em ber board, w ith  a c lear separation  o f  chairm an and 
m anaging d irec tor functions.
-N one o f  the directors act as a d irector o f  any other com pany audited 
by the incum bent audit firm  (m anipulated  in C ase 2).
-E ffective audit com m ittee, com prising  three non-executive 
directors, established eight years ago.
-No directors w ere previously  em ployees, associates o r partners o f  
the audit firm  (m anipulated  in C ases 8 and 9).
A udit firm /A u d it  
en gagem en t partner:
-U nnam ed ‘B ig F o u r’ audit firm.
-U nqualified  audit opinions issued in all years by current and prior 
auditors.
-Four years audit firm  tenure, w ith  the sam e audit engagem ent 
partner over that period (m anipulated  in Cases 3 and 4).
-C urrent year audit fee o f  $192 500, representing  approxim ately  5%  
o f  the total audit fee revenue o f  the audit firm  office, located in 
‘an A ustra lian  State capital c ity ’.
-No additional audit firm  rem uneration  from  non-audit services over 
the period o f  the audit engagem ent (m anipulated  in C ases 5, 6 and 
7).
P otentia l audit threat 
m an ipu lation s:
-In terlocking directorships (C ase 2): T hree o f  the eight d irectors also 
non-executive directors o f other com panies currently audited  by  
the incum bent audit firm.
-N ine years audit firm  tenure (C ases 3 and 4).
-P rovision o f  additional non-audit (taxation) services over the audit 
firm ’s four year tenure period: Low  level (approxim ately  one-half 
the audit fee, C ase 7) and high level (three to four tim es the audit 
fee, C ases 5 and 6).
-Form er audit partner as d irec to r o f  auditee: D irector resigned 12 
m onths earlier after 17 years w ith  the audit firm , becom ing 
d irector o f  the auditee eight m onths earlier (C ases 8 and 9).
A u d it safeguard  
m anipu lations:
-Period o f  audit partner ro tation  (w ith  nine years audit firm  tenure): 
four years (C ase 3) and seven years (C ase 4).
-A uditor and audit firm  subject to oversight by  the US PC A O B  due 
to debt and equity  ra ising by  the auditee in the U nited  States 
(C ase 5).
-Local (internal) independence board  w ith in  the audit firm , 
com prising  a panel o f  four experts (C ase 8).
Table 4.7: Experimental case scenario information — Final 
research instrument
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A summary of the scenario information presented in the final research instrument 
experimental cases was summarised in Table 4.7. It was concluded in sub-section 
4.1.4 that the experimental cases in the pilot study were understandable to research 
participants and that the research instrument was capable of completion in a 
reasonable period of time. Also, the measurement of meaning research framework, 
utilising semantic differential analysis and factor analysis, was successfully applied to 
the data from the pilot study’s experimental cases. Accordingly, the basic audit 
engagement scenario information developed for the final research instrument 
experimental cases, as summarised in Table 4.7, was substantially based on that in the 
pilot study cases.
The information on the auditee company specified in all nine cases in the final 
research instrument, as in the pilot study, portrayed a financially stable retailing 
company publicly listed on the ASX with a market capitalisation ranking of around 
number 200. Strong corporate governance was indicated by reference to a clear 
separation of the chairman and managing director functions and an effective audit 
committee comprising three non-executive directors.
All nine cases specified the auditor being an unnamed ‘Big Four’ audit firm to portray 
an audit by a high quality auditor. The nine cases specified that unqualified audit 
opinions had been issued in all years by the current and prior auditors. In all except 
Cases 3 and 4 where audit firm tenure was manipulated to indicate a longer nine year 
tenure period, the cases specified, as in the pilot study, an audit firm tenure period of 
four years.
While the current year audit fee was stated to be $162 500 in the pilot study cases, 
this was increased to $192 500 in the final research instrument cases. This was to
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reflect the later time period in which the final research instrument was administered,26 
and the significant increase in Australian audit fees being forecast at the time 
following increases in professional indemnity insurance premiums, the corporate 
collapse of HIH Insurance, the demise of Andersen resulting in the ‘Big Five’ 
becoming the ‘Big Four’, and the various proposals for audit reform being advanced
97and debated.“
4.2.3 Research instrument: Alternate versions and variations
Three alternate versions of the research instrument were developed, each containing 
three experimental cases. Version 1 contained Cases 2, 3 and 5, Version 2 contained 
Cases 4, 6 and 8 and Version 3 contained Cases 1, 7 and 9.
It would be unreasonable to expect individual research participants to complete all 
nine experimental cases, as fatigue effects would be likely. Fatigue effects result in 
participant performance on a research task deteriorating as a result of boredom or 
tiredness (Haslam and McGarty, 2003). Accordingly, based on a decision that an 
individual participant could realistically respond to three cases in a reasonable time, 
the nine experimental cases were distributed, as described above, between the three
98major alternate versions of the research instrument.
Six variations within each of the three versions of the research instrument were 
developed. This was to protect against order effects. Order effects occur when
The pilot study research instrument was administered in June 2003 while, as noted in the 
following chapter, administration of the final research instrument commenced in March 2004.
See, for example, Bartholomeusz (2002), Buffini (2002b), Walters (2002b), Palmer (2003), 
Walters and Andrews (2004) and Wilson (2004). As administration of the research instrument 
commenced in March 2004, listed public company annual reports for the year ended 30 June 
2004 were not available at that time to confirm the extent of any audit fee increases.
As noted in Section 4.1.3, student participants completed the pilot study research instrument, 
comprising three cases, in a maximum of 50 minutes.
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participant responses in experimental research are affected by the order in which they 
are made. They represent ‘(e)xperimental effects that result from the sequencing of 
experimental treatments or the completion of dependent measures’ (Haslam and 
McGarty, 2003, p. 89), and can arise when the experimental tasks are completed in a 
serial manner (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001).
Order effects could potentially arise in the current research from the presentation 
order of the experimental cases and the semantic differential scales. Accordingly, for 
each of the three major versions of the research instrument, alternate variations 
presented the three experimental cases applicable to that version in all six possible 
orders. Also, three variations in the order of presentation of the semantic differential 
scales were used. These variations involved switching the top and bottom halves of 
the 22 scales and ‘flipping’ the end points of the individual scales.
A summary of the distribution of the cases between the three major versions of the 
instrument, and the variations within each of the three versions, is presented in Table 
4.8. Panel A of the table summarises the experimental cases presented within each of 
the three major versions of the research instrument. Panel B summarises the 
variations within each of the three major research instrument versions. The third 
column of Panel B presents the presentation order of the cases within each variation 
of the research instrument, while the final column shows the variations in the order of 
presentation of the semantic scales. As described above, three variations in the order 
of presentation of the scales were used, involving switching the top and bottom 
halves of the 22 scales and flipping the scale end points. Scales were presented in the 
same order as in the pilot study in the first variation (see Appendix 1). In the second 
variation, the end points of the final 11 scales were flipped and the top and bottom 
halves then switched. The third variation altered the order of presentation of the
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scales contained in the first version by flipping the end points of the first 11 scales 
and then switching the top and bottom halves.
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Panel A: Versions of research instrument
Version Company name Case scenario
Version 1
-C ase 2 O perations Ltd In terlock ing  d irec torsh ips.
-C ase 3 C orpora tion  Ltd L onger period  o f  aud it firm  tenure (n ine years); p artn e r ro tation  
every  four years.
-C ase 5 H oldings Ltd H igh level o f  tax non-aud it serv ices w ith  add itional PC A O B  
oversight.
Version 2
-C ase 4 A nonym ous Ltd L onger period  o f  audit firm  tenure (nine years); partn e r ro tation  
every  seven years.
-C ase 6 C om pany Ltd H igh level o f  tax non-aud it serv ices w ithou t add itiona l PC A O B  
oversight.
-C ase 8 E nterprise Ltd E x-partner as a d irec to r o f  the auditee; aud it firm  w ith  local 
independence board .
Version 3
-C ase 1 H ypothetical Ltd N o m ajo r po ten tia l independence threats.
-C ase 7 E ntity  L td L ow  level o f  tax non-aud it serv ices w ithout additional PC A O B  
oversight.
-C ase 9 Retail L td E x-partner as d irec to r o f  auditee; audit firm  w ithou t local 
independence board.
Panel B: Variations in research instrument versions
Variations in 
Version
Case order Semantic scale order
V ersion 1 1A 2 , 3 , 5 V ariation 1
(Cases 2, 3, 5) IB 2, 5 ,3 V ariation 1
1C 3 , 2 , 5 V ariation 2
ID 3, 5 ,2 V ariation 2
IE 5 , 2 , 3 V ariation 3
IF 5, 3 ,2 V ariation 3
V ersion 2 2A 4, 6 ,8 V ariation 1
(Cases 4, 6, 8) 2B 4, 8 ,6 V ariation 1
2C 6, 4 ,8 V ariation 2
2D 6, 8 ,4 V ariation 2
2E 8, 4 ,6 V ariation 3
2F 8, 6 ,4 V ariation 3
V ersion 3 3A 1 , 7 , 9 V ariation 1
(C ases 1, 7, 9) 3B 1 , 9 , 7 V ariation 1
3C 7 , 1 , 9 V ariation 2
3D 7, 9 ,1 V ariation 2
3E 9 , 1 , 7 V ariation 3
3F 9, 7 ,1 V ariation 3
Table 4.8: Alternate versions of the research instrument
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The nine cases were distributed between the three major versions of the research 
instrument to allow between-subjects, rather than within-subjects, comparisons. A 
within-subjects research design involves changes to an independent variable where 
the same participants are exposed to the variable manipulations, while a between- 
subjects design involves different participants being exposed to the manipulations 
(Balnaves and Caputi, 2001; Haslam and McGarty, 2003). Within-subjects designs 
therefore compare responses from the same group of research participants, while 
between-subjects designs compare responses of different groups.
Prior auditor independence perception studies investigating the effects of the auditor 
provision of non-audit services to audit clients indicate that it is important to employ 
a between-subjects design. Early studies employing within-subjects designs generally 
found that individual research participants perceived an impairment of auditor 
independence when non-audit services were also provided.29 However, in a study 
employing a between-subjects design, McKinley, Pany and Reckers (1985) did not 
find decreased perceptions of independence when the auditor also provided non-audit 
services. To investigate this anomaly, Pany and Reckers (1987) devised a three part 
study utilising two within-subjects and one between-subjects design. In the within- 
subjects design, respondents perceived an impairment of auditor independence when 
there was a joint provision of audit and non-audit services. However, this perception 
of independence impairment was not found in the between-subjects design. This 
finding was also replicated by Gul and Windsor (1994). These results suggest that the 
design of the experiment can be critical to the research results, and that a between-
29 See for example, Titard (1971), Hartley and Ross (1972), Lavin (1976, 1977), Lavin and Libby 
(1977), Reckers and Stagliano (1981), Shockley (1981), Pany and Reckers (1983, 1984) and 
Knapp (1985).
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subjects design is appropriate for experimental research investigating interpretations 
of auditor independence under various scenarios.
Hence, the case comparisons investigated in this study are based on between-subjects 
comparisons. While individual participants did each respond to three cases, this 
study’s analysis only compares responses from different participant groups. That is, 
comparisons are made only between responses to cases in different versions of the 
research instrument.30
4.2.4 Format of research instrument
The prior sub-sections explained the semantic differential scales and experimental 
cases utilised within the research instrument. This sub-section outlines how the entire 
research instrument was compiled for presentation to research participants.
The first section of the research instrument, reproduced in Appendix 2.1, contained 
the cover sheet and instructions. The instructions contained general guidance on 
completing the semantic scales and introduced the three cases that followed.
The three cases applicable to the individual version of the research instrument were 
then presented. The full text of each of these appears in Appendix 2.2.
Each case was followed by a response sheet, the three versions of which are 
reproduced in Appendix 2.3. Participants were firstly asked to respond, on a seven 
point scale with end points ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’, to the question 
‘To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this case would
Hence, for example, between-subjects comparison can be made of responses to Case 7 (low 
level of tax services without PCAOB oversight), Case 6 (high level of tax services without 
PCAOB oversight) and Case 5 (high level of tax services with PCAOB oversight) as these three 
cases appear in different versions of the research instrument.
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have maintained its independence’. This was followed by the 22 semantic scales, 
which participants completed in response to the statement ‘I interpret the 
independence of the audit firm in this case situation to be:’ A final question, asking 
for a ‘Yes/No’ response, was ‘If you were a non-executive director of the company in 
this case, would you regard the audit appointment to be satisfactory with respect to 
the independence of the audit firm?’ Accordingly, in addition to the 22 semantic 
scales, participants provided two additional responses to questions seeking their 
perception of the audit firm’s independence, one on a seven point scale and the other 
seeking a dichotomous response.
Following the response sheet for each case was a series of four questions, one for 
each major version of the research instrument, designed as manipulation checks. 
Manipulation checks, comprising specific questions embedded in the questionnaire, 
assess how participants perceive and interpret the particular manipulation (Gravetter 
and Forzano, 2006). In the present study, it allows a conclusion to be drawn on 
whether participants understood the manipulations of the potential auditor 
independence threats and safeguards in the case scenarios they were presented with. 
The three versions of the manipulation check questions are shown in Appendix 2.4
The final section of the research instrument, shown in Appendix 2.5, sought 
biographical details of the participants. These included details on current occupation, 
years experience in that occupation, use of audited financial reports, professional 
accounting association membership, gender, age and educational background.
4.3 SUMMARY
Construction of the study’s research instrument was summarised in this chapter. 
Discussion was included of the pilot study research instrument, pilot study results,
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conclusions drawn from those results, and a description of the final research 
instrument developed on the basis of the pilot study. The discussion in the chapter 
provides a background for the following chapter’s description of the study’s research 
participants and administration of the research instrument with those participants.
Il l
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
Following the previous chapter’s discussion of construction of the research 
instrument, the aim of this chapter is to describe the study’s research participants and 
procedures for administration of the research instrument.
The study seeks to examine whether there is shared meaning of the auditor 
independence concept between groups of key parties to the financial reporting 
communication process. It was highlighted in Chapter 2 that it will be difficult for 
auditors to effectively consider and evaluate their independence, particularly in 
marginal situations, if the exact meaning of independence is subject to ambiguity and 
uncertainty and if their own interpretation of the meaning of the concept differs from 
that of other parties to the financial reporting communication process.
The three major parties to the financial reporting communication process are financial 
report preparers, auditors and financial report users. The study’s research participants 
selected to represent these three groups are described in this chapter. The research 
instrument was administered with the research participants between 23 March 2004 
and 5 May 2005.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Sample size considerations are discussed in Section 
5.1. A description of the auditor research participants, and administration of the 
research instrument with them, is provided in Section 5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4
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present these details for the financial report preparer and financial report user 
participant groups. Comparative statistics for the three research participant groups are 
presented in Section 5.5, and a chapter summary in Section 5.6 completes the chapter.
5.1 SAMPLE SIZE CONSIDERATIONS
Before discussing the study’s research sample, it is necessary to consider sample size 
requirements. For factor analysis, the sample must be large enough to enable reliable 
correlation estimation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The required sample size is also 
affected by the magnitude of population correlations and the number of factors, as a 
smaller sample size is possible where there are strong correlations and a small 
number of distinct factors (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988; Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). Comrey and Lee (1992) give, as a guide, sample sizes of 200 as being ‘fair’, 
300 as ‘good’ and 500 as ‘very good’. Hair et al. (1998) provide, as a general rule, a 
minimum sample size of at least five times as many observations as there are 
variables to be analysed, with a more acceptable sample size having ten times as 
many variables. In the current study, with the 22 semantic differential scales as the 
major variables, a ten to one ratio would suggest a required sample size of 220.
Sample size considerations also apply to comparison of the individual experimental 
cases. As illustrated in Chapter 4 in relation to the pilot study analysis, analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) is used to compare factor placements for the different 
experimental cases. This procedure is used in the study to analyse differences in 
factor placements for each case between the different research participant groups. 
With the three research participant groups each providing responses to nine
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experimental cases,1 there are 27 cells for analysis. Assuming a minimum of 20 
responses in each cell, this would result in 540 observations in total. This exceeds the 
required sample size for factor analysis purposes of 220 calculated by applying the 
formula of Hair et al. (1998) and of 500 as specified by Comrey and Lee (1992) as 
being ‘very good’. Accordingly, a sample of at least 540 observations, comprising a 
minimum of 20 responses to each of the nine experimental cases for each of the three 
participant groups, would be suitable to satisfy sample size requirements. As there are 
three groups of participants each providing responses to three cases, the sample size 
required to provide the 540 observations is 60 for each participant group, equalling 
180 individuals in total.2
5.2 AUDITORS
On the supply side of the audit market, auditors comprise the first group of research 
participants for the study. It is auditors, both as individuals and as members of audit 
firms, who are required to maintain their independence in accordance with relevant 
professional and statutory requirements.
Eighty auditors participated in the study. This exceeded the requirement for a sample 
of 60 individuals representing auditors, as discussed in Section 5.1. Panel A of Table 
5.1 shows that 49 auditors (61.3 per cent) were from ‘Big Four’ audit firms and 31 
(38.8 per cent) from ‘Second Tier’ firms. This indicates that the auditors were drawn 
from a cross-section of firm types.
As explained in Chapter 4, this is achieved by using three major versions of the research 
instrument, each containing three experimental cases.
That is, if each participant group has 60 participants, 20 participants in each group can respond 
to each of the three versions of the research instrument. As there are three participant groups, the 
total number of individual participants will be 180. With each participant responding to three 
experimental cases, the total number of case observations will be 540.
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As summarised in Panel B of Table 5.1, the research instrument was administered 
with auditors within participating audit firms in one of two ways. The first method 
involved the researcher personally administering the instrument with auditors within 
their audit firm during office hours. Twenty (25 per cent) of the research instruments 
were administered in this way. This is the ideal way to administer the research 
instrument, as it maximises researcher control over administration. However, it was 
not possible to gain audit firm approval for this administration method in all cases. 
The alternative method involved the research instrument being forwarded to the audit 
firm and the firm itself distributing the instrument to participants. The firm then 
collected the completed instruments and returned them to the researcher. This was the 
method for 60 (75 per cent) of the auditors.
The majority of auditor participants were male. Panel C of Table 5.1 shows that, for 
the 75 participants providing gender details, 22 (29.3 per cent) were female and 53 
(70.7 per cent) male.
To ensure that auditor participants would be aware of, and would have been exposed 
to, the types of independence issues pertinent to this study, experienced auditors were 
selected as participants. Hronsky and Houghton (2001) defined an experienced 
auditor as one with at least three years experience in auditing. The average audit 
experience of the auditor research participants was 10.3 years, with a minimum of 
three years and a maximum of 31 years.
Panel D of Table 5.1 presents a frequency distribution of the years of audit experience 
of the auditor participants. The majority (64 per cent) of the 75 auditor participants 
providing audit experience information had between five and 15 years audit 
experience. Twenty per cent had at least 15 years experience, while only sixteen per
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cent had three to five years experience. Hence, the auditor participants can be 
considered to represent experienced auditors.3
3 Audit firms were requested to only select participants with at least three years experience, so 
there is no reason to believe the five non-respondents to this question did not have this length of 
experience.
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Panel A: Participant audit firms
Audit firm N N %
Big four:
Big Four firm 1 38
Big Four firm 2 6
Big Four firm 3 5 49 61.3
Second tier:
Second Tier firm 1 10
Second Tier firm 2 8
Second Tier firm 3 6
Second Tier firm 4 4
Second Tier firm 5 3 31 38.7
Total: 80 80 100.0
Panel B: Research instrument administration
Administration method N %
By researcher personally 20 25.0
By audit firm 60 75.0
Total: 80 100.0
Panel C: Gender
Gender N* %
Female 22 29.3
Male 53 70.7
Total: 75 100.0
* There were five non-responses to this question.
Panel D: Auditing experience
Experience N* %
3 years to < 5 years 12 16.0
5 years to < 10 years 30 40.0
10 years to < 15 years 18 24.0
15 years to < 20 years 7 9.3
20 years to < 25 years 4 5.3
25 years to < 30 years 2 2.7
> 3 0  years 2 2.7
Total: 75 100.0
* There were five non-responses to this question.
Table 5.1: Auditor research participants
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5.3 FINANCIAL REPORT PREPARERS
On the demand side of the audit market, financial report preparers represent the 
second research participant group. Preparers are required to interact with auditors in 
preparing, and making decisions on, the content of audited financial reports. 
Interaction also occurs in the course of the auditor’s gathering of audit evidence from 
sources within the auditee entity. It is therefore to be expected that preparers would 
be cognisant of audit, including independence, issues. It was highlighted in Chapter 2 
that an audit enhances the credibility of financial reports and assists in lowering an 
auditee’s cost of capital by reducing information risk. A credible, independent audit is 
therefore in an auditee entity’s interests, and preparers are the individuals having a 
major responsibility for the content of financial reports.
The research instrument was administered with preparers by means of mail. A 
mailing list of potential preparer participants, based on a prior study, was obtained 
from the PhD supervisor. An initial letter inviting participation in the research project, 
including a reply-paid envelope, was sent to 378 individuals. Eighty-eight (23.3 per 
cent) responded indicating their willingness to be involved, and copies of the research 
instrument were sent to these individuals. Follow up letters were sent after six weeks. 
Seventy-one completed and usable research instruments were received as a result of 
these processes. This represented an 80.7 per cent response rate from those replying 
to the initial invitation. This sample size of 71 exceeded the requirement for a sample 
of 60 individuals representing financial report preparers, as discussed in Section 5.1.
Table 5.2 provides details of the preparer participants. Panel A shows the roles of the 
participants. Panel B shows the type of entity with which the participants were
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associated. All entities with which participants were associated were audited. Panel C 
shows participant gender details.
The average length of experience of the preparer participants in their ‘current 
occupation’ was 11.5 years. Panel D of Table 5.2 presents a frequency distribution of 
the years of experience of the preparer participants. All except five of the 70 
preparers responding to this question had at least three year’s experience in their 
current occupation. The five with less than three year’s experience all had at least a 
university bachelors degree and were all members of a professional accounting 
association. One of the five was aged in the 26 to 30 year age group, one was in the 
31 to 35 year age group, while the other three were at least 36 years of age. The one 
non-respondent to the experience question was a financial controller. Given the 
employment roles of the preparers and their years of experience in those roles, it can 
be concluded that the preparer participants represent relatively experienced preparers.
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Panel A: Preparer roles
Preparer N %
Accountant 25 35.2
Chief Executive Officer 3 4.3
C hief Financial Officer 12 16.9
Chief Operating Officer 5 7.0
Director 3 4.3
Financial Controller 13 18.3
Financial Manager 5 7.0
Manager 5 7.0
Total: 71 100.0
Panel B: Employment
Employment entity N %
Listed public company 15 21.1
Non-listed company 46 64.8
Local government council/authority 3 4.2
Professional association 3 4.2
Community organisation 4 5.7
Total: 71 100.0
Panel C: Gender
Gender N %
Female 15 21.1
Male 56 78.9
Total: 71 100.0
Panel D: Experience in current occupation
Experience N* %
1 years to < 3 years 5 7.1
3 years to < 5 years 10 14.3
5 years to < 10 years 16 22.9
10 years to < 15 years 18 25.7
15 years to < 20 years 8 11.4
20 years to < 25 years 6 8.6
25 years to < 30 years 2 2.9
> 3 0  years 5 7.1
Total: 70 100.0
* There was one non-response to this question.
Table 5.2: Preparer research participants
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5.4 FINANCIAL REPORT USERS
Also on the demand side of the audit market, financial report users represent the third 
research participant group. Report users are a major party to the financial reporting 
communication process as recipients of financial reports. An audit aims to establish 
the credibility of communicated financial reports and create rational belief and 
confidence in those reports for the benefit of report users.
The financial report user participants represented a mixture of professional bank 
analysts and private investors. The final sample of 69 user participants comprised 19 
bank analysts and 50 private shareholders. This sample size exceeded the requirement 
for a sample of 60 individuals representing financial report users, as discussed 
previously in Section 5.1.
The user participants were the most difficult of the three groups to gain access to for 
purposes of the research, and hence it was necessary to administer the research 
instrument with these two groups of users to achieve a suitable sample size. Each of 
these user participant groups are described in the following two sub-sections.
5.4.1 Bank analyst research participants
The professional bank analysts were research, credit and financial analysts from two 
of the four major Australian banks.4 The research instruments were forwarded to 
individual contacts in the two banks who distributed them to participants. They then 
collected the completed instruments and returned them to the researcher. This resulted 
in 19 completed research instruments; 11 from one bank and eight from the other.
The four major Australian banks are the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), the 
Commonwealth Bank, the National Australia Bank (NAB) and the Westpac Banking 
Corporation.
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Table 5.3 provides details of the bank analyst research participants. Panel A shows 
gender details, while Panel B shows the experience of the analysts in their ‘current 
occupation’. The average experience of the participants in their current occupation 
was 7.5 years, with a minimum of 1.5 years and a maximum of 20 years. Panel B 
shows that six participants had between 1.5 and three years experience and 13 had at 
least 3 years experience. Of the former group, five had two years experience and one 
had 1.5 years experience.5
Given the direct relevance of the occupation (bank analyst) of these participants to the 
research question, all 19 of these participants were retained for use by the study.
The participant with 1.5 years experience indicated that they dealt with audited financial reports 
relatively frequently in their occupation (response of four on a five point scale where one 
represented ‘Never’ and five represented ‘Frequently’) and that the use of audited financial 
reports in their occupation was important (response of four on a five point scale where one 
equalled ‘Unimportant’ and five equalled ‘Very important’). This participant was not a member 
of a professional accounting association, but they were aged between 26 and 30 and held a 
bachelors degree.
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Panel A: Gender
Gender N %
Female 7 36.8
Male 12 63.2
Total: 19 100.0
Panel B: Experience in current occupation
Experience N %
1.5 years to < 2 years 1 5.3
2 years to < 3 years 5 26.3
3 years to < 5 years 5 26.4
5 years to < 10 years 2 10.5
10 years to < 15 years 2 10.5
15 years to < 20 years 2 10.5
20 years to < 25 years 2 10.5
Total: 19 100.0
Table 5.3: Bank analyst research participants
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5.4.2 Private shareholder research participants
The private shareholder research participants were members of the Australian 
Investors’ Association (AIA). The AIA was formed in 1991 with the aim of 
representing ‘the interests of private investors across the broad spectrum of 
investment products available in the retail market’ (Australian Investors’ Association, 
2005). The association promotes itself as ‘a strong and active fellowship of members 
who are committed to protecting and promoting investor interests’ (Australian 
Investors’ Association, 2006). Membership, which is restricted to individuals, 
numbered approximately 2,200 in October 2006.6
The objectives of the present research was explained, and copies of the research 
instrument distributed, after presentations given by the researcher at AIA monthly 
meetings in Brisbane, Melbourne and Perth.7 The research instrument was also 
distributed in conference materials to members at the AIA’s annual conference held 
in Sydney.8 A reply-paid envelope was included with all research instruments for 
return postage.
Table 5.4 presents data on the shareholder research participants. Panel A presents 
details of the research instruments distributed, returned and used. Two hundred and 
eighty-five research instruments were distributed in total. One hundred and fifty-nine 
of these were distributed at the three AIA monthly meetings, and 60 (37.7 per cent)
The AIA’s services to members include a quarterly journal, special interest group bulletins and a 
website archive of conference and seminar papers. The association holds an annual national 
conference, regular information meetings, seminars and workshops in most Australian capital 
cities, and a number of regional meetings and local discussions for members (Australian 
Investors’ Association, 2006).
The presentations were on the topic of ‘analysing company annual financial reports’ and not on 
the PhD research study. The presentations were held in Melbourne on 20 October 2004, in Perth 
on 2 November 2004 and in Brisbane on 1 December 2004.
The Sydney annual conference was held on 13 and 14 November 2004.
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were completed and returned.9 One hundred and twenty-six were distributed at the 
Sydney annual conference and six (4.8 per cent) were completed and returned. 
Accordingly, 66 completed research instruments were returned in total.
The difference in response rates between the monthly meetings and the annual 
conference is explainable as a personal presentation and request for participation was 
made by the researcher at the three monthly meetings (Brisbane, Melbourne and 
Perth) but not at the Sydney annual conference. The AIA members attending the 
monthly meetings were aware that the researcher was voluntarily giving the 
presentation in an attempt to gain research participation. In contrast, the research 
instruments were distributed at the Sydney annual conference in a pack with other 
conference materials, and the researcher was not in attendance to promote its 
completion.
Of the 66 completed research instruments returned, 16 were not used, for reasons 
discussed in the following paragraph, as the respondents indicated they only had a 
low level of familiarity with company financial reports. In response to a question 
asking the extent of their familiarity with company financial reports on a five point 
scale (with end points one representing ‘Not familiar’ and five representing ‘Very 
familiar), these 16 respondents provided a response of one or two, indicating low 
familiarity.
Houghton (1987a, 1997) found the cognitive structures within which certain 
accounting and auditing concepts were considered by private, non-institutional 
shareholders to be less complex than for sophisticated parties comprising experienced
9 The lowest response rate was 29.7 per cent from the Brisbane meeting. The highest was 43.9 per 
cent from the Perth meeting.
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accountants, managers and bankers. While the latter groups were found to consider 
the relevant concepts within three factor structures, the private shareholders exhibited 
only single factor structures. It was therefore considered important, for the 
shareholder group of user participants, that they have a reasonable level of familiarity 
with company financial reports. Only those participants responding with a three, four 
or five on the five point scale question asking about familiarity with company 
financial reports were retained for the study. Data collection procedures were 
undertaken at a number of locations around Australia, as discussed above, to ensure a 
suitable sample of shareholder participants with this reasonable level of financial 
report familiarity to ensure a suitable total sample of financial report users.
Panel B of Table 5.4 shows a frequency distribution of the level of familiarity with 
financial reports self-assessed by the 50 private shareholder participants retained for 
the study.
Panel C of Table 5.4 indicates the gender of the 50 shareholder participants, while 
Panel D presents a frequency distribution of the number of years they had been 
involved in investing activities. The average period involved in investing was 16.4 
years, with a minimum of one year and a maximum of 50 years. Only one participant 
had less than two year’s experience, with another five having between two and up to 
three year’s experience. The remaining 44 had at least five years experience.
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Panel A: Research instrument administration
Number Number Responses
City distributed returned used
Monthly meetings:
B risbane 37 11 7
M elbourne 56 20 16
Perth 66 29 22
159 60 45
Annual conference:
Sydney 126 6 5
Total: 285 66 50
Panel B: Familiarity with financial reports
Familiarity N* %
1 (N ot fam iliar) 0 0.0
2 0 0.0
3 17 34.0
4 23 46.0
5 (V ery fam iliar) 10 20.0
Total: 50 100.0
Panel C: Gender
Gender N %
Fem ale 8 16.0
M ale 42 84.0
Total: 50 100.0
Panel D: Years involved in investing
Experience N* %
1 year to < 2 years 1 2.0
2 years to < 3 years 5 10.0
3 years to < 5 years 2 4.0
5 years to < 10 years 8 16.0
10 years to < 15 years 14 28.0
15 years to < 20 years 3 6.0
20 years to < 25 years 3 6.0
25 years to < 30 years 4 8.0
30 years to < 35 years 4 8.0
35 years to < 40 years 0 0.0
> 40 years 6 12.0
Total: 50 100.0
Table 5.4: Shareholder research participants
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5.5 RESEARCH PARTICIPANT COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS
Comparative descriptive statistics for the three participant groups are presented in 
Table 5.5. Panel A presents age details. The majority of auditors, 73.6 per cent, were 
aged in the 25 to 40 year age bracket. Preparers were generally in higher age groups 
in comparison to the auditors, with 75.8 per cent in the 30 to 50 year age group. The 
greatest proportion of the bank analysts, 89.4 per cent, were in the 25 to 45 year age 
group, while 82 per cent of the shareholder participants were in the 50 to over 60 year 
age groups. Accordingly, the auditors tended to be the youngest group of participants 
and shareholders the oldest.
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents a frequency distribution of educational attainment. For 
all groups except the shareholders, the majority of participants held bachelor or 
honours degrees. These percentages were 90.8 per cent for the auditors, 72.8 per cent 
for preparers and 68.4 per cent for bank analysts. Forty eight per cent of the 
shareholders held degrees at these levels. The proportion of participants with masters 
and PhD degrees was highest, and relatively equal, for the preparers, bank analysts 
and shareholders (21 to 22 per cent). The shareholder group had the highest number 
of participants with only secondary or TAFE qualifications (30 per cent). Hence, a 
general conclusion is that the auditors had the narrowest range of qualifications, 
mainly at bachelor and honours degree levels, while the shareholders had the greatest 
variation with qualifications spread across all levels.
Panel C of Table 5.5 presents details of professional accounting association 
membership. All auditors were members of a professional association. The majority 
of preparers (87.1 per cent) and analysts (52.6 per cent) were members of such an
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association, but only a minority of shareholders (four per cent) held such 
membership.
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Panel A: Age
Age
Participant group
Auditors Preparers
Users
Analysts Shareholders
N* % N* % N % N %
< 2 5  years 6 7.9 0 0.0 1 5.3 0 0.0
25 years to < 30 years 27 35.5 5 7.1 7 36.8 1 2.0
30 years to < 35 years 17 22.3 14 20.0 5 26.3 2 4.0
35 years to < 40 years 12 15.8 10 14.3 1 5.3 2 4.0
40 years to < 45 years 4 5.3 14 20.0 4 21.0 2 4.0
45 years to < 50 years 5 6.6 15 21.5 1 5.3 2 4.0
50 years to < 55 years 4 5.3 5 7.1 0 0.00 8 16.0
55 years to < 60 years 1 1.3 4 5.7 0 0.00 12 24.0
> 60 years 0 0.0 3 4.3 0 0.00 21 42.0
Total: 76 100.0 70 100.0 19 100.0 50 100.0
* There were four auditor non-responses and one preparer non-response to this question.
Panel B: Education
Highest level of 
educational attainment
Participant group
Auditors Preparers
Users
Analysts Shareholders
N* % N* % N % N %
Secondary 0 0.0 2 2.9 0 0.0 10 20.0
TAFE certificate/diploma 1 1.3 2 2.9 2 10.5 5 10.0
Bachelors degree 54 71.1 35 50.0 6 31.6 16 32.0
H onours 15 19.7 16 22.8 7 36.8 8 16.0
M asters 6 7.9 12 17.1 4 21.1 9 18.0
PhD 0 0.0 3 4.3 0 0.0 2 4.0
Total: 76 100.0 70 100.0 19 100.0 50 100.0
* There were four auditor non-responses and one preparer non-response to this question.
Panel C: Professional accounting association membership
Membership
status
Participant group
Auditors Preparers
Users
Analysts Shareholders
N* % N* % N % N %
M em ber 76 100.0 61 87.1 10 52.6 2 4.0
N on-m em ber 0 0.0 9 12.9 9 47.4 48 96.0
Total: 76 100.0 70 100.0 19 100.0 50 100.0
* There were four auditor non-responses and one preparer non-response to this question.
Table 5.5: Research participant comparative descriptive statistics
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Table 5.6 presents a frequency distribution of the alternate versions of the research 
instrument completed by the research participant groups. The table shows that the 
completed instruments were distributed across the alternate versions within the 
participant groups. This was the situation both for the three major versions of the 
instrument and each of the six variations of case order within the three versions.
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Research
instrument
version/variation
Participant group
Auditors Preparers
Users
Analysts Shareholders
V ersion 1A 4 2 1 2
V ersion IB 4 4 1 3
V ersion 1C 5 5 2 3
V ersion ID 4 4 2 2
V ersion IE 4 4 1 2
V ersion IF 6 4 0 3
Total version 1: 27 23 7 15
V ersion 2A 4 5 1 4
V ersion 2B 3 5 1 4
V ersion 2C 5 4 1 1
V ersion 2D 6 4 2 4
V ersion 2E 4 4 0 5
V ersion 2F 4 3 0 3
Total version 2: 26 25 5 21
V ersion 3 A 5 3 1 1
V ersion 3B 5 5 2 3
V ersion 3C 4 4 2 1
V ersion 3D 4 4 1 4
V ersion 3E 5 4 1 2
V ersion 3F 4 3 0 3
Total version 3: 27 23 7 14
Grand Total: 80 71 19 50
Table 5.6: Research instrument versions administered
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5.6 SUMMARY
This chapter summarised the study’s auditor, financial report preparer and financial 
report user research participants and administration of the research instrument with 
them. The participants represent the three major parties to the financial reporting 
communication process. The final research sample was demonstrated to satisfy 
sample size requirements. Comparative descriptive statistics for the three participants 
groups were also presented.
The discussion of research method issues in this and the previous two chapters 
provides the basis for development of the study’s research hypotheses, presented in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Following the discussion of the measurement of meaning framework in Chapter 3 and 
the study’s research method in Chapters 4 and 5, research hypotheses are developed 
in this chapter.
The study’s general research question was stated in Chapter 3 as:
Is there shared meaning o f the auditor independence concept between key 
parties to the financial reporting communication process?
The study’s research hypotheses are developed to provide insight into alternative 
aspects of the above research question. The chapter proceeds as follows. Before 
developing the individual research hypotheses, the prior literature justifying the 
experimental case manipulations is presented in Section 6.1. Based on these 
independence threat and safeguard manipulations, hypotheses related to the cognitive 
structure (dimensions of meaning) within which the concept of auditor independence 
is considered by research participants are developed in Section 6.2. Hypotheses 
related to the manner in which the measured (connotative) meaning of the 
independence concept alters in response to the experimental cases are developed in 
Section 6.3. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 6.4.
6.1 EXPERIMENTAL CASES
The nine experimental cases varied the audit engagement scenarios with respect to 
potential independence threats and safeguards (refer Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). Prior to
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developing the study’s research hypotheses, the background to and justification for 
the experimental manipulations are provided in this section. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the potential threats to auditor independence manipulated for purposes of the study 
were:
• Auditor provision of non-audit services;
• Interlocking directorships among audit clients;
• Longer period of audit firm tenure;
• Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee company.
The independence safeguards manipulated in the experimental cases were:
• Audit subject to additional oversight by the United States Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB);
• Period of audit partner rotation;
• Local (internal) independence board within the audit firm.
As elaborated in the following sections, these experimental manipulations represent 
contemporary auditor independence issues. Variations in connotations of 
independence in response to these individual threat and safeguard situations can be 
examined utilising the measurement of meaning framework.
6.1.1 Independence threats
6.1.1.1 Auditor provision o f non-audit services
As noted in Chapter 4, the effect on auditor independence of the joint supply of audit 
and non-audit services has been the subject of debate and research since at least the 
1960s, and the corporate collapses earlier this decade have brought a renewed focus 
to the issue. Wyatt (2004) notes the beginning of the joint supply of audit and non­
audit services in the 1960s, with this accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s given 
the focus of accounting firms on providing an ever-expanding range of services to
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their client pools and the evaluation of audit partners based on the cross-selling of a 
range of consulting services to audit clients.
The arguments directed against auditors providing non-audit (management, 
management advisory or consulting) services are generally expressed in terms of 
economic dependence and mutuality of interest (Wines, 1994). If non-audit services 
become sufficiently important to the auditor, either in total or in relation to an 
individual client, the auditor’s economic dependence on those services and clients 
may cause bias and a loss of impartiality and objectivity. Increased profitability due 
to involvement in the provision of non-audit services may act as an incentive for 
auditors to bear higher audit risks, thus compromising objectivity (Beck, Frecka and 
Solomon, 1988a). Depending on the nature of the individual non-audit services 
provided, their joint provision to audit clients has the potential to raise all the various 
threats to independence identified in APES 110 (APESB, 2006a), namely ‘self- 
interest’ threats (s. 290.28.3), ‘self-review’ threats (s. 290.28.4), ‘advocacy’ threats 
(s. 290.28.5), ‘familiarity’ threats (s. 290.28.6) and ‘intimidation’ threats 
(s. 290.28.7).
A number of commentators in the 1950s and 1960s began arguing that the provision 
of non-audit services to audit clients, or of certain categories of non-audit services, 
raised potential conflicts of interest.1 Concerns were also raised in the United States 
in the 1970s by a number of inquiries, including the Metcalf Committee (United 
States Senate Subcommittee, 1976, 1977) and the Cohen Commission (Commission 
on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978).
See, for example, Cannon (1952), Cony (1961), Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Trueblood (1961), 
Hylton (1964), Brooker and Staunton (1966), Schulte (1966, 1967), Hoenemeyer (1967) and 
Kell (1968).
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Models of auditor independence have been developed to foster greater understanding 
of the variables that potentially influence independence (Kleinman, Palmon and 
Anandarajan, 1998). Goldman and Bariev (1974) and Nichols and Price (1976) 
contend that audit clients derive considerable power over their auditor from the ability 
to select and dismiss them and determine their employment conditions, especially 
given the comparative ease with which auditors can be substituted. DeAngelo (1981a, 
1981b) argued that an incumbent auditor captures client-specific quasi-rents and has 
incentives to lower quality to retain the client and protect those quasi-rents. Fees 
arising from non-audit services potentially increase these quasi-rents. A concern is 
that these rents might be implicitly contingent on a favourable audit report (Dopuch, 
King and Schwartz, 2004). In modelling the auditor as an expected utility maximiser, 
Antle (1982, 1984) contended that management has strong incentives to provide side 
payments to the auditor in exchange for a reduction in auditor effort, and these side 
payments could arise from non-audit sendees engagements.
Despite the potential for independence impairment, the models argue that factors such 
as potential reputation loss, litigation risk and the sanctioning powers of regulatory 
bodies provide positive, counteracting forces on auditors, increasing their ability to 
resist management pressure. Also, the provision of non-audit services has a tendency 
to increase the auditor’s power as these services benefit the client directly (Goldman 
and Bariev, 1974). Arrunada (1999a, 1999b) argues that the provision of non-audit 
services diversifies an audit firm’s revenue base and reduces dependence on 
individual clients, and therefore that the provision of non-audit services only 
adversely impacts the independence of auditors with undiversified clientele.
The earliest empirical studies into the non-audit services issue commenced in the 
mid-1960s. The research approach of these early studies was to survey various
Chapter 6 137
financial statement user and preparer groups for their reaction (perceptions) when 
various non-audit services were specified as being jointly supplied by the audit 
(accounting) firm (Schulte, 1965; Titard, 1971; Lavin, 1977; Lavin and Libby, 1977). 
The major groups surveyed included investment, financial and security analysts, bank 
loan officers, insurance and financial institution investment officers, and employees 
and executives of listed public companies and financial institutions. Findings of these 
studies suggested that a significant number of the financial statement users and 
preparers, although usually not a majority, had some auditor independence concerns 
when the audit firm also supplied certain other services.
Further studies examined differences in perceptions between financial statement users 
and executives on the one hand and members of the accounting profession on the 
other (Briloff, 1966; Hartley and Ross, 1972; Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980). Findings 
generally suggested that professional accountants did not consider non-audit sendees 
to detract from auditor independence to the same extent as financial statement users 
and executives.
Studies in the 1980s also attempted to provide further perspectives on a number of 
issues, including (a) whether respondents’ knowledge and understanding of the audit 
function or other factors, such as cognitive style or view of compatibility of audit and 
non-audit services, influenced their perceptions of independence (Reckers and 
Stagliano, 1981; Pany and Reckers, 1984; Gul, 1987; Pany and Reckers, 1988b), 
(b) the extent to which different categories of non-audit services affected 
respondents’ concerns (Pany and Reckers, 1983, 1984), (c) whether there was less 
concern when non-audit services were provided by a separate department within the 
accounting firm (Pany and Reckers, 1984), (d) whether the provision of non-audit 
services affected bank loan officers’ lending decisions (Firth, 1981; McKinley et al.,
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1985), and (e) the significance of the non-audit services problem in comparison to 
other threats to independence (Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985; Lindsay et al., 1987; 
Gul, 1989; Lindsay, 1989). While these studies generally confirmed that auditor 
provided non-audit services were perceived to increase the risk of independence 
impairment, findings also indicated that many factors impacted on this association 
and that the provision of non-audit services was not necessarily perceived as a greater 
risk than some other factors.2
However, these early perception studies have been criticised for phrasing the 
questions asked in a biased manner and for being seriously affected by demand 
effects, such that the focus of the research was transparent and the researchers’ 
expectations obvious (Pany and Reckers, 1987, 1988a; Beattie and Feamley, 2002). 
Demand effects arise when participants respond to cues about the experimental 
hypothesis or hypotheses and provide responses according to their view of any 
researcher expectancies (Ome, 1962; Weber and Cook, 1972; Pany and Reckers, 
1987; Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002; Haslam and McGarty, 2003). As noted in 
Chapter 4, McKinley et al. (1985), using a between-subjects design and in 
contradiction to the majority of the earlier research, did not find decreased 
perceptions of independence when the auditor also provided non-audit services. Pany 
and Reckers (1987) investigated this further, and found decreased perceptions of 
independence in a within-subjects (repeated measures) design but not in a between- 
subjects design.
For example, in comparison to the provision of non-audit services, findings suggested research 
participants perceived a higher risk of independence impairment when audit firms operated in a 
high competition environment or were smaller in size, when the client was in a healthy financial 
position, or where a conflict with a client involved an accounting issue not dealt with precisely 
by technical accounting standards (Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985; Gul, 1989; Lindsay, 1989).
This result was replicated, for non-audit services scenarios, by Gul and Windsor (1994).
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Further perception studies were undertaken in the 1990s. Results indicated that 
perceptions of bankers, in comparison to professional accountants, were more 
adversely impacted by the auditor provision of non-audit services (Bartlett, 1993), 
perceptions of independence were less adversely impacted when the non-audit 
services were provided by a separate division within the accounting firm and when 
the services were of lower materiality to the audit firm (Lowe and Pany, 1995), and 
perceptions of finance directors, in comparison to audit partners, were more adversely 
impacted by the provision of non-audit services (Beattie, Brandt and Feamley, 1999).
While the perception studies represent the earliest empirical research to examine the 
non-audit services issue, later research has utilised archival data sources based on 
audit and non-audit fee data. The earliest of the archival studies sought to examine 
whether knowledge spillovers between audit and non-audit services had an adverse 
impact on auditor independence. Knowledge spillovers, also referred to as economies 
of scope, occur when the performance of audit and non-audit services enables the 
audit firm to perform either or both services more cheaply than competitors (Simunic, 
1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Ikin, 2005). Independence concerns arise from knowledge 
spillovers if auditors retain the cost savings. Any retention would intensify the audit 
firm’s economic bonding to the client and raise the client’s relative power over the 
auditor, especially if the future stream of economic rents was substantial (Simunic, 
1984; Beck et al., 1988a, 1988b; Kleinman et al., 1998; Ikin, 2005).
Simunic (1984) was the first to report evidence of a positive relationship between 
audit and non-audit services fees, although he was careful not to infer a causal link 
and posited that the excess audit fee found might represent a quasi-rent for investing 
in non-audit (management advisory) services resources. Other studies have replicated
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this positive association between audit and non-audit services fees.4 However two 
studies, Simon and Francis (1988) and Abdel-khalik (1990), did not find any 
evidence of knowledge spillovers.
While Palmrose (1986b) found evidence of a positive association between audit fees 
and non-audit fees derived by the incumbent audit firm, a positive association was 
also found with non-audit fees derived by non-incumbents. This weakens any 
arguments of knowledge spillovers and independence concerns. Similarly, Davis et 
al. (1993) found the positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees to be also 
associated with increased audit hours. This suggests additional effort is required for 
audits of clients who also purchase non-audit services, which is inconsistent with the 
notion of audit production efficiencies arising from knowledge spillovers causing 
independence concerns. Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) 
also replicated the finding of Simunic (1984). However, in modelling audit and non­
audit fees as being jointly determined and thereby controlling for the joint behaviour 
of audit and non-audit fees, they did not find the existence of economies of scope that 
would suggest adverse implications for auditor independence.
Ezzamel et al. (2002) found the relationship between the level of fees and non-audit 
services to vary by category of non-audit service. Of five categories of non-audit 
services provided by incumbent auditors, only two categories had a significant 
positive relationship with audit fees.5 Also, there was no association between audit 
fees and the five categories of non-audit services when supplied by a non-incumbent
These studies include Turpen (1990), Palmrose (1986b), Davis, Ricchiute and Trompeter (1993), 
Butterworth and Houghton (1995), Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996), Francis, Reichelt 
and Wang (2005) and Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy and Zhou (2006).
The five categories of non-audit services were finance advice, tax services, accounting-related 
services, management consultancy and others. A positive relationship with audit fees was found 
only for the finance advice and tax services categories.
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firm. Ezzamel et al. (2002) interpret this as supporting explanations of any positive 
association being due to client specific differences or to events giving rise to the 
client’s purchase of more audit and non-audit services, rather than of any suggestion 
of direct economic linkages between the cost functions for these services that cause 
independence concerns.
In summary, the majority of studies, with some exceptions, have identified 
knowledge spillovers. While Beattie and Feamley (2002, p. 52) conclude that there is 
‘clearly no evidence that cost savings from joint provision are being passed on to the 
auditee’, a number of the studies have identified circumstances which suggest that 
any positive relationship between audit and non-audit services fees does not raise 
independence concerns. Hence, as concluded by Ikin (2005), few clear implications 
for auditor independence can be drawn from this line of research.
Some studies have explored market responses to the auditor provision of non-audit 
services. Based on the view that non-audit services adversely affect the credibility 
and infonnativeness of audited accounting earnings, Gul and Tsui (1999) found, 
especially for companies with non-Big Six auditors, earnings explanatory power for 
returns to be negatively related with non-audit services.6 Other studies have reported 
a negative stock price reaction to company’s with higher non-audit services 
(Krishnan, Sami and Zhang, 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). Company bond ratings 
have also been found to be lower for companies procuring higher levels of non-audit 
services from their auditor (Brandon, Crabtree and Maher, 2004).
6 That is, the explanatory power of a regression of stock returns as the dependent variable and 
accounting earnings as the independent variable was found to be weaker for firms receiving non­
audit services from their auditor in comparison to those that did not.
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If company managers perceive that non-audit services could adversely affect earnings 
quality and audit quality, it would be expected that companies with higher agency 
costs would purchase lower levels of non-audit services, and particularly recurring 
non-audit services, from their auditor. This hypothesis was supported by Parkash and 
Venable (1993) and Firth (1997).7
Other archival research has attempted to investigate the relationship between non­
audit services and auditor independence more directly. The major studies have 
examined the relationship between non-audit services and (a) auditor tenure and 
switching, (b) qualified audit opinions, (c) earnings management, (d) profit 
restatements, and (e) auditor focus (Ikin, 2005). A summary of each of these areas 
follows.
Auditor tenure lengths have been found to be higher for auditees purchasing high 
levels of certain categories of recurring non-audit services (Beck et al., 1988b).8 This 
result was not found for non-recurrent non-audit services, and Barkess and Simnett 
(1994) found no relationship between total non-audit services fees and length of 
auditor tenure.
As an extension of the auditor tenure issue, auditor switching has also been examined. 
If the auditor provision of other services raises potential independence concerns, it 
might be expected that companies purchasing higher levels of non-audit services from
These studies measured the level of agency costs with variables such as ownership dispersion, 
manager/director share ownership and leverage. A major limitation of this research is that it is 
difficult to determine whether the lower levels of non-audit services detected are driven by 
agency theory related incentives for an independent auditor or are simply due to a lesser need by 
these companies for non-audit services (Ikin, 2005).
However, while being statistically significantly, the average tenure length for auditees 
purchasing high levels of recurring non-audit services was only approximately one year longer 
than that for a control sample. Also, Dopuch (1988) questioned the skewed sample used in the 
study and the ambiguous nature of the findings.
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their incumbent auditor would have a lower propensity to switch auditor than 
companies purchasing lower levels of non-audit services. However, DeBerg, Kaplan 
and Pany (1991) found no evidence to support this. They also found that the purchase 
of non-audit services declined significantly in the year following an auditor change, 
again discounting any independence concerns arising from an auditor switch. 
However in a contrary finding, Barkess and Simnett (1994) found a significant 
increase in non-audit services fees paid by companies switching auditor, suggesting 
that clients may change auditor to gain access to higher levels of other services.
In an early study of shareholder voting for the ratification of the external auditor, 
Glezen and Millar (1985) did not find any association between votes against auditor 
ratification and the level of non-audit services. However in later studies, 
Raghunandan (2003), Raghunandan and Rama (2003) and Mishra, Raghunandan and 
Rama (2005) did find the proportion of shareholders voting against auditor 
ratification to be positively associated with the level of the non-audit fee ratio, 
suggesting some independence concerns. However, the studies found that 
approximately 95 to 98 per cent of shareholders voted for the auditor’s ratification, 
suggesting the vast majority did not perceive any potential independence problems.
Audit qualification studies have sought to explore whether there is a lower propensity 
for auditors to issue qualified audit opinions in the presence of higher non-audit 
services fees. A number of studies have found a negative association between the 
auditor provision of non-audit services and the incidence of qualified audit opinions 
(Wines, 1994; Sharma, 2001; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Firth, 2002; Basioudis, 
Geiger and Papanastasiou, 2006). However, other studies have failed to detect such a 
relationship (Craswell, 1999; Lennox, 1999; DeFond, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam, 2002; Geiger and Rama, 2003). In modelling the total level of non-
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audit services fees derived by audit firms from individual audit clients, Barkess and 
Simnett (1994) did not find any relationship with audit qualifications.
The findings from the audit qualification studies are difficult to reconcile due to 
variations in the research methods adopt. In particular, it is important that the audit 
opinion models should be well specified and that there are no omitted variables 
(Beattie and Feamley, 2002). Further, a possible explanation for any observed 
negative association is that the provision of other services to an audit client may help 
resolve problems, and/or improve accounting systems, internal controls and 
operations, such that the need for a qualified opinion is substantially reduced (Firth, 
2002; Ikin, 2005). Hence, any negative association cannot readily be interpreted as 
auditors compromising their independence to retain the non-audit services fees 
(Beattie and Feamley, 2002).
As with the audit qualification research, studies examining non-audit services and 
earnings management9 have employed variations in research methods and produced 
inconsistent findings. Earnings management, representing a proxy for lower earnings 
and audit quality, has been examined mainly through the use of accruals models to 
detect discretionary or abnormal accruals.
Gore, Pope and Singh (2001) and Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) were the first 
to document a positive association between earnings management and the auditor 
provision of non-audit services. This positive association was also found by
Earnings management, defined as ‘a purposeful intervention in the financial reporting process, 
with the intent of obtaining some private gain’, arises because of the variety of accrual options 
available under generally accepted accounting principles and accounting standards (Schipper, 
1989). Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) state that earnings management occurs ‘when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or 
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.’
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Ferguson, Seow and Young (2004) and Callaway-Dee, Lulseged and Nowlin (2006). 
Some association between high non-audit services and earnings management was 
found by Gul, Jaggi and Krishnan (2007), but only for audit clients of small size 
where auditor tenure was not more than three years.
However, in response to a number of criticisms of Frankel et al. (2002) raised by 
Kinney and Libby (2002), a number of studies utilised alternative models, additional 
control variables and alternative samples (Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; 
Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Reynolds, Deis and Francis, 2004; Huang, Mishra and 
Raghunandan, 2007). These studies did not find any association between non-audit 
services fees and earnings management. In an alternative specification of earnings 
management, Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor (2006) found no association between 
higher than expected levels of non-audit services and the extent to which earnings 
reflected bad news on a timely basis. Two further studies found a negative, rather 
than positive, association between non-audit services fees and earnings management 
(Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Antle et al., 2006). Accordingly, it has been 
concluded that difficulties with this field of research arise from the measurement of 
the proxy variable for independence and the validity of the proxy itself (Beattie and 
Feamley, 2002), and that findings are fragile and are sensitive to sample selection and 
model specification (Francis, 2006).
Company profit restatements have also been examined as a proxy for lower financial 
reporting and audit quality. Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant (2003) and Agrawal 
and Chadha (2005) found no association between the auditor provision of non-audit 
services and profit restatements. Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) sought to 
determine whether there was any association between profit restatements and various 
categories of non-audit services provided by audit firms, and found a significant
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positive association only for a residual, ‘unspecified’ category of non-audit services. 
There was no relationship found between profit restatements and the ‘financial 
information systems design and implementation’ and ‘internal audit’ service 
categories, while there was a significantly negative association found for ‘tax 
services’.
Auditor focus studies have attempted to address the issue of whether the focus of the 
audit can be affected by the auditor provision of non-audit services. As noted earlier, 
Davis et al. (1993) found a positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees, but 
also found this to be associated with increased audit effort. In analysing individual 
audit activity categories, Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) found significantly higher 
labour hours for four of eight categories when non-audit services were jointly 
provided, with none of the other categories having lower labour hours.10 In contrast, 
O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994) found no effect of the joint performance of non­
audit services on total audit hours nor on hours for individual staff categories. In a 
study of an individual firm’s initial audit engagement proposals, Johnstone and 
Bedard (2001) found that, for clients purchasing additional services, more audit hours 
and a greater use of industry experts were planned. While their results showed a 
relatively small fee premium for the additional services clients, analysis of the 
accepted bids implied that this premium was bid away by the market.
The results of the above audit focus studies do not suggest independence concerns 
arising from the joint provision of non-audit services. However, Felix, Grämling and 
Maletta (2005) found some contrary evidence. In situations where significant non-
The eight audit activities were planning, internal control, critical substantive, noncritical 
substantive, critical review, noncritical review, financial statements and client interaction. When 
non-audit sendees were also provided by the auditor, higher labour hours were found for the 
planning, internal control, financial statements and client interaction activities.
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audit services were also provided, external auditors appeared to be more affected by 
client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when 
making internal audit reliance decisions.
Experimental audit focus research has also been conducted. Studies have examined 
the influence of the joint provision of audit and non-audit services on internal control 
assessments (Corless and Parker, 1987), the likelihood of unqualified audit opinions 
(Lord, 1992) and auditors’ decisions on whether to accept a client’s aggressive 
reporting practices (Chang and Hwang, 2003). No adverse independence implications 
were found by these studies based on the non-audit services manipulations. In 
contrast, Favere-Marchesi (2006) found some evidence of auditors assessing a lower 
risk of fraud when non-audit services were also provided, although the author 
observed that the lower risk assessments may have arisen because of perceptions of 
increased audit quality arising from greater client knowledge. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to generalise the findings of these studies beyond the individual experimental 
conditions.
In summary, the academic research findings generally suggest that the joint provision 
of audit and non-audit services does not impair independence in fact, but could, by 
reference to views of financial report users, impair independence in appearance 
(Beattie and Feamley, 2002; Ikin, 2005). Francis (2006, p. 753) observes that ‘given 
the inherent difficulty of empirically observing the impairment of audit quality, the 
failure to find smoking-gun evidence should not give ... too much comfort that NAS 
(non-audit services) are unproblematic for the accounting profession.’
A number of reports have been prepared, and legislation enacted, addressing the non­
audit services issues in the aftermath of the corporate collapses in the earlier part of
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this decade. The major development in the United States, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
has been enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002. This legislation prohibits a 
range of non-audit services to audit clients11 and requires the pre-approval, in most 
cases, of any other non-audit services by the company’s audit committee. These 
provisions have also been adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its 
rules (SEC, 2003).
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) issued a considerably revised 
version of its Code o f Ethics for Professional Accountants in 2001 (IFAC, 2001). The 
code specified the conceptual framework approach to independence, requiring 
auditors to take into account threats to independence, accepted safeguards and the 
public interest (IFAC, 2001, para. 8.11). This conceptual framework approach 
continues to be the basis for the latest version of the IFAC Code (IFAC, 2005). With 
respect to the provision of non-audit services to assurance engagement clients, the 
Code prohibits auditors undertaking non-audit services that effectively involve them 
performing management (executive) functions or making management decisions for 
the client (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.159). The Code also specifies nine categories of non­
audit services that pose a high risk to independence, (IFAC, 2005, ss 290.166 to 
290.203), these being similar to the categories prohibited in the United States by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act n However, the IFAC Code does not specify a blanket
As noted in Chapter 2, the prohibited categories of non-audit services are (a) bookkeeping or 
other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client, 
(b) financial information systems design and implementation, (c) appraisal or valuation services, 
fairness opinions or contribution-in-kind reports, (d) actuarial services, (e) internal audit 
outsourcing services, (f) management functions or human resources, (g) broker or dealer, 
investment adviser or investment banking services, (h) legal services and expert services 
unrelated to the audit, and (i) any other service that the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) determines, by regulation, to be impermissible.
The non-audit services categories are (a) preparing accounting records and financial statements, 
(b) valuation services, (c) internal audit services, (d) information technology systems services, 
(e) temporary staff assignments, (f) litigation support services, (g) legal services, (h) recruiting 
senior management, and (i) corporate finance and similar activities.
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prohibition for these services, but indicates they should be undertaken only if 
appropriate safeguards are introduced to ensure independence threats are reduced to 
an acceptable level.
In Australia, the major reports where the auditor provision of non-audit services has 
been commented on have been the Ramsay Report (Ramsay, 2001), the report of the 
federal government’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (2002b) and the 
report of the HIH Insurance Royal Commission (HIH Royal Commission, 2003). The 
major recommendations were for (a) updated professional ethics rules, (b) greater 
responsibility for the audit committee and board of directors to determine that 
auditor-provided non-audit services do not compromise auditor independence,14 
(c) strengthened disclosure requirements, with disclosure of non-audit services 
dissected by category of service together with appropriate discussion of those services 
(Ramsay, 2001, pp. 11,62), and (d) establishing an Auditor Independence 
Supervisory Board with the power to monitor the adequacy of non-audit services 
disclosures (Ramsay, 2001, pp. 10, 62).
Following the various reports and the CLERP 9 discussion paper (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002), the CLERP 9 legislation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) 
resulted in amendments to the Australian Corporations Act 2001. Major amendments 
prescribed disclosure, in the directors’ report of listed companies, of the amounts paid 
or payable to the auditors for non-audit services, and a statement by the directors on 
whether they are satisfied that the provision of non-audit services by the auditor are 
compatible with, and do not compromise, the auditor independence requirements 
imposed by the Act (s. 300(1 IB)). With the Australian adoption of international
Ramsay (2001, pp. 11, 62), Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (2002, pp. xxv, 98).
14 Ramsay (2001, pp. 11, 62), HIH Royal Commission (2003, Vol. l,pp . lxvii, 175).
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financial reporting standards, accounting standard AASB 101 Presentation o f 
Financial Statements specified requirements consistent with the Ramsay Report for 
the disclosure of non-audit services dissected by category (Australian Accounting 
Standards Board, 2004, para. 126).
The experimental scenarios in the study’s Cases 5, 6 and 7 specified the auditor 
provision of non-audit services in the form of taxation services. Despite the potential 
independence concerns raised by the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, 
the provision of taxation services to audit clients has not generally been seen to 
represent a high independence risk. Francis (2006, p. 748) highlights that tax services 
are now the largest non-audit service activity on most audit engagements, and that 
they are ‘generally viewed positively as a logical add-on to the audit ...’ Subject to 
pre-approval by the company’s audit committee, tax services are specifically allowed 
in the United States, with some exceptions, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
SEC’s rules (SEC, 2003). Tax services are also generally allowed in Australia 
pursuant to the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (APESB, 2006a, 
s. 290.180), as they are in Canada, the European Union and the United Kingdom 
(Department of the Treasury, 2006).
However, there have been some independence concerns raised recently regarding 
taxation services. The United States PCAOB in 2004 proposed rules prohibiting an 
audit firm providing tax planning and advice on ‘certain types of potentially abusive 
tax transactions’ (PCAOB, 2004b). These rules were adopted in July 2005 (PCAOB, 
2005), but did not change the position with respect to normal tax compliance and tax
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advice services.15 The rules are similar in the United Kingdom, with some 
prohibitions specified in relation to the promotion of tax structures or products.16
IF AC, through its International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), 
also released an exposure draft in December 2006 with updated provisions in its Code 
o f Ethics for Professional Accountants on taxation services (IESBA, 2006). Major 
revisions contained in the exposure draft prohibit (a) tax advice where the 
effectiveness of that advice depends on a particular accounting treatment or financial 
statement presentation and there is reasonable doubt as to the appropriateness of the 
related treatment or presentation (s. 290.182), and (b) acting as an advocate for an 
audit client before a public tribunal or court in the resolution of a material tax matter 
(s. 290.184).
The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 5, 6 and 7 indicated that 
the audit firm’s taxation division had provided, with the pre-approval of the audit 
committee, additional non-audit services to the auditee over the four year audit tenure 
period. These services were specified to comprise tax compliance services and tax 
planning advice, with fees from each of these categories being approximately equal. 
As explained in Chapter 4, Cases 5 and 6 indicated annual taxation services over the 
four year period of three to four times the audit fee, while Case 7 indicated annual tax 
services of approximately one-half the audit fee.
The major revisions in relation to tax services (PCAOB, 2005) were (a) to ban the auditor from 
providing any services (i) to audit clients related to the ‘marketing, planning, or opining in 
favour of the tax treatment of. . .  aggressive tax position transactions’ (Rule 3522(b)) or (ii) for 
persons ‘in financial reporting oversight roles’ at the audit client (Rule 3523), and (b) to require 
audit firms to provide the audit committee of the audit client with, for allowable tax services, a 
description of the scope of service and the fee structure for the engagement (Rules 3522 to 
3524).
The United Kingdom’s relevant ethical standard prohibits the audit firm promoting tax structures 
or products, or providing tax advice to an audit client, if there is reasonable doubt as to ‘the 
appropriateness of the related accounting treatment involved’ (Auditing Practices Board, 2004d, 
para. 66).
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6.1.1.2 Interlocking directorships among audit clients
Company boards of directors include directors who may, and often do, sit on the 
boards of other companies, creating networks of inter-company ties (Mizruchi, 1996; 
Jubb, 2000; Houghton and Jubb, 2003a). These networks of ties, forming bonds 
between the respective organisations, are referred to as interlocking directorates or 
interlocking directorships (Dooley, 1969; Pennings, 1980; Davison, Stening and Wai, 
1984; Scott and Griff; 1984; Jubb, 2000). It tends to be non-executive or external 
directors who create these ties, as these directors have more time to devote to multiple 
directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Jubb, 2000). In contrast to non-executive directors, 
executive directors are more likely to be employed only by a single entity or group.
Legislative provisions have been enacted in Australia to ensure that, at least to some 
extent, interlocking directorships are transparent. The CLERP 9 legislation of 2004 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) amended the Corporations Act 2001 (s. 300(11)) 
to require companies to disclose, for its directors, all directorships of other listed 
companies held at any time in the three years immediately prior to the end of the 
financial year and the period for which each directorship had been held.
There has been considerable research into interlocking directorships generally, and 
prior research has documented their presence in Australia. Major reasons for 
interlocks include monitoring of sources of environmental uncertainty, cooptation, 
collusion, legitimacy, career advancement and social cohesion (Allen, 1974; 
Schoorman et al., 1981; Mizruchi, 1996).
See, for example, Dooley (1969), Allen (1974), Koenig, Gogel and Sonquist (1979), Pennings 
(1980), Koenig and Gogel (1981), Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin (1981), Palmer (1983), 
Omstein (1984), Scott and Griff (1984), Mizruchi and Steams (1988) and Mizmchi (1996).
18 See, for example, Rolfe (1967), Hall (1983), Carroll, Stening and Stening (1990), Alexander and 
Murray (1992), Alexander, Murray and Houghton (1994) and Jubb (2000).
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While there has been much general research into interlocking directorships, there has 
been a lack of research focusing on the relationship between these interlocks and the 
selection and retention of auditors (Jubb, 2000; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Davison et 
al. (1984) were the first to document a link between interlocking directorates and the 
company’s auditor choice. They found a significant relationship between the number 
of director interlocks of Australian companies and the probability of the interlocked 
companies being audited by the same audit firm. In a more robust Australian study, 
Jubb (2000) found that the existence of these multiple board directorships had a 
systematic and significant effect on auditor choice and that these interlocks 
incrementally explained auditor choice when controlling for various institutional 
variables. These director-auditor links have also been found to be positively 
associated with length of auditor tenure (Courtney and Jubb, 2005).
Auditing involves interpersonal relationships between directors and auditors. 
Houghton and Jubb (2003a) point out that, despite it being the role of shareholders 
under the Corporations Act 2001 to appoint the auditor at a meeting of members, the 
choice of an auditor in practice represents a choice of people (auditors) by other 
people (directors). Further, ongoing audit engagements involve interactions between 
auditors and directors of auditee entities. An audit engagement can be considered in 
the context of a relationship between ‘exchange partners’, with attachments or 
commitments developed between the exchange partners serving to prolong the 
exchange and limit the mobility of those partners (Cook, 1977). Attachments between 
auditor and auditee occur mainly at the individual level (Seabright, Levinthal and 
Fichman, 1992; Courtney and Jubb, 2005), and research has found that the choice of 
continuing with business relationships depends on the trust that emerges between 
organisations arising from repeated personal attachments and ties (Cook, 1977;
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Levinthal and Fichman, 1988). De Ruyter and Wetzels (1999) found affective 
commitment, arising from trust and pleasant business partnerships in the course of an 
audit relationship, to be positively associated with ‘continuance commitment’. This 
reduced the probability of a client switching auditors.
Relationships generated in the presence of director-auditor links allow the 
development of mutual dependence due to the stability of the alliances established 
(Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Public accounting firms are known to tap into these 
networks, which often include former employees, to promote practice growth and 
firm survival (Jubb, 2000). It is therefore not surprising that the limited research in 
this area (Davison et al., 1984; Jubb, 2000; Courtney and Jubb, 2005) has found 
interlocking directorships to be positively associated with company auditor choice 
and length of tenure.
There are no statutory provisions in Australia precluding an audit firm auditing 
companies with interlocking directorships, but independence issues potentially arise. 
Seabright et al. (1992, p. 155) note that audit firms become enmeshed in a complex of 
ties in the course of professional engagements and that, while this embeddedness ‘is a 
natural result of the relationship between a client and an audit firm ... it is clearly at 
variance with normative expectations about professional detachment and avoidance 
of personal ties to clients.’ The presence of interlocking directorships among audit 
clients increases the possibilities for these personal ties, therefore potentially raising 
independence concerns (Jubb, 2000; Houghton and Jubb, 2003a; Courtney and Jubb, 
2005).
One category of threats to independence specified in APES 110 is that of ‘self- 
interest’ (APESB, 2006a, s. 290.28.3). When interlocking directorships exist among
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audit clients, additional self-interest threats could arise as the audit firm is dealing not 
only with a single entity but with a ‘family’ of companies linked by shared directors 
(Houghton and Jubb, 2003a). Examples of self-interest threats specified in APES 110 
that could be heightened when interlocking directorships exist include undue 
dependence on total fees from assurance clients, concern about the possibility of 
losing an engagement and having a close business relationship with assurance clients 
(s. 290.28.3).
Another category of independence threats specified in APES 110 is that arising from 
‘familiarity’ (s. 290.28.6). These threats arise when, because of a close relationship 
with an assurance client, the audit firm or a member of the audit team becomes too 
sympathetic to the client’s interests. It was highlighted earlier that auditing involves 
interpersonal relationships, at the individual level, between directors (and managers) 
and auditors. These interpersonal relationships are potentially greater, and may occur 
more frequently, when interlocking directorships exist among audit clients due to the 
networks of ties between the audited entities and the audit firm.
The final example of independence threats specified in APES 110 that could 
potentially be greater in the presence of interlocking directorships is that of 
‘intimidation’ (s. 290.28.7). Examples of these include the threat of the auditor’s 
replacement over a disagreement with the application of an accounting principle or 
pressure to inappropriately reduce the extent of audit work in order to reduce fees 
(s. 290.28.7). These threats could potentially be greater when a number of entities, 
related by interlocking directorships, are being audited, as the auditor stands to lose
multiple audits.
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Courtney and Jubb (2005, p. 133) summarise the potential self-interest, familiarity 
and intimidation threats arising from interlocking directorships by stating that ‘[t]he 
objectivity of the auditor may be compromised if the relationship is too cosy, and/or 
if the loss of several rather than a single audit client is the feared consequence of the 
auditor remaining non-compliant with the auditee’s preferred reporting.’
The potential threats, though, may be more perceived than real (Houghton and Jubb, 
2003a). It is most likely non-executive directors who will be involved in any 
interlocking directorships. The interests of non-executive directors, in comparison to 
executive directors, are likely to be more closely aligned with the interests of 
shareholders, and hence the presence of these pre-existing relationships may be less 
threatening to independence as a result (Houghton and Jubb, 2003a). Also, 
relationships arising from these interlocks may benefit audit quality (Houghton and 
Jubb, 2003a). DeAngelo (1981b) argues that auditors with a larger number of clients 
have more to lose by performing a low quality audit and failing to report a discovered 
breach in a particular client’s records, and that this increases the audit quality 
supplied by larger audit firms. Using the same reasoning, an auditor conducting a low 
quality audit of a company for which interlocks exist could potentially lose the audit 
of all companies in the network. Accordingly, Houghton and Jubb (2003a) argue that 
there is an economic incentive for the auditor to perform high quality work where 
substantial interlocking relationships are present.
Nevertheless, the presence of interlocking directorates among an audit firm’s clients 
has the potential to negatively affect auditor independence. No prior research, though, 
has examined perceptions of auditor independence where interlocking directorships 
exist. The experimental scenario contained in the study’s Case 2 indicated that three 
non-executive directors of the auditee were also non-executive directors of other
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companies audited by the incumbent audit firm. This created interlocks between the 
auditee company and two other companies, with the presence of a common audit 
engagement partner.
6.1.1.3 Period o f audit firm tenure
It has long been suggested that lengthy periods of auditor tenure may pose potential 
threats to auditor independence (see for example, Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; United 
States Senate Subcommittee, 1976, 1977; Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 
1978; Shockley, 1982). The potential independence problems have also been raised 
recently in Australia in the Ramsay Report (Ramsay, 2001) and by the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (2002). The HIH Royal Commission (2003) 
also stated that a lengthy relationship presented clear risks with respect to 
independence.19 A longer period of audit tenure increases the relationships and 
personal ties existing between auditor and client. The threats identified by APES 110 
(APESB, 2006a) that this could particularly affect are ‘self-interest’ threats 
(s. 290.28.3), ‘familiarity’ threats (s. 290.28.6) and ‘intimidation’ threats 
(s. 290.28.7).
Because of a long association with a client, a behavioural bond can develop between 
the auditor and auditee as they become more familiar with each other (Latham, Jacobs 
and Roush, 1998). The auditor may become less likely to use innovative audit 
procedures, may fail to maintain an attitude of professional scepticism and/or may 
lose the objectivity necessary for independence (Shockley, 1982; Raghunathan, Lewis 
and Evans, 1994; Catanach and Walker, 1999). Further, an incumbent auditor
The Commission highlighted that HIH Insurance’s auditor, Andersen, had been the incumbent 
auditor since 1971 (the major companies in the HIH group were placed in provisional liquidation 
in March 2001), and that HIH had become one of the most significant clients of Andersen’s 
Sydney practice (HIH Royal Commission, 2003, Vol. 1, p. 179).
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captures client-specific quasi-rents and has incentives to lower quality in future 
periods to retain the client and protect those quasi-rents (DeAngelo, 1981b). Because 
considerable learning costs are associated with a new client, the later periods of 
auditor tenure tend to be periods of relative stability and positive cash flows, which 
could motivate the auditor to not report misrepresentations in the client’s financial 
report (Raghunathan et al., 1994).
In an early study, Firth (1980) examined the effect on perceptions of auditor 
independence of a situation where an audit partner had been in sole charge of a large 
audit for a period of ten years. Only a minority of respondents considered this to 
adversely affect independence, although this percentage was greater for financial 
analysts (22 per cent) and loan officers (21 per cent) than for chartered accountants in 
Big Eight firms (11 per cent) or chartered accountants in other public practice firms 
(six per cent). Also, this longer tenure situation did not significantly affect 
hypothetical lending decisions of bank loan officers based on the audited financial 
statements (Firth, 1981).
Two further studies, though, reported a negative association between perceptions of 
independence or audit quality and auditor tenure length. Audit committee members 
have been found to perceive that longer auditor tenure length is associated with lower 
audit quality, as indicated by their assessment of the conditional likelihood of the 
auditor reporting a discovered material error (Knapp, 1991). Sainty, Taylor and 
Williams (2002) reported some evidence of investor dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent auditor, as measured by the proportion of votes against renewing the 
auditor’s contract, when the auditor had been incumbent for at least five years.
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While the above studies examined perceptions of independence or audit quality, other 
research has examined proxies for actual audit quality and found a negative 
association with auditor tenure length.20 In studies of lawsuits against auditors, St. 
Pierre and Anderson (1984) found only 23 percent of lawsuits to be associated with 
auditor tenure periods of three years or less, which could be interpreted to suggest the 
majority of those lawsuits to be associated with longer tenure periods. However, 
Lys and Watts (1994) and Stice (1991) found no relationship between auditor 
lawsuits and tenure length, while the findings of Latham et al. (1998) suggest that 
inappropriate audit opinions in audits that are subsequently subject to litigation are 
more likely to be associated with shorter auditor tenure.
As noted earlier in Section 6.1.1.1, there is some evidence of longer auditor tenure 
lengths for auditees purchasing high levels of recurring non-audit services (Beck et 
al., 1988b). Also, as noted in the previous sub-section, interlocking directorates have 
been found to be positively associated with tenure length (Courtney and Jubb, 2005).
Other empirical studies have provided further evidence of a possible negative 
relationship between audit quality and tenure length. Palmrose (1989) reported that 
audit quality, as proxied by audit engagement hours, declined with length of audit 
firm tenure. For audits of school districts conducted by Texan CPA firms, Deis and 
Giroux (1992) and Giroux, Deis and Bryan (1995) found decreased assessments of 
audit quality, in quality control reviews by the relevant education agency, as auditor 
tenure increased. Copley and Doucet (1993) found that the probability of a sub-
As noted in Chapter 2, audit quality comprises both auditor competence and independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). These two auditor qualities, though, are 
likely to be related in individual circumstances. For example, if an auditor is not independent 
and therefore does not expect to report a misrepresentation even if detected, they may find it cost 
efficient to put less than adequate effort (competence) into the audit (Raghunathan et al., 1994).
Although this has also been interpreted as suggesting that litigation risks increase with newer 
audit clients (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Latham et al., 1998).
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standard audit increased with auditor tenure length.22 O’Keefe, King and Gaver 
(1994), although not specifically a test of tenure, reported fewer violations of 
generally accepted accounting standards in the audited financial reports of California 
school districts in initial audit engagements in comparison to repeat engagements. 
Raghunathan et al. (1994) found that audit failures, where the SEC ruled that audited 
financial statements filed with it contained misrepresentations, were more likely to 
occur in the first year or after the fifth year of audit firm tenure. Vanstraelen (2000) 
reported that a longer period of audit tenure significantly reduced the likelihood of a 
qualified audit opinion for large Belgian companies. Chi and Huang (2005) found 
evidence consistent with lower earnings quality, by reference to abnormal accruals, in 
the later years of audit firm tenure. Some evidence has also been found of earnings 
‘surprises’ to meet or beat earnings forecasts in the later years of audit firm tenure, 
with the negative impact of longer firm tenure becoming apparent after tenure periods 
of at least 18 years (Azizkhani, Monroe and Shailer, 2007b).
Choi and Doogar (2005) found longer auditor tenure to be negatively associated with 
the likelihood of a going concern qualification, particularly for non-Big Five auditors. 
Longer periods of audit partner tenure have also been found to be associated with a 
lower propensity to issue going-concern audit opinions for distressed companies and 
with companies just beating or missing earnings benchmarks, the latter suggesting 
earnings management (Carey and Simnett, 2006). In contrast though, Craswell, 
Stokes and Laughton (2002) and Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) did not detect any 
relationship between auditor tenure length and the propensity of auditors to issue 
unqualified audit opinions.
22 Whether an audit was considered sub-standard was based on conclusions of formal reports of the 
United States Office of Regional Inspector General into audits of federal financial assistance 
recipients.
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While a number of the above studies suggest longer auditor tenure impacting 
adversely on independence and audit quality, there is an alternative argument that 
longer tenure may have positive effects. The deeper familiarity and insight into the 
client’s operations gained by a longer audit relationship can allow more efficient and 
less costly audit services, this increasing the dependency of the client on the auditor 
and increasing the auditor’s ability to withstand client pressure (Shockley, 1982).
A number of recent studies provide some evidence of a positive relationship between 
audit quality and tenure length. For a sample of companies entering bankruptcy, 
Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) examined the association between the type of audit 
opinion issued immediately prior to bankruptcy and the length of auditor tenure. They 
found there were significantly more audit reporting failures in the earlier years of 
audit tenure than in later years. In examining audit deficiencies documented in 
PCAOB inspection reports, Gunny, Krishnan and Zhang (2007) found that longer 
auditor tenure periods mitigated deficiencies for non-Big Four auditors.
Evidence has also been advanced that companies with long-tenured auditors receive 
higher bond ratings and incur lower debt costs (Mansi, Maxwell and Miller, 2004; 
Crabtree, Brandon and Maher, 2006). Using earnings response coefficients from 
retums-eamings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, 
Ghosh and Moon (2005) document a positive association between earnings response 
coefficients and length of auditor tenure. Azizkhani et al. (2007b) report audit firm 
and engagement partner tenure to be associated with lower ex-ante cost of equity 
capital, calculated by reference to analysts’ earnings per share forecasts, for non-Big 
Four audit firms. These four studies suggest that longer auditor tenure is valued by 
capital market participants.
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Finally, a further four major published studies have used accruals models to gain an 
insight into earnings management, audit quality and the impact of longer tenure 
periods. Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) found absolute unexpected accruals 
to be associated with shorter (two to three year) tenure periods but to be unrelated to 
longer (greater than eight year) tenure periods. This supports lower earnings and audit 
quality for only the shorter tenure periods. Frankel et al. (2002) and Myers, Myers 
and Omer (2003) found the level of company absolute accruals to be negatively 
associated with auditor tenure length, suggesting lower accruals and higher earnings 
quality when the auditor had been incumbent for longer periods. However in a 
replication of Frankel et al. (2002) that included an additional control variable for 
company asset growth, Reynolds et al. (2004) did not find any significant relationship 
between absolute discretionary accruals and tenure length. Also, Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) failed to find any significant relationship between lengthy auditor tenure and 
fraudulent financial reporting. A recent working paper, though, has documented a 
positive association between longer periods of auditor tenure and the likelihood of 
companies reporting levels of discretionary accruals that allow them to meet or beat 
earnings forecasts (Davis, Soo and Trompeter, (2007).
The respondents to a survey of audit firms and company directors conducted by the 
General Accounting Office (2003) did not believe that auditor tenure affected the 
manner in which auditors dealt with material financial reporting issues. However, the 
discussion in this sub-section highlights the contradictory and inconclusive nature of 
the research findings. A major problem is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
disentangle competence and independence effects arising from longer periods of 
auditor tenure. Also, by necessity, the prior research has examined various alternative 
proxies for audit quality and independence. It is therefore not unexpected that mixed
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results have been found. Nevertheless, the prior literature does make it clear that there 
is the potential for independence impairment, both in fact and in appearance, when 
audit firms are incumbent for longer periods. This particularly arises from the 
interpersonal attachments and commitments that arise in the course of auditor-client 
relationships (Cook, 1977; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Seabright et al., 1992; 
De Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999; Jubb, 2000). APES 110 specifically states that 
familiarity threats can arise as a result of a long association between senior audit 
personnel and assurance clients (APESB, 2006a, ss. 290.153 and 290.154).
The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 3 and 4 manipulated audit 
firm tenure length. These cases indicated the audit firm had been retained for the 
previous nine years, while all other cases indicated a four year tenure period. The four 
year tenure period was selected for all except Cases 3 and 4 to indicate a shorter 
tenure period, but not an engagement that could be considered an initial or early one. 
The nine year tenure period, being over twice the four years of tenure indicated in the 
other experimental cases, was selected for Cases 3 and 4 to clearly differentiate 
auditor tenure length. Sainty et al. (2002) and Raghunathan et al. (1994) classified 
audit tenure periods exceeding four and five years respectively as long, while Johnson 
et al. (2002) classified a tenure period exceeding eight years as long. Also, a nine year 
tenure period exceeds the average tenure length reported in most of the prior 
studies.24
The difference between Cases 3 and 4 was in the period of audit partner rotation specified. This 
aspect will be discussed in Section 6.1.2.2.
The average auditor tenure lengths for sample companies, where reported in the prior studies, 
were 3.6 years in Copley and Doucet (1993), 8.2 years in Frankel et al. (2002), 6.0 years in 
Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), 8.8 years in Mansi et al. (2004), 7.2 years in Reynolds et al. 
(2004), 8.5 years in Ghosh and Moon (2005) and 13.3 in Crabtree et al. (2006).
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6.1.1.4 Former audit firm partner as a director o f the auditee
It is not unusual for audit staff to be recruited for employment with audit clients, and 
audit partners and experienced staff have often moved to senior positions, including 
directorships, with former audit clients (Wines, 2004). This practice is often referred 
to as the revolving door (see, for example, Clikeman, 1998; Menon and Williams, 
2004; Geiger, North and O’Connell, 2005). The Australian and international codes of 
ethics consider that this circumstance can create ‘self interest’, ‘familiarity’ and 
‘intimidation’ threats (IFAC, 2005, s. 290.143; APESB, 2006a, s. 290.28.6). The 
specific concerns arise from (a) the question of the ability of audit staff to be 
independent and exercise due diligence when dealing with an ex-colleague, (b) a 
reticence for audit staff to query the former colleague, (c) the former auditor 
potentially being able to exercise undue influence over the audit team, (d) the inside 
knowledge of the audit firm’s practices possessed by the former auditor, and (e) the 
possibility of an auditor taking a more lenient audit approach in the period prior to 
employment with the client (Imhoff, 1978; Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson, 2000; 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; Ramsay, 2001).
Prior research indicates that financial report users’ perceptions of independence tend 
to be diminished when an auditor accepts employment with a client (Imhoff, 1978; 
Firth, 1980; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993). Independence concerns have been found to 
increase as the time lapse between working as an auditor of the audit client and 
accepting employment with the client decreases (Imhoff, 1978; Koh and Mahathevan, 
1993), and the independence concerns have been found to be greater for financial 
report users than for CPAs (Imhoff, 1978; Firth, 1980)
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Evidence from two experimental studies also found client employment effects to 
influence auditor decisions. Parlin and Bartlett (1994) reported higher preliminary 
assessments of materiality in cases where the client’s controller had been the audit 
manager in charge of the prior year’s audit, suggesting the auditors were influenced 
by knowledge of the prior employment. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) examined the 
reporting intentions of audit seniors who discovered an audit manager to be 
considering employment with an audit client but to be failing to comply with the 
relevant ethical ruling. The relevant ruling required the managers to remove 
themselves from the engagement until their offers were rejected or until employment 
was no longer sought. The study found evidence that the audit seniors would not 
always report this non-compliance to the audit engagement partner. This suggested 
weaknesses in the ethical ruling, resulting in independence concerns remaining in that 
situation.
Beasley et al. (1999, 2000) reported that, in a sample of 44 fraudulently reporting 
companies, five had chief financial officers who had worked for the incumbent audit 
firm immediately prior to joining the employer. Two later earnings management 
studies, though, report conflicting results. Menon and Williams (2004) found 
evidence of earnings management in companies where a former audit partner was an 
officer or director. In contrast, Geiger et al. (2005) did not detect evidence of earnings 
management in situations where companies had hired a senior financial reporting 
executive directly from the external audit firm.
In summary, the prior research generally suggests that potential independence 
concerns can arise from client employment effects. The corporate collapses earlier 
this decade have also drawn attention to the issue. For example, in the United States, 
former senior audit partners and staff of the incumbent audit firm were directors,
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officers or in senior positions at Enron, Global Crossing and Waste Management 
(SEC, 2001; Menon and Williams, 2004; Geiger et al., 2005). In Australia, three of 
the directors of HIH Insurance, including the chairman, were formerly partners of the 
incumbent audit firm (Ramsay, 2001; HIH Royal Commission, 2003).
To reduce the threat of independence impairment in these situations, various regimes 
have enacted cooling-off periods. These place limitations on the circumstances under 
which a former audit partner or staff member can undertake employment with an 
audit client. For example, IF AC (2003) recommended a two year cooling-off period 
for an individual who had a key role on an audit, or in the chain of command, within 
the audit firm before they could take on a key role at the audit client.
The relevant ethical standard in the United Kingdom applies to a former audit firm 
partner appointed as a director or to a key management position with an audit client. 
If such a partner had previously acted as an audit engagement partner (or as an 
independent partner, key audit partner or partner in the chain of command), the audit 
firm is required to resign as auditor and not accept reappointment until either a two 
year period has elapsed or the former partner ceases employment with the former 
client, whichever is the earlier (Auditing Practices Board, 2004b, para. 44).
In the Unites States, s. 206 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes it unlawful for an 
accounting firm to perform an audit if the audit client’s chief executive officer, 
controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer or any person serving in an 
equivalent position has previously been employed by the accounting firm and 
participated in the audit in any capacity during the one year period preceding the date
of initiation of the audit.
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The various independence reports in Australia earlier this decade advocated cooling- 
off period safeguards. The Ramsay Report recommended a two year cooling-off 
period during which a former audit firm partner directly involved in the audit of the 
client could not become a director of that client (Ramsay, 2001, p. 9). The CLERP 9 
discussion paper endorsed this proposal, but extended its application to preclude a 
former partner from taking ‘a position with the client involving responsibility for 
fundamental management decisions’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 49). The 
HIH Royal Commission (2003, Vol. 1, pp. lxvii, 177) advocated a further 
strengthening by recommending (a) a four year cooling-off period before a former 
partner or key senior audit staff member who was involved in the audit of a client 
could become a director of, or take a senior management position with, the client, and 
(b) a two year cooling-off period for a former partner who was not directly involved 
in the audit of the client. The CLERP 9 legislation of 2004 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2004) ultimately amended the Corporations Act 2001 (ss. 324CI and 
324CJ) to specify a two year cooling-off period for lead or review auditors and 
professional members of the audit team. The proposal for a two year cooling-off 
period for a former partner not directly involved in the audit was not enacted.
The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 8 and 9 indicated a former 
audit firm partner being a director of the audit client.25 These cases stated that the 
director resigned from the audit firm 12 months earlier after 17 years with the firm, 
becoming director of the auditee eight months earlier. The director had not previously 
been involved in the audit of the auditee, and hence was not subject to the cooling-off 
period specified in the Corporations Act 2001. However, these cases did specify that 
the current audit engagement partner had worked closely with this director when
25 The difference between Cases 8 and 9 was whether a local independence board within the audit 
firm was specified. This aspect will be discussed in Section 6.1.2.3.
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previously with the audit firm, including as an audit supervisor and manager on 
several audits for which the director had previously been the manager or engagement 
partner.
6.1.2 Independence safeguards
6.1.2.1 Audit subject to additional external oversight
The effective oversight of the accounting profession and of independent audits is 
critical to the integrity of financial reporting (IOSCO, 2002a). There has been a recent 
growth in the establishment of external public oversight boards comprising 
‘government or professional committees to review the work of auditors and take an 
active part in setting and enforcing standards’ (Hayes, Dassen, Schilder and Wallage, 
2005, p. 48). Simnett and Smith (2005, p. 45) state that the instigation of public 
oversight ‘has become a popular mechanism for reforming all of the recent ills 
attributed to the auditing standard-setting process’, and the European Commission 
(2004b) argues that independence of public oversight systems from the profession is 
important for the restoration of public trust in statutory audits. In theory, oversight by 
an independent body should restore confidence through the introduction of neutrality 
and transparency (Simnett and Smith, 2005).
It is generally considered that the setting of auditing standards requires the significant 
practical and technical expertise of practicing auditors but, if auditors are given a free 
rein, the concern is that they will produce standards that reflect the interests of the 
profession rather than the public (Simnett and Smith, 2005). This provides the 
rationale for the additional oversight of auditors and auditing by some form of 
external public oversight board. Auditor oversight can occur in a number of ways, 
including within audit firms, by professional organisations and public or private
Chapter 6 1 6 9
sector oversight bodies, and through government oversight (IOSCO, 2002a). While 
the accounting profession in many countries has typically operated on a self- 
regulatory basis, there has been a growing recognition that ‘the impact, or potential 
impact, of the profession on industry and commerce is so great that some supervision 
of the profession is needed to ensure its self-regulatory mechanisms are both adequate 
and appropriate’ (Ramsay, 2001, p. 63). Similarly, IOSCO (2002a) believes there is 
growing international consensus on the benefits of an audit oversight system that is 
not based exclusively or predominantly on self-regulation. Accordingly, recent 
developments in public oversight have tended to represent a move away from self­
regulation to varying extents.
The former Public Oversight Board (POB) in the United States, established in 1977 
and operating until 2002, is an example of an oversight approach. The board was 
established as an independent private sector body charged with overseeing and 
reporting on the programs of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA, with 
the aim of providing assurance that the SECPS was serving the public interest (POB, 
1979, 2002; Meigs, Whittington and Meigs, 1982). It was intended that this would 
provide the pressure of public scrutiny on audit firms to ensure their continued 
participation and compliance with the SECPS’s requirements (Olson, 1982). The 
POB comprised five members drawn from outside the accounting profession, with 
experience in such areas as business, education, banking, law, economics and 
government (Cook and Winkle, 1980; Hermanson, Strawser and Strawser, 1993; 
POB, 2002). It operated until May 2002.26
26 The Board wound itself up on 1 May 2002 (POB, 2002). This was mainly the result of an SEC 
proposal for a new private sector regulatory structure, but was also due to a decrease in support 
from the SECPS and the AICPA (POB, 2002, pp. 2-3).
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As explained in Chapter 2, a new US public oversight body, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), was established with the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002 on 30 July 2002 (ss. 101-109). The underlying mission 
of the board is to restore the confidence of investors and society in independent 
auditors following ‘the repeated revelations of accounting scandals and audit failures’ 
(Carmichael, 2004, p. 128). The PCAOB’s specified role is to ‘oversee the audit of 
public companies ... in order to protect the interests of investors and further the 
public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit 
reports . . .’ (s. 101(a)). Major oversight functions of the board include a continuing 
program of inspections to assess the degree of compliance of registered firms and 
associated persons with applicable rules and standards (s. 104) and the conduct of 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings (s. 105).27 The board consists of five 
financially literate members appointed from ‘prominent individuals of integrity and 
reputation who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the 
public’ (s. 101(e)(1)). Only two members may be, or may have been, certified public 
accountants, and the chairperson cannot have been a practicing certified public 
accountant within the five year period prior to their appointment to the board 
(s. 101(e)(2)).
In Canada, two auditor oversight bodies have been established in recent times. The 
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) was announced in July 2002 and
Specific duties of the board are to (a) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports 
for issuers, (b) establish or adopt auditing, quality control, independence and other standards 
relating to the preparation of audit reports, (c) conduct inspections of registered accounting firms 
and associates, (d) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings, (e) perform other duties 
or functions as the board or SEC determines to be necessary or appropriate, (f) enforce 
compliance with the rules and standards relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports, 
and (g) manage the board’s operations (s. 101(c)).
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incorporated in April 2003 (CPAB, 2003).28 The role of the CPAB is to provide 
independent oversight for auditors of entities that report to the Canadian securities 
commissions (CPAB, 2003). In particular, the CPAB conducts inspections and 
investigations of participating audit firms to assess their compliance with the board’s 
rules, professional standards and the firms’ own quality control standards, and can 
require remedial actions and impose sanctions where appropriate (CPAB, 2003, 
2005).
The Auditing and Assurance Standards Oversight Council (AASOC) was also 
established in Canada, in October 2002, as an independent body to serve the public 
interest by overseeing the activities of the Canadian auditing standard-setting body, 
the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AASOC, 2005).29 Members of the 
AASOC comprise prominent members of the community, together with senior 
representatives from public interest bodies, including the Canadian Securities 
Administrators, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the 
CPAB (AASOC, 2005).
The government in the United Kingdom, following a number of reviews and
30reports, legislated for a strengthening of the regulatory framework for corporate
The CPAB was established by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the 
Federal Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the Canadian provincial securities 
commissions (CPAB, 2003).
More specifically, the responsibilities of the AASOC include appointing members to, and 
providing input into the strategic direction and priories of, the Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board, working with that board to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the views of 
relevant stakeholders, ensuring the standard-setting process is effective and responsive to the 
public interest, and monitoring the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board’s activities 
(AASOC, 2005).
See, for example, Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (2002, 2003) and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004).
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governance, auditing and financial reporting.31 This resulted in a significant widening 
of the responsibilities of the United Kingdom’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC 
(UK)), “ with the council becoming, from April 2004, a unified and authoritative 
regulator responsible for setting accounting and audit standards, monitoring and 
enforcing those standards, and overseeing auditors and the self-regulatory activities of 
the major professional accounting bodies (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004; 
FRC (UK), 2004, 2005). Also, the Professional Oversight Board33 was established as 
a board of the FRC (UK) to undertake the oversight function (FRC (UK), 2004, 
2007a, 2007c), and an Audit Inspection Unit was set up, as part of the board, with 
specific responsibility for monitoring the audits of all listed and other major public 
interest entities (FRC (UK), 2007b).
In the European Union, a proposal for more robust oversight of the audit profession 
was announced in March 2004 (European Commission, 2004a). Pursuant to revisions 
to the 8th Company Law Directive, the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight 
Bodies (EGAOB) was established in December 2005 to ensure effective coordination 
of public oversight systems within the European Union (European Commission, 
2005a, 2005b, 2006). The specific tasks of the body are to (a) facilitate cooperation 
between public oversight systems of member states and bring about an exchange of 
good practice concerning the establishment and ongoing cooperation of such systems,
(b) contribute to the technical assessment of public oversight systems, and
(c) contribute to the technical examination of international auditing standards with a
view to their adoption at the community level (European Commission, 2005a). The
The reforms were legislated in the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) 
Act 2004 (October 2004) and The Companies Act 1989 (Delegation) Order 2005 (August 2005).
The abbreviation FRC (UK) is used here to differentiate the Financial Reporting Council in the 
United Kingdom from Australia’s Financial Reporting Council.
Formerly the Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy prior to a name change in May 
2006 (FRC (UK), 2007d).
33
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EGAOB is composed of high-level, non-practitioner representatives from the entities 
responsible for public oversight of statutory auditors and audit firms in member states 
or, in their absence, of representatives from the competent National Ministries 
(European Commission, 2005a, 2005b).
In the international arena, the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) was jointly 
created, in February 2005, by a number of international and related organisations in 
collaboration with IF AC (PIOB, 2006, 2007a).34 The objective of the PIOB is to 
‘increase the confidence of investors and others that the public interest activities of 
IFAC (including the setting of standards by IFAC boards and committees) are 
properly responsive to the public interest’ (PIOB, 2006, p. 3). The PIOB exercises 
oversight over IFAC’s three standard-setting boards,35 their respective Consultative 
Advisory Groups and IFAC’s Compliance Advisory Panel.36 The board comprises 
eight members nominated by IOSCO, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the World Bank, together 
with two observers nominated by the European Commission (PIOB, 2007b).
Developments have also occurred in Australia, with the Ramsay Report
recommending the establishment of an Auditor Independence Supervisory Board
(Ramsay, 2001, pp. 12-14). The report considered an independent supervisory board
to be ‘an essential instrument in addressing the challenge of implementing new
auditor independence requirements in Australia’ and that it would ‘play a vital role in
These organisations were IOSCO, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, The World Bank and the European 
Commission.
These boards are the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, the International 
Ethics Standards Board for Accountants and the International Accounting Education Standards 
Board (PIOB, 2006, 2007a).
The Compliance Advisory Panel evaluates the compliance of member bodies with IFAC’s 
membership rules, including their commitment to implement IFAC audit, ethics and education 
standards (PIOB, 2006, 2007a).
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ensuring public confidence in the independence of auditors by monitoring 
implementation of the new regime, compliance with it, and important international 
developments in the area of auditor independence’ (Ramsay, 2001, p. 12).
Rather than establishing a new Australian body, the audit oversight function was 
assigned to the existing Financial Reporting Council (FRC) with the passage of the 
CLERP 9 legislation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). This resulted in the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 being amended to 
significantly expand the FRC’s functions to include, from 1 July 2004, oversight of 
Australia’s auditing standard-setting process and the monitoring of the effectiveness 
of Australia’s auditor independence requirements (FRC, 2004).
With respect to auditor independence, s. 225(2B)(a) was inserted into the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 to extend the FRC’s functions to 
monitor and assess the nature and overall adequacy of (a) the systems and processes 
used by Australian auditors to ensure compliance with auditor independence 
requirements, (b) the systems and processes used by professional accounting bodies 
for planning and performing quality assurance reviews of audit work undertaken by 
Australian auditors to the extent to which those reviews relate to auditor 
independence requirements, (c) the action that Australian auditors who have been 
subject to such quality assurance reviews have taken in response to the reports 
prepared, (d) the action taken by professional accounting bodies to ensure that 
Australian auditors who have been subject to such quality assurance reviews respond 
appropriately to the reports prepared, and (e) the investigation and disciplinary 
procedures of professional accounting bodies as those procedures apply to Australian
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37auditors.' In addition, the FRC’s functions were expanded to include the monitoring 
of international auditor independence developments and assessing the adequacy of 
Australia’s independence requirements (s. 225(2B)(e)).
The increased development of external public oversight bodies internationally, as 
highlighted in the discussion in this sub-section, emphasises that increased public 
oversight has been central to the strengthening of the audit function following the 
corporate collapses and perceptions of auditor independence impairment of earlier 
this decade. The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 5 and 6 
indicated a high level of non-audit (taxation) services. Case 5, but not Case 6, 
indicated that the company had raised debt and equity in the United States and 
therefore that the audit of the company, and the Australian auditor and audit firm, 
were subject to additional oversight by the PCAOB. The aim of the experimental 
manipulation was to convey the notion of an additional layer of rigorous external 
public oversight. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides the PCAOB with 
extensive powers to inspect registered public accounting firms (s. 104) and conduct 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings (s. 105), with detailed sanctions specified 
in s. 105(4). Also, the study’s research instrument was administered between 23 
March 2004 and 5 May 2005, a period spanning that in which the Australian FRC’s
ASIC conducts inspections of Australian audit firms on behalf of the FRC (Department of the 
Treasury, 2005; Jubb and Houghton, 2007). Two reports to the FRC on the audit inspection 
program have been prepared by ASIC to date (ASIC, 2005, 2006). The PCAOB has also 
recently, on 16 July 2007, entered into a Statement o f  Protocol with ASIC ‘to enhance 
cooperation in the supervisory oversight of auditors and public accounting firms that practice in 
the two regulators’ respective jurisdictions’ (PCAOB, 2007). This has been enabled in Australia 
by amendments to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 and the 
Corporations Act 2001 enacted in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Amendment (Audit Inspection) Act 2007.
These sanctions include (a) temporary suspension or permanent revocation of registration, 
(b) temporary or permanent suspension or barring of a person from further association with any 
registered public accounting firm, (c) temporary or permanent limitation on the activities, 
functions or operations of firms or persons, (d) civil monetary penalties, (e) censure, (f) required 
additional professional education or training, or (g) any other appropriate sanction provided for 
in the PCAOB’s rules (s. 105(4)).
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audit oversight function became operational from 1 July 2004 but after the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act establishing the PCAOB was enacted on 30 July 2002.39 Accordingly, at 
the time of administering the research instrument, Australia’s public auditor oversight 
function was not as developed as that operating in the United States with the 
established PCAOB. Also, in contrast to the PCAOB, the FRC in Australia has been 
criticised for having no specific disciplinary powers (Simnett and Smith, 2005) 40
6.1.2.2 Auditor rotation
The potential independence threats posed by a lengthy period of auditor tenure were 
discussed in Section 6.1.1.3. The major safeguard that has been recommended to deal 
with these threats involves some form of auditor rotation. This requires an audited 
entity to change its audit firm, or the audit firm to change the partner(s) and/or audit 
personnel on the audit engagement, after some prescribed period of time.
While the corporate collapses earlier this decade gave impetus to recommendations 
for auditor rotation, the issue of mandatory rotation has been debated for many years 
(SEC, 2003). For example, it was raised by regulators in the United States McKesson 
& Robbins case at SEC hearings in 1939 (Hoyle, 1978; Ng, 2003) and by various 
commissions, regulators and professional organisations prior to the turn of this
The first members of the PCAOB were named on 25 October 2002, the board’s first public 
meeting was held on 9 January 2003, and the final determination required by the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act to establish the PCAOB was made by the SEC on 25 April 2003 (PCAOB, 2004a).
Simnett and Smith (2005, pp. 51-2) observe that disciplinary procedures have been left in the 
hands of the professional bodies, that the highest powers the FRC possess are to advise 
government if improvements are required and to refer matters to the Companies Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB) and ASIC, and that this could be viewed as ‘a mere 
veil of oversight established to induce perceptions of an efficient oversight regime.’
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century.41 Some companies had adopted audit firm rotation policies voluntarily as 
early as the beginning of the twentieth century, and the US company Du Pont rotated 
its audit firm every year, and later every several years, from 1910 until 1954 (Ng, 
2003; Zeff, 2003).
Auditor rotation is primarily designed to mitigate familiarity threats between the 
auditor and the audit client’s management (IFAC, 2005; APESB, 2006a). The general 
arguments in support of rotation are that pressures faced by the incumbent auditor to 
retain the audit client, together with the auditor’s comfort level and close personal 
relationship with management developed over time, can adversely affect the auditor’s 
actions in appropriately dealing with audit and financial reporting issues 
(Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, 1977; Hoyle, 1978; 
Catanach and Walker, 1999; General Accounting Office, 2003). A major claimed 
benefit of rotation is that it can break the relationship between the auditor and the 
audit client’s management and enable a ‘fresh’ approach to the audit (Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978; Hoyle, 1978; Shanahan, 2002; General Accounting 
Office, 2003).
Audit firm rotation may be perceived as having the effect of reducing the economic 
bond between the auditor and client and lessening certain judgmental biases (Smith 
and Kida, 1991; Tan, 1995; Gates, Lowe and Reckers, 2007). Some proponents of 
audit firm rotation also contend that increased competition between firms will 
positively impact on the quality of audit services (Hoyle, 1978; Petty and Cuganesan, 
1996; Catanach and Walker, 1999; Shanahan, 2002; Healey and Kim, 2003) and that
See, for example, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management (1977), Commission 
on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1978), AICPA SECPS (1992); Auditing Practices Board (1992), 
Cadbury Committee (1992), Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants and ICAA 
(1993), Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC (1994), Public Oversight Board (1994) and 
the General Accounting Office (1996).
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audit firm rotation provides effective external review of work done by previous 
auditors (Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, 1977; Catanach 
and Walker, 1999; Healey and Kim, 2003; Imhoff, 2003).
The general criticism of rotation is that it could be counterproductive by impacting 
negatively on audit quality (Arrunada and Paz-Ares, 1997; Catanach and Walker, 
1999; Culvenor and Stokes, 2002, 2003; Houghton, 2002b, 2002c). It was highlighted 
in Chapter 2 that audit quality depends on both the auditor’s competence and 
independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). Critics contend that, 
after rotation, the new auditor’s lack of knowledge of the company’s operations, 
information systems and financial reporting practices, and the time needed to gain 
that knowledge, increase the risk of lowered audit quality and audit failure (Catanach 
and Walker, 1999; General Accounting Office, 2003).
Increased costs for audit firms and increased costs and disruption for audited entities 
are a further disadvantage of rotation requirements (Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities, 1978; Hoyle, 1978; Catanach and Walker, 1999; General 
Accounting Office, 2003). This will particularly be a problem in the early years of an 
audit engagement. A substantial amount of auditors’ specific knowledge and assets 
connected to initial audits are destroyed with firm rotation, and client-specific 
information must be rebuilt after each rotation (Arrunada and Paz-Ares, 1997; 
Nelson, 2006). Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1997) also contend that rotation can 
simultaneously damage both competence and independence. The auditor’s ability to 
detect irregularities is hampered by a greater number of initial audits and a lesser 
degree of specialisation, and the willingness of the auditor to report detected 
irregularities is reduced as rotation diminishes the expected cost of not reporting 
because of the lessened audit tenure period. Houghton (2002b, 2002c) argues that
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audit firm rotation provides an incentive for auditors to do a minimal job for the 
limited tenure period to maximise profitability until the audit is lost to the next profit- 
maximising firm. Also, Hoyle (1978) argues that the complexity and size of most 
modem businesses are not conducive to short audit engagements. A further problem 
is that the limited number of audit partners and audit firms will make rotation more 
difficult to achieve (Petty and Cuganesan, 1996; Houghton and Jubb, 2003c).
While there has been a paucity of academic research into auditor rotation, a small 
number of perception and experimental studies have been conducted. The perception 
studies found that non-rotation of audit firms was not a dominant factor leading to 
perceptions of independence impairment (Teoh and Lim, 1996), and that audit partner 
rotation was not perceived to have any impact on the auditor’s ability to resist 
management pressure (Goodwin and Seow, 2002). Hence, these studies do not 
suggest improved perceptions of independence arising from audit firm or partner 
rotation.
In an experimental study, Dopuch et al. (2001) found that a requirement for audit firm 
rotation decreased auditors’ willingness to issue biased and misstated audit reports. In 
a further experimental study specifying an impasse between an auditor and their client 
on the treatment of a possible material misstatement, Arel, Brody and Pany (2006) 
found that auditor participants, where audit firm rotation was stipulated, were more 
likely to modify their audit report than were participants where a continuing 
relationship was expected. Gates et al. (2007) found that audit firm rotation, but not 
audit partner rotation, improved the confidence of participants in a company’s 
reported earnings. Accordingly, the results of these experimental studies suggest a 
positive impact on independence arising from audit firm rotation.
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In an empirical study, Azizkhani et al. (2007a) find some evidence of benefits arising 
from audit partner rotation. Partner rotation was found by the study to reduce the 
ability of companies to beat analyst earnings forecasts.
The major recent legislative and professional developments, though, have largely 
involved the prescription of audit partner, rather than audit firm, rotation. For 
example, none of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom or the 
United States require audit firm rotation (Department of the Treasury, 2006).
In Australia, the Ramsay Report proposed mandatory rotation of audit partners for 
audits of listed entities after a maximum of seven years (Ramsay, 2001, p. 16). The 
CLERP 9 discussion paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 4) recommended 
compulsory rotation of the lead engagement and review partners for listed entity 
audits after five years. The HIH Royal Commission broadly supported the CLERP 9 
recommendation, including the five year period, but recommended that the proposal 
be extended to also require the rotation of ‘key senior audit personnel’ (HIH Royal 
Commission, 2003, Vol. 1, pp. lxviii, 180). The final CLERP 9 legislation amended 
the Corporations Act 2001 (ss. 324DA to 324 DD) to require the lead and review 
auditors to rotate after five successive years and not audit an individual audit client 
for more than five out of seven successive financial years. ASIC has the power to 
extend the rotation period to up to seven years on application from the auditor where 
the rotation obligations would impose an unreasonable burden (s. 342A).42
Australia’s APES 110 (APESB, 2006a), consistent with the IF AC code (IFAC, 2005),
states that using the same lead engagement partner, audit review partner (if any) or
In making such a determination, ASIC is to have regard to (a) the nature of the audited body or 
bodies, including whether specialist knowledge is necessary to carry out the activity properly, 
(b) the availability of other registered company auditors capable of providing satisfactory audit 
services, and (c) any other matters which ASIC considers relevant (s. 342A(7)).
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engagement quality control reviewer on an audit over a prolonged period may create 
a familiarity threat (APESB, 2006a, s. 290.154). Consistent with the Corporations 
Act 2001, the code prescribes that the relevant partners or quality control reviewer 
should be rotated after serving in any of these capacities for a period no longer than 
five financial years within a seven year period, and should not again participate in the 
audit engagement for at least two years (APESB, 2006a, s. 290.154).
In the Unites States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002 (s. 203) makes it unlawful for a 
firm to provide audit services to an issuing entity if the lead or coordinating partner, 
or the partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for 
that issuer in each of the previous five years. Consistent provisions are specified in 
the SEC’s rules (SEC, 2003). Also, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is silent with regard 
to any time-out period before a partner can return to the audit client engagement, the 
SEC specifies a five year time out period (SEC, 2003).43
Five year partner rotation and time out periods are also applicable for audits of listed 
companies in the United Kingdom, with this applying to personnel who have acted as 
the audit engagement partner or the independent partner (Auditing Practices Board, 
2004c). The five year rotation and time out periods for partners also apply in Canada, 
while the European Union rules specify a rotation period of seven years and a time 
out period of two years (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2003; 
Department of the Treasury, 2006; European Commission, 2006; FRC, 2006).
The Commission’s rules also extend rotation to (a) other partners on the audit engagement team 
who have responsibility for decision-making on significant auditing, accounting and reporting 
matters or who maintain regular contact with management and the audit committee, and (b) the 
lead partner on any subsidiaries whose assets or revenues are at least 20 per cent of consolidated 
assets or revenue (SEC, 2003). For these partners, rotation is required after no more than seven 
years and the time out period is two years.
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As detailed in the discussion above, current independence developments have seen 
the specification of requirements for audit partner rotation. The experimental 
scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 3 and 4 manipulated audit firm tenure length. 
These cases specified the audit firm had been retained for the previous nine years, 
while all other cases indicated a four year tenure period. The difference between 
Cases 3 and 4 was in the period of audit partner rotation. Case 3 specified a four year 
rotation period, while Case 4 specified a seven year rotation period. The aim of the 
experimental manipulation was to determine whether these differences in rotation 
period impacted on connotations of independence.
The seven year period was chosen for the longer rotation period scenario (Case 4) as 
this represents the longest of the various audit partner rotation periods specified in the 
regimes discussed above. A seven year rotation period is specified in the European 
Union’s rules (European Commission, 2006). The Ramsay Report in Australia, prior 
to the CLERP 9 legislation, proposed rotation of audit partners for audits of listed 
entities after a maximum of seven years (Ramsay, 2001). Also, as noted previously, 
ASIC has the power under the Corporations Act 2001 (s. 342A) to extend the rotation 
period to seven years where the five year period would impose an unreasonable 
burden.
The four year rotation period was chosen for the shorter rotation period scenario 
(Case 3) to signify a period of slightly lesser length than the five years stipulated in 
most of the regimes discussed in this sub-section, including Australia’s. In being 
approximately 57 per cent of the seven year period specified in Case 4, a four year 
rotation period is of considerably lesser length. If audit partner rotation impacts 
favourably on perceptions of auditor independence, the expectation is that
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connotations of auditor independence would be more favourable for the four year 
partner rotation period than for the seven year rotation period.
6.1.2.3 Local independence board within the audit firm
Auditor oversight can occur in a number of ways, including within audit firms, by 
professional organisations and public or private sector oversight bodies, and through 
government oversight (IOSCO, 2002a). It was observed in Section 6.1.2.1 that recent 
developments in auditor independence have represented a move toward greater 
external oversight. However, arguments have been advanced for additional internal 
oversight within audit firms themselves.
International and Australian auditing pronouncements specify quality control 
standards for audit firms. The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) has issued its International Standard on Quality Control ISQC 1 (IAASB, 
2006b), while APES 320 Quality Control for Firms (APESB, 2006b) represents the 
parallel Australian pronouncement. These pronouncements, which reinforce the 
requirements specified in the Code o f Ethics for Professional Accountants of IF AC 
and the APESB (IFAC, 2005; APESB, 2006a), require audit firms to establish quality 
control policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
independence requirements are complied with (APESB, 2006b, s. 18; IAASB, 2006, 
s. 18).
A relatively recent proposal that has been raised for additional quality control over 
auditor independence is the establishment of local independence oversight boards 
within individual audit firms. This was proposed in Australia in a submission to the 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit by Houghton (2002a), and further
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espoused by Houghton and Jubb (2002, 2003b, 2003c, 2005). The following 
discussion draws from those references.
The proposal is based on the notion that local (internal) independence boards would 
represent an additional and observable quality control for independence. The proposal 
argues for audit firms having a critical mass of audits of publicly traded companies to 
establish their own independence board and for audit firms not having such a critical 
mass to have access to an independence board established under the auspices of an 
accounting professional body. The independence board would have the authority to 
define, review and decide on all threats and potential threats to independence within 
the audit firm. The board would also have responsibility for quality control and 
education programs in respect of an audit firm’s decision making. The creation of 
these local independence boards would represent a market-observable independence 
quality control process developed under the scrutiny of market competition.
These boards would involve a panel of expert persons not associated with the audit 
firm and who would not benefit commercially from any decisions made. 
Remuneration of the board members would not be linked to the profitability of the 
firm, and structures could be set up to ensure some distance between the audit firm 
and the members’ remuneration. For example, a trust fund could be set up by the 
accounting firm and independence board members could be remunerated from 
interest or other revenue generated within the fund.
The proposal is for independence boards to comprise between three and seven 
persons. The board would comprise experts from fields such as auditing, commercial 
law, professional services, accounting and auditing standard setting and accounting 
policy making. Current or former audit partners, and employees of the firm or similar
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organisations, would be ineligible. The independence board would, in whole or with a 
minimum of three members, consider each threat to independence that exists within 
the firm. The outcome of these deliberations would be a decision on whether to 
proceed with individual audit engagements, and whether to put in place controls and 
procedures that would ensure the attainment of an adequate level of independence for 
individual engagements. The board would have, in effect, a power of veto over 
independence issues and ultimate control of acceptance and retention of audit 
engagements.
The names and qualifications of board members would be made public for 
transparency purposes. Membership of individuals on the board would be subject to 
some maximum period within the one firm, such as five years. To ensure continuity, 
no more than one-third of the board would retire in any one year. Members would not 
be allowed to move from one board to another for some stipulated period to protect 
an audit firm’s confidentiality.
The rationale for the proposal for local independence boards is that there is currently 
little or no observable information on the processes and outcomes in respect of an 
audit firm’s independence. While audit firms operate in a highly competitive 
environment and are active rivals with respect to audit pricing and audit competency, 
there is little evidence that they compete with respect to independence. Independence 
issues and independence threats are often subtle, and it is possible that auditors and 
auditees are sometimes not even conscious of them. Accordingly, actual and potential 
threats to independence are difficult to observe and measure. However, controlling 
independence decisions cannot rely on crude definitions and imprecise measures. The 
formal legislative and regulatory processes for ensuring independence are unlikely to 
succeed in establishing the presence of an independence threat except where the
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threat is gross, extreme or easily measured. Hence, the more usual subtle 
independence threats are not susceptible to effective legalistic or regulatory 
intervention. Such intervention will also be incomplete if, over time, threats to 
independence change or new threats emerge. A market-based model can respond to 
these changes on a timely basis as the market itself changes. In comparison, legislated 
requirements are subject to delay and lobbying by vested interests.
Independence is rarely tested rigourously, and the market tends to accept an auditor’s 
independence as a matter of trust rather than on the basis of any substantive 
underlying evidence. If the market has reason to question independence, the auditor 
rarely has convincing defences for the objectivity of their decision making or the 
independence of their audit. Decisions relating to independence are made entirely 
within the audit firm and final judgments are routinely made by persons within the 
firm who, either directly or indirectly, have some commercial interest in the outcome 
of the decision. If the market’s trust in an auditor’s independence is eroded in any 
way, the outcome is likely to involve scepticism and, as a consequence, the depleted 
value attributed to the audit by the market will be more exaggerated than would be 
the case if independence were more directly observable.
The objective of local internal independence boards is therefore to (a) enhance 
independence decisions within audit firms, (b) make more transparent to the users of 
audit reports the characteristics of the audit process, both in terms of competence and 
independence, and (c) remove independence decision making from those who have a 
commercial or vested interest in the outcome of independence decisions. The major 
arguments for a local internal independence board, rather than an arrangement 
imposed externally, are expressed in the proposal as follows:
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• Independence issues, threats and potential threats can be dealt with swiftly and 
contemporaneously with the audit. A decision ex ante in any critical matter 
can be made and enforced by the board. This is preferable to dealing with an 
independence threat ex post, where a compromise or a greater economic cost 
may result;
• The board can deal with commercially sensitive issues without them 
becoming public or accessible to competitors;
• The quality control processes of the board can be observed by the market. 
Accounting firms could therefore compete in the market on the basis of their 
quality control procedures for independence rather than only on competence 
and price;
• Issues that are extremely subtle or difficult to assess and measure can be dealt 
with sympathetically but conclusively, and matters subject to conflicting 
arguments can be addressed without reference to crude measures;
• Reward structures within audit firms can take into account decisions made by 
the independence board to achieve equity across partners responsible for firm 
growth.
The model proposed represents a market-based solution comprising strong 
competitive processes to enhance the quality and transparency of independence 
decision making. However, an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework 
would also be required. This would necessitate a regime for the approval or 
registration of independence boards. Ideally, boards would be registered with a 
corporate regulator, minimum standards of membership and procedures would be 
specified and board decisions would be enforceable.
In enabling firms to compete with respect to their quality control over independence, 
the establishment of local independence boards would allow firms to focus not on 
short term revenue gains from a particular audit or non-audit engagement but on long 
term gains to their firm and the profession, and ultimately on the auditee and their 
shareholders. The establishment of such boards would represent an additional quality
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control process that could infiltrate and subsume all the processes in the audit firm 
and affect the culture and ethos of the audit processes.
The Australian firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) announced, in May 2002, an 
application of the local independence board proposal with the formation of an Audit 
Standards Oversight Board to oversee the firm’s audit quality and independence 
processes (PwC, 2002; Houghton, 2003; Houghton and Jubb, 2003b). The board 
reported directly to the firm’s Board of Partners, with all members appointed from 
outside the firm for a maximum, non-renewable term of five years (PwC, 2002). The 
board, though, published only two reports; in August 2003 (PwC Audit Standards 
Oversight Board, 2003) and September 2004 (PwC, 2004).
The Australian firm of KPMG established a variation on the local independence 
board concept with the establishment of an expert review panel, comprising 
Australian university professors Keith Houghton and Ken Trotman, to 
comprehensively review the firm’s independence, conflict resolution and quality 
control procedures (KPMG Australia, 2002; Houghton, 2003; Houghton and Jubb, 
2003b). Reports were prepared for 2002, 2003 and 2004 (Houghton and Trotman, 
2002, 2003, 2005).
The establishment of these local independence oversight processes was affected by 
the expanded FRC responsibilities for the oversight of Australian auditors and the 
formation, as noted in Chapter 2, of the Audit Quality Review Board.44 KPMG and 
PwC no longer continued with their local independence oversight initiatives after 
their reports for the 2004 year.
With the release of its third report for the 2004 year, KPMG specifically stated that ‘[w]ith the 
introduction of the Audit Quality Review Board (AQRB) there will not be a need for any future 
reports to be undertaken by Professors Houghton and Trotman’ (KPMG Australia, 2005).
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The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 8 and 9 indicated a former 
audit firm partner being a director of the audit client. Case 8, but not Case 9, specified 
the presence of a local independence board within the audit firm. The case specified 
that the firm, to emphasise and make visible quality controls for independence, had 
established a separate independence board eighteen months earlier. The board was 
specified to comprise a panel of four expert persons not otherwise commercially 
associated with the audit firm. These members were a commercial lawyer, a retired 
former partner of another ‘Big Four’ accounting firm, a university auditing professor 
and a former chairperson of the Australian Accounting Standards Board. The 
independence board was specified to have specific authority to define, review and 
decide upon all threats and potential threats to auditor independence, with the aim of 
removing decision making in respect of such independence matters from those within 
the firm who had a commercial or vested interest in the outcome. The aim of the 
experimental manipulation was to convey the notion of an additional quality control 
process comprising an additional layer of oversight, in this case from an 
independence board within the audit firm.
6.1.3 Summary: Potential independence threats and safeguards
The chapter to this point has summarised the prior literature on the independence 
threats and safeguards forming the basis for the study’s experimental manipulations. 
To reiterate, the potential threats forming the basis for the study’s experimental cases 
are (a) the auditor provision of non-audit (taxation) services, (b) interlocking 
directorships among audit clients, (c) a longer period of audit firm tenure, and (d) the 
presence of a former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee company. The 
safeguards included in the experimental cases to mitigate potential independence 
threats are (a) the audit being subject to additional external oversight by the PCAOB,
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(b) alternate periods of audit partner rotation, and (c) the establishment of a local 
(internal) independence board within the audit firm. The discussion of the prior 
academic research and recent developments indicates that the experimental 
manipulations represent contemporary auditor independence issues. The experimental 
cases comprise potential independence threats highlighted in the literature that can 
presently arise, independence safeguards introduced to mitigate potential 
independence threats, or proposals for additional independence safeguards.
6.2 HYPOTHESES: COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
The study’s general research question was stated as:
Is there shared meaning o f the auditor independence concept between key 
parties to the financial reporting communication process?
The study’s general research question seeks to determine whether there is shared 
meaning of the auditor independence concept between alternative groups of key 
parties to the financial reporting communication process. The measurement of 
meaning framework is employed to facilitate investigation of the general research 
question by identifying the cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor 
independence is considered. The experimental cases provide a wide variety of 
independence threat and safeguard scenarios over which, given the prior literature 
summarised in the previous sections, connotations (interpretations) of auditor 
independence would be expected to vary. Analysis of the study’s semantic differential 
scale data will enable the dimensions of meaning underlying the auditor 
independence concept to be identified.
As emphasised in Chapter 3, Osgood et al. (1957) proposed the three factor E-P-A 
(Evaluative, Potency, Activity) structure for meaning generally. These three
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dimensions have been supported for general concepts in many prior studies, and have 
been investigated in the prior accounting and auditing studies referred to in Chapter 4.
Accordingly, the first research hypothesis is stated as:
HI: Research participants interpret the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept within a three factor E-P-A cognitive structure.
The measurement of meaning research method can provide insight into whether there 
is shared meaning of the concept of auditor independence for the research 
participants. As a minimum, this would require the three groups to interpret the 
independence concept within the same general cognitive (factor) structure. 
Hypothesis 1 above suggests an E-P-A structure for the independence concept. 
However, shared meaning does not require such a three factor structure. Irrespective 
of the number of factors the cognitive structure is found to comprise, shared meaning 
requires the identified structure to be shared both between and within the research 
participant groups. That is, the cognitive structure must be the same for each of the 
research participant groups and must be shared within each of the individual groups.
The second research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H2: Research participants interpret the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept within a shared cognitive structure.
6.3 HYPOTHESES: EXPERIMENTAL CASES AND MEASURED
MEANING
Following identification of the cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor 
independence is considered, the measurement of meaning framework can be used to 
determine how research participants interpret the individual audit engagement 
independence threat and safeguard experimental scenarios. The framework can be
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used to determine whether there are any (a) between-group differences for each of the 
individual experimental cases, and (b) within-group differences, for each participant 
group, between various alternative experimental cases.
6.3.1 Between-group differences
Semantic differential analysis can examine whether there are any differences between 
the three participant groups in measured meanings of auditor independence 
(connotations of independence) for each of the alternative experimental cases. That is, 
factor placements can be compared for identical scenarios between the three groups, 
providing insight into whether between-group differences exist in connotations of 
independence for each of the individual experimental cases. Shared meaning of the 
concept in individual situations would be absent if significant between-group 
differences exist. Any such differences would be of practical significance as they 
would signify a lack of agreement between the alternative parties in response to the 
specified threat and safeguard circumstances. The third research hypothesis is 
therefore stated as:
H3: There are no significant differences between research participant groups 
in the measured meaning o f auditor independence for each o f the 
alternative experimental cases.
6.3.2 Within-group differences
The hypotheses developed in this sub-section seek to establish whether within-group 
differences, for each participant group, exist between the various alternative 
experimental cases. That is, they aim to determine the manner and extent to which the 
specified independence threats and safeguards affect the measured meaning of
independence.
Chapter 6 193
6.3.2.1 Non-audit services and additional external oversight
The independence threats posed by the auditor provision of non-audit services were 
discussed in Section 6.1.1.1. It was concluded that the academic research findings 
generally suggest that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services do not 
impair independence in fact but could impair perceptions of auditor independence 
(independence in appearance).
While studies have examined many categories of non-audit services, the discussion in 
Section 6.1.1.1 highlighted that there is some current debate on the auditor provision 
of taxation services. Some categories of auditor provided taxation services have been 
banned, or must be considered carefully, pursuant to legislation and professional rules 
in various regimes. Taxation advice centred on higher risk tax structures and 
potentially abusive and aggressive tax transactions have been effectively prohibited in 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (Auditing Practices 
Board, 2004d; PCAOB, 2005). In addition, an international exposure draft issued by 
the IESBA in December 2006 proposes the prohibition of tax advice where the 
effectiveness of that advice depends on a particular accounting treatment or financial 
statement presentation and there is reasonable doubt as to the appropriateness of the 
related treatment or presentation (IESBA, 2006, s. 290.182). However, at the date of 
writing, changes of this nature have not been implemented or formally foreshadowed 
in Australia. Consistent with earlier versions of Professional Statement F.l (ICAA 
and CPA Australia, 2002a, 2004), the current APES 110 states that taxation services 
comprise a broad range of services, including compliance, planning, provision of 
formal taxation opinions and assistance in the resolution of tax disputes, and that such 
assignments ‘are generally not seen to create threats to independence’ (APESB,
2006a, s. 290.180).
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There are, therefore, no specific prohibitions on accounting firms providing general 
tax compliance and tax planning services to audit clients in Australia. Further, there 
has been a lack of prior research examining perceptions of independence when 
general tax compliance and tax planning services are provided by accounting firms to 
audit clients. However, the joint provision of audit and taxation services has the 
potential to raise the self-interest, self review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation 
threats specified in APES 110 (APESB, 2006a, s. 200.3). The potential for adverse 
impacts on perceptions of independence would also be expected to increase as the 
level of taxation services increase, and especially when the fees derived from those 
services are relatively high in relation to the audit fee.
The experimental scenarios contained in the study’s Cases 5 and 6 indicated that the 
audit firm’s taxation division had provided, with the pre-approval of the audit 
committee, additional tax compliance and tax planning services to the auditee. These 
services were specified to amount to approximately three to four times the audit fee 
over the four year audit tenure period, and hence would be considered to be at a high 
level in both absolute and proportional terms.45
Hence, the study’s fourth hypothesis considers that connotations of auditor 
independence will be adversely impacted by the joint provision of audit services and 
a high level of taxation services. The hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H4: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a high level o f 
auditor provided taxation services.
45 To reiterate, the audit fee was specified to have increased from $178 500 to $192 500 per annum 
over the four year tenure period, while the taxation services fees had increased from 328% of the 
audit fee ($584 800) to 399% ($767 500) over the same period.
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Hypothesis 4 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Cases 5 and 6 with those 
in Case 1. It was specified in Case 1 that the audit firm had not derived any additional 
remuneration from the provision of non-audit services over the period of the audit 
engagement.
Hypothesis 4 is based on the expectation that the potential for negative perceptions of 
independence increases as the level of audit firm provided taxation services increases. 
It would therefore also be expected that, in comparison to a high level of taxation 
services, perceptions of independence would be less adversely affected by a lower 
level of audit firm provided taxation services.
The experimental scenario in Case 7 indicated that the audit firm’s taxation division 
had provided to the auditee, with the pre-approval of the audit committee, additional 
tax compliance and tax planning services amounting to approximately one-half the 
audit fee over the four year audit tenure period.46 Accordingly, the taxation services 
were at a considerably lower level than specified in Cases 5 and 6, and connotations 
of independence would be expected to be more adversely affected in those latter cases 
than in Case 7.
The fifth research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H5: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the extent o f auditor provided 
taxation services.
46 To reiterate, the taxation services fees specified in Case 7 had increased from 47% of the audit 
fee ($83 500) to 49% ($94 300) over the four year audit tenure period.
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Hypothesis 5 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Cases 5 and 6 (high 
taxation services) with those in Case 7.
The prior literature on the independence safeguard of additional auditor oversight by 
a public oversight board was discussed in Section 6.1.2.1. It was concluded that there 
have been further developments internationally in recent years in the establishment of 
additional public oversight bodies. These bodies provide additional public oversight 
of the audit function and auditor independence, and this increased oversight has been 
designed to strengthen the audit function following the corporate collapses and 
perceptions of independence impairment of earlier this decade.
The likelihood for negative perceptions of auditor independence arising in response to 
potential independence threat conditions would be expected to be lower in 
circumstances where there is an additional safeguard in the form of additional public 
oversight of the audit function and auditor independence. The experimental scenarios 
contained in the study’s Cases 5 and 6 specified the potential threat of a high level of 
audit firm provided taxation services. However Case 5, but not Case 6, indicated the 
company had raised debt and equity in the United States and therefore that the audit 
of the company, and the Australian auditor and audit firm, were subject to additional 
oversight by the PCAOB. The expectation, the basis for H6, would therefore be for 
connotations of the audit firm’s independence to be positively impacted by the 
existence of this additional auditor oversight by the PCAOB.
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The sixth research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H6: The measured meaning of auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the existence o f additional 
auditor oversight.
Hypothesis 6 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Case 5 (high taxation 
services with additional PCAOB oversight) with those in Case 6 (high taxation 
services without additional PCAOB oversight).
6.3.2.2 Interlocking directorships among audit clients
The independence threats posed by interlocking directorships among audit clients 
were discussed in Section 6.1.1.2. The findings of the small number of empirical 
studies to have examined interlocking directorships suggest that these interlocks are 
positively associated with company auditor choice and length of audit tenure 
(Davison et al., 1984; Jubb, 2000; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). The discussion in 
Section 6.1.1.2 also highlighted that the presence of interlocking directorships among 
audit clients increases the possibility for personal ties arising between the audit firm 
and the audit client, thereby raising potential independence concerns. The discussion 
also highlighted that interlocking directorships potentially raised various categories of 
threats specified in APES 110 (APESB, 2006a, s. 200.3), and particularly those of 
self interest, familiarity and intimidation.
No prior research has examined perceptions of auditor independence in the presence 
of interlocking directorships. The experimental scenario contained in the study’s Case 
2 indicated that three non-executive directors of the auditee were also non-executive 
directors of other companies audited by the incumbent audit firm. This created
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interlocks between the auditee company and two other companies, with the presence 
of a common audit engagement partner. The expectation, the basis for //7, would 
therefore be for connotations of the audit firm’s independence to be adversely 
affected by the presence of these interlocking directorships.
The seventh research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H7: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f interlocking 
directorships among audit clients.
Hypothesis 7 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Case 2, where the 
interlocking directorships were specified, with those in Case 1 where no major 
potential threats to independence were indicated.
6.3.23 Longer period of audit firm tenure and audit partner rotation
The independence threats posed by lengthy periods of audit firm tenure were 
discussed in Section 6.1.1.3. It was concluded that, while the prior research is 
inconsistent, it does make clear that there is the potential for independence 
impairment, both in fact and in appearance, when audit firms are incumbent for 
longer periods. This particularly arises from the interpersonal attachments, 
commitments and behavioural bonds that arise in the course of the auditor-client 
relationship. The threat categories identified by APES 110 (APESB, 2006a) that this 
could particularly affect are those of self-interest, familiarity and intimidation.
The experimental scenarios specified in Cases 3 and 4 indicated the audit firm had 
been retained for a period of nine years. All other cases specified a four year tenure 
period. While four and seven year audit partner rotation periods respectively were
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indicated in Cases 3 and 4, the basic threat arising from a longer period of audit firm 
tenure still remains. Audit partner rotation represents only a partial solution, as 
rotation addresses only one aspect of the threat, being that arising from any 
interpersonal relationships between that specific partner and the audited company’s 
directors and other personnel. The threat arising from the relationship between the 
audit firm and the audited entity, built up over a lengthy period of tenure, still 
remains. Client-specific quasi-rents, as identified by DeAngelo (1981b), will still be 
captured by the audit firm, and the firm therefore still has incentives to lower quality 
over future periods to retain the client and protect those quasi-rents. The later periods 
of the audit firm’s tenure, as highlighted by Raghunathan et al. (1994), tend to be 
periods of relative stability and positive cash flows after the considerable learning 
costs associates with a new client, and this could lessen the audit firm’s motivation to 
report financial statement misrepresentations in the audit report.
The expectation, the basis for H8, would therefore be for the audit firm’s 
independence to be considered to be adversely impacted by the longer period of audit 
firm tenure.
The eighth research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H8: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the length o f audit firm tenure, 
even in the presence o f audit partner rotation policies.
Hypothesis 8 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Cases 3 and 4, where 
audit firm tenure length was nine years, with those in Case 1, where audit firm tenure 
length was four years.
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The prior literature on the independence safeguard of audit partner rotation was 
discussed in Section 6.1.2.2. That discussion noted that recent independence 
developments in many regimes, including Australia, have specified requirements for 
audit partner rotation as a major independence safeguard. If audit partner rotation is 
perceived to have a positive impact on auditor independence, the expectation is that 
connotations of auditor independence in the scenarios where the audit firm had been 
incumbent for a period of nine years would be more favourable where partner rotation 
occurs after four years rather than after seven years.
The ninth research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H9: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the period o f audit partner 
rotation.
Hypothesis 9 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Case 3 (nine year audit 
firm tenure with partner rotation after four years) with those in Case 4 (nine year 
audit firm tenure with partner rotation after seven years).
6.3.2.4 Former audit firm partner as a director o f the auditee and local 
independence board
The independence threats posed by audit firm partners and staff moving to 
employment or directorships with audit clients were discussed in Section 6.1.1.4. The 
findings of perception studies indicate that financial report users’ perceptions of 
auditor independence tend to be diminished when an auditor accepts employment 
with a client. Experimental studies have found client employment effects to influence 
auditor decisions in a manner that could pose independence perception concerns.
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Research has also found some evidence of instances of fraudulent reporting and 
earnings management where company officers or directors were formerly partners 
with, or had worked for, the incumbent audit firm.
Experimental Cases 8 and 9 indicated that one of the auditee company’s directors had 
previously been employed in the incumbent audit firm for a total period of over 17 
years, with 11 of these as a partner. The scenario indicated that the current audit 
engagement partner had been with the audit firm for the entire period in which the 
director had been with the firm. In addition, the current audit engagement partner had 
worked as an audit supervisor and manager on several audits for which the director 
had previously been the manager or audit engagement partner, hence indicating a 
previous close working relationship between the two. The director had not previously 
been involved in the audit of the auditee, and hence was not subject to the cooling-off 
period specified in the Corporations Act 2001.
This situation, though, would not have been allowed pursuant to the proposal of the 
HIH Royal Commission for a two year cooling-off period for a former partner not 
directly involved in the audit (HIH Royal Commission, 2003, Vol. 1, pp. lxvii, 177). 
However, this proposal was not enacted in the final CLERP 9 legislation 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). Given the prior literature and the HIH Royal 
Commission’s proposal, the expectation that forms the basis for H10 is that 
connotations of the audit firm’s independence will be adversely affected by the 
presence of a director of the audit client who was formerly an audit partner of the 
audit firm. This expectation arises from the previous close working relationship 
between the current audit partner and the director, irrespective of the fact that the 
director had not formerly been involved specifically in the audit of the auditee
company.
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The tenth research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
HI 0: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a director o f 
the audit client who was formerly an audit partner o f the audit firm.
The proposal for an additional auditor independence safeguard comprising local 
independence boards established within audit firms, as presented in Houghton 
(2002a) and Houghton and Jubb (2002, 2003b, 2003c, 2005) was discussed in Section 
6.1.2.3. The rationale for these local independence boards is that they would represent 
an observable quality control for independence and would represent additional 
oversight of auditor independence by a panel of external experts.
Accordingly, if research participants consider these local independence boards to 
represent an effective quality control safeguarding independence, the likelihood for 
negative perceptions of auditor independence arising in response to potential 
independence threat conditions would be expected to be lower in circumstances 
where such a board existed. Accordingly, the expectation is that, ceteris paribus, 
connotations of auditor independence would be more favourable in scenarios where a 
local independence board was specified. As noted above, the experimental scenarios 
contained in the study’s Cases 8 and 9 specified that one of the auditee company’s 
directors had previously been employed by, and been a partner with, the incumbent 
audit firm. However Case 8, but not Case 9, indicated the presence of a local internal 
independence board. The expectation, the basis for HI 1, is therefore that connotations 
of the audit firm’s independence will be positively impacted by the existence of the 
local independence board specified in Case 8.
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The eleventh research hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H ll:  The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a local 
independence board within the audit firm.
Hypothesis 11 can be tested by comparing, for each research participant group, the 
measured meanings of independence (factor placements) in Case 8 (existence of ex­
partner as director of auditee with local independence board) with those in Case 9 
(existence of ex-partner as director of auditee without local independence board).
6.4 SUMMARY
Research hypotheses were developed in this chapter for the purpose of investigating 
the study’s general research question of whether shared meaning of the auditor 
independence concept exists between alternative groups of key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process. These hypotheses are designed to identify the 
cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor independence is considered by 
research participants, establish whether differences exist between participant groups 
in the measured meaning (connotations) of independence for each of the individual 
experimental cases, and determine the manner and extent to which the relevant 
independence threats and safeguards affect connotations of independence for each 
participant group. The study’s 11 research hypotheses are restated in Table 6.1.
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Research hypotheses
H I : R e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in te rp re t th e  c o n n o ta tiv e  m e a n in g  o f  th e  a u d ito r  
in d e p e n d e n c e  c o n c e p t w ith in  a th re e  fa c to r  E -P -A  c o g n itiv e  s tru c tu re .
H2: R e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in te rp re t th e  c o n n o ta tiv e  m e a n in g  o f  th e  a u d ito r  
in d e p e n d e n c e  c o n c e p t w ith in  a sh a re d  c o g n itiv e  s tru c tu re .
H3: T h e re  a re  n o  s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  re se a rc h  p a r tic ip a n t g ro u p s  in  th e  
m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  fo r  e a ch  o f  th e  a lte rn a tiv e  
e x p e r im e n ta l  c a se s .
H4: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  a  h ig h  lev e l o f  a u d ito r  
p ro v id e d  ta x a t io n  se rv ices .
H5: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  e x te n t o f  a u d ito r  p ro v id e d  ta x a tio n  
se rv ic e s .
H6: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d d itio n a l a u d ito r  o v e rs ig h t.
H7: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  in te r lo c k in g  d ire c to rs h ip s  
a m o n g  a u d it  c lie n ts .
H8: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  le n g th  o f  au d it  f irm  te n u re , e v e n  in  th e  
p re s e n c e  o f  a u d it  p a r tn e r  ro ta tio n  p o lic ie s .
H9: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  p e r io d  o f  a u d it  p a r tn e r  ro ta tio n .
H10: T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  a  d ire c to r  o f  th e  a u d it  c lie n t 
w h o  w a s  fo rm e r ly  an  a u d it  p a r tn e r  o f  th e  a u d it  firm .
Hl l :  T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  in d iv id u a l re se a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a ffe c te d  b y  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  a  lo ca l in d e p e n d e n c e  b o a rd  
w ith in  th e  a u d it  f irm .
Table 6.1: Research hypotheses
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Following the development of research hypotheses in this chapter, the study’s 
research findings are presented in the following four chapters. An initial analysis of 
the research data is presented in Chapter 7. An evaluation of the cognitive structure 
for the concept of auditor independence, addressing HI and H2, is presented in 
Chapter 8. Research findings examining between-group differences in measured 
meaning for the experimental cases, addressing H3, are presented in Chapter 9, while 
findings examining within-group differences, addressing H4 to HI 1, are presented in 
Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 7
INITIAL DATA ANALYSIS
Prior to analysing the sematic differential scale data in accordance with the 
measurement of meaning framework, a preliminary understanding of the research 
data can be gained by undertaking a number of initial data analysis procedures. This 
also ensures the research data is appropriate for subsequent statistical analysis.
The initial data analysis procedures presented in this chapter are (a) a summary of the 
research sample size across the participant groups and experimental cases, (b) an 
analysis of manipulation check responses, (c) descriptive statistics for the semantic 
differential scale variables, (d) correlation matrix for the study’s variables, 
(e) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) of the semantic scale data by case 
and participant category, and (f) overview analysis of auditor independence 
perceptions by experimental case and participant category.
7.1 SAMPLE SIZE ACROSS PARTICIPANT GROUPS AND 
EXPERIMENTAL CASES
Information on the alternate versions of the research instrument and on the research 
participants was presented in Chapters 4 and 5. To complement that information in 
relation to the research sample, a summary of the research sample size by 
experimental case and participant group is shown in Table 7.1. As explained in 
Chapter 4, Cases 2, 3 and 5 were contained in Version 1 of the research instrument, 
Cases 4, 6 and 8 in Version 2 and Cases 1, 7 and 9 in Version 3.
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Experimental
Case
Participant groujp
Auditors Preparers Users
Case 1 27 23 21
Case 2 27 23 21 1
Case 3 27 23 22
C ase 4 26 25 26
C ase 5 27 23 22
Case 6 26 25 26
C ase 7 27 23 21
C ase 8 26 25 26
C ase 9 26 2 23 21
One user participant did not complete Case 2 (Version 1 of the research instrument). 
One auditor participant did not complete Case 9 (Version 3 of the research instrument).
Table 7.1: Summary of research sample size by experimental 
case and participant group
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Discussion of sample size considerations in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5 demonstrated 
that a sample of 20 responses to each of the nine experimental cases by each of the 
three participant groups would satisfy sample size requirements. The figures in Table
7.1 show that this requirement has been exceeded for all experimental cases and 
research groups.
7.2 MANIPULATION CHECKS
As noted in Chapter 4, manipulation checks were included in the research instrument 
after each experimental case. Manipulation checks assess how participants perceive 
and interpret the particular experimental manipulation (Gravetter and Forzano, 2006). 
In the present study, this allows a conclusion to be drawn on whether participants 
understood the manipulations in each of the case scenarios.
A summary of the results of the manipulation checks for each case for each 
participant group is presented in Table 7.2. The table shows that all participants in all 
three groups correctly answered the manipulation check questions for Case 2 and 
Case 6. All other cases had at least one manipulation check incorrectly answered for 
at least one participant group.
For the ten case and participant group cells in Table 7.2 where manipulation checks 
were failed (refer shaded cells), four involved only one participant incorrectly 
responding to the manipulation check questions (Cases 3 and 7 for auditors and Cases 
1 and 9 for preparers). One involved two participants responding incorrectly (Case 5 
for auditors), one involved three incorrect responses (Case 8 for preparers) and one 
involved four incorrect responses (Case 8 for auditors). Case 4 had the highest 
incorrect manipulation check response rate, with the manipulation check being failed 
by ten of the 26 auditors, five of the 25 preparers and six of the 26 users.
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Auditors Preparers Users
N % N % N %
C a se  1 Passed 27 100.0 22 95.7 21 100.0
Failed 0 0.0 1 4.3 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0 23 100.0 21 100.0
C ase  2 Passed 27 100.0 23 100.0 21 100.0
Failed 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0 23 100.0 21 100.0
C ase  3 Passed 26 96.3 23 100.0 22 100.0
Failed 1 3.7 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0 23 100.0 22 100.0
C ase  4 Passed 16 61.5 20 80.0 20 76.9
Failed 10 38.5 5 20.0 6 23.1
Total 26 100.0 25 100.0 26 100.0
C ase  5 Passed 25 92.6 23 100.0 22 100.0
Failed 2 7.4 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0 23 100.0 22 100.0
C ase  6 Passed 26 100.0 25 100.0 26 100.0
Failed 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 26 100.0 25 100.0 26 100.0
C ase  7 Passed 26 96.3 23 100.0 21 100.0
Failed 1 3.7 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0 23 100.0 21 100.0
C ase  8 Passed 22 84.6 22 88.0 26 100.0
Failed 4 15.4 3 12.0 0 0.0
Total 26 100.0 25 100.0 26 100.0
C ase  9 Passed 26 100.0 22 95.7 21 100.0
Failed 0 0.0 1 4.3 0 0.0
Total 26 100.0 23 100.0 21 100.0
Table 7.2: Summary of manipulation checks
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The incorrect manipulation check response rate for Case 4, the case with the highest 
number and rate of manipulation check failures, was 38.5 per cent for auditors, 23.1 
per cent for users and 20 per cent for preparers. The case specified a nine year period 
of audit firm tenure with partner rotation every seven years. Under this scenario, 
rotation of the audit engagement partner had occurred two years earlier. The 
manipulation check question where incorrect responses occurred asked for a ‘Yes/No’ 
response to the question ‘The company’s current audit engagement partner has been 
in this position for over eight years.’ The correct response was ‘No’, as the current 
audit engagement partner had only been in the position for two years.
Given that the case clearly stated that ‘the engagement was most recently rotated two 
years ago to a new audit engagement partner from the firm’, the likely reason for the 
high rate of incorrect responses to this Case 4 manipulation check was that the 
participants interpreted the question as asking about the period of audit firm, rather 
than audit engagement partner, tenure. The audit firm was specified to have had a 
nine year period of audit tenure in Case 4, in comparison to a four year period in the 
other cases (Cases 6 and 8) to which these participants responded.
Case 8 had the second highest incorrect manipulation check response rate. The 
incorrect manipulation check response rate was 15.4 per cent for auditors and 12 per 
cent for preparers. There were no manipulation check failures for the users. Case 8 
specified a former audit firm partner being a director of the auditee, with the audit 
firm having a local independence board. Unlike the manipulation check failures for 
Case 4, the incorrect Case 8 manipulation check responses were not for a single 
manipulation check question. Two auditors and two preparers failed the manipulation 
check question relating to presence of a former audit firm partner as an auditee 
company director, two auditors responded incorrectly to the question relating to the
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existence of a local (internal) independence board, and one preparer responded 
incorrectly to the question on the period for which the current audit engagement 
partner had been in that position.
Cases 4 and 8 were the only cases for which incorrect manipulation responses were 
made by more than one participant group. The manipulation check failures for Cases 
1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 were only for single participant groups. Also, with the exception of 
case 5 which had two manipulation check failures for auditors, the other four cases 
had only one incorrect manipulation check response.
Given the importance of having as large a sample size as possible, it is crucial not to 
discard participant responses without further analysis. To assess the manipulation 
check failures, the significance of differences in each of the 22 semantic scales for 
each relevant case was assessed between (a) the sub-group of participant responses 
for which manipulation checks were correctly answered and (b) all participants, 
including those for whom the manipulation checks were not correctly answered.1 This 
analysis indicates whether the responses to the semantic scales are significantly 
affected by the inclusion of those from participants who had failed the relevant 
manipulation check. The non-parametric Mann Whitney U test was used for this 
purpose.
Importantly, no significant differences in any of the semantic scale responses, at 
p  < .05, were found by the Mann Whitney testing when the manipulation check failure 
responses were included. Table 7.3 presents, for each case and group where there was 
a manipulation check failure, a summary of the Mann Whitney analysis by presenting
This procedure was adopted as sample size considerations meant it was not appropriate to 
compare the small number of responses with manipulation failures directly with the responses 
where manipulation check failures were not present.
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data on the individual scale that exhibited the difference of the greatest significance 
when the manipulation check failure responses were included. Hence, for example, 
for the preparer group for Case 1, the individual semantic scale of the 22 that 
exhibited the difference of greatest statistical significance was the bad-good scale, 
where the difference was at a significance level of p = J63. The case with the 
difference in an individual scale that was of greatest significance was for the auditor 
group for Case 4. The significance of the difference in that case was at p  = .163 for 
the indirect-direct scale. The next greatest difference was at p = .298 (in the weak- 
strong scale for users for Case 4).
Given that the testing indicates no significant difference in semantic differential 
scales by including responses where manipulation check questions were not answered 
correctly, all responses were retained for purposes of the research. However, given 
that Cases 4 and 8 were the cases for which there were incorrect manipulation 
responses for more than one participant group and where the total number of incorrect 
responses across all groups was greater than two, additional sensitivity analysis is 
conducted in the analysis of individual cases presented in Chapters 9 and 10 for these 
cases. This additional analysis allows a conclusion to be drawn on whether the 
study’s results in relation to these cases are significantly affected by the inclusion of 
manipulation check failure observations.
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Case
Participant
group
Highest signii Icance Semantic differential 
scaleMann Whitney U P
Case 1 Preparers 242.0 .763 B ad-G ood
Case 3 A uditors 338.0 .790 Incom plete-C om plete
Case 4 A uditors 156.5 .163 Indirect-D irect
Case 4 Preparers 225.5 .564 E stim ated-E xact
Case 4 Users 219.0 .298 W eak-S trong
Case 5 A uditors 317.5 .674 U nnecessary-N ecessary
Case 7 A uditors 339.0 .821 U nnecessary-N ecessary
Case 8 A uditors 247.0 .408 A dverse-B eneficial
Case 8 Preparers 248.0 .553 U nexpected-E xpected
Case 9 Preparers 245.0 .848 Estim ated-E xact
Table 7.3: Analysis of manipulation checks
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7.3 SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Based on the pilot study’s results, for statistical analysis purposes the participant 
semantic scale responses were coded with the ‘positive’ end point of the scale given a 
value of ‘7’ and the ‘negative’ end point coded as ‘1’. Hence, for example, if a 
participant responded by ticking the ‘good’ end point of the bad-good scale or the 
‘safe’ end point of the risky-safe, those responses were coded as ‘7’. Similarly, if a 
participant responded by ticking the ‘bad’ or ‘risky’ end points, those responses were 
coded ‘l ’.2
Descriptive statistics of the semantic scale data, presented in descending order of 
variance, are shown in Table 7.4. These indicate that the 22 scales had variances of 
between 3.83 and 2.05 (for the seven point scale), and all scales had a range from the 
lowest to highest possible values. The ten scales exhibiting the highest variances 
comprised five evaluative and five potency scales. The next five scales in descending 
order of variance comprised four activity scales and one evaluative scale.
2 Given this coding system, all factor placements in any subsequent factor analysis will be 
positive if research participants, as a whole, respond to the semantic scales in the same way as 
the pilot study participants.
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Semantic scale 
(E-P-A)
Variance Standard
Deviation
Mean Minimum Maximum
Risky-Safe (E) 3.83 1.96 4.52 1 7
Incomplete-Complete (P) 3.68 1.92 4.66 1 7
Bad-Good (E) 3.56 1.89 4.83 1 7
Subjective-Objective (E) 3.52 1.88 4.39 1 7
Weak-Strong (P) 3.43 1.85 4.60 1 7
Imaginary-Real (P) 3.07 1.75 4.89 1 7
Adverse-Beneficial (E) 3.05 1.75 4.96 1 7
Intangible-Tangible (P) 2.96 1.72 4.60 1 7
Estimated-Exact (P) 2.93 1.71 4.42 1 7
Discretionary-Required (E) 2.91 1.71 5.39 1 7
Unplanned-Planned (A) 2.85 1.69 5.10 1 7
Uncontrollable-Controllable (E) 2.83 1.68 5.03 1 7
Inflexible-Flexible (A) 2.75 1.66 4.12 1 7
Passive-Active (A) 2.67 1.63 4.52 1 7
Short-term-Long-term (A) 2.66 1.63 4.62 1 7
Unmeasurable-Measurable (P) 2.65 1.63 4.93 1 7
Unexpected-Expected (E) 2.60 1.61 5.33 1 7
Temporary-Permanent (A) 2.49 1.58 4.56 1 7
Variable-Constant (A) 2.49 1.58 4.41 1 7
Static-Dynamic (A) 2.25 1.50 4.27 1 7
Indirect-Direct (P) 2.24 1.50 4.45 1 7
Unnecessary-Necessary (E) 2.05 1.43 5.76 1 7
N = 658
(E) = Evaluative scales 
(P) = Potency scales 
(A) = Activity scales
Table 7.4: Semantic differential scale descriptive statistics
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7.4 CORRELATION MATRICES
Correlations between the study’s variables are presented in this section. The 
correlations are presented and discussed in separate sub-sections for each of the 
evaluative, potency and activity scales.
7.4.1 Evaluative scales
Correlations for the eight evaluative scales with all scales are presented in Table 7.5. 
The matrix shows that the evaluative scales are generally highly correlated with each 
other. Correlations range from a high of 0.841 (bad-good with risky-safe) to a low of 
0.196 (subjective-objective with unnecessary-necessary). Fourteen of the 28 
correlations between the eight evaluative scales exceed 0.5 and all are significant at 
<  .001 .
The evaluative scales are also generally highly correlated with the seven potency 
scales. Correlations range from a high of 0.839 (bad-good with weak-strong) to a 
low of 0.162 (unnecessary-necessary with indirect-direct). Thirty-one of the 56 
correlations between the evaluative and potency scales exceed 0.5 and all are 
significant at/? < .001.
The evaluative scales are less highly correlated with the seven activity scales than 
with the potency scales. Correlations between the evaluative and activity scales range 
from a high of 0.654 (risky-safe with unplanned-planned) to a low of -0.016 
(discretionary-required with inflexible-flexible). Seven of the 56 correlations 
between the evaluative and activity scales exceed 0.5. Forty-five of these 56 
correlations are significant at p < .001, with another one significant at p < .01 and one
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at p < .05. The inflexible-flexible scale is the only activity scale that is not 
significantly correlated with any of the evaluative scales.
In addition to seeking responses on the 22 semantic differential scales, the research 
instrument response sheet also contained two questions relating to participants’ 
perceptions of the audit firm’s independence for each case. The first question sought 
a response to a seven point scale question ‘To what extent do you agree with the 
statement that the audit firm in this case would have maintained its independence’, 
with end points ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’. The final question on the 
response sheet sought a ‘Yes/No’ dichotomous response to the question ‘If you were 
a non-executive director of the company in this case, would you regard the audit 
appointment to be satisfactory with respect to the independence of the audit firm?’
Correlations between the evaluative scales and the participant’s perception score 
responses are also presented in Table 7.5. Correlations between the evaluative scales 
and the seven point perception scores range from a high of 0.838 (bad-good) to a low 
of 0.299 (unnecessary-necessary). Six of the eight correlations exceed 0.5 and all are 
significant at p < .001.
Correlations between the evaluative scales and the dichotomous perception scores 
range from a high of 0.746 (bad-good) to a low of 0.222 (unnecessary-necessary). 
Four of the eight correlations exceed 0.5 and all are significant at p<  .001.
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In summary, the eight evaluative scales are significantly correlated with each other 
and also with the seven potency scales. With the exception of the inflexible-flexible 
scale, the evaluative scales are generally correlated with the activity scales, although 
not at as high a level as with the potency scales. The evaluative scales also show 
generally high correlations with participant’s responses to the two independence 
perception scale questions.
7.4.2 Potency scales
Correlations for the seven potency scales are presented in Table 7.6. The matrix 
shows that the potency scales are generally highly correlated with each other. 
Correlations range from a high of 0.801 (incomplete-complete with weak-strong) to 
a low of 0.443 (indirect-direct with unmeasurable-measurable). Nineteen of the 21 
correlations between the seven potency scales exceed 0.5 and all are significant at
p < .001.
As noted in the previous sub-section, the potency scales are highly correlated with the 
evaluative scales. They are also generally highly con-elated with the seven activity 
scales, with correlations ranging from a high of 0.645 (weak-strong with unplanned- 
planned) to a low of -0.029 (estimated-exact with inflexible-flexible). Ten of the 49 
correlations between the potency and activity scales exceed 0.5. As with the 
correlations with the evaluative scales, the inflexible-flexible scale is the only activity 
scale that is not significantly correlated with any of the potency scales. Of the other 
correlations between the potency and activity scales, all are significant at p < .001.
Correlations between the potency scales and the seven point perception scores range 
from a high of 0.832 (incomplete-complete) to a low of 0.489 (intangible-tangible). 
Five of the seven correlations exceed 0.5 and all are significant at p < .001.
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Correlations between the potency scales and the dichotomous perception scores range 
from a high of 0.736 (incomplete-complete) to a low of 0.412 (intangible-tangible). 
Three of the seven correlations exceed 0.5 and all are significant at/? < .001.
In summary, the seven potency scales are significantly correlated with each other and, 
as discussed in the prior sub-section, with the eight evaluative scales. With the 
exception of the inflexible-flexible scale, the potency scales are correlated with the 
activity scales, although not generally at as high a level as with the evaluative scales. 
The potency scales also show generally high correlations with participant’s responses 
to the two independence perception scale questions.
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7.4.3 Activity scales
Correlations for the seven activity scales are presented in Table 7.7. The matrix 
shows that all activity scales, with the exception of the inflexible-flexible scale, are 
highly correlated with each other. The inflexible-flexible scale is significantly 
positively correlated with two of the other activity scales, significantly negatively 
correlated with three of the activity scales, and not significantly correlated with the 
remaining activity scale. Excluding the inflexible-flexible scale, correlations between 
the other six activity scales range from a high of 0.597 (short-term-long-term with 
temporary-permanent) to a low of 0.096 (short-term-long-term with static-dynamic). 
Of the correlations between the activity scales excluding the inflexible-flexible scale, 
four of the 15 correlations exceed 0.5. Of these 15 correlations, 14 are significant at 
p < .001 and the other at p < .05.
In summary, the seven activity scales, with the exception of the inflexible-flexible 
scale, are consistently significantly positively correlated with each other. As 
discussed in the prior sub-sections, and again with the exception of the inflexible- 
flexible scale, the activity scales are generally significantly correlated with the 
evaluative and potency scales. The activity scales, with the exception of the 
inflexible-flexible scale, are also significantly correlated with the two independence 
perception scale scores.
The inflexible-flexible scale is the scale that differs the most from the others, with a 
range of positive and negative correlations with the other activity scales and a lack of 
correlation with the evaluative and potency scales and with the two perception scale
scores.
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As an overall summary, the correlations show a high level of association between the 
various evaluative, potency and activity scales, with the inflexible-flexible scale 
being the exception. However, it must be borne in mind that this analysis is for all 
three participant groups pooled, which may disguise differences within individual 
groups.
7.5 MANOVA OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE DATA
Analysis of the semantic scale data was conducted using MANOVA to compare the 
raw responses to the 22 scales for the nine cases across the three research participant 
groups. Analysis of the raw scores is not a measure of difference in meaning within 
the Osgood et al. (1957) framework, but does provide an initial indication of whether 
there are differences in scale responses between the three participant groups and the 
alternative experimental cases.
Care, though, should be exercised in interpreting these results due to sample size 
considerations. A minimum sample size in each cell of 20 is recommended for 
MANOVA (Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). With three participant 
groups and nine experimental cases, there are 27 cells in the current study. 
Observation of Table 7.1 shows that all cell sizes exceed 20 observations. However, 
an additional sample size requirement for MANOVA is that the number of 
observations in each cell should exceed the number of dependent variables (Hair et 
al., 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). With 22 semantic differential scales as 
dependent variables in the study’s MANOVA, the minimum sample size in each cell 
should be 23. Observation of Table 7.1 reveals that six of the nine cells for users have 
cell sizes of slightly less than this. Four cells for the users have 21 observations 
(Cases 1, 2, 7 and 9) and a further two cells have 22 observations (Cases 3 and 5).
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Accordingly, while the MANOVA results reported in this section provide an initial 
indication of whether there are differences in scale responses between the three 
participant groups and the alternative experimental cases, the above sample size 
limitation should be kept in mind.
The MANOVA results, presented in Table 7.8, indicate highly significant differences 
between the three groups of research participants, between the alternative 
experimental cases, and in the interaction term. These differences are generally of 
consistent significance under the four alternative test statistics (Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ 
Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace and Roy’s Largest Root)/ As an overall test, this provides 
evidence that differences in semantic scale responses exist between the three 
participant groups and between the nine experimental cases.
Of these four multivariate statistics, Pillai’s Trace is generally considered to be the most robust 
against assumption violations (Coakes, 2005). Nevertheless, the statistics for all four methods 
are reported for completeness and to show that the results are not sensitive to the method 
adopted.
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Effect Test Value F
Hypothesis
df
Error
df P
In tercep t P illa i’s T race 0.98 1296.92 22 610 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.02 1296.92 22 610 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 46 .77 1296.92 22 610 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 46 .77 1296.92 22 610 < .0 0 1
G roup P illa i’s T race 0.27 4.41 44 1222 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.74 4.51 44 1220 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 0.33 4 .60 44 1218 < .0 0 1
R oy’s Largest Root 0 .26 7.19 22 611 < .0 0 1
C ase P illa i’s T race 0.65 2.50 176 4936 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.47 2.79 176 4622 < .0 0 1
H ote lling ’s T race 0.91 3.15 176 4866 < .0 0 1
R oy’s Largest Root 0.63 17.65 22 617 < .0 0 1
G roup  * C ase P illa i’s T race 0.64 1.18 352 10000 .012
In terac tion W ilks’ Lam bda 0.51 1.19 352 7972 .009
H otelling’s T race 0.70 1.20 352 9730 .006
R oy’s Largest Root 0 .16 4 .66 22 625 < .0 0 1
Table 7.8: MANOVA results for semantic differentia! scale data
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The MANOVA results presented in Table 7.8 show a significant interaction term. An 
interaction effect means that the difference on one treatment variable depends on the 
level of a second treatment variable (Hair et al., 1998). In the present analysis, the 
treatment variables are the three participant groups and the nine experimental cases. 
The significant interaction effect indicates that the relationship between the semantic 
scales and the experimental cases is not consistent across the three participant groups. 
Accordingly, the MANOVA of semantic scale data was also conducted separately for 
each group. Results are presented in Table 7.9.
The MANOVA results for auditors, preparers and users presented in Table 7.9 show 
highly significant differences in the semantic scale data between the alternate 
experimental cases for all three groups.4 Under all tests, the results show differences 
between the experimental cases in the scale responses for all groups at a significance 
of at least p = .001.
4 As noted previously, the results for the user participants should be interpreted with caution due 
to the sample size limitation for six of the nine cells (cases).
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Panel A: MANOVA results for auditors
Effect Test Value F
Hypothesis
df
Error
df P
In te rcep t P illa i’s T race 0.98 537.28 22 209 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.02 537.28 22 209 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 56.56 537.28 22 209 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 56.56 537.28 22 209 < .0 0 1
C ase P illa i’s Trace 0.99 1.39 176 1728 .001
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.32 1.46 176 1593 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 1.31 1.54 176 1658 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 0.58 5.71 22 216 < .0 0 1
Panel B: MANOVA results for preparers
Effect Test Value F
Hypothesis
df
Error
df P
In te rcep t P illa i’s T race 0.98 414 .29 22 183 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ L am bda 0.02 414.29 22 183 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 49.81 414 .29 22 183 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 49.81 414 .29 22 183 < .0 0 1
C ase P illa i’s T race 1.29 1.66 176 1520 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ L am bda 0.22 1.78 176 1397 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 1.86 1.91 176 1450 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 0.87 7.55 22 190 < .0 0 1
Panel C: MANOVA results for users
Effect Test Value F
Hypothesis
df
Error
df P
In te rcep t P illa i’s T race 0.98 415.48 22 176 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.02 415.48 22 176 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 51.94 415.48 22 176 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 51.94 415 .48 22 176 < .0 0 1
C ase P illa i’s T race 1.27 1.56 176 1464 < .0 0 1
W ilks’ Lam bda 0.21 1.77 176 1344 < .0 0 1
H otelling’s T race 2.05 2.03 176 1394 < .0 0 1
Roy’s Largest Root 1.20 10.01 22 183 < .0 0 1
Table 7.9: MANOVA results by research participant group
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Further MANOVA results, not reported in Table 7.9, allow identification of the 
individual semantic scales that differ between the experimental cases for each 
participant group. Of the 22 semantic scales, significant differences at p < .05 existed 
for 16 of the scales for auditors, 20 scales for preparers and 20 scales for users.
The only scale that did not differ significantly between the experimental cases for all 
three participant groups was the inflexible-flexible scale. For both the preparers and 
users, the unnecessary-necessary scale did not differ significantly between the 
alternate cases. The only other scales that did not exhibit significant between-case 
differences were for the auditor group with respect to the short-term-long-term, 
static-dynamic, subjective-objective, temporary-permanent and variable-constant 
scales.
The results in this section provide evidence that significant differences in a majority 
of the semantic scales exist between the nine experimental cases for each of the 
research participant groups. This also suggests that there are likely to be differences, 
between the participant groups and the experimental cases, in any factors comprising 
these scales extracted by applying the measurement of meaning method.
7.6 PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
As noted earlier, the research instrument response sheet contained, in addition to the 
22 semantic scales, two questions relating to participants’ perceptions of the audit 
firm’s independence for each case.
The first perception question, requiring a response on a seven-point scale with end 
points ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’, asked ‘To what extent do you agree
with the statement that the audit firm in this case would have maintained its
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independence’. Univariate ANOVA was conducted to model the responses as a 
function of the three groups of research participants and the nine experimental cases. 
Results are presented in Panel Table 7.10. The results show highly significant 
differences in the perception scores between the three groups of research participants, 
between the nine cases and in the interaction term.
Given the significant interaction effect, the univariate ANOVA of the perception 
responses was also conducted separately for each group. Results, reported in Table 
7.11, show the experimental case variable to be significant for all groups at p < .001. 
These results indicate highly significant differences in the perception scores between 
the alternate cases for each of the research participant groups.
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Source
Sum of 
squares df
Mean
square F P
Corrected Model 959.26 26 36.90 16.72 <.001
Intercept 14604.46 1 14604.46 6619.31 <.001
Group 90.90 2 45.45 20.60 < .0 01
Case 770.42 8 96.30 43.65 < .0 0 1
Group * Case interaction 106.76 16 6.67 3.02 < .0 0 1
Error 1352.49 613 2.21
Total 17221.00 640
Corrected total 2311.75 639
Adjusted R squared = .39 
N (Auditors) = 234 (6 non-responses) 
N (Preparers) = 204 (9 non-responses) 
N (Users) = 202 (5 non-responses)
Table 7.10: Univariate ANOVA of seven point scale perception responses
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Panel A: Univariate ANOVA for auditors
Source
Sum of 
squares df
Mean
square F P
Corrected Model 178.14 8 22.27 9.48 <.001
Intercept 6592.16 1 6592.16 2806.74 <.001
Case 178.14 8 22.27 9.48 < .0 0 1
Error 528.46 225 2.35
Total 7320.00 234
Corrected total 706.60 233
Adjusted R squared = .23
Panel B: Univariate ANOVA for preparers
Source
Sum of 
squares df
Mean
square F P
Corrected Model 
Intercept
Case
Error
Total
Corrected total
273.68 
4363.59
273.68
422.26
5055.00
695.94
8
1
8
195
204
203
34.21 
4363.59
34.21
2.17
15.80 
2015.12
15.80
<.001
<.001
< .0 0 1
Adjusted R squared = .37
Panel C: Univariate ANOVA for users
Source
Sum of 
squares df
Mean
square F p
Corrected Model 
Intercept
Case
Error
Total
Corrected total
416.48 
3969.49
416.48
401.78
4846.00
818.26
8
1
8
193
202
201
52.06 
3969.49
52.06
2.08
25.01 
1906.82
25.01
<.001
<.001
< .0 0 1
Adjusted R squared = .49
Table 7.11: Univariate ANOVA of seven point scale perception
responses by group
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The second perception question, requiring a dichotomous Yes/No response, asked ‘If 
you were a non-executive director of the company in this case, would you regard the 
appointment to be satisfactory with respect to the independence of the audit firm?’ 
Results from a logistic regression of the responses, reported in Table 7.12, show 
moderately significant differences in the dichotomous perception scores between the 
three groups of research participants (p = .064) and between the nine cases (at 
p = .098). The interaction term is not significant in the logistic regression.
As the measurement of meaning framework is the principal method used in this 
study, further analysis of the differences in the perception scores between the 
participant groups and the experimental cases is not undertaken. However, the finding 
of generally significant differences in the perception responses, especially for the 
seven point scale question, supports the results from the MANOVA of the semantic 
scale data indicating that there are significant differences in interpretations of auditor 
independence across the participant groups and experimental cases.
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Beta
Std
error Wald df P
Constant 3.00 0.62 23.73 1 <.001
Group -0.50 0.27 3.44 1 .064
Case -0.17 0.10 2.73 1 .098
Group * Case interaction -0.04 0.05 0.85 1 .355
Cox and Snell R squared = .137 
Nagelkerke R squared = .190
Percentage correctly classified = 71.1% 
N (Auditors) = 237 (3 non-responses)
N (Preparers) = 210 (3 non-responses) 
N (Users) = 201 (6 non-responses)
Table 7.12: Logistic regression of dichotomous scale perception responses
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7.7 SUMMARY
Results from initial data analysis procedures were reported in this chapter. The 
chapter commenced with a dissection of the sample size across the participant groups 
and experimental cases, followed by an analysis of responses to manipulation check 
questions and presentation of descriptive statistics for the semantic scale data. This 
was followed by presentation of correlation matrices of correlations between the 
study variables, these indicating a high level of association between the various 
evaluative, potency and activity scales. Analyses of the individual semantic scale 
responses and the responses to the two auditor independence perception questions 
indicated significant differences in interpretations of auditor independence between 
the three participant groups and the nine experimental cases. These initial data 
analysis procedures form the background for the measurement of meaning framework 
analysis presented in the following three chapters.
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CHAPTER 8
RESEARCH FINDINGS: COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
The previous chapter presented results from an initial examination of the research 
data. The major research findings of the study are now presented. The two major 
components of the study entail (a) determining the cognitive structure within which 
the concept of auditor independence is considered by research participants, and 
(b) examining the measured meaning of auditor independence in the nine alternative 
experimental cases across the three participant groups. Results of the first component 
of the study are presented in this chapter, allowing conclusions to be drawn on the 
study’s HI and H2. Results of the second component are presented in Chapters 9 and 
10.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Issues related to the form of factor analysis to be 
used to investigate cognitive structure are discussed in Section 8.1. Introductory 
factor analysis results are presented in Section 8.2, including factor eigenvalues and a 
scree plot of eigenvalues. The results of four, three, two and single factor analytic 
models are presented in Sections 8.3 to 8.6. A discussion of the findings relating to 
the cognitive structure within which the meaning of the auditor independence concept 
is considered by research participants is contained in Section 8.7, and a summary in 
Section 8.8 completes the chapter.
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8.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS: COMPONENT ANALYSIS VERSUS COMMON 
FACTOR ANALYSIS
Before examining the cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor 
independence is interpreted by research participants, important issues related to the 
appropriate form of factor analysis are discussed in this section.
Factor analysis is a method used to determine whether or not a set of observed 
variables can be more parsimoniously expressed by a smaller set of variables while 
preserving the basic information provided by the original variable set (Velicer, 
Peacock and Jackson, 1982). It was noted in Chapter 3 that factor analysis is a generic 
name given to a class of multivariate statistical methods, and that there are many 
variants (Hair et al., 1998). The two major subsets are component (or principal 
component) analysis and common factor analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; 
Nunnally, 1978; Gorsuch, 1983; Velicer and Jackson, 1990a, 1990b). The choice 
between the two is primarily dependent on the research objective and on prior 
knowledge of the variance in the variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Hair et al., 
1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
There are three types of variance for the purpose of factor analysis generally: 
(a) common (shared) variance, (b) specific (unique) variance and (c) error variance 
(Nunnally, 1978; Bryant and Yamold, 1995; Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). Common variance is the variance in a variable that is shared with all other 
variables in the analysis. Specific (unique) variance is the variance associated with 
only a specific variable. Error variance is that variance due to unreliability in the data- 
gathering process, measurement error, or a random component in the measured
phenomenon.
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Component analysis considers total variance, and therefore derives factors 
(components) comprising common variance in addition to any specific and error 
variance. Components derived by component analysis represent a ‘mathematically 
determined, empirical solution with common, unique and error variance mixed into 
components’ (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p. 610).
In contrast, factors resulting from common factor analysis are based only on common 
variance. Common factor analysis attempts to eliminate unique and error variance to 
derive factors based only on shared variance. Exclusion of unique and error variance 
is based on the belief that such variance only confuses the ‘picture of underlying 
processes’ (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p. 610).
Some references distinguish between component and common factor analysis by 
referring to the former as a manifest variable procedure and the latter as a latent 
variable procedure (Mulaik, 1990; Velicer and Jackson, 1990a; Costello and Osborne, 
2005).1 In representing a manifest variable procedure, component analysis can be 
described as simply deriving a weighted linear composite of the observed variables 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978b; Mulaik, 1990; Velicer and Jackson, 1990a).
A latent variable is an unobserved, underlying variable or construct that, with the 
addition of sampling error, accounts for the observed (manifest) variables (Velicer 
and Jackson, 1990a). Common factor analysis is designed to identify underlying, 
latent dimensions or constructs that reflect what the variables share in common. It is 
most appropriate when the objective is to identify latent constructs and when the 
researcher has little knowledge about the specific and error variance and therefore
I Similarly, Nunnally (1978) refers to component analysis as being concerned with real or actual 
factors and common factor analysis as pertaining to hypothetical factors.
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wishes to eliminate it (Cattell, 1978; Gorsuch, 1983; Bentler and Kano, 1990; Hair et 
al., 1998; Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum and Strahan, 1999). The aim of common 
factor analysis is to represent the observed variables as functions of other, latent 
variables. The common factors are responsible for the covariation among the 
observed variables, with the remaining variation being unique to each of the variables 
(Mulaik, 1990).
In summary, component analysis is used when the objective is to summarise most of 
the original information in a minimum number of factors (components) for prediction 
purposes, while common factor analysis is used primarily to identify underlying 
factors or dimensions that reflect what the variables share in common (Hair et al., 
1998).
The aim of the present study is to identify the dimensions of meaning underlying the 
concept of auditor independence, the latent construct. Accordingly, common factor 
analysis, rather than component analysis, is the appropriate method consistent with 
the objective of identifying the source of common variance underlying the meaning of 
the auditor independence construct.
Following extensive simulation studies, it has been concluded by a number of writers 
that, in practice, the distinction between the results of component analysis and 
common factor analysis is likely to be minimal (see, for example, Velicer, 1974, 
1976, 1977; Velicer et al., 1982; Velicer and Jackson, 1990a, 1990b). Some studies, 
though, have concluded that component loadings produced by component analysis are 
significantly inflated in comparison to those produced by common factor analysis, 
and that these are generally large enough to affect interpretations (see, for example, 
Borgatta, Kercher and Stull, 1986; Hubbard and Allen, 1987; Snook and Gorsuch,
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1989; Dziuban and Harris, 1973). Snook and Gorsuch (1989, p. 152) argue that 
‘common factor analysis includes error explicitly in the model and thereby reflects 
the statistical paradigm used in the social sciences.’ Gorsuch (1990, p. 39) believes 
that common factor analysis ‘should be routinely applied as the standard analysis 
because it recognizes we have error in our variables, gives unbiased instead of 
inflated loadings, and is more elegant as a part of the standard model used in 
univariate and multivariate analysis.’ This provides further support for the use of 
common factor analysis, rather than component analysis, in the current study.
8.2 INITIAL FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
Consistent with the prior measurement of meaning literature, the data reduction 
process used for the semantic differential scale data was common factor analysis with
'y
varimax (orthogonal) rotation.“
Principal axis factoring was used for the initial extraction of factors. While there are 
several different factor extraction methods available, information on their strengths 
and weaknesses is scarce and often only available in obscure references (Costello and 
Osborne, 2005). Nevertheless, the two major extraction methods are principal axis 
factoring and maximum likelihood factoring (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Costello and 
Osborne, 2005), and these are the two methods generally recommended in normal
See, for example, Osgood et al. (1957), Houghton (1987a, 1987b, 1988), Houghton and Messier 
(1990), Houghton and Hronsky (1993), McNamara and Moores (1995) and Hronsky and 
Houghton (2001). Varimax is an orthogonal rotation method, where factors are constrained to be 
orthogonal to, or uncorrelated with, each other (Kim and Mueller, 1978a; Hair et al., 1998; 
Fabrigar et al., 1999; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Varimax rotation maximises the sum of 
variances of squared loadings in the columns of the factor matrix (Mulaik, 1972; Nunally, 1978). 
Varimax is generally regarded as the preferred orthogonal rotation method, and is 
overwhelmingly the most widely used (Kim and Mueller, 1978a; Nunally, 1978; Comrey and 
Lee, 1992; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Costello and Osborne, 2005; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
The various methods of factor extraction obtain the unrotated factor matrix by satisfying certain 
mathematical criteria, such as extracting the maximum amount of variance in one factor or 
minimising the sum of squares of residuals (Comrey, 1978).
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circumstances (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). The principal axis factoring method has the 
advantage of entailing no distributional assumptions and is less likely than the 
maximum likelihood method to produce improper solutions (Fabrigar et al., 1999; 
Costello and Osborne, 2005). Also, efficiency and other mathematical properties of 
principal axis factoring have caused this common factor method to be preferred by 
mathematicians (Cattell, 1978). Accordingly, this was the basic extraction method 
used in the study.4
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for the study data was 0.956, 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant at p < .001.5 These statistics indicate 
that factor analysis is appropriate for the data.
Eigenvalues, proportion of variance explained and the scree plot resulting from the 
initial factor analysis are presented in Table 8.1.
Representing a least squares approach, the principal axis method extracts factors from the 
correlation matrix by placing squared multiple correlation coefficients in the diagonal as initial 
estimates of the communalities. The communality for a variable represents the variance it shares 
with all other variables in the analysis, being the variance accounted for by the common factors 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978a, 1978b; Bryant and Yamold, 1995; Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). Iterations continue by using the factor loadings as estimates of new 
communalities. The principle is to minimise the residual correlation after extracting a given 
number of factors, and to assess the degree of fit between the reproduced correlations under the 
model and the observed correlations (Cattell, 1978; Kim and Mueller, 1978b; SPSS Inc, 2005).
Bartlett’s test statistic equals 10,135.4 (231 degrees of freedom).
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Panel A: Eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative %
1 10.51 47.79 47.79
2 1.85 8.40 56.19
3 1.38 6.26 62.45
4 1.00 4.57 67.02
5 0.93 4.24 71.26
6 0.71 3.24 74.50
7 0.66 3.02 77.52
8 0.56 2.56 80.08
9 0.51 2.30 82.38
10 0.49 2.21 84.59
Panel B: Scree plot
Factor Number
Table 8.1: Eigenvalues and scree plot
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Application of the scree test suggests anywhere between a one and five factor 
solution. Another frequently used criterion in deciding how many factors to retain in a 
factor solution is to accept all those with eigenvalues exceeding one (Kaiser, 1960), 
although it is generally agreed that this tends to result in the acceptance of too many 
factors.6 Three factors have eigenvalues exceeding one, and a fourth factor has an 
eigenvalue equal to one. It can be highlighted, though, that the first factor is 
particularly dominant, with an eigenvalue over five times as large as the second 
factor.
Given that the fourth factor has an eigenvalue equal to one, the approach adopted in 
the study was to commence with a four factor solution, utilising factor comparability 
analysis to assess the robustness and stability of the structure.
8.3 FOUR FACTOR MODEL
The varimax rotated factor matrix for the four factor solution is presented in Table 
8.2. The table shows that 18 of the 22 scales have factor loadings exceeding 0.5.
Factor 1 comprises a mix of three evaluative and three potency scales. Factor 2 
consists of one evaluative, three potency and two activity scales. The third factor 
comprises three evaluative scales and Factor 4 comprises three activity scales.
6 See, for example, Cattell and Jaspers (1967), Browne (1968), Linn (1968), Comrey (1978), Lee 
and Comrey (1979) and Everett (1983).
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Factors
Scales 1 2 3 4
Bad-Good .824 E .315 .267 .150
Incomplete-Complete .798 P .315 .249 .163
Risky-Safe .778 E .343 .270 .180
Weak-Strong .748 P .406 .294 .182
Adverse-Beneficial .729 E .269 .389 .136
Imaginary-Real .693 P .379 .306 .219
Passive-Active .277 .653 A .138 .139
Intangible-T angible .280 .598 P .292 .184
Subj ective-Obj ective .319 .583 E .164 .201
Indirect-Direct .337 .569 P .128 .396
Static-Dynamic .175 .530 A .047 -.120
Estimated-Exact .350 .502 P .179 .260
Unnecessary-Necessary .193 .091 .676 E -.057
Discretionary-Required .219 .072 .640 E .108
Unexpected-Expected .378 .310 .610 E .095
Short-term-Long-term .218 .209 .075 .661 A
T emporary-Permanent .307 .286 .003 .620 A
V ariable-Constant .181 .431 .034 .607 A
Uncontrollable-Controllable .461 .340 .403 .181
Unplanned-Planned .438 .457 .431 .105
Unmeasurable-Measurable .361 .487 .291 .178
Inflexible-Flexible .045 .192 -.045 -.389
(Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
(Rotation Method: Varimax)
Table 8.2: Rotated factor matrix — Four factor model
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Factor comparability analysis was used to test the four factor solution for both 
between-group and within-group stability. Results are shown in Table 8.3.
Panel A of Table 8.3 shows comparability for Factor 1, at the required correlation 
threshold of at least 0.894 (80 per cent shared variance), between the auditor and 
preparer groups and between the preparers and users. With a correlation of 0.864, 
Factor 1 is approaching comparability between the auditors and users.
Panel B of Table 8.3 shows that the highest comparability for Factor 2 is between 
auditors and users (correlation of 0.819). The other two between-group correlations 
are less than 0.8.
Panel C of Table 8.3 shows a correlation of 0.846 for Factor 3 between the preparer 
and user groups. However, the correlation for Factor 3 is very low between auditors 
and users, and is slightly negative between auditors and preparers.
As shown in Panel D of Table 8.3, there is a lack of between-group comparability at 
the required level for Factor 4, with correlations ranging between 0.807 and 0.774.
Results of testing for within-group comparability are presented in Panel E of Table 
8.3.7 The only within-group correlation of at least 0.894 is for Factor 1 for the 
preparer group. The four factor structure appears to be approaching comparability for 
the preparers, with correlations for each of the four factors of at least 0.802. Within- 
group comparability is lowest for the auditor group, especially for Factors 3 and 4.
7 To enable within-group factor comparability testing, the participants in each group were 
randomly split into two halves, with each half balanced by the experimental cases.
Chapter 8 246
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.896 0.864
0.928
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.688 0.819
0.794
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
-0.074 0.211
0.846
Panel D: Between-group correlations for Factor 4
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.794 0.774
0.807
Panel E: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
A uditors 0.829 0.819 0.103 0.207
Preparers 0.897 0.802 0.864 0.824
U sers 0.839 0.722 0.640 0.455
Table 8.3: Factor comparability analysis — Four factor model
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To test the sensitivity of the basic factor analytic model (principal axis factoring with 
varimax rotation) to alternate specifications, the following four factor model 
variations were also performed, with factor comparability analysis results presented 
in Appendix 3:
o
• Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation (Appendix 3.1);
• Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation9 (Appendix 3.2); and
• Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation (Appendix 3.3).
These alternative models support the conclusion drawn from the basic four factor 
model. While there is a mixture of increased and decreased individual within-group 
and between-group correlations in the three alternative models in comparison to the 
basic model, only a minimum of within- and between-group correlations meet the 
threshold of 0.894 under all four factor models.10
In summary, the results of factor comparability analysis indicate that the four factor 
solution is not robust and stable, either between-groups or within-groups. 
Accordingly, a three factor solution is assessed in the following section.
Based on maximising the determinants of a residual partial correlation matrix, the objective of 
the maximum likelihood extraction method is to find the underlying population parameters that 
would have the greatest likelihood of producing the observed correlation matrix (Kim and 
Mueller, 1978a; 1978b). The method produces parameter estimates that are most likely to have 
produced the observed correlation matrix if the sample was from a multivariate normal 
distribution (SPSS Inc, 2005).
Direct oblimin is an oblique rotation method, where rotation is not limited by the orthogonality 
condition and where the factors are, in general, correlated to some extent (Kim and Mueller, 
1978a). Rather than arbitrarily constraining the factor rotation to an orthogonal solution, an 
oblique rotation identifies the extent to which the factors are correlated (Hair et al., 1998). Direct 
oblimin rotation is performed without resorting to reference axes (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). The 
method seeks a factor solution directly by minimising a function of the primary factor pattern 
coefficients (Harman, 1976), and is generally regarded as the starting point if oblique rotation is 
sought (Kim and Mueller, 1978a).
Under the basic (principal axis/varimax) four factor model, three of the correlations, out of a 
total of 24 possible between- and within-group correlations, exceed 0.894. Under the maximum 
likelihood/varimax and principal axis/direct oblimin models, five and six of the possible 24 
correlations respectively exceed 0.894. Under the maximum likelihood/direct oblimin model, 
seven correlations exceed 0.894 and another equals 0.893.
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8.4 THREE FACTOR MODEL
The first hypothesis for the study was stated as:
HI: Research participants interpret the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept within a three factor E-P-A cognitive structure.
The varimax rotated factor matrix for the three factor solution is presented in Table 
8.4. The table shows that 19 of the 22 scales have factor loadings exceeding 0.5.
The first factor in the three factor model encompasses all six evaluative and potency 
scales which comprised Factor 1 in the four factor model plus all three evaluative 
scales comprising Factor 3 in the four factor model. In addition, Factor 1 in the three 
factor model comprises one activity scale (unplanned-planned) and one evaluative 
scale (uncontrollable-controllable). These did not load on any factor, at a loading of 
at least 0.5, in the four factor model.
The second factor in the three factor model comprises the same scales as Factor 2 in 
the four factor model, with the exception of the estimated-exact scale.
The third factor in the three factor model consists of the same three activity scales 
comprising Factor 4 in the four factor model.
In summary, the first factor in the three factor model is generally a combination of 
Factors 1 and 3 from the four factor model, while Factors 2 and 3 in the three factor 
model are essentially the same as Factors 2 and 4 respectively from the four factor
model.
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Scales
Factor
1 2 3
A dverse-B eneficial .802 E .263 .230
B ad-G ood .778 E .327 .287
R isky-S afe .750 E .345 .309
Incom plete-C om plete .748 P .324 .297
W eak-S trong .747 P .401 .307
Im aginary-R eal .716 P .366 .326
U nexpected-E xpected .679 E .276 .089
U npl anned-P  1 anned .615 A .430 .150
U ncontrollable-C ontrollable .613 E .309 .222
U nnecessary-N ecessary .566 E .078 -.104
D iscretionary-R equired .557 E .057 .045
Passive-A ctive .289 .650 A .214
Subj ecti ve-O bj ecti ve .343 .559 E .275
S tatic-D ynam ic .161 .556 A -.051
In tang ib le-T  angible .404 .555 P .231
Ind irect-D irect .319 .536 P .471
T em porary-Perm anent .204 .238 .685 A
Short-term -Long-term .186 .151 .677 A
V ariab le-C onstan t .134 .375 .644 A
U nm easurab 1 e-M easurab 1 e .464 .455 .231
E stim ated-E xact .375 .473 .328
Inflex ib le-F lex ib le .017 .232 -.335
(Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
(Rotation Method: Varimax)
Table 8.4: Rotated factor matrix — Three factor model
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The three factors, and particularly Factors 1 and 3, appear partially consistent with the 
standard E-P-A structure. Factor 1 is dominated by seven evaluative scales, but also 
comprises three potency and one activity scale. Factor 2 consists of two activity 
scales, two potency scales and one evaluative scale. The third factor comprises three 
activity scales, all of which have temporal connotations.
Results of factor comparability analysis, shown in Table 8.5, indicate that the three 
factor solution is not robust and stable. Panels A to C of Table 8.5 show a general 
lack of between-group comparability at the required level. Factor 1 exhibits 
comparability between preparers and users and some comparability between auditors 
and users, although not at the threshold of 0.894 for the latter. There is a lack of 
between-group stability for Factor 1 between the auditor and preparer groups. Factors
2 and 3 do not exhibit between-group stability at the required level for any participant 
group.
The within-group correlations presented in Panel D of Table 8.5 indicate a general 
lack of within-group comparability at the required threshold when considering all 
three factors for each of the three participant groups. Factor 1 for auditors and Factor
3 for preparers are the only within-group correlations of at least 0.894.
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Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.707 0.858
0.918
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.663 0.684
0.719
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
A uditors -0.410 0.419
Preparers -0.594
Panel D: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
A uditors 0.985 0.792 0.636
Preparers 0.826 0.696 0.926
U sers 0.714 0.665 0.537
Table 8.5: Factor comparability analysis — Three factor model
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To test the sensitivity of the basic factor analytic model (principal axis factoring with 
varimax rotation), and as with the four factor model, the following three factor model 
variations were also performed, with factor comparability results presented in 
Appendix 4:
• Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation (Appendix 4.1);
• Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation (Appendix 4.2); and
• Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation (Appendix 4.3).
Under the basic three factor model, only three of the correlations, out of a total of 18 
possible between- and within-group correlations, exceed 0.894. Under the maximum 
likelihood/varimax model, five of the possible 18 correlations exceed 0.894. Under 
both the principal axis/direct oblimin and maximum likelihood/direct oblimin models, 
seven of the possible 18 correlations exceed 0.894. Under all three alternative models, 
Factor 1 exhibits between-group comparability for all groups, but this is not the case 
for any of the models for the second and third factors. Factor 1 exhibits within-group 
comparability for all groups under the alternative models, with the exception of 
auditors under the maximum likelihood/varimax model.
Given the results of factor comparability analysis, the three factor model cannot be 
considered to be robust and stable. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 (HI) is not supported. 
The three research participant groups, representing key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process, did not interpret the connotative meaning of the 
auditor independence concept within a shared, three factor E-P-A structure.
8.5 TWO FACTOR MODEL
The rotated factor matrix for the two factor solution is presented in Panel A of Table 
8.6. The first factor in the two factor solution comprises all scales that loaded on
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Factor 1 in the three factor model, with all except one of these (discretionary- 
required) having higher factor loadings. Factor 1 also comprises two scales that did 
not load on the first factor in the three factor solution. These were the unmeasurable- 
measurable (potency) scale which did not load on any factor in the three factor model, 
and the intangible-tangible (potency) scale which loaded on the second factor in the 
three factor model. Factor 2 comprises the three activity scales which formed the third 
factor in the three factor model and the indirect-direct (potency) scale which loaded 
on Factor 2 in the three factor model.
Panels B and C of Table 8.6 present the between-group factor comparability results. 
Panel B shows that the between-group correlation for Factor 1 between the auditors 
and preparers of 0.890 indicates a high level of comparability. However, the 
correlations for Factor 1 between the auditor and user groups and between the 
preparer and user groups are less that the comparability threshold of 0.894. The 
between-group correlations for Factor 2 (Panel C) are well below the required 
threshold, and therefore the two factor model cannot be considered to have between- 
group stability.
Panel D of Table 8.6 presents the within-group factor comparability results. While the 
first factor exhibits within-group stability for all three participant groups, Factor 2 
does not. Accordingly, a lack of overall between- and within-group stability is
evident.
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Panel A: Rotated factor matrix -  Two factor model
Scales
Factors
1 2
Adverse-Beneficial .819 E .263
Bad-Good .812 E .347
Weak-Strong .806 P .402
Risky-Safe .790 E .376
Incomplete-Complete .782 P .356
Imaginary-Real .763 P .403
Unexpected-Expected .724 E .152
Unplanned-Planned .704 A .289
Uncontrollable-Controllable .658 E .292
Unnecessary-Necessary .573 E -.106
U nmeasurab le-M easurable .560 P .385
Discretionary-Required .542 E .018
Intangible-T angible .534 P .437
Variable-Constant .185 .741 A
T emporary-Permanent .217 .679 A
Indirect-Direct .428 .648 P
Short-term-Long-term .179 .620 A
Subj ecti ve-Obj ecti ve .475 .480
Estimated-Exact .473 .488
Passive-Active .458 .466
Static-Dynamic .323 .212
Inflexible-Flexible .106 -.163
(Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
(Rotation Method: Varimax)
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 1 - 2  factor model
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.890 0.819
0.809
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 2 - 2  factor model
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.814 0.515
0.038
Panel D: Within-group correlations -  2 factor model
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2
Auditors 0.981 0.805
Preparers 0.918 0.774
Users 0.952 -0.446
Table 8.6: Two factor model
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T< test the sensitivity of the basic two factor analytic model to alternate 
specifi cat ions, the factor model variations conducted for the four and three factor 
rmdels were also performed, with factor comparability results presented in Appendix 
5:
• Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation (Appendix 5.1);
• Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation (Appendix 5.2); and
• Maximum likelihood factoring with direct oblimin rotation (Appendix 5.3).
Lhder the basic two factor model, none of the between-group correlations for either 
factor exceed 0.894, although the Factor 1 correlation between the auditor and 
pieparer groups equals 0.890. Under the three alternate models, Factor 1 exhibits 
comparability between all groups at the required threshold. However, this is not the 
Ccse for the second factor. Factor 1 exhibits within-group comparability at the 
required threshold under the basic model and all three alternative models, with the 
exception of within-group comparability for users under the principal axis/direct 
oblimn model. Factor 2 does not exhibit within-group comparability for any group 
und* any of the factor analysis models.
Giv;n these factor comparability results, the two factor model cannot be considered 
to b: robust and stable.
8.6 SINGLE FACTOR MODEL
The single factor solution is presented in Panel A of Table 8.7. The factor 
conparability analysis results presented in Panels B and C indicate this single factor 
mO'd to be robust and stable, both between the three research participant groups and 
witin each of the individual groups.
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Panel A: Factor matrix -  Single factor model
Scales Factor
W e a x -S tro n g .897 P
B a d -G o o d .871 E
R is k y -S a fe .8 6 9 E
Im a g in a ry -R e a l .862 P
I n c o n p le te - C o m p le te .851 P
A d v e rs e -B e n e f ic ia l .829 E
U  np  a n n e d -P  1 a n n e d .749 A
U n c o n tro lla b le -C o n tro lla b le .713 E
In d iie c t-D ire c t .7 0 4 P
U n e x p e c te d -E x p e c te d .688 E
In ta r g ib le - T  a n g ib le .687 P
U n r re a s u ra b le -M e a s u ra b le .681 P
E s t in a te d - E x a c t .662 P
S u b je c tiv e -O b je c tiv e .6 5 9 E
P a s s v e - A c t iv e .637 A
V a r iib le -C o n s ta n t .542 A
T  e r ro o ra ry -P e rm a n e n t .538 A
S h o it- te rm -L o n g - te rm A ll
D is c re t io n a ry -R e q u ire d .463
U n n :c e s s a ry -N  e c e s s a ry .419
S ta te - D y n a m ic .387
In f le x ib le -F le x ib le .001
(Exraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring)
Pand B: Between-group correlations -  Single factor model
P re p a re rs U se rs
A id ito rs
Preparers
0 .9 7 8 0 .9 8 3
0 .9 9 7
Pait‘1 C: Within-group correlations -  Single factor model
S p lit-h a lf
c o rre la tio n
c o e ff ic ie n ts
F a c to r  1
A  di to rs 0 .973
P c p a re rs 0 .991
U e rs 0 .9 9 7
Table 8.7: Single factor model
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Further within-group factor comparability analysis also indicated the single factor 
structure to be comparable within (a) the auditor group of participants when dissected 
between Big Four and Second Tier auditors, 11 (b) the preparer group when dissected 
between accountants and the other (combined) preparers, and (c) the user group
1 7when dissected between bank analyst and shareholder participants.
To further test the sensitivity of the single factor (principal axis factoring) model to 
alternate specifications, the following single factor models were also conducted:
• Maximum likelihood factoring; and
• Component (principal component) analysis.
These alternate models support the conclusion drawn from the basic single factor 
model. 14 Results consistently indicate the single factor model to be robust and stable, 
both between-groups and within-groups.
8.7 DISCUSSION OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
The second research hypothesis for the study was stated as:
H2: Research participants interpret the connotative meaning o f the auditor 
independence concept within a shared cognitive structure.
Correlation equals 0.981. Of the 80 auditor participants, 49 were from Big Four firms and 31 
from Second Tier firms.
Correlation equals 0.992. Accountants were the largest single group of preparer participants, 
representing 25 of the 71 preparers. The other preparer groups comprised chief executive 
officers, chief financial officers, chief operating officers, directors, financial controllers, 
financial managers and managers.
Correlation equals 0.996. Of the 69 user participants, 19 were bank analysts and 50 were 
shareholders who were members of the Australian Investors’ Association.
Under maximum likelihood factoring, the minimum between-group correlation for the single 
factor was 0.982 (between auditors and preparers) and the minimum within-group correlation 
was 0.976 (within the auditor group). Under component analysis, the minimum between-group 
correlation was 0.984 (again between auditors and preparers) and the minimum within-group 
correlation was 0.973 (again within the auditor group).
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Given the factor comparability analysis results for the single factor model, H2 is 
supported. The three research participant groups interpreted the connotative meaning 
of the auditor independence concept within a shared cognitive structure. While this 
was not a three-factor E-P-A structure, as hypothesised by H I, factor comparability 
results indicate the existence of a shared, single factor cognitive structure. Discussion 
of the nature of this single dimension of meaning follows.
Seventeen scales have factor loadings in the single factor model exceeding 0.5. These 
comprise six evaluative, seven potency and four activity scales. This indicates a 
variety of dimensions of connotative meaning being highly correlated with respect to 
the concept of auditor independence. This is also supported by the many significant 
correlations between the underlying evaluative, potency and activity scales presented 
in the previous chapter.
There are three evaluative and three potency scales with factor loadings exceeding 
0.8. The high loadings for both dimensions are intuitively reasonable when 
considering the auditor independence concept. For the independence concept, the 
good, safe and beneficial evaluative scales are similar in effect to the strong, real and 
complete potency scales. That is, if independence has connotations of being good, 
safe and beneficial, it will also have connotations of being strong, real and complete.
Fifteen scales have factor loadings exceeding 0.6. These comprise six evaluative, 
seven potency and two activity scales, again suggesting an overlap in a variety of 
dimensions of meaning with respect to the independence concept. It is pertinent to 
note that it is the activity scales which, of the three E-P-A dimensions, tend to have 
the least impact. The planned activity scale does load highly with a factor loading of 
0.749. Flowever, the other activity scales with loadings exceeding 0.5 are the last
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three of the loading factors, and the three remaining activity scales have loadings of 
less than 0.5.
It is also relevant to highlight that all seven potency scales load on the factor. Only 
two of the eight evaluative scales do not load. Given the compulsory nature of auditor 
independence, it is not surprising that the non-loading evaluative scales are the 
discretionary-required and unnecessary-necessary ones.
In summary, it can be concluded on the basis of this section’s analysis that, for the 
auditor, preparer and user research participants, the evaluative and potency 
dimensions of meaning in particular, but also the activity dimension to a lesser extent, 
are highly related and overlapping with respect to connotations of the auditor 
independence concept.
Osgood et al. (1957, p. 38) suggested that the evaluative factor plays the dominant 
role in meaningful judgments of general concepts, and this has been supported by 
subsequent studies. The relative weights of the three E-P-A factors have also been 
fairly consistent, with evaluation accounting for approximately double the amount of 
variance due to either potency or activity (Osgood et al., 1957, p. 38). The far greater 
proportion of variance explained by the single factor in the present study, and the 
robust and stable nature of this factor, supports the conclusion that the various 
evaluative, potency and activity scales work together in determining connotations 
(interpretations) of auditor independence in individual situations.
The results of the present study can also be compared with previous accounting and 
auditing studies using the same 22 semantic scales. In the prior studies in which
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eigenvalues were published,1^ the first factor eigenvalues were not as high as the 
value of 10.5 found in the present study. In studies deriving three or four factor 
solutions, the highest eigenvalue was 6.8 (Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). In 
accounting studies deriving single factor solutions for less experienced groups of 
research participants, the highest eigenvalue was 9.1 for shareholder participants 
(Houghton, 1987a). The eigenvalue of the first factor extracted in the pilot study 
(referred to in Chapter 4), where students were used as research participants, was 8.6. 
Accordingly, the high eigenvalue for the first factor in this study reinforces the 
conclusion that a single factor model is appropriate and that the alternative E-P-A 
dimensions are highly related and overlapping when considering the connotative 
meaning of the auditor independence concept.
The extraction of a factor combining alternative E-P-A scales is also not unique to the 
present study. Many of the prior accounting and auditing semantic differential studies 
have extracted dominant factors comprising alternative dimensions of meaning. For 
example, the dominant factor extracted in Houghton (1987a) comprised four potency, 
three evaluative and one activity scale. In Houghton and Hronsky (1993), the 
dominant factor comprised four evaluative, three activity and one potency scale, 
while Hronsky and Houghton (2001) extracted a dominant factor of four potency, two 
evaluative and one activity scale. Also, in Houghton (1987b), the dominant factor was 
a potency, not evaluative, one.
Osgood (1976, p. 37) emphasised the significance of the evaluative factor and noted 
that this attitudinal variable appeared to be primary in human judgment. He suggested 
that the greater the emotional or attitudinal loading of the concept being judged, the
15 These studies were Houghton (1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1997), Houghton and Messier (1990), 
Houghton and Hronsky (1993), Hronsky and Houghton (2001) and Wines (2006).
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greater the tendency of the semantic framework to collapse into a single, combined 
dimension (Osgood, 1976, p. 38). This appears to be the situation for the concept of 
auditor independence, a concept that does evoke considerable emotion. The auditing 
research literature and professional standards refer to perceptions of auditor 
independence, and this represents an attitudinal evaluation (interpretation) of 
independence in specific contexts. Perceptions of independence commonly involve 
evaluations of its strength, a potency dimension. It follows that the potency of 
independence is highly related to its evaluative dimension, and this is confirmed by 
the study’s finding of a single factor cognitive structure.
8.8 SUMMARY
The results from the first component of the study, determining the cognitive structure 
within which the concept of auditor independence is considered, were presented in 
this chapter. The chapter commenced with a discussion of issues related to the form 
of factor analysis used in applying the measurement of meaning framework. Factor 
analysis results for four, three, two and single factor models were then presented. 
Only the single factor model was found to be robust and stable between and within 
the three research participant groups. Hence, a three factor E-P-A cognitive structure 
as hypothesised by HI was not supported for the concept of auditor independence. 
However a shared single factor structure was found, supporting H2. Discussion of 
these findings highlighted that the evaluative and potency dimensions of meaning in 
particular, but also the activity dimension to a lesser extent, are highly related and 
overlapping for the auditor independence concept.
The single factor structure revealed by this first component of the study can be used 
to examine the measured meaning of the independence concept across the nine
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alternative experimental cases for the three research participant groups. The findings 
from this second component of the study are presented in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 9
RESEARCH FINDINGS: BETWEEN-GROUP 
COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL CASES
The prior chapter identified a single factor cognitive structure within which the 
concept of auditor independence was considered by research participants. Based on 
that identified structure, this and the following chapter present the findings from an 
examination of the measured meaning of auditor independence across the nine 
alternative experimental cases and across the three research participant groups. 
Findings from between-group comparisons of the experimental cases are examined in 
this chapter. The analysis allows conclusions to be drawn on the study’s H3. Within- 
group differences between sets of related cases are then examined in Chapter 10. The 
analyses in this and the following chapter allow further insight into participants’ 
connotations of independence arising from the alternative experimental cases and 
whether shared meaning of the concept of auditor independence exists.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Results of initial MANOVAs of the semantic scale 
data for each of the experimental cases are presented in Section 9.1. Factor 
placements for the experimental cases at the aggregated case level are presented in 
Section 9.2, and findings from between-group comparisons for the aggregated cases 
are presented and discussed in Section 9.3. Factor placements for individual cases are 
presented in Section 9.4, and findings from between-group comparisons of each of
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the individual cases are presented and discussed in Section 9.5. A summary in Section 
9.6 concludes the chapter.
9.1 BETWEEN GROUP COMPARISONS OF SEMANTIC SCALE DATA 
BY CASE
Results of MANOVAs of the data from the 22 semantic differential scales for each 
individual experimental case are presented in this section. This allows insight into 
whether there are any differences in each of the individual scales between the three 
research participant groups for each case. The MANOVA results are presented in 
Table 9.1.
The table shows the Pillai’s Trace between-group F  statistic and associated 
significance for each case.1 The table also shows, for each case, the number of the 22 
individual semantic scales for which significant between-group differences exist (at 
both p  < .05 and p  < .01).
i As explained in Chapter 7, Pillai’s Trace is generally considered to be the most robust of the 
MANOVA test statistics with respect to statistical assumption violations (Coakes, 2005). It is 
therefore the single summary statistic shown in Table 9.1.
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Pillai’s Trace: 
Between-group 
comparisons
Number of scales 
with significant 
between-group 
differences
Number of scales 
with significant 
between-group 
differences
Case Scenario F P at p  < .05 at p <  .01
1. No major threats 1.33 .127 3 1
2. Interlocking directorships 1.35 .113 0 0
3. Longer tenure and audit 
partner rotation after 4 years. 1.26 .175 6 2
4. Longer tenure and audit 
partner rotation after 7 years. 1.77 .009 5 2
5. High NAS with PCAOB 1.86 .006 12 8
6. High NAS without PCAOB 1.73 .012 12 10
7. Low NAS 1.41 .084 12 9
8. Ex-partner director of audit 
client with local 
independence board 0.93 .603 0 0
9. Ex-partner director of audit 
client without local 
independence board. 1.14 .297 0 0
NAS = Non-audit services
Table 9.1: MANOVA of semantic scales — Between-group 
differences in individual cases
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Table 9.1 shows that there are no significant between-group differences in any of the 
22 semantic scales for Cases 2, 8 and 9. There are, though, significant between-group 
differences in some of the scales for the other six cases.
For Case 1 (no major independence threats), there are significant between-group 
differences in three of the 22 scales at p  < .05. There are therefore 19 scales with no 
significant between-group differences at p < .05. The scales exhibiting significant 
differences were the bad-good, subjective-objective and indirect-direct scales.
Cases 3 and 4 specified longer periods of audit firm tenure (nine years) than did the 
other seven cases (four years). Table 9.1 shows that there are significant between- 
group differences, at p < .05, in six scales for Case 3 and five scales for Case 4. There 
were therefore no significant differences in 16 scales for Case 3 and 17 scales for 
Case 4 at p < .05. Two scales exhibited significant differences for both Cases 3 and 4 
at p < .05. These were the subjective-objective and variable-constant scales. The four 
further scales exhibiting significant differences at p < .05 for Case 3 were the 
indirect-direct, discretionary-required, passive-active and short-term-long-term 
scales. For Case 4, the further three scales exhibiting significant differences at p < .05 
were the unmeasurable-measurable, temporary-permanent and uncontrollable- 
controllable scales.
Cases 5, 6 and 7 specified the joint provision of audit and non-audit (taxation) 
services. Table 9.1 shows the greatest number of significant between-group 
differences for these three cases, with significant differences at p < .05 in 12 of the 22 
scales for each case. Nine individual scales exhibited significant between-group 
differences at this level for all three cases. These were the bad-good, unmeasurable- 
measurable, unplanned-planned, weak-strong, risky-safe, incomplete-complete,
Chapter 9 267
in aginary-real, adverse-beneficial and uncontrollable-controllable scales. The 
esimated-exact and temporary-permanent scales exhibited significant between- 
gnup differences at p<  .05 for both Cases 5 and 6. Other scales exhibiting significant 
b(tween-group differences at p < .05 were the static-dynamic scale for Case 5, the 
di;cretionary-required, unexpected-expected and passive-active scales for Case 6, 
ard the indirect-direct scale for Case 7.
Ir summary, the above discussion highlights that there are significant between-group 
deferences in individual semantic differential scales for six of the nine experimental 
cses. The three non-audit services cases exhibit the highest number of significant 
b<tween-group differences, each with significant differences at p  < .05 in 12 of the 22 
sales. There are therefore significant differences in slightly over one-half of the 22 
sales for these three cases. This represents twice the number of significant 
differences as the case with the next highest number of significant differences at 
.05, being Case 3 with significant differences at this level in six of the 22 scales.
Tble 9.1 also shows that the three non-audit services cases have a considerably 
lrger number of scales with significant between-group differences at/? < .01 than the 
oier cases. Cases 5, 6 and 7 have, respectively, eight, ten and nine semantic scales 
vth significant differences at p < .01. Cases 3 and 4 have only two scales each with 
spiificant differences at p < .01, while Case 1 has only one scale with a between- 
goup difference at this level.
Tsults of the analysis in this section indicate that there are some differences in the 
snantic scale data between the three participant groups for certain cases, and 
e3ecially for the three non-audit services cases. As explained in Chapter 3, factor 
sores (factor placements) arise from the data reduction step of factor analysis and
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represent a systematic summary of the individual variables included in the analysis. 
In the context of semantic differential analysis, the factor placements represent a 
summary of the semantic differential scale data and indicate the measured meaning of 
the particular concept being examined (Houghton and Messier, 1990; Houghton and 
Hronsky, 1993; Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). Between-group comparisons of factor 
placements therefore enable a systematic and parsimonious examination of the data 
for each individual research participant group compared to each of the other 
participant groups. This allows analysis of the information in all 22 semantic scales 
concurrently. Accordingly, the balance of this chapter is based on between-group 
comparisons of factor placements.
9.2 FACTOR PLACEMENTS AT THE AGGREGATED CASE LEVEL
The factor comparability analysis results presented in Chapter 8 enabled identification 
of a shared, single factor cognitive structure for the concept of auditor independence 
for the three research participant groups. The analyses in the chapter from this point 
compare the factor placements for the experimental cases, pursuant to the identified 
single factor structure, as measurements of connotations of independence held by 
each of the participant groups for the alternate cases.
Factor placements for each participant group for the experimental cases at the 
aggregated case level are presented in Table 9.2. Factor placements are presented for 
the cases containing common potential audit independence threats, as follows:
• Case 1: No major threats;
• Case 2: Interlocking directorships;
• Cases 3 and 4: Longer period of audit firm tenure;
• Cases 5, 6 and 7: Auditor provision of non-audit (taxation) services;
• Cases 8 and 9: Former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee company.
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Factor Placements
Case Scenario(s) Auditors Preparers Users
Case 1:
N o  m a jo r  th re a ts + 7 0 + 8 9 +61
Case 2:
In te r lo c k in g  d ire c to rs h ip s - 1 9 ^ 1 6 - 2 7
C ases 3 an d  4:
L o n g e r  p e r io d  o f  a u d it  f irm  te n u re + 5 9 +61 + 8 0
C ases 5, 6 an d  7:
N o n -a u d it  ( ta x a tio n )  se rv ic e s + 1 4 - 4 8 - 9 4
Cases 8 an d  9:
E x -p a rtn e r  d ire c to r  o f  a u d it  c lie n t - 3 0 -21 - 3 4
Table 9.2: Factor placements — Aggregated cases
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The factor placements for Case 1 (no major independence threats) are highly positive 
for all three participant groups. They range from a high of +89 for the preparers to 
+61 for the users.
In contrast to Case 1, the factor placements for Case 2 (interlocking directorships) are 
negative for all three groups. The interlocking directorships case stated that three non­
executive directors of the auditee, out of the eight directors in total, were also non­
executive directors of other companies audited by the incumbent audit firm. Factor 
placements for the case range from -19 for auditors to -46 for preparers.
Cases 3 and 4 were based on an audit firm tenure period of nine years, with audit 
partner rotation every four or seven years. This compared to a four year tenure period 
in all other cases. The factor placements for Cases 3 and 4 aggregated are highly 
positive for all participant groups, with a range from a high of +80 for users to a low 
of +59 for auditors.
The factor placements for Cases 5, 6 and 7 aggregated (auditor provision of additional 
taxation services to the auditee) are moderately positive for auditors, but are negative 
for preparers and users. In contrast to the earlier cases, factor placements show 
greater variability between the groups. Factor placements are positive for auditors 
(+14), negative for preparers (-48), and more extremely negative for users (-94).
Cases 8 and 9 involved a former audit firm partner being a director of the audit client. 
These cases stated that the director resigned from the audit firm 12 months earlier 
after 17 years with the firm, becoming director of the auditee eight months earlier. 
The director had not previously been involved in the audit of the auditee, and hence 
was not subject to the cooling-off period specified in the Corporations Act 2001.
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As with the interlocking directorships case, the factor placements for Cases 8 and 9 
aggregated are negative for all three groups. Factor placements for these cases 
aggregated range from -21 for preparers to -34 for users.
Observation of the factor placements presented in Table 9.2 shows a varying range of 
factor placements between the three participant groups, with the greatest range 
appearing for the non-audit services cases. The aim in the following section is to 
determine whether the differences in these factor placements for each of the cases at 
the aggregated independence threat level are statistically significant.
9.3 BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS AT THE AGGREGATED CASE 
LEVEL
Between-group one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) results, analysing factor 
placements for cases at the aggregated level, are presented in Table 9.3. The table 
also shows the results of post hoc testing. This enables determination of whether there 
are significant differences in factor placements between alternate pairs of research 
participants.
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The factor placements for Case 1 (no major independence threats) are highly positive 
for all three participant groups. The ANOVA results indicate no significant 
differences in placements for this case between the three groups.
In contrast to Case 1, the factor placements for Case 2 (interlocking directorships) are 
negative for all three groups. Consistent with Case 1, the ANOVA results for Case 2 
indicate no significant differences between the three participant groups.
Cases 3 and 4 were based on an audit firm tenure period of nine years with audit 
partner rotation every four or seven years. This compared to a four year tenure period 
in all other cases. The factor placements for Cases 3 and 4 aggregated are highly 
positive for all participant groups. There are again no significant differences in factor 
placements between the three participant groups.
As noted in Chapter 7, Case 4 had the highest incidence of incorrect responses to the 
manipulation check questions. It was also the only case to have manipulation check 
failures within all research participant groups. Accordingly, the analysis of Cases 3 
and 4 (aggregated) was also conducted excluding the responses from participants 
responding incorrectly to the manipulation check questions. This did not result in any 
substantive change to the ANOVA results.
The factor placements for Cases 5, 6 and 7 aggregated (auditor provision of additional 
taxation services to the auditee) are moderately positive for auditors, but are negative 
for preparers and users. The post hoc testing results indicate significant differences in
2 Under this revised analysis, the F statistic was 1.64 and the significance level was at/? = .199. 
Post hoc differences between individual pairs of participant groups remained insignificant at
p  < .10.
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factor placements between all three participant groups, with the factor placements for 
users being the most negative.
Cases 8 and 9 involved a former audit firm partner being a director of the audit client. 
The factor placements for cases 8 and 9 aggregated are negative for all three groups 
and there are no significant between-group differences.
As noted in Chapter 7, Case 8 had the second highest incidence of incorrect responses 
to the manipulation check questions. It was also the only case, other than Case 4, to 
have manipulation check failures within more than one participant group. The 
analysis of Cases 8 and 9 (aggregated) was therefore also conducted excluding the 
responses from participants responding incorrectly to the manipulation check
-5
questions, but there were no substantive changes to the ANOVA results.
In summary, the above analyses of the factor placements for aggregated cases 
containing common potential audit independence threats reveal significant between- 
group differences for only the cases specifying the auditor provision of additional 
taxation services. There were no significant differences between any of the groups for 
the case presenting no major potential independence threats. Significant between- 
group differences were also not present for the cases presenting the potential 
independence threats of interlocking directorships, a longer period of audit firm 
tenure or a former audit partner being a director of the auditee.
3 Under this revised analysis, the F statistic was 0.22 and the significance level was at p  = .801. 
Post hoc differences between individual pairs of participant groups remained insignificant at
p  < .10
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9.4 FACTOR PLACEMENTS AT THE INDIVIDUAL CASE LEVEL
Factor placements for cases at the aggregated level were presented and analysed in 
the previous two sections. To provide further detail on participants’ connotations of 
independence under the alternative independence threat and safeguard scenarios, 
factor placements at the individual case level are presented in this section and are 
analysed for any between-group differences in Section 9.5.
Factor placements for each of the individual experimental cases are presented in 
Table 9.4. As already noted in Section 9.2, factor placements for all groups are highly 
positive for Case 1 (no independence threats) and are negative for Case 2 
(interlocking directorships).
Cases 3 and 4 specified a longer (nine year rather than four year) audit firm tenure 
period. As in Case 1 where no major independence threats were indicated, factor 
placements for Case 3, where the partner rotation period was after four years, are 
highly positive for all three participant groups. The factor placements for all groups 
are somewhat lower in Case 4, where the partner rotation period was after seven
years.
Chapter 9 276
Factor Placements
Case Scenario Auditors Preparers Users
1. N o  m a jo r  th re a ts + 7 0 + 8 9 +61
2. In te r lo c k in g  d ire c to rsh ip s - 1 9 - 4 6 - 2 7
3. L o n g e r  te n u re  an d  a u d it  
p a r tn e r  ro ta t io n  a f te r  4  y ea rs . + 7 0 + 7 8 + 85
4. L o n g e r  te n u re  an d  a u d it 
p a r tn e r  ro ta t io n  a f te r  7 yea rs . + 4 8 + 4 5 + 7 6
5. H ig h  N A S  w ith  P C A O B + 2 4 - 7 2 - 9 8
6. H ig h  N A S  w ith o u t P C A O B - 2 0 - 5 3 - 1 1 3
7. L o w  N A S + 3 6 - 1 8 - 6 5
8. E x -p a r tn e r  d ire c to r  o f  a u d it 
c lie n t w ith  lo ca l 
in d e p e n d e n c e  b o a rd + 2 + 7 - 2
9. E x -p a r tn e r  d ire c to r  o f  a u d it 
c lie n t w ith o u t lo ca l 
in d e p e n d e n c e  b o a rd . - 6 3 -5 1 - 7 5
Table 9.4: Factor placements — Individual cases
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For the individual cases comprising the auditor provision of non-audit (taxation) 
services (Cases 5 to 7), Table 9.4 shows generally negative factor placements for all 
participant groups, with the exception of positive placements for auditors for both 
Case 5 (high level of taxation services with PCAOB oversight) and Case 7 (low level 
of taxation services). The factor placements for each of the three cases show a trend 
of decreasing placements for each case moving across the columns from auditors to 
preparers to users. It is also clear that there is higher variability in the factor 
placements across the three groups for each of the non-audit services cases in 
comparison to the six other cases. Also, of the factor placements for all nine cases 
across the three groups, the two lowest are for the two high non-audit services cases 
for the users (-98 for Case 5 where additional PCAOB oversight was indicated and 
-113 for Case 6 where additional PCAOB oversight was not specified).
Cases 8 and 9 specified a former audit firm partner being a director of the audit client. 
The factor placements for Case 8, where a local independence board within the audit 
firm was indicated, are around the middle of the range of factor placements for all 
cases and groups, being +2, +7 and -2  for auditors, preparers and users respectively. 
The range of factor placements for this case indicates lower variability across the 
three groups than for any other individual case.
The factor placements for Case 9, where a local independence board was not 
specified, are negative for all three groups and are lower for each group in 
comparison to Case 8 where such a board was specified.
The factor placements for individual cases presented in Table 9.4 show a varying 
range o f placements across the three participant groups. Consistent with the factor 
placements for cases at the aggregated level presented in Section 9.2, the greatest
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variation in placements between the groups across the nine cases is evident for the 
three non-audit services cases. The aim in the following section is to determine 
whether the differences in these factor placements for each of the individual cases are 
statistically significant. This allows a conclusion to be drawn on whether there are 
between-group differences in connotations of auditor independence for each 
experimental case scenario.
9.5 BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS AT THE INDIVIDUAL CASE 
LEVEL
To gain insight into any between-group differences, ANOVA results for cases at the 
individual level are presented in Table 9.5. This also provides additional information 
on the factor placements for the individual cases that were aggregated in Section 9.3.
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As noted earlier, the factor placements for the case indicating no major independence 
threats (Case 1) are highly positive for all groups and, for the case indicating 
interlocking directorships (Case 2), are all negative. The ANOVA results show no 
significant between-group differences for either case.
Cases 3 and 4 were based on an audit firm tenure period of nine years, with audit 
partner rotation every four and seven years respectively. Factor placements for each 
of these individual cases are positive for all participant groups and there are no 
significant between-group differences.
As noted earlier, Case 4 had the highest manipulation check failure rate. The 
between-group comparisons for this case were re-analysed with the exclusion of the 
data for participants who had failed the manipulation check. This did not result in any 
substantive change to the ANOVA results.4
For the individual cases comprising the auditor provision of non-audit (taxation) 
services, Table 9.5 shows generally negative factor placements for all groups, with 
the exception of positive placements for auditors for both Case 5 (high level of 
taxation services with PCAOB oversight) and Case 7 (low level of taxation services). 
In contrast to Cases 1 to 4, between-group differences are evident for each of the 
three non-audit services cases. The factor placements are significantly lower for users 
in comparison to auditors for all three cases. Factor placements are significantly 
lower for preparers in comparison to auditors for Cases 5 and 7. There are no 
significant differences in factor placements between users and preparers for Cases 5
4 Under this revised analysis, the F statistic was 2.39 and the significance level was at p = .102. 
Post hoc differences between individual pairs of participant groups remained insignificant at
p<.10.
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and 7, but factor placements are significantly lower for users in comparison to 
preparers for Case 6.
Hence, for two of the three non-audit services cases (Cases 5 and 7), both the users 
and preparers have more negative interpretations of auditor independence than 
auditors. Only for one case (Case 6) are the interpretations of preparers not 
significantly different from those of auditors, but the interpretations of users are 
significantly more negative than those of the other two groups for this case.
There are no significant between-group differences in factor placements for either of 
Cases 8 or 9. Accordingly, for each of these cases individually, the three groups are in 
agreement in their interpretation of auditor independence.
As noted earlier, Case 8 had the second highest manipulation check failure rate. The 
between-group comparisons for this case were re-analysed with the exclusion of the 
data for participants who had failed the manipulation check, but there were no 
substantive changes to the ANOVA results.5
Shared meaning of the auditor independence concept in the individual experimental 
cases would be absent if significant differences exist between the three research 
participant groups. Any differences would be of practical significance as they would 
signify a lack of agreement between key parties to the financial reporting 
communication process in response to the specified independence threat and 
safeguard circumstances. The study’s third research hypothesis was stated as:
5 Under this revised analysis, the F statistic was 0.69 and the significance level was at p = .508. 
Post hoc differences between individual pairs of participant groups remained insignificant at 
p<A0.
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H3: There are no significant differences between research participant groups 
in the measured meaning o f auditor independence for each o f the 
alternative experimental cases.
The analyses presented in this chapter show there are no significant between-group 
differences for any of the cases except for the three non-audit services cases. With the 
exception of those non-audit services cases, shared meaning of the independence 
concept between the three participant groups exists under the stated independence 
threat and safeguard scenarios. Hence, pursuant to the measurement of meaning 
research framework, the three participant groups are in agreement in their 
interpretation of the audit firm’s independence for the individual cases specifying 
(a) no major independence threats, (b) interlocking directorships, (c) a longer period 
of audit firm tenure (with four or seven year audit rotation periods), and (d) a former 
audit partner of the audit firm being a director of the audit client (both with and 
without a local independence board). Accordingly, H3 is supported for these 
situations.
However, H3 is not supported for the three cases comprising the auditor provision of 
non-audit (taxation) services. Significant between-group differences are evident for 
each of these cases (Cases 5, 6 and 7). Factor placements are significantly lower for 
users in comparison to auditors for all three of the non-audit services cases. They are 
also significantly lower for preparers in comparison to auditors for two of the cases 
and for preparers in comparison to users for the remaining non-audit services case. 
These between-group differences signify a lack of shared meaning between the 
relevant groups for these non-audit services scenarios.
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9.6 SUMMARY
Based on the analyses in this chapter, a general conclusion can be drawn that the three 
participant groups, representing the three major parties to the financial reporting 
communication process, generally exhibit shared meaning of the auditor’s 
independence across the alternative experimental case scenarios. The major area in 
which the study found significant differences to exist between auditors and users, and 
with preparers to a slightly lesser extent, was that of the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services.
The between-group comparisons of factor placements summarised in this chapter did 
not examine, other than in a general way, the manner in which connotations of auditor 
independence held by each individual participant group were impacted by the 
potential independence threat and safeguard manipulations presented. Within-group 
comparisons of factor placements for this purpose are the subject of the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 10
RESEARCH FINDINGS: WITHIN-GROUP 
COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL CASES
The prior chapter presented between-group comparisons of connotations of auditor 
independence for the nine experimental cases. Findings from an analysis of 
differences within each of the participant groups between related sets of cases are 
presented in this chapter. This provides insight into the impact of the alternative 
experimental case scenarios on interpretations of independence for each of the 
participant groups, and thereby on various contemporary auditor independence issues. 
The findings enable conclusions to be drawn on the study’s hypotheses H4 to HI 1.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 10.1 to Section 10.4 present an analysis of 
within-group differences for cases involving, respectively, (a) the non-audit (taxation) 
services threat and the additional public oversight board safeguard, (b) the 
interlocking directorships threat, (c) the longer period of audit firm tenure threat and 
the auditor rotation safeguard, and (d) the threat of an auditee company director who 
was formerly a partner of the incumbent audit firm and the safeguard of a local 
independence board. A summary in Section 10.5 concludes the chapter.
10.1 NON-AUDIT SERVICES AND PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
The first group of cases to be compared in this section are the non-audit (taxation) 
services cases (Cases 5, 6 and 7). As discussed in the previous chapter, these three
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cases were the only cases, of the nine, to exhibit significant between-group 
differences in factor placements.
Prior to specifically comparing the three non-audit services cases, the first within- 
group comparisons presented are between the case in which no major independence 
threats were indicated (Case 1) and the two cases where the audit firm jointly 
provided audit services and a relatively high level of non-audit services (Cases 5 and 
6).1 Recall that the two high non-audit services cases indicated the provision of 
taxation services to the audit client over the audit firm’s four year tenure period of 
approximately three to four times the audit fee in each year. Case 5 indicated the 
presence of additional oversight by the United States PCAOB, while the presence of 
the PCAOB was not indicated in Case 6.
Before comparing factor placements for Cases 1, 5 and 6 for each participant group, 
results from initial MANOVAs of the semantic differential scale data for these cases 
are discussed for each group. This allows insight into whether, for each group, there 
are significant differences in any of the 22 semantic differential scales between Cases 
1, 5 and 6.
For the auditors, the MANOVA results revealed significant differences across the 
three cases in 11 of the 22 semantic scales at p < .05, with seven of these significant 
at p < .01. For the preparers, there were significant differences in 17 of the semantic 
scales at p  < .05, all of which were also significant at p  < .01. For the users, there 
were significant differences in 19 of 22 semantic scales, 18 of which were significant 
at p  < .05.
While being within-group tests, all comparisons in the study (with one exception referred to later 
in this sub-section), as explained in Chapter 4, represent between-subject comparisons. Hence, in 
the above comparison, different sub-groups of auditors responded to Cases 1, 5 and 6, as did 
different sub-groups of preparers and users.
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Accordingly, the MANOVA results indicate, for Cases 1, 5 and 6, significant 
differences in a large number of the 22 semantic scales within each of the participant 
groups. As explained in Chapter 9, comparisons of factor placements enable a more 
systematic and parsimonious means for analysing the semantic differential data. For 
this purpose, one-way ANOVA results comparing factor placements between Cases 
1, 5 and 6 within each of the three participant groups are presented in Table 10.1.
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Panel A: One-way ANOVA of factor placements
Case Scenario
Factor Placements
Auditors Preparers Users
1. No major threats +70 +89 +61
5. High NAS with PCAOB +24 -72 -98
6. High NAS without PCAOB -20 -53 -113
ANOVA: F 11.06 31.78 34.10
P <.001 <.001 <.001
NAS = Non-audit services
Panel B: Within-group post hoc comparisons
Scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Auditors:
Case 1 vs Case 5 46 p  = . 059 p  =.  053
Case 1 vs Case 6 90 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 5 vs Case 6 44 N.S. N.S.
Preparers:
Case 1 vs Case 5 161 p  <. 001 p < .0 0 1
Case 1 vs Case 6 142 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 5 vs Case 6 -19 N.S. N.S.
Users:
Case 1 vs Case 5 159 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 1 vs Case 6 174 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 5 vs Case 6 15 N.S. N.S.
N.S. = Not significant (at/? < .10)
Table 10.1: Case placements —  High non-audit (taxation) services
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As revealed in Panel A of Table 10.1, significant within-group differences in factor 
placements exist for all three participant groups for Cases 1, 5 and 6. This is not 
surprising given the large number of significant within-group differences in the 
underlying semantic differential scales revealed in the initial MANOVA results.
The within-group post hoc comparison results presented in Panel B of Table 10.1 
indicate significantly lower factor placements within each of the three groups for the
'y
two non-audit services cases (Cases 5 and 6) in comparison to Case 1. This suggests 
all participants considered the auditor’s independence to have been adversely 
impacted by the provision of a high level of taxation services.
The study’s fourth research hypothesis was stated as:
H4: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a high level o f 
auditor provided taxation services.
Given the significantly lower factor placements for Cases 5 and 6 in comparison to 
Case 1 for all participant groups, H4 is supported. The two experimental cases 
involving a high level of auditor provided taxation services result in significantly 
lower factor placements for all groups in comparison to the case indicating no major 
threats to auditor independence.
To further investigate the non-audit services issue, the three non-audit services cases 
are now compared. This allows comparison of the factor placements for the case in 
which a low level of non-audit services was specified (Case 7) with the two cases
The difference between Cases 1 and 5 for auditors is approaching significance, with significance 
levels of p  = .059 (Scheffe) and p = .053 (Bonferroni). The other two within-group differences 
between Cases 1 and 5, and all three between Cases 1 and 6, are significant atp<  .001.
This, though, does not indicate shared meaning for these cases. As noted in Section 9.1, 
significant between-group differences exist for both Case 5 and Case 6.
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indicating a high level of non-audit services (Cases 5 and 6). The low non-audit 
services case specified the provision of taxation services to the audit client over the 
audit firm’s four year tenure period of approximately one-half the audit fee. As noted 
earlier, this compares to a level of three to four times the annual audit fee specified in 
the high non-audit services cases.
Before comparing factor placements for Cases 5, 6 and 7 for each participant group, 
results from initial MANOVAs of the semantic differential scale data for these cases 
are discussed for each group.
For the auditors, the MANOVA results revealed significant differences across the 
three cases in five of the 22 semantic scales at p  < .05, with one of these significant at 
p < .01. For the preparers, there were significant differences in four of the semantic 
scales at p < .05, two of which were significant at p < .01. For the users, there were 
significant differences in only two of the 22 semantic scales at p < .05, none of which 
were significant at p < .01.
In comparison to the MANOVA results arising from a comparison of Cases 1, 5 and 
6, the MANOVA results from a comparison of Cases 5, 6 and 7 showed differences, 
within each participant group, in a considerably smaller number of individual 
semantic scales. Differences in some scales did nevertheless exist, especially for the 
auditor and preparer groups. To further investigate these within-group differences, 
ANOVA results comparing the factor placements between the three non-audit 
services cases are presented in Table 10.2.
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Panel A: One-way ANQVA of factor placements
Case Scenario
Factor Placements
Auditors Preparers Users
7. Low NAS +36 -18 -65
5. High NAS with PCAOB +24 -72 -98
6. High NAS without PCAOB -20 -53 -113
ANOVA: F 3.89 2.46 1.96
______________________________ .025 .093 .150
NAS = Non-audit services
Panel B: Within-group post hoc comparisons
Scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Auditors:
Case 7 vs Case 5 12 N.S. N.S.
Case 7 vs Case 6 56 p  = .035 p  = . 029
Case 5 vs Case 6 44 N.S. N.S.
Preparers:
Case 7 vs Case 5 54 N.S. N.S.
Case 7 vs Case 6 35 N.S. N.S.
Case 5 vs Case 6 -19 N.S. N.S.
Users:
Case 7 vs Case 5 33 N.S. N.S.
Case 7 vs Case 6 48 N.S. N.S.
Case 5 vs Case 6 15 N.S. N.S.
N.S. = Not significant (at p  < .10)
Table 10.2: Case placements — Low and high non-audit (taxation) services
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As revealed in Panel A of Table 10.2, the auditors are the only participant group for 
which there is a highly significant within-group difference in factor placements for 
the three non-audit services scenarios (p = .025). The within-group difference for the 
three cases is of moderate significance for the preparer group (p = .093), but not 
significant at/? < .10 for the users.
Post hoc comparison results, presented in Panel B of Table 10.2, show that the auditor 
factor placements for the case indicating a high level of taxation services without 
PCAOB oversight (Case 6) are significantly lower than those for the low taxation 
services case (Case 7).
The lack of statistically significant post hoc comparisons within each of the preparer 
and user gr.oups between the three taxation services cases, and their negative factor 
placements in all cases, supports the conclusion that both these groups had lower 
interpretations of auditor independence in the presence of these non-audit services 
(given the comparison with factor placements for Case 1 presented in Table 10.1), 
and that this was the situation whether those services were provided at the lower or 
higher levels specified.4
As this is an important issue, a further within-subject comparison was conducted to 
determine the extent to which the low non-audit services scenario impacted 
negatively on connotations of independence. This was achieved by comparing factor 
placements for Case 7 (low taxation services) with Case 1 (no major threats).5 For the
That is, factor placements for the preparers and users are significantly lower for the two high 
non-audit services cases in comparison to the no major threats case (Table 10.1), indicating an 
adverse impact on connotations of independence from this high level of non-audit services. 
However, for these two participant groups, Table 10.2 shows no significant differences in factor 
placements between the low non-audit services case and the two high non-audit services cases.
This was the only within-subject comparison conducted by the study.
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auditor group, there was no significant difference in factor placements between these 
two cases (mean difference = 34; p = .150). For the preparers and users, though, there 
were significantly lower factor placements for the low non-audit services case in 
comparison to the no major threats case. The mean difference for the preparer group 
was 107 (p < .001) and for the user group was 126 (p < .001). This reinforces the 
adverse impact on connotations of independence of even the lower level of taxation 
services specified in Case 7 for the preparers and users. This was in contrast to the 
auditors, where there was not a significant adverse impact.
The fifth research hypothesis was stated as:
H5: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the extent o f auditor provided 
taxation services.
Hypothesis five is tested by comparing factor placements for Cases 6 and 7. As Case
5 introduced the additional safeguard of PCAOB oversight, the difference between 
Cases 5 and 7 is not directly a test of H5.
Hypothesis five is supported for auditors, given the significantly lower factor 
placements for Case 6 in comparison to Case 7. Hence, for this group, connotations of 
independence were adversely affected by the higher level of taxation services in Case
6 in comparison to the lower level in Case 7. However, given the lack of significant 
differences in factor placements for preparers and users between these cases, H5 is 
not supported for these two groups.
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The sixth research hypothesis was stated as:
H6: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the existence o f additional 
auditor oversight.
Hypothesis six is tested by comparing factor placements for Cases 5 and 6. Both 
cases involved the same high level of taxation services, but Case 5 indicated the 
presence of additional PCAOB oversight. The post hoc comparison tests in Panel B 
of Table 10.2 show no significant differences for any of the three groups between 
Cases 5 and 6. In the presence of the high level of taxation services indicated in those 
cases, the presence of additional PCAOB oversight does not result in significantly 
lower factor placements. Accordingly, for these experimental cases, H6 is not 
supported for any of the three research participant groups. Additional PCAOB 
oversight does not result in a significant improvement in connotations of 
independence.
10.2 INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS AMONG AUDIT CLIENTS
To examine the effect of the existence of interlocking directorships among audit 
clients, Case 1 (no major independence threats case) and Case 2 (interlocking 
directorships) are compared in this section.
Before comparing factor placements for Cases 1 and 2 for each participant group, 
results from initial MANOVAs of the semantic differential scale data for these cases 
are discussed for each group. For the auditors, the MANOVA results revealed 
significant differences between the two cases in 14 of the 22 semantic scales at 
p < .05, with 11 of these significant at p<.01. For the preparers, there were 
significant differences in 16 of the semantic scales at p  < .05, all of which were
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significant at p<  .01. For the users, there were significant differences in 11 of the 
semantic scales at p  < .05, with seven of these significant at p < .01. The MANOVA 
results therefore indicate significant differences between Case 1 and Case 2 in a large 
number of the scales within each of the participant groups.
ANOVA results comparing factor placements between Cases 1, 2 and 6 for each 
participant group are presented in Table 10.3. Case 6 is included in the comparison to 
further examine the extent of any perceived independence threat presented by 
interlocking directorships. This enables a comparison of the perceived threat arising 
from the interlocking directorships case (Case 2) with that from the auditor provision 
of a relatively high level of taxation services without additional public oversight 
(Case 6).
The ANOVA results presented in Panel A of Table 10.3 show there are significant 
within-group differences in factor placements for all three participant groups between
Cases 1, 2 and 6.
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Panel A: One-way ANOVA of factor placements
Case Scenario
Factor Placements
Auditors Preparers Users
1. No major threats +70 +89 +61
2. Interlocking directorships -19 -46 -27
6. High NAS without PCAOB -20 -53 -113
ANOVA: F 12.39 30.20 27.74
P <.001 <.001 <.001
Panel B: Within-group post hoc comparisons
Scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Auditors:
C ase  1 vs C ase  2 89 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
C ase  2 vs C ase  6 i N .S . N .S .
Preparers:
C ase  1 vs C ase  2 135 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
C ase  2 vs C ase  6 7 N .S . N .S .
Users:
C ase  1 vs C ase  2 88 p  = .  003 p  = .  002
C ase  2 vs C ase  6 86 p = .  002 p -  .001
N.S. = Not significant (at/? < .10)
Table 10.3: Case placements — Interlocking directorships
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Within-group post hoc comparisons are presented in Panel B of Table 10.3.6 These 
show significantly lower factor placements within each of the three groups for the 
interlocking directorships case in comparison to Case 1. This indicates that all 
participant groups, including auditors themselves, considered auditor independence to 
have been significantly diminished in the presence of the interlocking directorships.
The study’s seventh research hypothesis was stated as:
H7: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f interlocking 
directorships among audit clients.
Given the significantly lower factor placements for Case 2 in comparison to Case 1 
for all participant groups, H7 is supported. The presence of the interlocking 
directorships among audit clients specified in Case 2 results in significantly lower 
factor placements for all groups in comparison to the case indicating no major threats 
to auditor independence.
With regard to the threat to auditor independence of interlocking directorships in 
comparison to that of the auditor provision of a relatively high level of non-audit 
(taxation) services, there are no significant differences in factor placements for these 
two cases for auditors and preparers. For these two groups, the adverse impact on 
auditor independence of interlocking directorships is not significantly different from 
that of the auditor provision of a high level of taxation services. However, users did 
consider the high taxation services case to represent a greater threat to auditor 
independence than the presence of interlocking directorships, as indicated by 
significantly lower factor placements for the former case.
6 Post hoc comparisons between Cases 1 and 6 are not presented in Table 10.3 as these were 
discussed in the previous section.
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10.3 LONGER PERIOD OF AUDIT FIRM TENURE AND AUDIT PARTNER 
ROTATION
To examine the impact on interpretations of auditor independence of a longer period 
of audit firm tenure and of audit partner rotation, factor placements for Case 1 (no 
major independence threats) are compared with those for Cases 3 and 4 in this 
section. The scenario in Case 1 was based on an audit firm tenure period of four 
years. Cases 3 and 4 were based on an audit firm tenure period of nine years, with 
audit partner rotation every four and seven years respectively.
Before comparing factor placements for Cases 1, 3 and 4 for each participant group, 
results from initial MANOVAs of the semantic differential scale data for these cases 
are discussed for each group. For the auditors, the MANOVA results revealed 
significant differences across the three cases in three of the 22 semantic scales at 
/?<.05, none of which were significant at /?<.01. For the preparers, there were 
significant differences in four of the semantic scales at p < .05, only one of which was 
significant at p < .01. For the users, there were no significant differences in any of the 
semantic scales at p  < .05. The MANOVA results therefore indicate significant 
differences between Cases 1, 3 and 4 in only a very small number of the scales for the 
auditor and preparer groups and in no scales for the users.
ANOVA results from a comparison of factor placements for Cases 1, 3 and 4 are 
presented in Panel A of Table 10.4. The table reveals positive factor placements for 
the three cases for all three participant groups.
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Panel A: One-way ANQVA of factor placements
Case Scenario
Factor Placements
Auditors Preparers Users
1. No major threats +70 +89 +61
3. Longer tenure and audit
partner rotation after 4 years. +70 +78 +85
4. Longer tenure and audit
partner rotation after 7 years. +48 +45 +76
ANOVA: F 1.21 2.86 0.76
______________________________ .304 .064 .472
Panel B: Within-group post hoc comparisons
Scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Auditors:
Case 1 vs Case 3 0 N.S. N.S.
Case 1 vs Case 4 22 N.S. N.S.
Case 3 vs Case 4 22 N.S. N.S.
Preparers:
Case 1 vs Case 3 11 N.S. N.S.
Case 1 vs Case 4 44 p  = .080 p  = .075
Case 3 vs Case 4 33 N.S. N.S.
Users:
Case 1 vs Case 3 -24 N.S. N.S.
Case 1 vs Case 4 -15 N.S. N.S.
Case 3 vs Case 4 9 N.S. N.S.
N.S. = Not significant (at/? < .10)
Table 10.4: Case placements —  Longer period of audit tenure 
and audit partner rotation
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As revealed in Panel A of Table 10.4, the preparers are the only participant group for 
which there is a moderately significant within-group difference in factor placements 
across the three cases (p = .064). The within-group differences for the auditors and 
users between the three cases are not significant at p < . 10.
Within-group post hoc comparison tests are presented in Panel B of Table 10.4. The 
post hoc comparisons show a moderately significant difference in factor placements 
between only Cases 1 and 4 for the preparers (p = .080 Scheffe and .075 Bonferroni).
As noted earlier, Case 4 had the highest manipulation check failure rate of the nine 
experimental cases. The within-group comparisons for Cases 1, 3 and 4 were 
therefore reanalysed with the exclusion of the data for participants who had failed the 
manipulation checks. There were again no significant within-group differences in 
factor placements for the auditor and user groups.7
There was a minor change, though, for the preparers. The removal of the 
manipulation check failures increased the factor placement for Case 4 from +45 to 
+49. While there was a within-group difference of moderate significance between 
Case 1 and 4 for the preparers in the original analysis, this difference was not 
significant with the removal of the manipulation check failures.9
With the manipulation check failures removed, the factor placement for auditors for Case 3 
increased from +70 to +74 and for Case 4 from +48 to +75. For users, the factor placement for 
Case 4 increased from +76 to +90 (there were no manipulation failures for Case 3). Hence, the 
removal of the manipulation failure observations brought the factor placements for Cases 3 and 
4 closer together for the auditors and users.
There were no manipulation check failures for Case 3 for the preparers.
The significance of the overall ANOVA for the three cases for the preparers decreased from 
p = .064 to p = .  102. The significance of the difference between Cases 1 and 4 when the 
manipulation check failures were removed decreased from p  = .080 (Scheffe) and p  = .075 
(Bonferroni) to p = .111 (both Scheffe and Bonferroni).
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The study’s eighth research hypothesis was stated as:
H8: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the length o f audit firm tenure, 
even in the presence o f audit partner rotation policies.
Given the lack of any significant within-group differences between Cases 1 and 3 and 
Cases 1 and 4, H8 is not supported. There is no significant difference in factor 
placements between the case specifying an audit firm tenure period of four years and 
the two cases indicating a nine year tenure period.
The ninth research hypothesis was stated as:
H9: The measured meaning o f auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the period of audit partner 
rotation.
By reference to the lack of any significant differences in factor placements between 
Cases 3 and 4 for any of the three participant groups, H9 is not supported.10 When the 
audit firm had been incumbent for a nine year period, an audit partner rotation period 
of four years did not result in significantly higher factor placements for any group in 
comparison to rotation periods of seven years.
10.4 FORMER PARTNER AS DIRECTOR OF AUDITEE AND LOCAL 
INDEPENDENCE BOARD
Cases 8 and 9 both included the potential independence threat of the presence of a 
former audit partner of the audit firm as a director of the audit client. Case 8 indicated 
that the audit firm had a local (internal) independence board, while such a board was 
not indicated in Case 9.
10 As noted earlier, this conclusion is unaffected by the removal of manipulation check failure 
observations from the analysis.
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To enable between-subject comparisons of Cases 8 and 9 with a case in which auditor 
independence was not considered to have been adversely affected, the two cases are 
compared with Case 3. That case, involving a nine year period of audit firm tenure 
with audit partner rotation after 4 years, is used as a proxy for a scenario with no 
major independence threats. The factor placements for this case, presented previously 
in Section 10.3 and Tablel0.4, show no significant differences to those for Case 1 (no 
major independence threats) for any participant group.
Before comparing factor placements for Cases 3, 8 and 9 for each participant group, 
results from initial MANOVAs of the semantic differential scale data for these cases 
are discussed for each group. For the auditors, the MANOVA results revealed 
significant differences across the three cases in 13 of the 22 semantic scales at 
p < .05, with 11 of these also significant at /?<.01. For the preparers, there were 
significant differences in 17 of the semantic scales at p < .05, of which 12 were also 
significant at p< .01 . For the users, there were significant differences in 18 of the 
semantic scales at p < . 05, all of which were also significant at p < . 01. The 
MANOVA results therefore indicate significant within-group differences between 
Cases 3, 8 and 9 in a large number of the semantic scales for all participant groups.
ANOVA results from a comparison of factor placements for Cases 3, 8 and 9 are 
presented in Panel A of Table 10.5. These show significant within-group differences 
in factor placements for all three participant groups.
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Panel A: One-way ANOVA of factor placements
Case Scenario
Factor Placements
Auditors Preparers Users
3. Longer tenure and rotation 
after 4 years.
8. Ex-partner director of audit 
client with local
+70 +78 +85
independence board 
9. Ex-partner director of audit 
client without local
+2 +7 -2
independence board. -63 -51 -75
ANOVA: F 18.17 13.97 19.61
P <.001 <.001 <.001
Panel B: Within-groun post hoc comparisons
Scenarios Mean Difference Scheffe Bonferroni
Auditors
Case 3 vs Case 8 68 p  = .011 p  = .009
Case 3 vs Case 9 133 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 8 vs Case 9 65 p  =.018 p  = .014
Preparers:
Case 3 vs Case 8 71 p  = .016 II
Case 3 vs Case 9 129 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 8 vs Case 9 58 p  = .059 p  = . 054
Users:
Case 3 vs Case 8 87 p =.  003 p  = . 002
Case 3 vs Case 9 160 p < .0 0 1 p < .0 0 1
Case 8 vs Case 9 73 _____ _____ p = .012
N.S. = Not significant (atp  < .10)
Table 10.5: Case placements —  Former partner as director of audit 
client and local independence board
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The study’s tenth research hypothesis was stated as:
H10: The measured meaning of auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a director o f  
the audit client who was formerly an audit partner o f the audit firm.
The above hypothesis is tested by comparing Case 3, the case proxying no major 
independence threats, with Case 9. The post hoc comparisons presented in Panel B of 
Table 10.5 show significantly lower factor placements for Case 9 in comparison to 
case 3, at p<.001, for all participant groups. This indicates all groups consider 
auditor independence to have been significantly diminished where a former audit 
partner had moved to become a director of the auditee. Accordingly, H10 is 
supported.
The significance of the differences between Case 3 and Case 8 can also be observed. 
In comparison to Case 9, Case 8 specified the additional safeguard of a local 
independence board within the audit firm. Panel B of Tablet 0.5 shows significantly 
lower factor placements for all groups for Case 8 in comparison to Case 3. Hence, 
even with the additional safeguard of a local independence board, all groups consider 
auditor independence to be diminished when a former audit partner has become a 
director of the auditee.11 This provides additional support for H10.
The eleventh research hypothesis was stated as:
H ll:  The measured meaning of auditor independence within individual 
research participant groups is affected by the presence o f a local 
independence board within the audit firm.
Case 8 was the case with the second highest manipulation check failure rate. When excluding 
the manipulation check failure observations, the difference between Cases 3 and 8 for preparers 
was significant at p  = .014 (Scheffe) and p  = .011 (Bonferroni). The difference for auditors fell 
to a moderate significance level of p  = .083 (Scheffe) and p  = .078 (Bonferroni). There were no 
manipulation check failures in Case 8 for the user group.
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The above hypothesis is tested by comparing the two case scenarios involving an ex­
audit partner as director of the audit client (Cases 8 and 9). The post hoc comparisons 
presented in Panel B of Table 10.5 indicate, for these two cases, significantly higher 
factor placements for Case 8 where a local independence board was specified to exist 
within the audit firm. This is generally consistent for all participant groups, although 
the significance was only at a moderate level for the preparers.12
When the manipulation check failure observations for auditors and preparers were 
removed, the significance of the difference in Cases 8 and 9 factor placements for 
auditors remained at p<  .001 (Scheffe and Bonferroni). However, the difference for 
preparers became insignificant (p = .119, both Scheffe and Bonferroni).
The above results lead to the conclusion that the auditors and users, but not the 
preparers, consider auditor independence to be positively affected by the presence of 
a local audit independence board within the audit firm. Accordingly, Hl 1 is supported 
for the auditors and users but not for the preparers.
10.5 SUMMARY
The within-group comparisons of related sets of experimental cases presented in this 
chapter highlight the negative impact on connotations of auditor independence of 
non-audit (taxation) services, interlocking directorships and the presence of a former 
audit partner as a director of the auditee. The findings also document the positive 
impact on connotations of independence of a local independence board within the 
audit firm.
The significance of the difference was at p = .059 (Scheffe) and .054 (Bonferroni). 
There were no manipulation check failures for users for Cases 8 or 9.
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The study’s research findings have been presented in this and the previous two 
chapters. The next, and final, chapter presents an overall summary, particularly 
outlining policy issues arising from the study’s findings, research limitations and 
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter, which concludes the thesis, proceeds as follows. The objectives and 
theoretical foundations of the research, together with the study’s general research 
question and research method, are summarised in Section 11.1. Conclusions drawn 
from the study’s data analysis are presented in Section 11.2. Limitations of the 
research are discussed in Section 11.3. Policy, theoretical and future research 
implications are presented in Section 11.4, and a chapter summary is contained in 
Section 11.5.
11.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH
The research reported in the thesis was designed to provide further investigation into 
the concept of auditor independence following the series of corporate collapses earlier 
this decade. Vigorous debate on auditor independence arose in the aftermath of those 
collapses. A number of formal inquiries and reviews were commissioned and reports 
prepared in Australia and internationally. These have resulted in considerable 
substantive amendment to the legislative and professional rules and guidelines aimed 
at strengthening the independence of auditors in fact and in appearance. The ultimate 
aim of the revisions and amendments has been to ensure the confidence of 
shareholders and other stakeholders in the reliability of audited financial reports.
The independence pronouncements and standards issued by the major professional 
accounting organisations and regulatory bodies represent their attempts to provide a
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definition of auditor independence and to provide guidance for auditors when 
evaluating their independence in practice. These statements therefore effectively 
elaborate on the meaning of the concept of auditor independence, particularly by 
presenting explanations of independence and by providing rules and guidelines 
regarding various threats to auditor independence and safeguards to protect against 
independence impairment. Recent amendments to the pronouncements, standards and 
legislation in Australia and internationally have been designed to guide auditors in the 
light of contemporary developments.
The objective of the research was to determine, using an innovative research method 
not previously applied in the extant literature, the presence and extent of shared 
meaning of the concept of auditor independence between key parties to the financial 
reporting communication process. The aim was also to determine the extent to which 
connotations of auditor independence are affected by various potential independence 
threats and safeguards. The research framework for the measurement of meaning 
originally developed by Osgood et al. (1957) was used for this purpose. Auditors, 
financial report preparers and financial report users were used as research participants 
to represent the major parties to the financial reporting communication process.
The experimental manipulations employed in the study represented contemporary 
auditor independence issues. The manipulations comprised potential independence 
threats highlighted in the literature, independence safeguards introduced to mitigate 
potential independence threats, and proposals for additional independence safeguards. 
The measurement of meaning research framework was utilised to examine whether 
there was shared meaning of aspects of these contemporary issues between the three 
research participant groups. The findings provide insight into interpretations of 
independence in response to the independence threats and safeguards examined.
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11.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
The results of the study show that the Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning 
research framework can be successfully used to examine the connotative meaning of 
the auditor independence concept. A summary of the research findings in relation to 
each of the research hypotheses, based on the individual experimental cases employed 
in the study, is presented in Table 11.1. The findings are then summarised under the 
headings (a) cognitive structure and shared meaning {HI and H2), (b) between-group 
comparisons of experimental cases and shared meaning (H3), and (c) within-group 
comparisons of experimental cases {H4 to HI 1).
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Research hypotheses
Supported / 
Not supported
H I :  R e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in te rp re t  th e  c o n n o ta t iv e
m e a n in g  o f  th e  a u d i to r  in d e p e n d e n c e  c o n c e p t  w ith in  a  
th re e  f a c to r  E -P -A  c o g n it iv e  s tru c tu re .
N o t  su p p o r te d .
H 2 :  R e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in te rp re t  th e  c o n n o ta t iv e
m e a n in g  o f  th e  a u d i to r  in d e p e n d e n c e  c o n c e p t  w ith in  a  
s h a re d  c o g n i t iv e  s tru c tu re .
S u p p o r te d  ( s in g le  fa c to r  
c o g n it iv e  s tru c tu re ) .
H 3 :  T h e re  a r e  n o  s ig n if ic a n t  d if f e re n c e s  b e tw e e n  re s e a rc h  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  in  th e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  
in d e p e n d e n c e  fo r  e a c h  o f  th e  a l te rn a t iv e  e x p e r im e n ta l  
c a se s .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a ll 
e x p e r im e n ta l  c a s e s  e x c e p t 
th e  th r e e  n o n -a u d it  
( ta x a t io n )  s e rv ic e s  c a se s .
H 4 :  T h e  m e a s u r e d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  h ig h  le v e l o f  a u d ito r  p ro v id e d  
ta x a t io n  s e rv ic e s .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a ll  p a r t ic ip a n t  
g ro u p s .
H 5 :  T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  e x te n t  o f  a u d i to r  p ro v id e d  ta x a t io n  s e rv ic e s .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a u d ito r s .
N o t  s u p p o r te d  f o r  p r e p a re r s  
a n d  u se rs .
H 6 :  T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d d it io n a l  a u d i to r  o v e rs ig h t.
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a u d ito r s .
N o t  s u p p o r te d  fo r  p re p a re r s  
a n d  u se rs .
H 7 :  T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  in te r lo c k in g  d ire c to r s h ip s  a m o n g  a u d it  
c l ie n ts .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a ll  p a r t ic ip a n t  
g ro u p s .
H 8 :  T h e  m e a s u r e d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  le n g th  o f  a u d it  f irm  te n u re , e v e n  in  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
a u d it  p a r tn e r  ro ta t io n  p o lic ie s .
N o t  s u p p o r te d  fo r  a n y  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p .
H 9 :  T h e  m e a s u r e d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  p e r io d  o f  a u d it  p a r tn e r  ro ta tio n .
N o t  s u p p o r te d  fo r  a n y  
p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p .
H 1 0 :  T h e  m e a s u re d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w ith in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  d i r e c to r  o f  th e  a u d it c l ie n t  w h o  w a s  
fo rm e r ly  a n  a u d it  p a r tn e r  o f  th e  a u d it  firm .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a ll  p a r t ic ip a n t  
g ro u p s .
H I  1: T h e  m e a s u r e d  m e a n in g  o f  a u d ito r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w i th in  
in d iv id u a l  r e s e a rc h  p a r t ic ip a n t  g ro u p s  is  a f f e c te d  b y  
th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  lo c a l  in d e p e n d e n c e  b o a rd  w i th in  th e  
a u d it  f irm .
S u p p o r te d  fo r  a u d i to r s  a n d  
u se rs .
N o t  s u p p o r te d  fo r  p re p a re r s .
T a b le ll.l:  Research hypotheses —  Summary of research findings
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11.2.1 Cognitive structure and shared meaning
Contrary to H I , study results showed that the three research participant groups did 
not interpret the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept within a 
shared, three-factor E-P-A (evaluative, potency, activity) cognitive structure.
However, consistent with H2, the research participants did interpret the connotative 
meaning of auditor independence within a shared cognitive structure, albeit a single 
factor structure. The evaluative and potency dimensions of meaning in particular, but 
also the activity dimension to a lesser extent, were found to be highly related and 
overlapping for the auditor independence concept. Osgood (1976) suggested that the 
greater the emotional or attitudinal loading of the concept being judged, the greater 
the tendency of the semantic framework to collapse into a single, combined 
dimension. The results of this study suggest this to be the case for the concept of 
auditor independence, a concept that does evoke considerable emotion.
11.2.2 Between-group comparisons of experimental cases and shared meaning
The study’s H3 hypothesised that there would be no significant differences in the 
measured meaning (connotations) of auditor independence between the research 
participant groups for each of the alternative experimental cases. This was supported 
for all cases except the three non-audit (taxation) services experimental cases.
The three participant groups were in agreement in their interpretation of the audit 
firm’s independence, by reference to factor placements under the shared cognitive 
structure, for the individual cases specifying (a) no major independence threats, 
(b) interlocking directorships among audit clients, (c) a longer period of audit firm 
tenure (with four or seven year audit partner rotation periods), and (d) a former audit
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partner of the audit firm being a director of the audit client (both with and without a 
local independence board). This indicates shared meaning for these situations.
However, significant between-group differences were evident for the three 
experimental cases specifying the auditor provision of non-audit (taxation) services. 
In particular, factor placements were significantly lower for users in comparison to 
auditors for all three cases and for preparers in comparison to auditors for two of the 
three cases. This signifies a lack of shared meaning for the non-audit services 
scenarios presented.
11.2.3 Within-group comparisons of experimental cases
Within-group comparisons of related sets of cases for each participant group allowed 
insight into the impact of alternative experimental case scenarios on connotations of 
auditor independence. In turn, this allowed insight into various contemporary 
independence issues.
In support of H4, connotations of auditor independence were adversely affected by 
the presence of a high level of auditor provided taxation services for all participant 
groups. In addition, for auditors only and in partial support of H5, connotations of 
auditor independence were affected by the extent of auditor provided taxation 
services. Significantly lower factor placements were found for auditors for the case 
specifying a high level of taxation services without additional PCAOB oversight in 
comparison to the case specifying a low level of taxation services.
However, H5 was not supported for the preparers and users. There was no significant 
difference in connotations of the auditor’s independence between the case specifying 
a low level of taxation services and the two cases in which high levels of taxation
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services were indicated. This again signifies a lack o f shared meaning between the 
participant groups with respect to independence in the presence of audit firm provided 
non-audit services.
In the presence of a high level of audit firm provided non-audit services, none of the 
participant groups’ connotations of the audit firm’s independence were improved by 
the presence o f additional PCAOB oversight. H6 was therefore not supported for any 
of the groups.
In support of H7, all three groups considered auditor independence to be adversely 
impacted by the presence of interlocking directorships among audit clients. In this 
experimental case, the audit partner was specified to also be the audit engagement 
partner for two other companies for which interlocking directorships existed between 
three non-executive directors.
The study’s H8 was not supported. While H8 proposed that connotations of auditor 
independence would be adversely affected by a longer nine year period of audit firm 
tenure in comparison to a shorter four year tenure period, even in the presence of 
audit partner rotation policies, this was not supported for any of the participant 
groups. Further, there was no negative impact on connotations of auditor 
independence for any o f the three groups where the period of audit partner rotation 
was seven years rather than four years. Accordingly, H9 was not supported.
Study results found connotations of auditor independence to be adversely impacted 
by the presence of a former audit partner of the incumbent audit firm as a director of 
the auditee company. This was the situation for all participant groups, and therefore 
H10 was supported. However, for the auditor and user groups (but not the preparers),
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connotations of independence were positively impacted in this situation by the 
presence of a local independence board within the audit firm. Accordingly, H10 was 
partially supported.
In summary, the results of the within-group comparisons of experimental cases show 
that the Osgood et al. (1957) research framework for the measurement of meaning 
can be used to examine similarities and differences in connotations of auditor 
independence in response to differing audit engagement circumstances.
11.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This section discusses the limitations of the research and assesses the impacts these 
limitations have on the research conclusions. The potential threats to validity 
described by Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002) provide the basis for this 
discussion. The typology of threats identified by Shadish et al (2002) comprises 
threats to (a) statistical conclusion validity, (b) internal validity, (c) construct validity, 
and (d) external validity.
11.3.1 Statistical conclusion validity
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the appropriate use of statistics to infer 
whether the presumed independent and dependent variables covary (Shadish et al., 
2002). Three possible threats to statistical conclusion validity in the study arise from 
(a) unreliability of treatment implementation, (b) extraneous variance in the 
experimental setting, and (c) heterogeneity of respondents.
An unreliability of treatment implementation threat occurs if a treatment is 
implemented inconsistently from site to site or from person to person within sites 
(Shadish et al., 2002). A related potential threat is that of extraneous variance in the
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experimental setting. This arises from features of the experimental setting which 
‘artifactually inflate error’, such as any distractions facing research participants 
(Shadish et al., 2002, p. 51). These threats are pervasive in field experiments where 
controlling the treatment is less feasible than in the laboratory (Shadish et al., 2002).
The potential threats in the study of unreliability of treatment implementation and 
extraneous variance in the experimental setting arise from the manner in which the 
research instrument was administered. Procedures for administration of the research 
instrument were explained in Chapter 5. Given the difficult of gaining access to 
research participants for the type of experimental research undertaken by the study, 
the research instrument could not be administered with participants in a controlled, 
laboratory setting. To gain access to auditor participants, the majority of research 
instruments were distributed to the relevant audit staff by personnel within the audit 
firms and then returned to the researcher. Administration of the research instrument 
with preparers was achieved via mail. Administration with users was achieved by a 
combination of the two approaches used for the auditors and preparers. These 
procedures considerably reduced the control of the researcher over the administration 
process, but were necessary to obtain a suitable sample size for the three participant 
groups.
A further potential statistical conclusion validity threat in the study arises from 
heterogeneity of respondents, which can potentially obscure any systematic 
covariation between the treatment and the outcome (Shadish et al., 2002). Of the 
three participant groups, heterogeneity of respondents would be of least concern for 
the auditors. All auditor participants were from major Big Four and Second Tier 
accounting firms. Participants were also relatively experienced, with a minimum of
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three years audit experience. Nevertheless, possible variation across audit firms and 
across levels of auditor experience is a potential study limitation.
The preparer participants were employed in a number of different roles. While 
accountants represented the largest sub-group within this category, other preparers 
included, for example, chief financial and chief operating officers, financial 
controllers and managers. These alternate occupational roles could potentially result 
in differing perspectives on the audit function and the concept of auditor 
independence.
The user participants, comprising bank analysts and private shareholders, represented 
two distinct sub-groups. While participants in the former sub-group were directly 
employed in roles requiring the use of audited financial reports, the latter group 
would be more inclined to use financial reports voluntarily as an input into their own 
investment activities. Accordingly, this could potentially result in differing 
perspectives on the audit function and the concept of auditor independence for the 
two sub-groups.
Despite the above, and from the viewpoint of the measured meaning of the auditor 
independence concept, it is not expected that possible heterogeneity in each of the 
study’s participant groups will have significantly contributed to error variance. The 
finding of a shared cognitive structure within which the concept of auditor 
independence was considered by each participant group suggests that heterogeneity of 
respondents does not constitute a major problem. However, any heterogeneity could 
nevertheless potentially affect individual connotations of independence in the 
individual experimental cases.
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Statistical conclusion validity, though, was strengthened by the use of a number of 
variations in the statistical analysis methods. In particular, alternative factor analysis 
extraction and rotation methods and alternative post hoc comparison tests (Scheffe 
and Bonferroni) were used, with no substantive change to the research results.
11.3.2 Internal validity
Internal validity refers to whether the covariation between the independent and 
dependent variables results from a causal relationship (Shadish et al., 2002). It refers 
to ‘the extent to which the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
has been correctly interpreted’ (Haslam and McGarty, 2003, p. 51). Two possible 
threats to internal validity in this study arise from history and testing.
The threat to internal validity of history arises when events occurring concurrently 
with the experimental treatment affect the observed effect (Shadish et al., 2002). In 
laboratory research, history is controlled by isolating research participants from 
outside events (Shadish et al., 2002). This, though, was not possible in the present 
study. As highlighted in Chapter 5 and the previous sub-section, only a minority of 
the research instruments were administered by the researcher in controlled conditions 
over a specific, limited time period. Accordingly, for the majority of participants, 
other events could have occurred during the period between receiving the research 
instrument and returning it that could have affected responses. In particular, while the 
corporate collapses such as those of Enron and HIH Insurance occurred in 2001, 
repercussions continued for some time after. Accordingly, while the initial magnitude 
of the reporting of these corporate collapses and the reaction of the various regulatory 
and professional bodies had decreased by the time of administration of the research 
instrument (March 2004 to May 2005), the responses of participants to the
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experimental conditions could have been affected by the ongoing developments at the 
time. Further, an extended period of time of slightly over 13 months was required to 
gain access to all participant groups and meet sample size requirements. This poses 
the threat that research participants could have been exposed to varied events 
impacting on their responses at the time they were completing the research 
instrument. These events could have particularly arisen from, for example, the 
reporting in the media, or professional and regulatory developments occurring at the 
time, with respect to auditor independence issues in the aftermath of the 2001 
corporate collapses.
The second potential internal validity threat in the study arises from testing. This 
threat arises where exposure to a test can affect scores on subsequent exposures to the 
test, thereby confusing the treatment effect (Shadish et al., 2002). The result is that 
practice, familiarity or other forms of reactivity arising from repeated exposure to a 
test can be mistaken for treatment effects (Shadish et al., 2002). In the present study, 
all research participants were exposed to the testing more than once as they responded 
to three experimental cases each. As explained in Chapter 4, all possible orders o f the 
experimental cases were presented in alternate variations of the research instrument to 
protect against order effects, and this should have minimised testing effects. 
Nevertheless, the potential for an internal validity threat arising from a testing effect 
remains.
11.3.3 Construct validity
Construct validity involves ‘making inferences from the sampling particulars o f a 
study to the higher-order constructs they represent’ (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 65). 
Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences are warranted from the
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observed persons, settings, and cause and effect operations included in the study to 
the constructs that these instances might represent (Shadish et al., 2002). The concept 
of auditor independence represents the construct for which measured meaning was 
investigated in the present study. Possible construct validity threats could arise from 
(a) inadequate explication of constructs, (b) construct confounding, (c) mono-method 
bias, (d) experimenter expectancies, and (e) novelty and disruption effects.
A construct validity threat from a failure to adequately explicate the construct leads to 
the potential for incorrect inferences about the relationship between the operation and 
the construct (Shadish et al., 2002). Common errors in explicating constructs include 
identifying constructs at too general or too specific a level, identifying a wrong 
construct or identifying a single construct that actually reflects two or more constructs 
(Mark, 2000). While the study was designed to investigate the construct of auditor 
independence, research participants may have considered other issues in providing 
their responses. For example, participants may have been making assessments of a 
broader construct than that of independence only, such as that of auditor quality 
comprising both auditor competence and independence. It is possible that the preparer 
and user participants, who would be expected to have less knowledge of and 
experience with independence than the auditors, may have been responding based on 
a different understanding (conceptualisation) of exactly what auditor independence 
entails.
A related validity threat is that of construct confounding, which arises because 
operations in an experiment are rarely pure representations of constructs (Shadish et 
al., 2002). Participants’ considerations of, for example, auditor competence in the 
present study may have confounded their interpretations of auditor independence in 
individual experimental cases.
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Mono-method bias transpires when all operationalisations of a construct use the same 
method, resulting in the method becoming part of the construct studied (Shadish et 
al., 2002). This bias can arise when alternate treatments are presented to participants, 
and outcome responses are measured, in the same way (Shadish et al., 2002). While 
mono-method bias was reduced in the study to some extent by protecting against 
order effects in the presentation of experimental cases and semantic scales, the 
potential for bias remains due to use of the same set of semantic scales and the same 
general manner of presentation of the different experimental cases.
A further potential construct validity threat arises from experimenter expectancies, 
caused by the researcher conveying expectations about desirable responses (Shadish 
et al., 2002). Demand characteristics (demand effects) may arise in behavioural 
experiments, these resulting in participants responding to cues about the experimental 
hypothesis and replying differently than they would in real world situations (Ome, 
1962; Weber and Cook, 1972; Pany and Reckers, 1987; Gul and Windsor, 1994; 
Haslam and McGarty, 2003). While the researcher in the present study did not convey 
any expectations of desired responses in any correspondence with participants or in 
the research instrument itself, participants may have consciously or subconsciously 
considered, when responding to the alternate experimental cases, the responses the 
researcher might have expected or desired.
A final potential construct validity threat is that caused by novelty and disruption 
effects (Shadish et al., 2002). These result in participants responding unusually well 
to novel situations or unusually poorly where their routine is disrupted (Shadish et al., 
2002). Novelty or disruption effects could have affected participants’ responses in the 
present study, and it is possible that the effects may have differed between 
participants. For example, some participants may have felt completion of the research
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instrument disrupted their normal work or leisure routine and reacted negatively, such 
as by completing the research instrument in a minimum amount of time with less than 
a complete level of commitment. Other participants may have considered their 
involvement in the research to be a novel situation and reacted positively by 
considering their responses carefully.
One aspect of the study which has impacted positively on construct validity stems 
from the research method’s utilisation of 22 semantic differential scales across nine 
experimental cases with three participant groups. This decreases any threat of mono­
operation bias, which occurs when only a single operationalisation of a construct is 
used in an experiment (Shadish et al, 2002). Another positive aspect stems from the 
fact that the experimental cases presented widely differing treatment levels with 
respect to potential independence threats and safeguards. This reduces the threat of 
confounding the construct with the level of the construct (Shadish et a l , 2002). 
Nevertheless, the validity threat remains that the 22 scales potentially measured only 
certain aspects of the independence construct.
11.3.4 External validity
External validity relates to the validity of inferences about whether the causal 
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables and 
measurement variables (Shadish et al., 2002), and refers to the extent to which a 
research finding can be generalised to other situations (Haslam and McGarty, 2003). 
Of the various external validity threats identified by Shadish et al. (2002), possible 
threats in the present study arise from interaction of the causal relationship (a) with 
units, (b) over treatment variations, (c) with outcomes, and (d) with setting.
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An interaction of the causal relationship with units means that an effect found with 
certain kinds of units might not hold if other types of units had been studied (Shadish 
et al., 2002). The units in the study were the research participants. In order to 
generalise from an experimental sample to a population, the sample must be 
representative of the population on theoretically relevant dimensions (Haslam and 
McGarty, 2003). Accordingly, the research results may not be generalisable to the 
general population of auditors, preparers and users if the participant group samples 
were not representative of the respective populations.
The auditor participants were not employed in a single audit firm but were drawn 
from three Big Four and five Second Tier firms. Within the total sample, though, 
there was a large group of participants from a single Big Four firm. This group 
represented 47.5 per cent of the total sample of auditors, with the next largest group 
of auditor participants, from a Second Tier firm, representing 12.5 per cent of the 
auditor sample. Flence, there was a degree of concentration of participants from one 
particular audit firm. However, as a group, the auditor participants represented a 
range of experience levels, spanning from three years to over 30 years experience, 
and the group comprised both females and males. Despite some degree of 
concentration of participants from one Big Four firm, the sample should have 
mitigated external validity threats to at least some extent as the auditors were drawn 
from eight firms rather than a single firm, comprised both females and males, and 
represented a range of experience levels. Nevertheless, the potential for external 
validity threats will be present if the participants differed in a systematic way from 
the general population of auditors across all types of audit firms.
The financial report preparer participants were drawn from a variety of roles, 
employing entities and experience levels. They also comprised both females and
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males. Accordingly, the sample would have mitigated external validity threats to a 
large extent given this variation. However, it could not be expected that these 
characteristics would exactly mirror those of the entire population of financial report 
preparers, and hence the potential for external validity threats remains. Also, as noted 
in Chapter 5, the preparer participants had responded to a mail request to voluntarily 
participate in the research. The potential threat exists that the type of preparers who 
volunteered to be involved in the research might have differ in systematic ways from 
the general population of financial report preparers.
The financial report user participants represented both institutional (professional bank 
analyst) and private shareholder (investor) users. The bank analysts had a variety of 
years of experience in their current occupation (from one year to 25 years) and 
comprised both females and males. The private shareholder participants all had at 
least a reasonable level of familiarity with audited financial reports, comprised both 
females and males and had a range of experience in investing (from one to 40 years). 
Hence, from the viewpoint of external validity, a study strength is that it did not focus 
on a single group of financial report users having a narrow range of occupational or 
investment experience characteristics.
However, the analysts voluntarily participated in the research and, being from two of 
the four major Australian banks, only represented one area of analyst employment. 
They therefore could not be expected to be completely representative of the 
population of the professional analyst community. The private shareholder 
participants were all individual investors, were members of the Australian Investors’ 
Association (AIA) who had attended the association’s monthly meetings or annual 
conference, and were voluntary research participants. They therefore could not be 
expected to be entirely representative of the population of individual investors, and
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potentially may not even have been completely representative of the AIA’s total 
membership.
An interaction of the causal relationship over treatment variations means that an 
effect found with one treatment variation might not hold with other variations of that 
treatment or combinations of treatments (Shadish et al., 2002). The experimental 
scenarios were based on potential independence threat treatments of interlocking 
directorships between certain directors, non-audit (taxation) services at two different 
levels, a longer period of audit firm tenure of a particular length, and a director of the 
auditee company having formerly been a partner of the audit firm for a specified time 
period. Similarly, the potential independence safeguard treatments were based on 
individual specifications of additional public oversight, audit partner rotation after 
two specific time periods and local independence boards within the audit firm. 
Whether the research results could be generalised to farther variations of these 
potential independence threats and safeguards or to different potential threats and 
safeguards would require further research.
A further aspect of a treatment variation validity threat arises from the audit 
engagement scenarios expressed in the experimental cases. Characteristics of the 
auditee company portrayed in the cases were based on, for example, a retail company 
in a sound financial position with a market capitalisation of around 200 on the ASX, 
an eight member board with separation of the chairman and managing director 
functions and an effective audit committee. The participants’ reactions to the potential 
auditor independence threats and safeguards may have differed with alternate 
specifications of industry, financial condition, company size and/or corporate 
governance structure. Similarly, characteristics of the audit engagement portrayed in 
the cases included a Big Four audit firm, unqualified opinions in prior years and an
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audit fee of a particular magnitude. The participant’s responses may have differed 
with variations in audit firm type, prior audit opinions and/or audit fee level.
An interaction of the causal relationship with outcomes means that an effect on one 
kind of outcome observation might not hold if other outcome observations were used 
(Shadish et al., 2002). The primary outcome observations in the study were the 
responses of the participants to the 22 semantic differential scales within the research 
instrument. Conclusions on the effects of the alternate experimental cases may have 
differed if responses in a different form were requested. For example, narrative 
responses in an interview setting may have resulted in different research conclusions 
to those elicited from the 22 semantic scales.
An interaction of the causal relationship with setting means that an effect found in 
one kind of setting may not hold if other settings were used (Shadish et al., 2002). 
The setting in the present study refers to the environment in which the research 
participants were employed or engaged and in which they completed the research 
instrument. Many of the issues discussed earlier in this sub-section with respect to the 
research participants and the environment within which they completed the research 
instrument are also applicable here. A potential external validity threat is that the 
research results may not be generalisable to other settings, including real world rather 
than experimental settings.
11.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The study makes a contribution in being the first to have examined the concept of 
auditor independence using the Osgood et al. (1957) research framework for the 
measurement of meaning. The implications of the research are discussed in this
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section under the headings (a) theoretical implications, (b) methodological 
implications, (c) policy implications, and (d) future research implications.
11.4.1 Theoretical implications
The thesis has made a theoretical contribution to the collective knowledge and 
thinking about the connotative meaning of concepts generally and, more specifically, 
the connotative meaning of the concept of auditor independence. It has achieved this 
by building on earlier research that has examined perceptions of auditor independence 
in different contexts. The thesis also adds to current theory by focusing on the three 
major groups of parties to the financial reporting communication process, auditors, 
financial report preparers and financial report users, in a single study.
The thesis has made a theoretical contribution with respect to the dimensions of 
connotative meaning within which specific concepts are judged. Osgood et al. (1957) 
proposed the three E-P-A dimensions for the general domain of connotative meaning; 
that is, for common concepts within ordinary fields of usage. Osgood et al (1957) 
concluded that these three factors have reappeared in a wide variety of judgmental 
situations, particularly where the sampling of concepts has been broad. However, 
Osgood (1976) suggested that there would be a tendency for these dimensions (the 
semantic framework) to collapse into a single, combined dimension where the 
emotional or attitudinal loading of the concept being judged was high. The concept of 
auditor independence is one that evokes considerable emotion as evidenced by, for 
example, the questioning of auditor independence following the corporate collapses 
earlier this decade. The auditing research literature and professional standards refer to 
perceptions of auditor independence, and this represents an attitudinal evaluation 
(interpretation) of independence in specific contexts. The study’s finding of a single
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dimension of meaning for the concept of auditor independence, rather than a three- 
dimensional E-P-A structure, provides theoretical support for the insight of Osgood 
(1976) regarding concepts that are highly emotional or attitudinal in nature.
11.4.2 Methodological implications
The thesis makes a methodological contribution by using the measurement of 
meaning research framework to examine a concept to which it has not previously 
been applied. A conclusion to be drawn is that the framework represents a valid and 
useful research tool for the purpose of examining connotations of auditor 
independence in specific contexts and across alternate parties to the financial 
reporting communication process. The research findings suggest that the method can 
be used to provide a means by which the effects of potential auditor independence 
threats and safeguards on connotations of independence might be better understood. 
This theoretical contribution has implications for policy-makers, as discussed in the 
next sub-section.
The study also confirms that the 22 semantic differential scales developed by 
Houghton (1987a, 1988) can be used to investigate a variety of accounting and 
auditing concepts. These scales have been used in a number of other prior accounting 
and auditing concept studies (Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Bagranoff et al., 1994; 
Houghton, 1997; Hronsky and Houghton, 2001), and subsets of the scales have also 
been used (Houghton, 1987b; Houghton and Messier, 1990). The present study serves 
to confirm their relevance in examining a further auditing concept, that of auditor 
independence.
A major methodological implication stems from the study’s illustration of the manner 
in which the measurement of meaning research method can be utilised to
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prospectively evaluate the impact on connotations (perceptions) of any proposed 
changes to auditor independence rules. In developing new or revised rules, the 
method could be used by professional bodies, regulatory bodies and researchers to 
assess the reaction of various interested parties to any revisions prior to their 
finalisation. The method could also be used to assess reactions to variations of 
proposed measures.
11.4.3 Policy implications
Implications for policy-makers arise from the research. These particularly concern 
(a) assumptions about the existence of an audit expectation gap, and (b) the impact of 
specific potential independence threat and safeguard circumstances.
A major implication of the research concerns the audit expectation gap. As 
highlighted in Chapter 2, the independence concept has been identified as a central 
issue contributing to the expectation gap. With respect to auditor independence, the 
expectation gap suggests differences between auditors and financial report users in 
connotations of the independence concept in individual contexts. However, the 
research found that the auditor and user participant groups generally exhibited shared 
meaning of the audit firm’s independence across the various experimental case 
scenarios. This finding suggests that the audit expectation gap between the two 
groups, at least with respect to auditor independence, may be exaggerated.
The auditors and users were generally in agreement in their interpretation of the 
auditor’s independence across the various independence threat and safeguard 
scenarios. However, the major area in which the study found significant differences 
between auditors and users was that of the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services. Users were concerned with the audit firm provision of non-audit services
Chapter 11 328
even when these were at the lower level and even when they were specified to only 
comprise traditional taxation (tax compliance and tax planning) services. This 
supports the views of various authors (see, for example, Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; 
Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Pentland, 1993; Power, 1995) that the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services is the key issue contributing to the audit expectation gap 
in the area of auditor independence.
With the major exception of the auditor provision of non-audit services, the research 
findings suggest to policy-makers that there is generally a shared meaning of the 
auditor independence concept between auditors and financial report users. This is of 
relevance when considering the views of auditors and financial report users on auditor 
independence rules and guidelines, and particularly on those rules and guidelines 
related to independence in appearance. If significant differences are found between 
auditors and users in connotations of independence in a particular audit context, this 
suggests that the issue is a genuinely controversial one requiring specific examination 
by policy-makers, rather than being assumed to be simply a manifestation of the audit 
expectation gap.
A second major implication is that the research provides further information for 
policy-makers with respect to specific potential auditor independence threats and 
safeguards. The manipulations in the experimental cases represented contemporary 
auditor independence issues. They comprised potential independence threats 
highlighted in the literature, independence safeguards introduced to minimise 
potential independence threats, or proposals for additional independence safeguards. 
The study, therefore, has implications for policy-makers in providing further evidence 
on the impact on connotations of these specific independence threats and on the
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perceived effectiveness, or otherwise, of independence safeguards. A discussion of 
the specific implications follows.
Connotations of auditor independence were found to be adversely affected by the 
presence of a high level of auditor provided non-audit services for all participant 
groups. This was despite the fact that the non-audit services comprised only taxation 
services provided by a different division within the accounting firm. In addition, 
preparers’ and users’ connotations of auditor independence were as adversely effected 
when these taxation services fees were at a lower level of around one-eighth the 
higher level amount. While the provision of traditional taxation services to audit 
clients has generally not been considered to represent a high independence risk, the 
findings of the study reinforce the problematic nature of the auditor provision of these 
services for the accounting profession. As noted in Chapter 6, Francis (2006) states 
that taxation services are generally viewed positively as a logical add-on to the audit. 
However, the study’s findings suggest that the Australian preparer and user research 
participants did not view taxation services positively from an independence 
perspective, at least at the levels specified in the relevant experimental cases.
It is possible that the taxation services in the lower fee case, approaching a level of 
one-half the audit fee, may nevertheless have been considered to be relatively high by 
the preparers and users. These participants may have considered at least some of 
those taxation services to have comprised the type of tax advice centred on higher risk 
tax structures and potentially abusive and aggressive tax transactions that have been 
prohibited in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, or to 
comprise the type of advice, recently mentioned by the International Ethics Standards 
Board for Accountants (IESBA), that depends on a questionable accounting treatment 
or financial statement presentation. If this is the situation, the research indicates that
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the effective banning of this type of potentially abusive and aggressive tax planning 
would be viewed favourably, by preparers and users, from the viewpoint of 
independence in appearance. This supports the recent moves in the United Kingdom 
and the United States to ban these types of services, and suggests that the Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB) in Australia should also consider 
specifically referring to such potentially abusive and aggressive tax planning in 
APES 110 (APESB, 2006a).
A further implication is that the view, such as that expressed by Francis (2006), that 
normal taxation services are generally viewed positively as a logical add-on to the 
audit may require some reconsideration by policy-makers. It is possible that, due to 
the corporate collapses earlier this decade and the resulting questioning of the 
independence of auditors, various parties to the financial reporting communication 
process, but not auditors themselves, have become more sensitive to the joint 
provision of even normal types of tax compliance and tax planning services. Policy­
makers need to be aware of any such shifts in thought processes as they impact on 
perceptions of auditor independence. The study findings suggest that policy-makers, 
and especially the APESB in the Australian context, should investigate the issue of 
the joint provision of audit and taxation services to better understand the effect on 
independence perceptions of the normal type of tax compliance and tax planning 
services versus the more potentially abusive or aggressive tax services.
The potential independence threat of interlocking directorships among audit clients 
was also examined by the study. All participant groups agreed on the adverse impact 
of audit engagement scenarios involving the presence of interlocking directorships. 
However, there are currently no professional rules or legislative provisions that, other 
than in a general way, address this issue. In Australia, APES 110 requires members to
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avoid relationships that ‘bias or unduly influence’ professional judgment (APESB, 
2006a, s. 120.2). With specific reference to auditor independence, APES 110 states 
that personal relationships between a member of the assurance team and a director 
could create self-interest, familiarity or intimidation threats, and that such 
circumstances will need to be evaluated and safeguards applied to reduce the threat to 
an acceptable level (APESB, 2006a, s. 290.135). The extent of any personal 
relationships between auditors and directors would normally be expected to be greater 
if certain individuals act as directors of more than one client of the audit firm, and 
particularly where the same audit partner is involved.
Given the paucity of prior research into the effects of interlocking directorships on 
auditor independence, policy-makers should determine the extent to which these 
interlocks exist in practice and consider whether specific rules should be introduced 
to address them. In particular, policy-makers should consider whether the general 
provisions requiring auditors to be independent in fact and in appearance are 
sufficient to counteract any potential adverse perceptions of independence arising in 
the presence of interlocking directorships. If not, legislators might need to consider 
whether specific legislative requirements should be introduced to limit the extent to 
which interlocking directorships can exist among a firm’s audit clients. Also, 
professional bodies might consider whether specific requirements should be inserted 
in relevant codes or guidelines, either limiting the extent to which interlocking 
directorships can exist or specifically mentioning them as a potential threat to be 
carefully considered.
A longer period of audit firm tenure was examined as a potential independence threat 
in the study, together with audit partner rotation as an associated independence 
safeguard. In the presence of audit partner rotation policies, all three groups of
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research participants did not consider auditor independence to be adversely impacted 
by a longer nine year, rather than four year, period of audit firm tenure. In addition, 
participants did not consider auditor independence to be adversely impacted if audit 
partner rotation occurred after seven years rather than after four years. This provides 
support for the current Australian Corporations Act 2001 requirements for partner 
rotation after five years in normal circumstances and seven years as a maximum.
The findings also provide evidence that audit partner rotation is perceived to be a 
suitable safeguard against potential independence concerns stemming from longer 
periods of audit firm tenure of the length examined in the relevant experimental cases. 
In turn, this suggests that proposals for audit firm, rather than audit partner, rotation 
may be unnecessary. The implication for policy-makers is that, if audit firm rotation 
is to be contemplated, it only needs to be considered for audit firm tenure periods of 
some length greater than the nine years specified in the study’s experimental cases.
The final potential independence threat examined by the study was the presence of a 
former audit firm partner as a director of the audit client. The three research 
participant groups agreed on the adverse impact on auditor independence of this 
potential threat. This suggests that the requirements introduced relatively recently by 
various policy-makers internationally for cooling-off periods before former audit 
partners can take positions with an audit firm client are justified.
An original study finding was of an adverse impact on connotations of independence 
arising from a former partner becoming a director of an audit client despite the 
relevant experimental scenario specifying the former partner had not previously been 
involved in the audit of that company. In Australia, the HIH Royal Commission 
(2003, Vol. 1, pp. lxvii, 177) advocated a two year cooling-off period for a former
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partner who was not directly involved in the audit of the client. However, this was not 
enacted in the Australian CLERP 9 legislation of 2004 and the situation is therefore 
not subject to the two year cooling-off period specified in s. 324CI of the 
Corporations Act 2001. Accordingly, given the extent of the adverse reaction to this 
potential independence threat by all research participant groups, the study’s finding 
suggests that policy-makers should consider extending the cooling-off period 
requirements to encompass this situation.
In addition to the independence safeguard of audit partner rotation discussed earlier, 
two further safeguards investigated by the study were additional external oversight by 
a formal oversight board and the establishment of a local independence board within 
the audit firm. With respect to the first of these safeguards, additional oversight by the 
PCAOB was not considered by the research participants to protect against 
independence concerns arising from the high non-audit (taxation) services scenarios, 
these being perceived to be of high threat by all three participant groups. This 
suggests that additional external oversight does not provide a complete solution when 
a high independence threat is perceived to be present. Accordingly, while the FRC in 
Australia does now have an additional role in providing oversight of auditors and 
their independence, the finding indicates that such oversight cannot be relied on alone 
to control independence threats. This suggests that individual rules and guidelines are 
still required to address specific potential independence threats, and therefore that 
policy-makers need to consider the specific independence threats for which explicit 
rules and guidance are required.
The study found that the auditor and user participant groups agreed on the beneficial 
impact of the existence of a local independence board within the audit firm. Hence, 
the finding suggests the benefits to audit firms of establishing such local
Chapter 11 334
independence boards and of publicising any similar internal procedures they have 
established. Alternatively, Australian audit firms might consider registering with, and 
being subject to the monitoring of, the Audit Quality Review Board (AQRB) that has 
now been established, as this would fulfil a similar role.1 This would make the 
internal independence processes of the monitored firm more transparent, in a manner 
similar to that provided by a local independence board within the firm.
At a broader level, the findings suggest that policy-makers should closely examine 
the various processes that exist for the oversight and inspection of audit firms. The 
two safeguards of an oversight and inspection nature included as case manipulations 
in the study were oversight by the PCAOB and the establishment of a local 
independence board. These essentially represent two ends of the continuum of 
oversight and inspection. At one end of the spectrum, PCAOB oversight represents an 
external, legislative-based regime. A local independence board within the audit firm 
represents an internal, firm-based regime.
Between the two extremes are various other oversight and inspection mechanisms. 
Some examples in the Australian environment include those of ASIC, the FRC, the 
professional accounting bodies such as CPA Australia and the ICAA, the AQRB and 
the global accounting firms themselves. As there has been a proliferation of oversight 
and inspection regimes, it appears timely for a review to be conducted by the 
regulatory and professional policy-makers to determine the contribution of each and 
to consider whether rationalisation is warranted. Rationalisation could avoid 
duplication of effort by the different bodies involved and result in more effective and 
efficient oversight and inspection. It could also result in lower costs for audit firms, in
i At the time of writing, only the four Big Four audit firms were registered with the AQRB 
(AQRB, 2007).
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a time of significant staffing pressures, in complying with oversight and inspection 
requirements.
The various implications for policy-makers discussed above also have implications 
for auditors themselves. Knowledge of the impacts on connotations of the various 
potential independence threats and safeguards examined provides further information, 
based on rigorous research, allowing auditors to more effectively consider and 
evaluate their independence in practice.
11.4.4 Future research implications
Several areas for future research are suggested. First, a previously noted limitation 
was that, due to the difficulty of gaining access to research participants for the type of 
experimental research undertaken, the research instrument was not administered in a 
controlled, laboratory setting. Future research could therefore aim to replicate the 
study in a more controlled setting. This would particularly address statistical 
conclusion validity threats arising from unreliability of treatment implementation and 
extraneous variance in the experimental setting and from internal validity threats 
arising from history.
Second, to address external validity threats, and particularly those arising from 
interaction of the causal relationship with units (participants) and setting, the research 
could be replicated with other groups of research participants in other settings. 
Different groups of auditors, financial report users and financial report preparers to 
those in this study could act as participants to determine whether similar results are
found.
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Also, other categories of research participants could be used. In particular, further 
research could seek the participation of policy-makers. This extension would be 
useful given the implications for policy-makers outlined previously. Given that the 
various policy-makers internationally are responsible for setting the auditor 
independence rules and guidelines in their particular jurisdictions, it would be useful 
to know whether they consider the concept of auditor independence in the same 
manner as other parties to the financial reporting communication process. In that they 
are responsible for setting and enforcing the independence rules, it would be 
especially useful for policy-makers to know whether their interpretation of 
independence differs from those of the auditors who are regulated and the users who 
rely on the output of the audit process. If so, they can implicitly take this into account 
in determining reasonable and appropriate independence rules and guidelines. Using 
Australia as an example, the major policy-makers who could be used as research 
participants would be members of the AUASB, the FRC, ASIC and the professional 
accounting bodies.
Third, to address external validity threats arising from interaction of the causal 
relationship over treatment variations, the research could be repeated with 
experimental cases comprising further auditor independence threats and safeguards. 
These cases could comprise either variations of the threats and safeguards examined 
in the study or completely different threats and safeguards.
The experimental cases in the study included potential independence threats 
highlighted in the literature that can currently arise. Accordingly, research examining 
variations in these potential threats will provide further input into their effects. With 
respect to the potential threat of the joint provision of audit and taxation services,
further research could examine the effects of taxation services at lower fee levels than
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those in the present study to attempt to determine the point at which they might not 
impact adversely on connotations of auditor independence. Research could also 
investigate the difference in connotations of independence arising from the 
accounting firm provision of the usual types of tax compliance and tax planning 
services in comparison to those of a potentially more abusive or aggressive nature.
Further research into the potential threat of interlocking directorships among audit 
clients could examine the effects on connotations of independence of variations in 
case scenarios of the nature and extent of interlocks, such as variations in the number 
of directors and the number of companies involved in the interlocks. Also, any 
interaction between interlocking directorships and other potential threats, such as the 
length of audit firm or audit partner tenure, could be examined.
Further research into the potential threat of lengthier periods of audit firm tenure 
could examine tenure periods of greater than the nine year period examined in the 
present study to determine the extent to which partner rotation provides benefits in 
the presence of longer tenure periods. Research could also examine the question of 
the length of firm tenure at which audit partner rotation may no longer be considered 
to be a suitable safeguard and where audit firm rotation might be considered to 
provide a more acceptable independence safeguard.
Further research into the potential threat created by a former audit partner being a 
director of an auditee company could examine alternate specifications of the length of 
the period that the partner had previously been with the audit firm and of the period 
elapsing between the partner leaving the audit firm and joining the audit client.
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In addition to potential audit threats, the experimental cases also comprised 
independence safeguards introduced to minimise potential independence threats or 
proposals for additional independence safeguards. The study’s research approach 
could be used to further examine such issues as the impacts on connotations of 
independence of (a) additional external oversight by a formal oversight board on 
potential independence threats other than that of the joint provision of audit and non­
audit (taxation) services examined in the study, and (b) alternate specifications of the 
format or composition of local independence boards within audit firms.
Further research of this nature would provide insight into the effect of various audit 
contexts on connotations of auditor independence. While only single major potential 
independence threats and single major safeguards were manipulated in each of the 
experimental cases in the present study, auditors in practice are likely to face a 
number of potential threats concurrently and have a number of safeguards in place to 
confront those threats. Accordingly, future research could manipulate a number of 
threat and safeguard conditions concurrently to determine the impacts on 
connotations of independence. As noted earlier, this could provide benefits to 
professional bodies, standard-setters and regulators in terms of an improved 
understanding of the perceived effects of potential independence threats and 
safeguards.
Finally, the study used the twenty-two semantic scales previously employed in prior 
accounting and auditing studies. While most were found to be effective in examining 
the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept, future research could 
attempt to develop further semantic scales that could be suitable for the purpose of 
examining the independence concept.
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11.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
The results of the research reported in the thesis were discussed and summarised in 
this chapter. Limitations of the research were identified and commented on. Aside 
from the usual limitations that apply to this type of research, none of the possible 
limitations identified appeared to impair the validity of results or the study’s 
contribution. The chapter also discussed theoretical and policy implications stemming 
from the study’s findings. The chapter concluded with suggestions for future research 
that could confirm the study findings and extend and expand the research method 
utilised in the thesis.
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AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A PhD Research Project
Graeme Wines
(Telephone: 03 55633271) 
(Fax: 03 55633320) 
(Email: winesg@deakin.edu.au)
TO THE PARTICIPANTS
This research study is concerned with interpretations of the meaning of auditor 
independence in response to certain fact situations. In particular, we are 
interested in the meaning you attribute to the concept of auditor independence.
This questionnaire contains three separate parts. Each part consists of a brief 
case study of a particular audit engagement. After reading the case material, 
your perception of auditor independence, and interpretation of the meaning of 
auditor independence, in that particular fact situation will be solicited.
The usefulness of the results of this research study is dependent on the integrity 
of your responses. You should be aware that there are not necessarily any 
correct answers. Rather, we are interested in your individual responses.
As this study is concerned with individual judgments, it is important that you 
work independently. Once you have made a judgment, please do not revise it 
but proceed to the next case.
We thank you for your participation and gratefully acknowledge your time and 
effort.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
In this questionnaire, we are interested in your interpretation of the meaning of the 
concept of auditor independence.
You are asked to consider auditor independence in relation to certain variables 
(adjectival pairings or scales, e.g. GOOD -BAD). The following instructions should 
assist you in completing the questionnaire with a minimum of difficulty.
(1) Please indicate your response to each scale by placing a tick [ ✓  ] in the space that 
best categorises your response.
For example, if you feel that auditor independence in the described situation 
tends to be something that is extremely strong, tick as indicated below:
STRONG ____:____:____:____:____:____: WEAK
If, on the other hand, you feel that auditor independence in the described situation 
tends to be something that is fairly weak, tick as indicated below:
STRONG :____:____:____:____:____:_ ✓  _:____: WEAK
Thus, for each of the scales, you should place your tick in any ONE of the seven 
spaces that best represents your view.
(2) If the concept of auditor independence has some meaning to you in the described 
situation but you think the individual scale may not be relevant to describing your 
response, then tick the mid-point of the scale.
For example, if you do not feel the scale is relevant, or if you feel that auditor 
independence in the described situation tends to be at a mid-point between the 
two extreme ends of the scale, then tick as indicated below:
BENEFICIAL :____: : :_ ✓  _: : : : ADVERSE
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PARTI
Hypothetical Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded 
profitably throughout this period and is currently in a sound financial position. The 
size of Hypothetical Ltd places it at around number 200 in a ranking, by market 
capitalisation, of all companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Hypothetical Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Five’ accounting 
firms, for the previous four years. The same audit partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial 
reports of the company released during this four year period have received 
unqualified audit opinions. Hypothetical’s prior auditor also did not issue any 
qualified audit opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Hypothetical Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear 
separation of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of 
Hypothetical acts as a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm, 
and none of the directors were previously employees, associates or partners of the 
audit firm. The audit firm does not audit any of the company’s direct competitors.
Hypothetical Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s 
non-executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated 
effectively since its inception and has not experienced any problems in 
communications between itself and the audit firm. Various audit issues raised with 
the committee in the past have been successfully addressed and concluded to the 
satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Hypothetical Ltd audit engagement, amounting to 
$162 500, represents approximately five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the 
office (located in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. 
The audit firm has not derived any additional remuneration from the provision of 
non-audit services to the company over the four year period.
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To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this 
situation would be seen by third parties to be free of any interest or 
circumstance incompatible with objectivity and independence:
Strongly Disagree :____ :____ :____ :___ _____ :____ :____ : Strongly Agree
In my view, the independence of the audit firm in this situation tends to be:
EXACT : : : : : : : : ESTIMATED
BAD : : : : : : : : GOOD
MEASURABLE : : : : : : : : UNMEASURABLE
NECESSARY : : : : : : : : UNNECESSARY
PLANNED : : : : : : : : UNPLANNED
OBJECTIVE : : : : : : : : SUBJECTIVE
TANGIBLE : : : : : : : : INTANGIBLE
STRONG : : : : : : : : WEAK
INDIRECT : : : : : : : : DIRECT
VARIABLE : : CONSTANT
SAFE : : : : : : : : RISKY
COMPLETE : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETE
DISCRETIONARY : : : : : : : : REQUIRED
REAL : : : : : : : : IMAGINARY
BENEFICIAL : : : : : : : : ADVERSE
TEMPORARY : : : : : : : : PERMANENT
CONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : : UNCONTROLLABLE
UNEXPECTED : : : : : : : : EXPECTED
PASSIVE : : : : : : : : ACTIVE
STATIC : : : : : : : : DYNAMIC
LONG-TERM : : : : : : : : SHORT-TERM
INFLEXIBLE : : : : : : : : FLEXIBLE
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PART II
Company Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded 
profitably throughout this period and is currently in a sound financial position. The 
size of Company Ltd places it at around number 200 in a ranking, by market 
capitalisation, of all companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Company Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Five’ accounting 
firms, for the previous four years. The same audit partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial 
reports of the company released during this four year period have received 
unqualified audit opinions. Company’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified 
audit opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Company Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear 
separation of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors 
acts as a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of 
the directors were previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm. The 
auditor does not audit any of the company’s direct competitors
Company Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s 
non-executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated 
effectively since its inception and has not experienced any problems in 
communications between itself and the audit firm. Various audit issues raised with 
the committee in the past have been successfully addressed and concluded to the 
satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Company Ltd audit engagement in the current year, 
amounting to $162 500, represents approximately five percent of the total audit fee 
revenue of the office (located in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s 
audit firm. In addition to audit services, the audit firm has provided additional non­
audit services to Company over the prior six years. While these services have 
generally been of a recurring nature, the scope and extent of the services has 
increased over the period of the audit firm’s tenure. The services rendered mainly 
comprise tax compliance work, tax planning, information technology systems advice, 
feasibility studies and mergers and acquisitions advice. The table below indicates 
annual non-audit services remuneration as a percentage of the audit fee in each year 
of the audit firm’s tenure:
F inancia l
Year
Audit fee Non-audit 
services fees
Non-audit services fees as 
a percentage of the audit 
fee
2002 $ 162 500 $648000 398.8%
2001 $157500 $614 000 389.8%
2000 $153 000 $541 000 353.6%
1999 $150 500 $493 000 327.6%
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To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this 
situation would be seen by third parties to be free of any interest or 
circumstance incompatible with objectivity and independence:
Strongly Disagree :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ : Strongly Agree
In my view, the independence of the audit firm in this situation tends to be:
EXACT : : : : : : : : ESTIMATED
BAD : : : : : : : : GOOD
MEASURABLE : : : : : : : : UNMEASURABLE
NECESSARY : : : : : : : : UNNECESSARY
PLANNED : : : : : : : : UNPLANNED
OBJECTIVE : : : : : : : : SUBJECTIVE
TANGIBLE : : : : : : : : INTANGIBLE
STRONG : : : : : : : : WEAK
INDIRECT : : : : : : : : DIRECT
VARIABLE : : CONSTANT
SAFE : : : : : : : : RISKY
COMPLETE : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETE
DISCRETIONARY : : : : : : : : REQUIRED
REAL : : : : : : : : IMAGINARY
BENEFICIAL : : : : : : : : ADVERSE
TEMPORARY : : : : : : : : PERMANENT
CONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : : UNCONTROLLABLE
UNEXPECTED : : : : : : : : EXPECTED
PASSIVE : : : : : : : : ACTIVE
STATIC : : : : : : : : DYNAMIC
LONG-TERM : : : : : : : : SHORT-TERM
INFLEXIBLE : : : : : : : : FLEXIBLE
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PART III
Retail Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably 
throughout this period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of 
Retail Ltd places it at around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all 
companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Retail Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Five’ accounting firms, 
for the previous four years. The same audit partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial 
reports of the company released during this four year period have received 
unqualified audit opinions. Retail’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit 
opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Retail Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation 
of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Retail acts 
as a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm. The audit firm 
does not audit any of the company’s direct competitors.
Retail Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively 
since its inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between 
itself and the audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past 
have been successfully addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit 
partner.
With the exception of one of the directors, none of Retail Ltd’s directors, including 
the chairman and managing director, were previously employees, associates or 
partners of the audit firm. One non-executive director, Director A, was previously an 
audit partner with the audit firm, although they had not previously been involved in 
the Retail audit in any way. Director A, who had joined the audit firm as an audit 
supervisor nineteen years ago and been a partner for eleven years, resigned from the 
firm eighteen months ago and became a director of Retail twelve months ago. The 
current Retail audit engagement partner, who had been with the audit firm for the 
entire period in which Director A had been an employee and partner, became a 
partner of the firm three years after Director A gained partnership. Prior to becoming 
a partner, Retail’s current auditor had worked as an audit supervisor and manager on 
several audits for which Director A had previously been the manager or engagement 
partner. Director A is a member of Retail’s audit committee.
The audit fee derived from the Retail Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $162 500, 
represents approximately five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office 
(located in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit 
firm has not derived any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit 
services to the company over the four year period.
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To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this 
situation would be seen by third parties to be free of any interest or 
circumstance incompatible with objectivity and independence:
Strongly Disagree :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ : Strongly Agree
In my view, the independence of the audit firm in this situation tends to be:
EXACT :____ :____ _________ :____ :____ :____ : ESTIMATED
BAD : : : : : : : :  GOOD
MEASURABLE : : : : : : : :  UNMEASURABLE
NECESSARY : : : : : : : :  UNNECESSARY
PLANNED : : : : : : : :  UNPLANNED
OBJECTIVE : : : : : : : :  SUBJECTIVE
TANGIBLE : : : : : : : :  INTANGIBLE
STRONG : : : : : : : :  WEAK
INDIRECT : : : : : : : :  DIRECT
VARIABLE : CONSTANT
SAFE : : : : : : : :  RISKY
COMPLETE : : : : : : : :  INCOMPLETE
DISCRETIONARY : : : : : : : :  REQUIRED
REAL : : : : : : : :  IMAGINARY
BENEFICIAL : : : : : : : :  ADVERSE
TEMPORARY : : : : : : : :  PERMANENT
CONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : :  UNCONTROLLABLE
UNEXPECTED : : : : : : : :  EXPECTED
PASSIVE : : : : : : : :  ACTIVE
STATIC : : : : : : : :  DYNAMIC
LONG-TERM : : : : : : : :  SHORT-TERM
INFLEXIBLE : : : : : : : :  FLEXIBLE
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AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A PhD Research Project
Graeme Wines
(Telephone: 03 55633271) 
(Fax: 03 55633320) 
(Email: winesg@deakin.edu.au)
TO THE PARTICIPANTS
This research study is concerned with interpretations of the meaning of auditor 
independence in response to certain fact situations. In particular, we are 
interested in the meaning you attribute to the concept of auditor independence.
This questionnaire contains two parts. The first part consists of three brief case 
studies of particular audit engagements. After reading the case material, your 
perception of auditor independence and interpretation of the meaning of 
auditor independence in each of the particular fact situations will be solicited. 
Part two asks you for a small number of biographical details.
The usefulness of the results of this research study is dependent on the integrity 
of your responses. You should be aware that there are not necessarily any 
correct answers. Rather, we are interested in your individual responses.
As this study is concerned with individual judgments, it is important that you 
work independently. Once you have made a judgment, please do not revise it 
but proceed to the next case.
We thank you for your participation and gratefully acknowledge the donation 
of your time and effort.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
In this questionnaire, we are interested in your interpretation of the meaning of the 
concept of auditor independence.
You are asked to consider auditor independence in relation to certain variables 
(adjectival pairings or scales, e.g. BAD-GOOD). The following instructions should 
assist you in completing the questionnaire with a minimum of difficulty.
(1) Please indicate your response to each scale by placing a tick [ ✓  ] in the space that 
best categorises your response.
For example, if you feel that auditor independence in the described situation 
tends to be something that is extremely strong, tick as indicated below:
STRONG ____:____:____:____:____:____: WEAK
If, on the other hand, you feel that auditor independence in the described situation 
tends to be something that is fairly weak, tick as indicated below:
STRONG :____:____:____;____:_____________: WEAK
If you feel that auditor independence in the described situation tends to be at a 
mid-point between the two extreme ends of the scale, then tick the mid-point as 
follows:
STRONG :____:____:_____________ :___ :____: WEAK
Thus, for each of the scales, you should place your tick in any ONE of the seven 
spaces that best represents your view.
(2) If you think the individual scale may not be relevant in describing your 
interpretation of auditor independence in the specific situation, then tick the mid­
point of the scale as indicated below:
OBJECTIVE :____:____:____:_ ✓  :____:____:____: SUBJECTIVE
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PARTI
Case Studies
In this part of the questionnaire, you are provided with three brief case studies 
of particular audit engagements.
After reading each of the cases, you are asked to respond by describing your 
understanding of auditor independence in that particular fact situation in 
relation to the scales provided, as described in the General Instructions.
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Case 1
Hypothetical Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Hypothetical Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Hypothetical Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, 
for the previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of 
the company released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions 
indicating that the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. Hypothetical’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit 
opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Hypothetical Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation 
of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Hypothetical acts 
as a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors 
were previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Hypothetical Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Hypothetical Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the four year period.
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C ase 2
Operations Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Operations Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Operations Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for 
the previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of 
the company released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions 
indicating that the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. Operations Ltd’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit 
opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Operations Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of 
the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors were previously 
employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Three of the directors of Operations Ltd, who have all been non-executive directors for at 
least the past six years, are also non-executive directors of other companies that are currently 
audited by Operations Ltd’s audit firm. In all cases, Operations’ audit engagement partner is 
also the audit engagement partner for these other companies (DEF Ltd and GEH Ltd) and has 
been for over six years. The table below indicates, for each of the directors, the names of the 
other companies for which they are also a director and the total period of their directorship of 
those companies.
O perations
Ltd
D irector
N am e o f other  
com panies for w hich  
they act as d irector
T otal
num ber o f  
years as 
director
Director A DEF Ltd 6
Director B DEF Ltd and GEH Ltd 7
Director C GEH Ltd 5
Operations Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Operations Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the four year period.
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C ase 3
Corporation Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Corporation Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Corporation Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, 
for the previous nine years. All published financial reports of the company released during 
this nine year period have received unqualified audit opinions indicating that the accounts 
have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian accounting standards. 
Corporation’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit opinions during their period 
of tenure.
The audit firm has a policy of audit partner rotation (both engagement and review partner) 
every four years. In accordance with this policy, the engagement was most recently rotated 
two years ago to a new audit engagement partner from the firm. Prior to the date of the 
rotation, the current audit engagement partner had not undertaken any audit or other work for 
Corporation Ltd. The engagement will be rotated to a new audit engagement partner in two 
years time.
The board of directors of Corporation Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation 
of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Corporation acts as 
a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors 
were previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Corporation Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Corporation Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the nine year period.
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C ase 4
Anonymous Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Anonymous Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Anonymous Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, 
for the previous nine years. All published financial reports of the company released during 
this nine year period have received unqualified audit opinions indicating that the accounts 
have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian accounting standards. The 
company’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit opinions during their period of 
tenure.
The audit firm has a policy of audit partner rotation (both engagement and review partner) 
every seven years. In accordance with this policy, the engagement was most recently rotated 
two years ago to a new audit engagement partner from the firm. Prior to the date of the 
rotation, the current audit engagement partner had not undertaken any audit or other work for 
Anonymous Ltd. The engagement will be rotated to a new audit engagement partner in five 
years time.
The board of directors of .Anonymous Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation 
of the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Anonymous acts as 
a director of any other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors 
were previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Anonymous Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Anonymous Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the nine year period.
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C ase 5
Holdings Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Holdings Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Holdings Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for 
the previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of 
the company released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions 
indicating that the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. Holdings Ltd’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit 
opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Holdings Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of 
the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors acts as a director of any 
other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors were previously 
employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Holdings Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Holdings Ltd audit engagement in the current year, amounting 
to $192 500, represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office 
(located in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. In addition to 
audit services, the ‘Big Four’ firm’s taxation division has provided additional tax services to 
Holdings over the prior four years. While these services have generally been of a recurring 
nature, the scope and extent of the sendees has increased somewhat over the period of the 
audit firm’s tenure. The services rendered comprise tax compliance services and tax planning 
advice, with fees from each of these categories being approximately equal. The table below 
indicates annual non-audit services remuneration, including as a percentage of the audit fee, 
in each year of the audit firm’s tenure:
Financial
Y ear
A udit fee T axation  
services fees
T axation  services fees 
as a percentage o f  
the audit fee
2002 $ 192 500 $ 767 500 399 %
2001 $ 186 500 $ 727 000 390 %
2000 $ 181 000 $ 640 000 354 %
1999 $ 178 500 $ 584 800 328 %
As Holdings Ltd has raised debt and equity in the United States, the audit of Holdings Ltd’s 
financial report, and the Australian auditor and audit firm, are subject to oversight by the US 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Pursuant to United States 
legislation, the taxation services provided by the auditor are allowable only if they have been 
pre-approved by Holdings Ltd’s audit committee. The audit committee has considered and 
pre-approved the procurement of the additional tax services from the audit firm.
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Case 6
Company Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Company Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Company Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for 
the previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of 
the company released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions 
indicating that the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. Company’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit opinions 
during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Company Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of 
the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors acts as a director of any 
other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors were previously 
employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Company Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Company Ltd audit engagement in the current year, amounting 
to $192 500, represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office 
(located in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. In addition to 
audit services, the ‘Big Four’ Finn’s taxation division has provided additional tax services to 
Company over the prior four years. While these services have generally been of a recurring 
nature, the scope and extent of the services has increased somewhat over the period of the 
audit firm’s tenure. The services rendered comprise tax compliance services and tax planning 
advice, with fees from each of these categories being approximately equal. Company Ltd’s 
audit committee has considered and pre-approved the procurement of the additional tax 
services from the audit firm. The table below indicates annual non-audit services 
remuneration, including as a percentage of the audit fee, in each year of the audit firm’s 
tenure:
Financial
Year
Audit fee Non-audit 
services fees
Taxation services fees 
as a percentage of 
the audit fee
2002 $ 192 500 $ 767 500 399 %
2001 $ 186 500 $ 727 000 390 %
2000 $ 181 000 $ 640 000 354 %
1999 $ 178 500 $ 584 800 328 %
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Case 7
Entity Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Entity Ltd places it at around 
number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange.
Entity Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for the 
previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit engagement, 
and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of the company 
released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions indicating that 
the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian accounting standards. 
Entity’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit opinions during their period of 
tenure.
The board of directors of Entity Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of the 
chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors acts as a director of any 
other company audited by its current audit firm, and none of the directors were previously 
employees, associates or partners of the audit firm.
Entity Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non-executive 
directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its inception 
and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the audit firm. 
Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully addressed 
and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
The audit fee derived from the Entity Ltd audit engagement in the current year, amounting to 
$192 500, represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located 
in an Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. In addition to audit 
services, the ‘Big Four’ firm’s taxation division has provided additional tax services to Entity 
over the prior four years. These services have generally been of a recurring nature, and their 
scope and extent has not changed greatly over the period of the audit firm’s tenure. The 
services rendered comprise tax compliance services and tax planning advice, with fees from 
each of these categories being approximately equal. Entity Ltd’s audit committee has 
considered and pre-approved the procurement of the additional tax services from the audit 
firm. The table below indicates annual non-audit services remuneration, including as a 
percentage of the audit fee, in each year of the audit firm’s tenure.
Financial
Year
Audit fee Non-audit 
services fees
Taxation services fees 
as a percentage of 
the audit fee
2002 $ 192 500 $ 94 300 49%
2001 $ 186 500 $ 90 600 49%
2000 $ 181 000 $ 85 800 47%
1999 $ 178 500 $ 83 500 47%
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C ase 8
Enterprise Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Enterprise Ltd places it at 
around number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.
Enterprise Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for 
the previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit 
engagement, and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of 
the company released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions 
indicating that the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. Enterprise’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit 
opinions during their period of tenure.
The board of directors of Enterprise Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of 
the chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Enterprise acts as a 
director of any other company audited by its current audit firm.
Enterprise Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non­
executive directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its 
inception and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the 
audit firm. Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully 
addressed and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
With the exception of one of the directors, Director A, none of Enterprise Ltd’s directors 
were previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm. Director A, a non­
executive director, was previously an audit partner with the audit firm, although they had not 
previously been involved in the Enterprise audit in any way or in any capacity. Director A, 
who had joined the audit firm as an audit supervisor eighteen years ago and been a partner for 
ten years, resigned from the firm twelve months ago. They became a director of Enterprise 
Ltd eight months ago. The current Enterprise Ltd audit engagement partner, who had been 
with the audit firm for the entire period in which Director A had been an employee and 
partner, became a partner of the firm three years after Director A gained partnership. Prior to 
becoming a partner, Enterprise’s current auditor had worked as an audit supervisor and 
manager on several audits for which Director A had previously been the manager or 
engagement partner. Director A is a member of Enterprise Ltd’s audit committee.
The audit fee derived from the Enterprise Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the four year period.
To emphasise and make visible quality controls for independence, the audit firm established a 
separate ‘Independence Board’ eighteen months ago. This board comprises a panel of four 
expert persons not otherwise commercially associated with the “Big Four’ firm, the current 
members being a commercial lawyer, a retired former partner of another ‘Big Four’ 
accounting firm, a university auditing professor and a former chairperson of the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board. The Independence Board has the specific authority to define, 
review and decide upon all threats and potential threats to auditor independence, and to 
remove decision making in respect of such independence matters from those within the firm 
who have a commercial or vested interest in the outcome.
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C ase 9
Retail Ltd, a public company operating in retailing, has been listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for the past twenty years. The company has traded profitably throughout this 
period and is currently in a sound financial position. The size of Retail Ltd places it at around 
number 200 in a ranking, by market capitalisation, of all companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange.
Retail Ltd has retained its current audit firm, one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, for the 
previous four years. The same audit engagement partner has managed the audit engagement, 
and signed the audit report, over this period. All published financial reports of the company 
released during this four year period have received unqualified audit opinions indicating that 
the accounts have been true and fair and in accordance with Australian accounting standards. 
Retail’s prior auditor also did not issue any qualified audit opinions during their period of 
tenure.
The board of directors of Retail Ltd comprises eight members, with a clear separation of the 
chairman and managing director functions. None of the directors of Retail acts as a director 
of any other company audited by its current audit firm.
Retail Ltd established an audit committee, comprising three of the company’s non-executive 
directors, eight years ago. The audit committee has operated effectively since its inception 
and has not experienced any problems in communications between itself and the audit firm. 
Various audit issues raised with the committee in the past have been successfully addressed 
and concluded to the satisfaction of the audit partner.
With the exception of one of the directors, Director A, none of Retail Ltd’s directors were 
previously employees, associates or partners of the audit firm. Director A, a non-executive 
director, was previously an audit partner with the audit firm, although they had not previously 
been involved in the Retail audit in any way or in any capacity. Director A, who had joined 
the audit firm as an audit supervisor eighteen years ago and been a partner for ten years, 
resigned from the firm twelve months ago. They became a director of Retail Ltd eight months 
ago. The current Retail Ltd audit engagement partner, who had been with the audit firm for 
the entire period in which Director A had been an employee and partner, became a partner of 
the firm three years after Director A gained partnership. Prior to becoming a partner, Retail’s 
current auditor had worked as an audit supervisor and manager on several audits for which 
Director A had previously been the manager or engagement partner. Director A is a member 
of Retail Ltd’s audit committee.
The audit fee derived from the Retail Ltd audit engagement, amounting to $192 500, 
represents less than five percent of the total audit fee revenue of the office (located in an 
Australian State capital city) of the audit partner’s audit firm. The audit firm has not derived 
any additional remuneration from the provision of non-audit (consulting) services to the 
company over the four year period.
Appendix 2 364
Appendix 2.3
Response sheets
Appendix 2 365
Response sheet: Research instrument Version 1
To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this case 
would have maintained its independence:
Strongly Disagree ___ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ : Strongly Agree
I interpret the independence of the audit firm in this case situation to be:
EXACT : : : : : : : : ESTIMATED
BAD : : : : : : : : GOOD
MEASURABLE : : : : : : : : UNMEASURABLE
NECESSARY : : : : : : : : UNNECESSARY
PLANNED : : : : : : : : UNPLANNED
OBJECTIVE : : : : : : : : SUBJECTIVE
TANGIBLE : : : : : : : : INTANGIBLE
STRONG : : : : : : : : WEAK
INDIRECT : : : : : : : : DIRECT
VARIABLE : : : : : : : : CONSTANT
SAFE : : : : : : : : RISKY
COMPLETE : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETE
DISCRETIONARY : : : : : : : : REQUIRED
REAL : : : : : : : : IMAGINARY
BENEFICIAL : : : : : : : : ADVERSE
TEMPORARY : : : : : : : : PERMANENT
CONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : : UNCONTROLLABLE
UNEXPECTED : : : : : : : : EXPECTED
PASSIVE : : : : : : : : ACTIVE
STATIC : : : : : : : : DYNAMIC
LONG-TERM : : : : : : : : SHORT-TERM
INFLEXIBLE : : : : : : : : FLEXIBLE
If you were a non-executive director of the company in this case, would you 
regard the audit appointment to be satisfactory with respect to the independence 
of the audit firm?
Yes No
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Response sheet: Research instrument Version 2
To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this case 
would have maintained its independence:
Strongly Agree ___ :____:____:____:____:____:____: Strongly Disagree
I interpret the independence of the audit firm in this case situation to be:
INCOMPLETE : : : : : : : : COMPLETE
REQUIRED : : : : : : : : DISCRETIONARY
IMAGINARY : : : : : : : : REAL
ADVERSE : : : : : : : : BENEFICIAL
PERMANENT : : : : : : : : TEMPORARY
UNCONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : : CONTROLLABLE
EXPECTED : : : : : : : : UNEXPECTED
ACTIVE : : : : : : : : PASSIVE
DYNAMIC : : : : : : : : STATIC
SHORT-TERM : : : : : : : : LONG-TERM
FLEXIBLE : : : : : : : : INFLEXIBLE
EXACT : : : : : : : : ESTIMATED
BAD : : : : : : : : GOOD
MEASURABLE : : : : : : : : UNMEASURABLE
NECESSARY : : : : : : : : UNNECESSARY
PLANNED : : : : : : : : UNPLANNED
OBJECTIVE : : : : : : : : SUBJECTIVE
TANGIBLE : : : : : : : : INTANGIBLE
STRONG : : : : : : : : WEAK
INDIRECT : : : : : : : : DIRECT
VARIABLE : : : : : : : : CONSTANT
SAFE : : : : : : : : RISKY
If you were a non-executive director of the company in this case, would you 
regard the audit appointment to be satisfactory with respect to the independence 
of the audit firm?
Yes No
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Response sheet: Research instrument Version 3
To what extent do you agree with the statement that the audit firm in this case 
would have maintained its independence:
Strongly Disagree :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ : Strongly Agree
I interpret the independence of the audit firm in this case situation to be:
COMPLETE : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETE
DISCRETIONARY : : : : : : : : REQUIRED
REAL : : : : : : : : IMAGINARY
BENEFICIAL : : : : : : : : ADVERSE
TEMPORARY : : : : : : : : PERMANENT
CONTROLLABLE : : : : : : : : UNCONTROLLABLE
UNEXPECTED : : : : : : : : EXPECTED
PASSIVE : : : : : : : : ACTIVE
STATIC : : : : : : : : DYNAMIC
LONG-TERM : : : : : : : : SHORT-TERM
INFLEXIBLE : : : : : : : : FLEXIBLE
ESTIMATED : : : : : : : : EXACT
GOOD : : : : : : : : BAD
UNMEASURABLE : : : : : : : : MEASURABLE
UNNECESSARY : : : : : : : : NECESSARY
UNPLANNED : : : : : : : : PLANNED
SUBJECTIVE : : : : : : : : OBJECTIVE
INTANGIBLE : : : : : : : : TANGIBLE
WEAK : : : : : : : : STRONG
DIRECT : : : : : : : : INDIRECT
CONSTANT : : : : : : : : VARIABLE
RISKY : : : : : : : : SAFE
If you were a non-executive director of the company in this case, would you 
regard the audit appointment to be satisfactory with respect to the independence 
of the audit firm?
Yes No
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Manipulation checks: Research instrument Version 1
In respect of the case you have just completed, could you please respond to the 
following statements by ticking the appropriate box.
It was stated in the case that the current audit engagement partner was appointed 
pursuant to an audit partner rotation policy.
Yes No
It was stated in the case that at least one director on the board of the company also 
acts as a director of another company having the same audit firm and audit 
engagement partner.
Yes No □
The audit firm derived additional remuneration from the company by providing 
taxation services.
Yes No □
It was stated in the case that the audit of the company, and the Australian auditor and 
audit firm, were subject to oversight by the US Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB).
Yes No □
Appendix 2 370
Manipulation checks: Research instrument Version 2
In respect of the case you have just completed, could you please respond to the 
following statements by ticking the appropriate box.
The company’s current audit engagement partner has been in this position for over 
eight years.
Yes No
It was stated in the case that a director on the board of the company was formerly an 
audit partner of the audit firm.
Yes No □
The audit firm derived additional remuneration from the company by providing 
taxation services.
Yes Q  No
It was stated in the case that the audit firm had established a separate ‘Independence 
Board’ to review threats and potential threats to auditor independence.
Yes No □
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Manipulation checks: Research instrument Version 3
In respect of the case you have just completed, could you please respond to the 
following statements by ticking the appropriate box.
The company in the case you have just completed operated in the retail industry. 
Yes No
The audit firm derived additional remuneration from the company by providing non­
audit (tax) services.
Yes No
It was stated in the case that a director on the board of the company was formerly an 
audit partner of fne audit firm.
Yes No □
The auditor’s opinion on the financial report of the company was qualified.
Yes □  No □
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Biographical details: All participants
PART II
Biographical Details
The following information will assist us in analysing your responses. You are 
reminded that all responses are anonymous and that no individual can be identified.
1. Current occupation:..................................................................................................
2. Years of experience in current occupation:..............................................................
3. In my current occupation, I deal with audited financial reports (please tick the appropriate 
space):
Frequently : : : : : :  Never
4. The use of audited financial reports in my occupation is (please tick the appropriate 
space):
Very important :____ :____ :____ ; ; ; Unimportant
5. Are you a member of a professional accounting association?
Yes No □
6. What is your gender?
Female } | Male | j
7. What is your age? (please tick the appropriate box):
Less than 25................. ......
Between 26 and 30....... ......
Between 31 and 35....... ......
Between 36 and 40....... ......
Between 41 and 45....... ......
Between 46 and 50....... ......
Between 51 and 55....... ......
Between 56 and 60....... ......
Over 60........................ ......
8. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (please tick the appropriate box):
Secondary....................................... ......
TAFE certificate/diploma............... ......
Bachelor degree.............................. ......
Honours/postgraduate degree......... ......
Masters degree...............................  ......
PhD................................................  ......
Other:.............................................  ......
Please specify...........................
THANK YOU FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND 
EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE.
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Biographical details: Additional questions for Australian Investors’ 
Association participants
9 .
10. 
1 1 .
Years as a member of the Australian Investors’ Association:
Years involved in investing:
Do you own shares in any listed public company? 
Yes No
12. Please indicate the degree to which you are familiar with company financial reports 
(please tick the appropriate space):
Not familiar : : : : : :  Very familiar
13. In your investment activities, to what extent do you refer to audited financial 
reports (please tick the appropriate space):
Never ;____ :____ :____ ;____ : : Frequently
THANK YOU FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF YOUR VALUABLE TIM E AND 
EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE.
APPENDIX 3
FACTOR COMPARABILITY ANALYSIS:
ALTERNATIVE FOUR FACTOR MODELS
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Appendix 3.1
Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.929 0.927
0.974
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.704 0.671
0.630
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
-0.031 0.619
0.441
Panel D: Between-group correlations for Factor 4
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
-0.032 0.072
0.746
Panel E: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Auditors 0.870 0.815 0.615 -0.167
Preparers 0.961 0.749 0.862 0.588
Users 0.958 0.744 0.629 0.526
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Appendix 3.2
P r i n c i p a l  a x is  f a c t o r i n g  w it h  d i r e c t  o b l i m i n  r o t a t i o n
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.859 0.958
0.928
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.767 -0.289
0.890
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
-0.352 0.646
0.389
Panel D: Between-group correlations for Factor 4
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
-0.440 -0.526
-0.009
Panel E: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
A uditors 0.928 0.909 -0.169 0.326
Preparers 0.859 0.826 0.900 -0.753
U sers 0.973 0.660 0.554 0.520
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A p p e n d ix  3.3
M a x i m u m  l i k e l ih o o d  f a c t o r i n g  w it h  d i r e c t
OBLIMIN ROTATION
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.941 0.992
0.975
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.548 0.893
0.465
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.489 0.618
0.500
Panel D: Between-group correlations for Factor 4
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.210 -0.197
-0.698
Panel E: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
A uditors 0.949 0.907 0.064 -0.287
Preparers 0.838 -0.635 0.906 0.620
U sers 0.993 -0.697 0.627 0.665
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Appendix 4.1
Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax rotation
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.945 0.934
0.972
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
Auditors
Preparers
0.688 0.884
0.676
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
Auditors 0.640 0.432
Preparers 0.656
Panel D: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Auditors 0.737 0.858 -0.292
Preparers 0.937 0.811 0.589
Users 0.946 0.766 0.417
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Appendix 4.2
Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.903 0.956
0.991
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.486 0.414
0.782
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.429 0.243
-0.615
Panel D: Within-group correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
A uditors 0.905 0.324 0.386
Preparers 0.957 0.279 0.944
U sers 0.988 0.554 0.541
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Appendix 4.3
Maximum likelihood factoring with direct
OBLIMIN ROTATION
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.973 0.981
0.996
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.766 0.456
0.616
Panel C: Between-group correlations for Factor 3
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.780 0.273
0.309
Panel D: Within-eroun correlations
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
A uditors 0.935 0.906 0.387
Preparers 0.949 0.023 0.702
U sers 0.993 0.725 0.757
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A p p e n d ix  5.1
M a x i m u m  l i k e l i h o o d  f a c t o r in g  w i t h  v a r i m a x  r o t a t i o n
Panel A: Between-2roup correlations for Factor 1 - 2  factor model
P rep are rs U se rs
A u d ito rs
P re p a re rs
0 .962 0 .9 0 6
0 .9 7 6
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2 - 2  factor model
P rep are rs U se rs
A u d ito rs
P re p a re rs
0 .757 0 .5 6 7
0 .8 7 2
Panel C: Within-group correlations -  2 factor model
S p lit-h a lf  c o rre la tio n  c o e ff ic ie n ts
F ac to r 1 F a c to r  2
A u d ito rs 0 .910 0 .793
P re p a re rs 0.941 0 .7 5 7
U se rs 0 .899 0.521
Appendix 5 385
Appendix 5.2
Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1 - 2  factor model
P rep are rs U se rs
A u d ito rs
P re p a re rs
0.931 0 .9 6 6
0 .9 9 6
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2 - 2  factor model
P rep are rs U se rs
A u d ito rs
P re p a re rs
-0 .1 1 7 -0 .1 6 3
0 .3 4 7
Panel C: Within-group correlations -  2 factor model
S p lit-h a lf  co rre la tio n  c o e ff ic ie n ts
F ac to r  1 F a c to r  2
A u d ito rs 0 .9 5 9 0 .2 8 8
P re p a re rs 0 .983 0 .4 7 6
U se rs 0 .838 0 .6 8 5
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Appendix 5.3
Maximum likelihood factoring with direct
OBLIMIN ROTATION
Panel A: Between-group correlations for Factor 1 - 2  factor model
Preparers U sers
A uditors
Preparers
0.946 0.980
0.997
Panel B: Between-group correlations for Factor 2 - 2  factor model
Preparers Users
A uditors
Preparers
0.423 0.587
0.693
Panel C: Within-group correlations -  2 factor model
Split-half correlation coefficients
Factor 1 Factor 2
A uditors 0.963 0.686
Preparers 0.968 0.364
U sers 0.978 0.303
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